non-cognitivism

non-cognitivism

relitavism
1. morality doesn't present itself as a matter of conventions relative to social social conventions, we aply morality to everyone regardless of if they're part of our society, can relitivism change this.
  1. perscriptivism and emotivism avoid these criticisms by being based on attitudes which exist on their own, they see that tolerance can conflict with people's moral attitudes, some people will see it as a important moral value but need to use it in moderation. they both argue that we can judge abhorent practivces by our moral standards but we can't justify interfering with peoples's lives due to our feelings and choices.
    1. the non-cognitivists can argue that the reason we are interfering is because the practices are cruel etc not because they go against our feelings and choices.
    2. the cognitivists can respond that by interfering we are getting the facts about reasons closer to the moral truth.
to what extent can we value what we like
1. emotivism and perscriptivism don't offer any content, but morality is about content.
  1. they see moral judgements in terms of form rather than content, this allows for anything to become a moral judgement
    1. a judgement is a value judgement if it has a particular form, and that it creates values rather than discovers them
      1. morality is about what is good or bad for human beings in general and how to deal with the problems of life
        there needs to be distiction between moral and aestetic approval in both emotivism and perscriptivism, as both theories offer little content and are based on approval.
    2. emotivists and prescriptists can respond that we can't value anything as our values are caused by our will and our will is guided by our nature, so there are limits to what you can value. we call certain things moral and it is common human nature underlines our feelings and choices, and it is our feelings which cause morality
to what extent can moral truths justify and motivate an action.
1. the reasons given for justifying an action are not the same as reasons for motivating an action. when justifying an action you show that it's morally good, when your motivated by an action the reason can be very different, e.g. if i save my friends life utilitariansm would say it's morally good as it causes the greatest happiness, but im motivated by love for my friend.
2. motivating actions.
  1. moral judgements guide our behaviour, moral truths do not as we are not motivated by truths, for a truth to motivate us we need to care about the truth. hume argued that in order to act we need beliefs (in how the world is) and desires (to motivate us to change it)
    1. the cognitivists can respond by saying that moral judgements are only motivating to people who care about morality, all moral judgements are motivating but only when we see them as being based on relational properties.
judging abhorent practices from other cultures
1. if there is no moral truth then doesn't it stand that anything goes, as the denial of moral truth implies tolerance as nobody can correct anyone else. but if morality is a product of my feelings and choices or a product of society then it has no authority over me, i can do what i like as long as i don't get caught.
  1. emotiovists and persrciptivists argue that the theory of moral values as a reflection of our feelings or social conventions doesn't imply that we should hold no moral code or that morality is a matter of taste.
    1. relitivists argue that there are moral values independent of any individual, we can compare people within our culture to our moral standard but not those outside
2. tolerance and its limits
  1. the denial of moral truth doesn't lead to tolerance, (firstly) tolerance is itself a moral value so to be tolerant because there is no moral values is a contradiction, also who are we to tell somebody to adopt a moral value (i.e. tolerance) and the denial of moral truth doesn't mean we should or shouldn't endorse tolerance as different cultures have different views on tolerance. (Second) if my morality is different than yours then i will not oln;y disargee with your morality but also those who disagree with me and try and change my morality to otherwise.
possibility of moral progress and ability to make mistakes
1. the denial of moral truth doesn't allow for the idea of moral progress, but morals have changed over time isn't this moral progress?
  1. the non-cognitivists claim that (Firstly) there can be moral improvements when people become more rational. this can happen through (Firstly) people can come to know more facts, and (Secondly) moral views can become more consistently applied, (Thirdly) people can become more coherent with their moral judgements e.g. people come into conflict with their moral feelings, moral progress would be to agree on a moral judgement. (Second) if we disagree with past moral codes but approve of current ones then we say that moral progress has been made, so the idea of moral progress is relevant to a particular point of view.

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	Created by samelesedy almost 11 years ago