Zusammenfassung der Ressource
Against Ethical Naturalism
- David Hume
- The Fact Value Gap
- he objected to the method of
argumentation many moral theorists
employed
- listing a set of facts such as 'stealing is the taking
of someone else's property' to justify a value claim
such as 'stealing is wrong'
- switch from factual to value language was not justified or logical
- this illogical jump would suggest that we can value anything we like, as
the two satements (factual and value-based) are never truly logically
linked
- G.E. Moore
- Open Question Argument
- Moore argues that there are three
possible conclusions
one can draw about the
nature of the word good:
- 'Good' = definable
- Moore argues here that when
attempting to define good, one
has to come up with a word
equation, good = x,
- however, unlike with the equation,
bachelor+ unmarried male which is a
closed statement, any definition of
good can always be questioned, 'but is
x really good?'
- thus it is an open question, and undefinable.
- 'Good' = meaningless
- dismisses this immediately, as if it was meaningless we
would not discuss morality at all
- 'Good' = indefinable
- we are forced to conclude that good is indefinable
- Naturalistic Fallacy
- Problems
- Moore's own alternative is not particularly convincing