Zusammenfassung der Ressource
AQ Epitomizes the "New Terrorism"/ Local vs. Global Jihad
- Questions
- AQ Eiptiomises
the "new
terrorism"
- Assumptions,
Definitions,
Clarifications
- Terrorism
- In 80s they were
supported by US -
"freedom fighters"
- How does AQ differ in its
structure, aims and methods
with previous insurgent
groups?
- AQ Origins and Dynamics
- Why did this arise in the
90s? one of the great
debates - is it something
new? Most rebel orgs tend
to be territorialized - be
concerned about state
capture, territory,
nationality
- AQ origins
- Afghanistan: the
"Blowback thesis":
- Cold war context - soviet
invasion of Afghanistan in
80s sparks US covert
action: aid mujahideen to
create 'soviet vietnam'
(brizinski)
- Role of CIA, pakistan ISI
(logistics conduit), and saudi
arabia (funding, osama)
-Triangulation
- Wstern 'information war' -
legitimacy/freedom
fighters/jihad chic- no one was
calling them terrorists in the
90s
- Embassy bombings in 93/ 98 = threat
- Roy: Pakistan further the
agenda, Zia ul-Haq used
Afghan war to make
pakistan a close ally of US
and regional vanguard of
sunni Islam
- Roy - after Cold War, no
reason for US to still focus
on Islam but Pakistan and SA
have reasons to maintain
ties with Islamic networks
(tools of legitimacy and
influence)
- 91 - Islamic networks
supported by SA and
Pakistan turn openly
anti-western - part of
change in strategic
landscape - fall of USSR
jihad success - now
turn to West
- Creation of capacity
for jihad in
Afghanistan,
international
networks,
information war and
technology, soviet
defeat = high morale,
- Training turf for
thousands,
unintended global
platform for Jihad
- Arab Afghans - some
radicalized like
Zawahiri, OBL, while
some volunteered just
for war
- Gulf War - OBL offers for
Ms to fight for SA - but SA
instead turns to US - loses
credibility, angers OBL and
others
- Turns to SA
antagonist: SUDAN,
until US/UK force
Sudan to expel him:
goes to
Yemen/Afghanistan
- Assasination of Azzam - OBL
takes over - thinks provoking
US in Afghanistan will lead to
a 'jihadist revival' against
invasion - is incorrect
- Although many go to
afghanistan to learn to
'wage jihad at home'
this is an exaggeration;
number of foreign
fighters in actual war
exaggerated (most
fighting done by
Afghanis) and few
return home =
preference for foreign
fighting
- Zawahiri goes
to Egypt, is
disappointed
by MB (see
Gerges arg)
- "single narrative - global/local
tension - how many of these
conflicts are still about the local
when there is a global AQ imposed
on them or are they still
networked?
- Old islamist causes -
algeria, egypt,
palestine, kashmir, SE
asia, et all
- lots of foreign fighters, FIS
looking to win elections in
algeria then civil war, =
massacres of muslims - main
grievance of AQ - Muslims
massacred by Christians - west
doesn't do anything about it
- New Muslim causes -
Bosnia, Chechnya,
Somalia etc. "massacres
of Muslims"
- Was Jihad a
cause or fallout
of Islamic
movements?
- Radicalization
doesn't follow
a single path
- AQ as a moral critique
(Devi, Wiktorowicz et
al): Islam is demystified
and fragmented into
multiple "landscapes",
pracices are 'ethical
rather than political'
- Goals: Ideology and demands
- What is
motivating/driving
ideology? Does it have a
coherent ideology and
well elaborated
demands? Are its
demands
negotiable?What do we
know about its
intentions?
- Exploit
modernity-
paradoxes of
radicalism
- radical vision of islamic society , literal
and Medieval interpretations of the
Qur'an, puritanical, need for
purification (holy sites),
disillusionment with the 'people"
exploit islam as a social force, leninist
idea of a revolutionary 'vanguard',
armed struggle: jihad as a historic
'city', what kind of ummah? manage
modernity for radical goals
- First period: focus on near,
Palestine, Islamic
countries- corrupt regimes,
expel polytheists
- Purify the regime in
SA (radical, protect
muslims from
massacres, attack
jews, destroy israel,
palestinian state
- Second period - shift
to the far enemy:
more global focus,
declaration of jihad
against the west in
1996 (judeo-crusader
alliance)
- Attack
'crusaders' end
US intervention in
Islamic countries,
protect Islam's oil
wealth
- Revitalise
ummah/restore
Islamic values in
Muslim countries,
caliphate later
development
- OBL
declaration
of Jihad
1996
- Third period:
Afghanistan/Iraq
- US 2011 declaration of
GWOT: polarization into
black and white groups
with no grey areas. Anti
American protests
erupt: Kuala Lumpur,
Africa etc.
- AQ has coherent,
populist aims, but are
difficult to negotiate
because they
dramatically conflict
with Western/US
interests
- Newly refashioned
ideological mutual repulsion:
COS huntington - western
policy, media absorb his
ideas and turn antagonistic
after Soviet expulsion from
Afghanistan - demonization
of Islam begins
- Cronin: AQ has no
'achievable' aims - evolved
over time, variably
including achievement of
"caliphate", overthrow of
non-Islamic regimes - we
shouldn't treat it as a
unified whole - potential
different interests of AQ
vs. past terrorist orgs
- Strategy and Tactics
- inspiation - information war:
insurgency/terrorism - tapping
in to existing conflicts -
"affiliates", emulation - brand,
lifestyle choice, homegrown
jihadis - social networks
(difficult now with surveillance),
cyberterrorism/graphic
immediacy
- "Terrorism"
- AQ glorifies
attacks on
communities =
guiding
principle(OBL 02)
- Overriding
norms of war -
no
discrimination
in use of
violence
- Suicide attacks -
not distinctive till
after 90s
- GIA fatwa in 97 -
no one is neutral
- Non discrimination
learned from secular
states USSR, Russia/US,
other Western
Militaries
- Organization and
Structure: Local Vs.
Global
- Support and recruitment
- Who joins AQ?
What is its
social/ideological
base of support? Is
it a social
movement? How
does it recruit?
- Wiktorowicz &
Kaltenthaler: focus on
explaining individual
behavior - spiritual
incentives - rewards in
the afterlife - outweigh
high costs/high risk
behavior
- Example Al Muhajiroun (UK)
disbanded in 04, reformed in
09 - time, energy, sacrifice -
appear to be engaged in
irrational choice (against
rational choice theory)
because threatened self-
interest (but spirituality?)
- But - more activist than
terrorist - few tip in to
violence - dozen of
members thought to
have become suicide
bombers
- Social movement
theory:jihad as a grievance
redress & resources and
mobilization theory
- Not sufficient
to explain
radicalization
and brutality
- Recruits
- Now: Most common
recruits: Students,
second generation
Muslims from the
West (born or settled
early) and converts
- Sageman: radicalization
is a product of individual
background, root
causes/social conditions,
in group dynamics (cult
like group pressure,
boding, rituals,
importance of 'bottom
up' emulation
- Sageman on networks:
"leaderless jihad" - hard
thing for security
agencies to deal with,
mutation of AQ -
expanding towards
growth of affiliates an
migration of threat
from outside to inside
- Hughes - an updated
version on the 'individual'
focus of psychology? little
attention to communities.
Is AQ embedded in
communities?
- JH on Sageman -
psychologist - government
policy can intensify or
interrupt process of
radicalization but aside from
standard techniques of
intelligence and security
operations- he has crudely
taken the network concept
and applied it to AQ
- CIA torture sessions
with AQ suspects
(evidence is hard to
come by) - conclusion -
AQ mostly
characterized by
'physically
unconnected networks
- Muslim experience of
western societies -
islamophobia, lack of
cultural sensitivity or
awareness, discrimination,
profiling, surveillance, the
"threat" - "enemy within
paranoia"
- Threat posed to WOT by
western democracy itself:
security state, damage to
moral core values,
repetitional damage caused
by torture, drones etc -
securocrats out of control -
failures of political
leadership
- Cronin: closer
to a social
movement
than terrorist
org.
- Tarrow: Transnational
contention: 1) Domestication 2)
Global framing GF (frame dom.
issues in broader terms than
original claims dictate) 3)
Transnational diffusion (spread
of similar forms of action/claims
across borders) 4) Externalization
(dom. actors targeting ext. actors
to defend interests) 5)
Transnational coalition formation
- TSM - Islamist groups form from
ME salafism in 70s/80s - inspired
dom. movements that have given
rise to terrorist cells that
congealed into AQ using loose
network org - nucleus around OBL
but multiplied into number of
autonomous groups in MENA and
W. Europe - characterized by
violence but ALSO ABILITY for
variety of action including gaining
adherents through mass
media/interent
- Forms of TN diffusion: direct
diffusion btwn individuals
(relational) vs. indirect
diffusion - new forms of
contention or participation
of existing forms through
non-relational means (word
of mouth or technology)
- Gerges: Jihad went global at a
time of decline for nat. jihadi
struggles; during period of
demobilization, co-optation,
incorporation and
normalization of Islamist
movements worldwide, with
Islam losing appeal as
counter-hegemonic
mobilization in world politics
- GF: CW "created an
environment favorable for dom.
mobilization & civ. society opp.
against US Bases - GF occur
primarily on domestic grounds
but have TN implications - 9/11
presented activists with GF
necessary to accelerate pace of
diffusion, scale shift, and
brokerance and consolidation of
trans. anti-base network
- Recruits choose
to join - no
connection to
AQ leadership
- Loose connectedness
pro-active policy: no
logistical trails, no links
for intelligence agencies
to examine, recruitment
will persist
- Communication: tools of
globalization - media,
internet, possible recruits
and enemy governments:
DUAL AUDIENCE -
maintaining image of AQ,
providing advice on
operations and cell structure
through "Enyclopedia of
Jihad"
- Pre 9/11 -
leadership
nucleus selects
10-20% of
recruits from
thousands who
come to
Afghanistan
- Support
- Roy: "interconnectedness" -
Salafis aim to 'delink' Islam
from cultural contexts - agents
of globalized Islam. Globalized
jihad: must be understood as a
combination of 'global and local
anxieties' among Muslims,
sometimes in tension with each
other; deterritorialization' of
Muslims through global
migrations, dilemmas of living
in secular Western societies,
assimilation
- Global jihad - an
individual duty to
which broad causes
have been reduced
to abstractions -
local struggles are
stereotypes
- Devji - Divorced
from collective
solidarity and action
based on common
history, interests or
ideas
- Post 9/11- Rely on
unconventional
methods of funding
(not state based) -
Islamic charities,
diaspora and
businesses owned
by aq leaders
- Vertical or horizontal? is it a
network? AQ plus local
affiliates? Has it mutated from
a more recognizable form, say
mass movement, to cell type to
network - each poses different
challenges. What kind of
leadership
- Afghanistan
- Creation of a
traditionalized
force, asabiya
- Growth of AQ into a structured,
organized Hierarchy of Sunni
defenders Tends to be hierarchical -
leadership, officer corp etc
- After afghanistan
becomes more fluid,
means of support
changed, means of
communication
changed
deteritorlialized, less
hierarchical - bases
destroyed, etc
- Death of Bin Laden 11
- but AQ doesn't end?
- Cronin: from
physical to
virtual
organization
- Physically
unconnected
networks, friends and
family circles, Islam
terror networks
(becoming more fluid
and unpredictable)
- Virtual Organization:
WOT changed
structure (AQ of 90s no
longer) - displacement
of training camps with
COIN tactics - diffusion;
turn to internet for
recruitment/publicity
- OBL death =
displacement
compensated by
mutation of AQ from a
visible, state based org
into "virtual" stateless
org
- No status leadership -
diffuse, cell based structure,
relies on common mission
statement, not operations;
allied with terrorist orgs with
VARIOUS MOTIVES -
ethno-nationalist to
moderate Sunni groups such
as Ilamiyah, Islamic Jihad, the
Taliban, Islamic movement of
Uzbekistan
- Devji - Franchises -
kind of business - AQ
doesn't own or
control all operatives
but links them
through training,
financing, info,
contacts
- Jihad is a global
movement due to
failure of local
struggle, inability to
control global
landscape of
operations by Poi
- Move to Saudi, Somalia,
Yemen, Sudan and then
back to Taliban and fold
in Afghanistan
- Involvement of AQ in
intl. conflicts like
Chechnya, Sudan
(taking over
nationalist
movements, painting
them Islamic
- Some go to
West to
finance/export
jihad
- Hegghammer -
jihadists prefer
foreign fighting
- Pre 9/11: Hierarchical,
International, several Western
educated recruits, no women,
dependence on SA/Pak for support,
funding and weapon mobilization,
training, military discipline,
Subcontractors, social grouping,
dependence on failed/collapsing
states
- Cronin - Physical
organization: "visible"
training camps in
Afghanistan, Traditional
hierarchical structure,
accept 10-20% of recruits
- Nucleus of AQ formed
by former Muj. fighters,
OBL, Zawahiri, Azzam,
Al-Adel, Zawahiri-
returned to Afghanistan
from Sudan after victory
of Taliban in 1996
- is it an org/structure? more like
network? what are demands?
how does it recruit? can we even
talk about "it"? - an
uncoordinated disaggregated
phenomenon linked to the
nebulous concept of jihad and
vague notions of antiwesternism?
- charting networks - tentacles:
old bogeyman?
- Capability and Threat
- What do we know about its
military and political
capability? How big a threat
is it?
- Growth of threat - How threat
perception in the 90s, intelligence
failures (9/11), weak intelligence
capability (arabic speakers),
sanctuaries (safe havens ISI),
Western policy priorities elsewhere,
Dispersion of 'Arab afghans' as
seeds, cultivation of
homegrown/wannabees, mobilizing
role of conflicts involving muslims
Lack of awareness of AQ threat
until E. Africa embassy bombings in
98
- Sangiovanni/Jones: networks
have an advantage (over
conventional state warfare) due
to adaptability, capacity for
rapid innovation/learning and
wide-scale recruitment BUT
prevailing pessimism of states
to combat illicit networks =
premature - networks have
structural disadvantages
- Disadvantages: information
limitation & communication
failure (monitoring); poor
decision making & risk taking;
restricted scope and
structural adaptability (relies
on interpersonal trust); CA
problems due to coordination;
security breaks; learning
disabilities
- AQ - most successful attack under
OBL hierarchy? = losing cohesion,
CA capacity, AQ a 'brand name'; still
dangerous but NOT attributable to
strength of network itself
- Theory and analysis
- How Does AQ fit within the study
of political violence, insurgency
and COIN, terrorism? By studying
past conflicts, other forms of
insurgency and terrorism and
state responses we can make any
plausible arguments about the
challenge posed by AQ might
develop, be managed
successfully?
- Cronin: traditional COIT
techniques may not
applicable (AQ end will be
different than past TOs
- Killing/capturing
leader effective
against hierarchical
structure - AQ will not
end, will deal blow to
C&C, rid AQ of
expertise, give moral
boost to
- Prevent "second
generation" - AQ
successful in
transferring
message to youth -
but can illuminate
differences within
AQ; give
concessions to local
groups to rid AQ of
sub members
- Cronin: US
objective must be to
enlarge the
movement's internal
consistencies and
differences, reduce
popular support
both active and
passive
- Reduce public support?
Bush democratization
thesis failed: but can
reduce ability for AQ to
use internet through
enhanced monitoring,
capitalize on AQ means
via CT multimedia
response focusing on
human rights
- Military Repression: -
"can't bomb an idea"
- some tactical
success but
evolution/fluidity
makes superficial
- Short Term COIT
Necessary but not
Sufficient
- Cronin and others: focus on
short term COIT measures -
need a macro perspective
exploring way debate is
framed and deducing
long-term strategies
- Framing:
disagreggate the
problem
- Islam as the Problem
- A Problem
within Islam =
radical
Salafism/outer
Jihad
- =Propagate Sunni
counter-narrative
- Schweitzer:
Solution must
come from within
Islam
- Rashid: Gulf states,
Pakistan
(wahhabism/deobandism)
must stop omni-balancing
using faith
- Qiyas:
Authoritative
voice, led by SA
must cultivate
traditional tenets
of Islam
(tolerance,
protection of
'people of the
book'
- Khatib: West
Must promote
this strategy
- Yes - Qutbism, jahiliyya,
"far jihad"; radical
salafism; christians and
jews "unbelievers;
Muslim takfiri;
AQ/affiliate leaders
exclusively Salafist, 30%
of members hail from 12
militant Salafist
Mosques (Sageman);
Self-sacrifice
(Schweitzer)
- No 1.2b
Muslims,
vast majority
not violent
- US FP as Problem
- US FP
counter-productive
= interventionist
policy, draconian
COIT
- = Change US FP
- Away from unilateralism/regime
change; shut down Bush symbols,
WOT; Soft power (Nye); towards
cyber-warfare (counter websites,
monitoring)
- Yes - Invasion of Iraq/
evangelicalism/reliance on
hard power/COIT/bad
framing; emphasis on
traditional COIT/COIN creates
deep grievances, sustains AQ
narrative (cycle
- No - AQ
grievance not
based on FP
- Government Policy - focus on
causes of radicalization from
WITHIN islam and or muslim
communities - rarely mention
role of government policy or
state behavior in causing
radicalization (illegal wars,
foreign occupation, support
for corrupt tyrants, etc
- Stress importance of
radicalization of the 98%
support base - too much
attention paid to radicalized
1-2%, lack of sophistication in
thinking about, let alone
managing radicalization. No
clarity about what extremism
is, what violent extremism is,
what radicalization is, what
our "core values are" what
Western (illegal) foreign
policy adventures do
- Contradictions - uk
supports overthrow of
syrian government, arms
rebels, but crimilalizeds as
"terrorists" young
britishmuslims who go out
to fight the syrian
government - shift from 80s
when jihadis were freedom
fighters
- AQ Intellectual Origins
- Reaction to
Westernization/modernization
- reaction against western control
and influence despite
decolonization (oil politics)
- Rise of Israel,
humiliating defeat of 67-
corrupt "modernizing"
and "islamic" regimes
(Saudi/Gulf states, Arab
nationalists/tyrants),
western
"presence"/military
bases and political and
economic influence(oil)
- Ikhwan vs. Arab Secular
Nationalism - Nasser
repression, Sayyid Qutb, use
of internment, torture,
execution (culture of
martyrdom) = Qutub's
anti-americanism and
anti-semitism
- Dual nature of Ikhwan -
revolutionary but
peaceful organizational
means?
- State within a state -
Grassroots, bottom up
revolution (Da'wa and
social services) moderation
- institutions -
religious, social,
economic,political
- Also militant
- Literal interpretations of
Qur'an (salafism)/jihadists
(note the role of Zawahiri
on Egyptian Islamic Jihad
in the 70s - assassination
of Sadatin 81
- Azzam, Zawahiri/Bin
Laden in Afghanistan
late 80s - AQ forms out
of that
- Qutb - modern world is corrupt,
needs to be transcended, Divisions
between islam - Shia and Sunni-
division into Salafism (Saudi origins)
- ummah must return to
fundamentals of prophet
Mohammed(religious doctrines that
emerged during first three
generations of leaders after the
prophet
- Paradox: AQ intellectual
origins - rooted in Salafi
tradition- use of oil wealth
to spread this form of
Islam through funding
(Qutb borrows idea of a
vanguard of secret
organization fro of
professional activists from
Lenninism) - mirror of
westernization
- Developmental problems:
Backwardness, democratic
youth bulge 65% of
population under 25,
elite-mass division,
urbanization
- Giles Kepel:
Structural
and
contingent
dimensions
- Structure - 1950s new forms of
authoritarianism, corruption,
inequality, urbanization -
Islamists mobilize as a social
movement to mitigate some of
the negative aspects of
modernization- the challenge is
to unify different social
interests: urban poor, youth,
pious but disgruntled middle
class - intelligentsia 'thinking
muslims
- Contingent: arab
nationalism, oil crisis,
rise of Sadat, peace
with Israel, Iranian
revolution (successful
even if on wrong side-
how to reconcile
sharia with
modernity? BUT many
"leaders" from upper
class
- AQ
Affiliates
(IR461)