U4. Biba

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Masters Comp Sec Mind Map on U4. Biba, created by Craig Parker on 04/12/2013.
Craig Parker
Mind Map by Craig Parker, updated more than 1 year ago
Craig Parker
Created by Craig Parker over 10 years ago
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Resource summary

U4. Biba
  1. Biba is a state machine model similar to BLP for integrity policies that regulate the modification of objects
    1. Concerned with integrity
      1. Models integrity policy
      2. modifications of objects can only flow downwards
      3. Integrity levels (such as 'clean' and 'dirty' or 'high' and 'low') are assigned to subjects and objects
        1. The basic idea of Biba is that a 'dirty' subject should not be allowed to contaminate (modify) a clean object.
        2. Biba also has policies for an 'invoke' operation whereby one subject can access (invoke) another subject,
          1. Different modes
            1. Static Mode - Similar to BLP
              1. 2 Security policies
                1. Simple integrity property - No write up
                  1. Integrity *-property
                    1. If subject s can read (observe) object o, then s can have write access to some other object o’
                      1. You are not permitted to 'contaminate' a high-level object with low-level data

                        Annotations:

                        • he Marketing Director of a company reads unsubstantiated information about market share from a public document obtained from the Internet. He then writes this information into the company’s strategic marketing plan for next year. The effect is that the company’s marketing strategy is based on low-grade (and possibly incorrect) data. he Biba integrity *-property prevents this situation from occurring
                  2. Dynamic Mode
                    1. Integrity levels change
                      1. a 'clean' subject may read a 'dirty' object, but the result is that the subject is then re-classified as 'dirty'
                        1. a low-level subject is permitted to write to a high-level object, but the object is then re-classified as low-level
                        2. Policy enforces automatic adjustment of security levels
                      2. Biba is the Duel of BLP. If you combine them see note

                        Annotations:

                        • In other words, the combination of BLP and Biba, with the same security labels, means that a subject may only access objects at exactly the same security level. If this is the intention of the policy, then that’s fine, but as we have seen there are some obvious situations where this can lead to problems (remember the manager sending a memo to his staff!).
                        1. Can be extended to include an access operation 'invoke'.
                          1. Subject may invoke another subject (such as a software tool) to access an object
                            1. Subjects are only allowed to invoke tools at a lower level. Otherwise, indirect contamination may occur.
                          2. Ring property (opposite of invoke)
                            1. A 'dirty' subject s1 may only invoke a 'clean' tool s2 to touch a 'clean' object.
                            2. The crucial lesson to learn is that you must decide the policy before attempting to model
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