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- 1What are the three main tenets/principles of Metaphysical Realism?1.) Independence: The objects of the world are mind-, language- and theory-independent
2.) Correspondence: Truth involves some sort of correspondence relation between words our thought-signs and external things
3.) Cartesianism: Even an ideal theory might be radically false (e.g. due to an evil demon who wants to deceive us) - 2How can the idea of Correspondence be spelled out?- Basic idea: Truth involves some sort of correspondence relation between words or thought-signs and external things
1.) Being True as Copying = true representations must copy reality
- Hard to do when thinking of how rich and detailed the world is
2.) Correspondence theory of truth - True representations aim at some kind of structural similarity with the world (for instance names pick out individual objects: "b" picks out the city of Berlin
3.) Truthmaker theory of truth
- If a representation is true, it has a truth maker. Truthmaker is whatever world entity makes a representation true: If "Berlin is dirty" is true, it has a truth-maker - 3What does it mean to say that "the ideal theory might be false"?- The ideal theory is defined as a theory that exhibits aspects such s that it predicts all observations perfectly that it explains without fault, that it is beautiful in every way so that it gives every indication of being true
- Even such a perfect theory might still be wrong for the things, thus or theory of the external world, might be totally false: We might actually be victims of an induced hallucination (due to a demon or the fact that our brains are actually in vats) - 4What is the relation between metaphysical realism and taking metaphysics seriously?One of the three tenets of metaphysical realism is that all objects exist independently from our minds, language and theories and that they provide the correct answers. Thus, it makes absolute sense for a metaphysical realist to ask questions such as "Is there a God" since there is a world independent from our minds where this metaphysical issues concerning the question are settled and give us the answer to the question
- 5How does the Kantian insight undermine metaphysics?- Kant argues that we can only make perceive the world as it is presented to us through our sense and our minds
- It is impossible to know how the world is independently of our minds
- But then, any works in metaphysics becomes completely senseless if we cannot really make sense of the world as it is actually is - 6In light of the Kantian insight, can philosophers still do metaphysics?Yes they can
- They just have to think of what "doing metaphysics" means in a different way.
- Option 1 would be to take our theories to simply be developments and articulation of our own conceptual apparatus. Metaphysics would then study our conceptual scheme. This idea is associated with Rudolf Carnap in analytic philosophy
-Option 2 would be to think of our theories as best attempt at describing reality and deal with that one. This ideas goes back to William Quine. - 7What is Putnam's no-miracle argument?Also called the argument from success
- Realism has a very simple explanation why the sciences are so successful: they work because their theories correspond to what the world is actually like
- the nonrealistic hast to consider the success of a science a miracle
- Since realism has a better explanation than non-realism it is superior to it and (at least more likely to be true) - 8Which ideas undermine Putnam's defense of metaphysical realism?1.) The Cartesian realization
- it is well possible that even our best theory that satisfies every criteria is nonetheless false
2.) The Model-Theoretic Argument: The same theory can be made true by many equivalent models. If this is the case, what does the theory objectively represent - 9What is Internal Realism?Internal Realism as the answer of Putnam to overcome the difficulties (Cartesian Realization and the Model-Theoretic Argument) with "normal" realism
Two Aspects:
1.) Conceptual Relativity = It is impossible to describe how the world is independently of a conceptual scheme -> we can only do so by using a certain conceptual framework
Example for Scheme: Counting Objects (three or seven objects)
2.) Mind Independence: Relative to a scheme, we can however describe objective and mind-independent facts
This eliminates the gap between language and reality that occurred with standard metaphysical realism - 10How is it possible to reconcile (= wieder zusammenführen) the conceptual relativity of reality with the mind-independence of facts?- In Internal Realism, there are still external (mind-independent) facts which can be described. They are, however, always relative to a scheme. We can, thus, not say what those facts would be independent from a conceptual framework
- 11How could Putnam's model-theoretic argument be summarized?#1: The ideal theory (of THE WORLD) can be false
#2: Suppose the ideal theory is consistent. According to the completeness theorem, it then has a model = an interpretation
#3: If theory is consistent and as therefore a model, it cannot be false
Intermediate Conclusion: The ideal theory cannot be false
#4: If the ideal theory has a model, it also has a permutation of that model
#5: This permutation has a different correspondence relation (using a proxy) between the original one between the ideal theory and THE WORLD but equally represents all the truths of the ideal theory
#6: Realist: This is not the intended correspondence
#7: The intended relation does not meet the operation and theoretical constraints
Problem: It actually does: Whenever a sentence is true or false is in the original relation, it is also true or false in the other one since it is a true interpretation
#8: The intended relation is causal (fails equally, tap about causation can be satisfied equally by different models containing different relations)
Conclusion: Metaphysical realism becomes unintelligible - 12Besides the model-theoretic argument, in what other ways does Putnam argue for the collapse of metaphysical realism?2nd collaps: Imagine that THE WORLD is a straight line
Two stories: The one says that there are points as infinitely small parts of the line and the other one denies the existence
- Both are equal descriptions
- This means, however, then that THE as it is in itself is lost, meaning that we give up any intelligible notion of how THE WORLD is
3rd collapse: Different translations of a language quailed equivalent mappings of the language on the world. Then, however, many different things make a correct theory true. We cannot, then, make sense of the idea of correspondence anymore - 13Why does the model-theoretic argument not affect internal realism?Internal Realism claims that we can only make sense of things through a conceptual framework. If the framework includes "cow talk", the statement "'Cows' are cows" is an a priori truth within this framework.
The question whether something else might rather refer to it, does then logically not arise - 14What is Devitt's response to the Model-Theoretic Argument offered by Putnam?- Starting point: Putnam criticizes that causation is insufficient to determine the intended model
-In order to challenge Putnam's Model-Theoretic argument, we need to engage in meta-theory (as Putnam himself does), which means we need to step back from our ideal theory
- So if Putnam asks us about how 'cow' does uniquely refer
We answer then in terms of causal relations
- If he then asks how "casually related" does uniquely refer we answer again in causal relations
- We can do this - theoretically infinitely - but every answer itself is actually already sufficient according to Devitt's
- When Putnam says that those answers are insufficient because "causally related" does not uniquely refer he is actually begging the question. For this is what he is actually supposed to be showing us. The realist can give him on every meta-level a sufficient answer - 15In what sense does Devitt accuse Putnam of begging the question?Putnam wants to show that "causally related" does not uniquely refer to show us the intended model. He says that on every meta-theory level, one could again ask the question of how "causally related" uniquely refers.
- Therefore the answer cannot be sufficient.
Devit argues that this is not the case. Just because one can raise further questions does not make the answer necessarily a bad one as well as the fact as the answer that "causally related" refers uniquely due to causal relation sounds quite trivial . Putnam just begs the question by assuming that "causally related" lacks determinate reference instead of actually showing us. - 16How should we define metaphysical realism, in Devitt's view?Devitt definies Realism as Physical Realism (PR).
PR = Common sense, and scientific, physical entities objectively exist indepndently of the mental
Two dimensions of PR:
1.) a claim about what exists: it is common sense, and scientific, physical entities that exisist
2.) a claim about the nature of that existentece: independent, external and objective - 17In what sense is Devitt's characterization of realism independent of truth or reference?PR does not entail the acceptance of truth
Acceptance of Truth also doe not entail PR for mere acceptance of truth entails nothing ontological at all (there are various notion of true)
Also a Correspondence notion of Truth (CNT) does not entail PR for it says ntohing about the nature of realitythat makes physical statements true or false - 18What is CNT all about?CNT = Correspondencen notion of truth
- Physical statements are true or false in virtue of (I) their strucutre,; (II) the referentail relation sbetween their parts and reality and (iii) the objective nature of that reality - 19On what grounds does Devitt think that one can be a realist and believe that the ideal theory cannot be false?Metaphysical Realism does not imply that an ideal theory necessarily has to be false but only that it is well possible that the ideal theory is false
- However, we can even believe that an ideal theory cannot be false and also be realists. An ideal theory acoomodates all possible evidence. If we define "possible evidence" in a quite liberal way we could come to the conclusion that an ideal theory can actually not be wrong - 20Why would internal realism not be a form of realism, in Devitt's view?Devitt argues that Putnam's internal realism turns more and more into antirealism the further you keep reading his work "Realism and Reason" where he explicates what his internal realism is all about.
It equates truth with warranted (berechtigt) assertability in the ideal limit of scientific investigation
No commitment to the correspondence view of truth
- no commitment to the objective existence of an external world - 21What is the difference between local and global descriptivism?Descriptivism = The reference of singular terms is fixed by whatever satisfies a definite description of the form "the x: Fx"
Local Descriptivism tells us how to get more reference if we have some already (by using old-language descriptions)
Jack The Rapper did this, that, and the other -> whoever meets this criteria is to become the referent of Jack the Ripper
Global Descriptivism = Account of Reference where we introduced references for the whole vocabulary in one block - 22How does global descriptivism succumb to the model-theoretic argument?
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- Karteikarten am SpracheRealität, erstellt von Franz Lagler am 11/02/2020.
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