Zusammenfassung der Ressource
COIN
- Hearts and Minds
- Myth: Secures
victory over
insurg. by
winning support
of populations
- Community
based/suggests
cooperation
- Why people Matter
- Clausewitzian
concern with
undermining "will of
enemy to risist by
the application of
force BUT still
thinks in terms of
"total war"
- Mall - Populations are
water and
insurgents are fish
- Population
control =
prerequisite for
undermining
enemy's capacity
to exist
- Kitson -
Poison the
Water if
necessary
- Rebellions can
be made by 2%,
who is best
positioned to win
support?
- Beckett -
Convince
locals of your
values to
"win" them
- Reality -
Cover for
coercion
- Paradoxes
- Ideology
- Assumes
ideological
battle can be
won
- Or
de-ideologises
it to a matter
of
"development
or Control
- Cooperation or Control?
- A War for the people (Thompson)?
- Control of the
masses through a
tight organization
is the master
weapon of
modern warfare
Trinquier
- Coin Strategies
- Objective: Destroy Enemy AND
Support/Sanctuary for Rebels
- Thompson, tmepler, Landsdale, Trinquier,
Gulala, Vann, Kitson, Kilcullen, Nagl, Petraeus
- Cooperative (Hearts and Minds)
- Paradox: Pursuasion
(cooperation and
co-option
- Military - good
for coercion, not
right tool for
cooperation
- Lack skills to
win communal
support, excel
in alienating
communities
- The "Uncommitted"
- Nagel - "the uncommitted"
- Assumes
communities are
uncommitted, foreign
soldiers will be more
attractive to local
communities & have
cultural knowledge to
win them over, that
demands can be met
- Ahistorical/Acontextual
- Disregard for
ideological
dimensions
- Reality:
Psychology's
emphasis on
'individuals' and
social realities of
communal
resistance
- HAM Strategy and Tactics -
still involve force
- Kilkullen -
Willingness to show
local people that
supporting the
enemy risks harm
and hardship
(hidden coercion
- Purely military victory impossible
- Templer& Thompson - Malaya
- Thompson: Ink Spot Approach:
clear, hold, build,
concentrate forces
and resources on
securing an area
then spread out
- Flaws: temporal and spacial
- Assumes timing
controlled by CIs, and
that a foreign
timetable can be
imposed
- assumes
different parts
of country are
"one size fits
all"
- HACK: Myth: Templar stress on
coercion - systematic population and
spacial control AND reform (elite
cooperation, greater
political/economic inclusion, land
reform(forced relocation), etc.
- Briggs plan (british
would leave): correlates
with decline of
insurgency, not hearts
and minds
- Nagl - Says
British Military
(Templer) open
to Tactical
Innovation/
learning/change
- Landsdale Philippines/Vietnam
- Vann - Vietnam
- Petraeus FM3-24 2006
- Force counterproductive,
money is ammunition,
stability operations (state
building, development,
co-option, long commitment
- "neutral or
passive majority" =
fundamental error
- More force =
counterproductive
(an operation that
kills 5 insurgents is
counterproductive if
collateral damage
leads to recruitment
of fifty more
- Everyone has their price?
- Smart Coin
- Armed Social Work/New Imperialism
- Military Alternatives
- Human Terrain System
- Rhone:
- Authorized 40 million
to assign teams of
anthropologists to
Iraq/Afghanistan
- Militarized social scientists
- stabilitzation/development experts
- McFate - national
security should be
infused with
anthropology - a
discipline created to
support war fighting in
the tribal zone
- Ignorance of
culture at
tactical level
endangers both
civilians and
troops
- Project Minerva (2008-)
- Criticism:
Gonzalez -
'culturally
informed
occupation"
- Lessons: focus on people
(human terrain), proximity
(don't commute), work
across boundaries (agency,
civil and military), exercise
initiative (get out ahead of
enemy), let the facts speak
for themselves, Learn and
Adapt, Live our values
- Subordination: Coercive/Control
- Paradox: Subordination
(coercion and
control)
- providing
security/destroying
insurgency- how
compatible
w/winning
support?
- Plays into hands of
revolutionary
insurgents, defeat
associated with own
organizations/politics,
not failures of military
leadership or doctrine,
disregard for ROL or HR
- concern with security and military tactics
- Kilcullen
- Does Coercion win
HAM? - framing COIN
force as "protectors"
against"intimidation
- "localization" of
control -
paramilitaries,
co-option eg.
"vietnamisation"
afghanisation
training etc.
- Force = shia militias
into security forces?
Afghanistan?
- Kitson
- Kitson - Low intensity
operations- defeat = long
term commitments,
district by district - food
rationing - British could
ration food, those who
fed insurgents could
starve, cut off insurgents
from population
(technically legal
- Gulala
- Aussaresses
- Trinquier
- Modern Warfare -
Popularized 1962 -
Vietnam - Good
intelligence = success
- quick and decisive
military victory- short
term it worked but
long term strategic
failure
- Cromwell "to win a
war of that sort you
must be ruthless" -
Montgomery to
Percival - today public
opinion precludes
such methods
- Tactics of population control
- Fixed security structures
- concentration camps
- death squads, torture
- Genocide
- Physical Barriers
- Resettlement/Ethnic Cleansing
- Routine abuse of civil liberties
- History/Myth
- "It Works"
- Developed from Military tactics
- History: narrative/Counter-narrative
- framed as not occupation
or conquest, as
benevolent co-option,
modernization,
development, progress
-'civilizing mission,
pacification, stabilization
- By empires
to maintain
control
regimes
- Fall of empires =
fail of coin?
- by colonizers
to eradicate or
control
indigenous
peoples
- military theorists
- Modern Myths
- Coin Works
- British Model
- Poitical, civil,
military
coordination
manages "end
of empire"
- French Model
- brute force
undermined by
lack of political
will
- Hearts and Minds
- Reforms come after defeat of insurgencies
- Templer Reforms
in Malaya (1950s)
after insurgency
peaked
- No interment camps for chinese
- JP Vann in
Vietnam - social
revolution to win
over people
- Not employed well
- Writing
about direct
experience
of defeat of
empires (they lost?)
- Dynamics
- Structures
Conflict
- Insurgency/Cinsurgency
dynamic interactions
- Escalation of violence
- More and
Stronger COIN
needed
- Intervening
space btw
outbreak &
resolution of
conflict
- Military COIN: Ineffective at
Best, Counterproductive At
Worst
- Objective: Destroy Enemy AND
support and
sanctuary for rebels
- Theoretical Dilemmas
- Biggest problem: lack of
strategic objective,
struggles about
nationalism and state
building usually more
clearly strategized
- Exit Plan
- State and nation building (technocratic elites, fixes)
- Propaganda
War vs.
substantive
reform
- Building Govt.
legitimacy through
provision of goods =
unsustainable, HN
can't develop its own
capacity
- Failure to
address
grievances (while
insurgency can)
- Goods and
services -
western
legitimacy, may
not be shared
- Luttwak- implies one
kind of politics in which
popular support is
important or decisive
and can be won by
providing better
government -
persistence of
dictatorship shows that
government needs no
popular support when it
has obedience
- establishment
of armed local
police to create
stability
- Can lead to dictators
and other criminal
entrepreneurs
(Beckett)
- Porch: Difficulty
translating
"lessons
learned" no one
size fits all
- "Presence"
alienates
communities"
- More troops = more opposition
- Using local troops
= exacerbates
ethnically divided
societies
- Infrastructure
- Living with "presence"
- Excesses
- Difficulty following
guidelines stated by
theorists
- Requires
Intelligence
(how to obtain)
- Drone - intelligence led, no contact at all
- Luttwak:
counter-surveillance,
interrogation, mass
detention Human
Vs. Technical
intelligence
- SPECIFY COIN:
Arabic speaking
interrogators,
cultural instruction
- Technological
Vs. Human
intelligence
- Proportionality/Discrimination
restraints?
- When COIN resorts to
same brutality as
insurgents
- Sexual Violence
- Indiscriminate Targeting of population
- Collateral Damage:
Killing 5 insurgents,
but collateral
damage leads to
recruitment of 50
more
- Cultural awareness?
- Naiivety of forces
- Longetivy of
COIN - What is
victory??
- Development (costs, selling it at home)
- political will for "long war"
- Morale
- Single Minded focus
on military response -
need for political,
economic and
informational
(propaganda
operations) Kilcullen
- Nagl: Lack of
institutional
Flexibility/Learning
- Military Capacity Dilemmas
- Capacity Problem: doctrine, recruitment, training, culture
- Military
purpose: break
states, not build
them
- Pre-Post conflict psychological disorders
- Training - what does it do?
- Lesson learning:
history of
interaction with
communities
- Can't apply
lessons from
one COIN
context to
another -Luttwak, etc.
- Military Tactics - "corporals wars"
- Low-level decision making
- "strategic corporals"
- Low intensity Wars = small units
- Concequences of Institutional military culture
- getting intelligence from hostile community?
- Search and destroy, kills - obsession with "contact"
- Difficulty of restraint in force - adrenaline rush
- "terrorizing terrorists"= terrorizing communities
- Cultural Ignorance
- Weapons/technology barrier
- Luttwak: ineffectiveness
of traditional armies
against insurgents,
insurgents commanding
silence of population
can't be overcome by
technical means
- Nagl - Organizational
culture of army - fight
conventional wars -
prevents organizational
learning (pessimistic
that this can change)
- US Military = Wrong for the Job
- Weinberger-Powell
Doctrine -
questions that
must be answered
before going to war
- is NS threatened? do
we have an
obtainable objective?
do we understand
the consequences,
do we have an exit
strategy?
- Purpose- avoid Vietnam, result Desert Storm
- McFate:
Military has
situational,
not cultural
awareness
- Information Wars
- How open is media war front?
- How cooperative is the media?
- Capacity to manage news
- Case Study: Iraq
- The Debate
- COIN Success?
- Kilcullen - shift in
strategies from
transitioning security
towards Iraqi forces to
imposing security directly
by implementing classic
COIN techniques
- Flipping of
Sunni tribes
"Sunni
Awakening"
- Provided
opportunity for
dealing with
political and
reconstruction
issues
- COIN Insignificant?
- Porch - tactical
innovations are
insignificant whereas
insurgencies occur at
strategic/political level
- Sunni
awakening-
already
happening
- Porch - Violence in Iraq
subsided as Shia
finished up ethnic
cleansing, combined
with coalition
security operations -
bullied Sunnis
- Fig Leaf - temporary
condition of security
that allowed US to
leave without
resolving fundamental
issues at the heart of
the insurgency
- Porch -
Repression
rather than
persuasion
created security - no HAM
- Conclusion
- Narratives reflect goals
- Porch - old school military guy
- Petraeus - media manipulator
- Conflicting conclusions about historical events
- Lack of clear data
- can't interview insurgents
- Definitions
- Terrain
- Fought in
urban, to
modern, to
desert to
jungles
- Insurgents (Beckett)
- Operate in difficult turrain
- Have local knowledge
- Have a degree of support among local population
- Insurgency,
Rebellion, or Civil
War - insurgency
removes legitimacy
- Coin
- Regular
armies
against
irregular
forces (Porch)
- Political contest between COIN
and insurgents for support and
confidence of HN (FM)
- Foreign vs. Domestic?
- Cooperative vs. Coercive?
- Alternatives?
- Luttwak; Must be
willing to
govern/occupy or
at least "out
terrorize the
terrorists" - US
and other govts
can't do that
- OR use ordinary
administrative functions
against insurgents
without violence -
government offices,
permits, rewards, etc -
US can do this but
requires OTHER means
other than military