Zusammenfassung der Ressource
Game Theory inInfrastructure Security
(Incomplete)
- classification
- payoffs
- zero-sum games
- at least one equilibrium
- one agent's loss, other agent's gain
- non-zero-sum games
- some don't have equilibrium
- constant-sum game
- sum of agent's payoff is same
- timing of play
- simultaneous games
- agents choose their actions
without knowing the
actions of the other players
- In Infrastructure Security
- decisions that can be
changed easily and rapidly
may be modeled as
simultaneous games
- sequential games
- in economics
- leader-follower games
- in security
- attacker-defender (AD) games
- defender-attacker (DA) games
- agents act in certain order
- the leader has a
first-mover advantage
(choices of the leader
can limit the options
of follower)
- In Infrastructure Security
- decisions about
observable capital
investments are typically
modeled as sequential
games
- how much
players know
- complete information
- payoffs of each combination
are common knowledge
- incomplete information
- not common knowledge
- Bayesian game
- perfect information
- all players know
all past moves
- imperfect information
- at least one player does
not know all past moves
- concepts
- equilibrium
- pure
- each agent has a unique and
deterministic equilibrium
- mixed
- at least one agent is assumed to
choose probabilistically among
multiple equilibrium strategies
- is any set of strategies where no player
has an incentive to change it's strategy,
if all players continue to play their
equilibrium strategies
- Game Theory
- assumes that each player wishes to
find its best strategy
- this assumption makes
possible for an analyst to
make predictions about
which strategies players
would be likely to choose
- 2. game-theoretic models
- 3. limitations of
game-theoretic models
- Rationality of the agents
- Common knowledge
- Modeling challenges
- Excessive conservatism
- 2.1 Simultaneous AD games
- 2.2 Sequential AD games
- 2.3 Sequential AD games
- 2.4 Sequential DAD games
- 2.5 Simultaneous DD games