Game Theory inInfrastructure Security (Incomplete)

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Bier, Vicki M., and Sinan Tas. "Game theory in infrastructure security." WIT Transactions on State-of-the-art in Science and Engineering 54 (2012).
Iano Newb
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Iano Newb
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Game Theory inInfrastructure Security (Incomplete)
  1. classification
    1. payoffs
      1. zero-sum games
        1. at least one equilibrium
          1. one agent's loss, other agent's gain
          2. non-zero-sum games
            1. some don't have equilibrium
            2. constant-sum game
              1. sum of agent's payoff is same
            3. timing of play
              1. simultaneous games
                1. agents choose their actions without knowing the actions of the other players
                  1. In Infrastructure Security
                    1. decisions that can be changed easily and rapidly may be modeled as simultaneous games
                  2. sequential games
                    1. in economics
                      1. leader-follower games
                      2. in security
                        1. attacker-defender (AD) games
                          1. defender-attacker (DA) games
                          2. agents act in certain order
                            1. the leader has a first-mover advantage (choices of the leader can limit the options of follower)
                              1. In Infrastructure Security
                                1. decisions about observable capital investments are typically modeled as sequential games
                            2. how much players know
                              1. complete information
                                1. payoffs of each combination are common knowledge
                                2. incomplete information
                                  1. not common knowledge
                                    1. Bayesian game
                                    2. perfect information
                                      1. all players know all past moves
                                      2. imperfect information
                                        1. at least one player does not know all past moves
                                    3. concepts
                                      1. equilibrium
                                        1. pure
                                          1. each agent has a unique and deterministic equilibrium
                                          2. mixed
                                            1. at least one agent is assumed to choose probabilistically among multiple equilibrium strategies
                                            2. is any set of strategies where no player has an incentive to change it's strategy, if all players continue to play their equilibrium strategies
                                            3. Game Theory
                                              1. assumes that each player wishes to find its best strategy
                                                1. this assumption makes possible for an analyst to make predictions about which strategies players would be likely to choose
                                                2. 2. game-theoretic models
                                                  1. 3. limitations of game-theoretic models
                                                    1. Rationality of the agents
                                                      1. Common knowledge
                                                        1. Modeling challenges
                                                          1. Excessive conservatism
                                                          2. 2.1 Simultaneous AD games
                                                            1. 2.2 Sequential AD games
                                                              1. 2.3 Sequential AD games
                                                                1. 2.4 Sequential DAD games
                                                                  1. 2.5 Simultaneous DD games
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