Is it correct to group (thoughts, feelings, senses) all as a mental-state?
Functionalism define minds state in terms of what they do. And functionalism are considered as Physicalism philosophers who refused the idea of defining the mind as immaterial substance. But with the functionalism isn't this a contradiction since function is only an association between the subject and the object but it doesn't exist outside our minds, in other words it doesn't have an extension, like "I sit on the chair" this defines the function of the chair is allowing people to sit down -in a certain posture- but this functionality is noticed by our minds only the physical existence in this case is only the touching between my body and the chair body, while the description of this as the chair function doesn't exist. Can we say that functionalism isn't physicalism and they may agree with the Cartesian Dualism?

	Erstellt von Ahmad Abdelwahed vor etwa 11 Jahre

These are of the questions that pop-up to my mind will studying this branch of philosophy.

Questions and Argurments