necessary = ref, eternal + transcendent nature of G.
means, exists OUTSIDE humans' space + time but is able
to create + act WITHIN it. Anselm: if He didn't exist in this
way, humans wouldn't exist either.
"That than which nothing greater can be
conceived." an address to G. "Anselm believes
already and this is significant" -Vardy. Proslogion
= a prayer + not a piece of philosophy
This definition is understood by believers + non-believers.
'G exists' = analytic - true merely by analysing what it means to be G.
Vardy: D.Z. Phillips + Fr. Gareth Moore: to talk of G's existence can't be considered to be talk about an object's existence. "God is not a substance" "talk of God is presupposed in the religious way of life."
Norman Malcolm sees Anselm's argument as having the force of a grammatical observation. believers, talking of G's inescapable reality to them. Phillips: believer = "God's existence is that on which my
whole life is based." A parallel, Moore's example, equator. exists, real, doesn't mean, physical line. idea, all accept. We live in a form of line in which the equator is real. G = a reality within the believer's
form of life. those outside this community do not have any use for language about G. person who has no use for praise, for worship. G-talk has no reality. "God is not a thing. God is rather an idea within
the form of life of the believing community." To the believer, G necessarily exists - like prime no.s exist for the mathematician.
'a supremely perfect being'
In this context,
must exist to
His second restatement (response, Caterus'
criticism) = 1. Whatever belongs to the essential
nature of something can't be denied of it. 2. G's
essence includes existence. 3. Existence must be
affirmed of G.
did take into account the type of attack that
Gaunilo made against Anselm's argument.
Descartes: 1. The argument applies only to an
absolutely perfect + necessary being. can't,
therefore, be applied to something like a lost
island. 2. Not everyone has to think of G, but if
they do think of G then G cannot be thought
not to exist (link, Malcolm's). 3. G alone = the
being whose essence entails G's existence.
cannot be 2 or more such beings.
Aqui rejects precisely the point that Descartes wants to
affirm. Descartes: can know G's essence + therefore we can
say that G must exist. Aqui doesn't think that G's essence is
knowable to humans.
The predicates follow from the
subject. But, all this tells us is
something about the IDEA of a
triangle + not about whether
there are any triangles.
"necessary for a unicorn to
have a horn", but this doesn't
prove there are any unicorns.
like Anselm + Plato before him, born w/ innate ideas -
universally shared. concepts: equality, cause, shape, no.
from birth, G. all the perfections = omniscience,
omnipotence, + omnibenevolence.
can't be separated from G's essence, "three angles equal to 2 right angles", triangle's essence.
doesn't mean, mountain + valley combo in our
imaginations actually exist in the real world.
Descartes: G's nature doesn't involve angles or valleys but perfections. unchanging
develops Proslogion 3
Proslogion 2, existence, predicate. Proslogion 3
doesn't treat existence as a predicate: necessary.
accepts that the first argument
fails. Malcolm beings by stating
that if G doesn't already exist, G
can't come into existence, require a
cause, limited being. G's existence
is impossible or necessary. Could
only be impossible if it were
logically absurd or contradictory,
MUST be necessary.
Hick: no way of getting rid of the 'if', if G
exists, exists necessarily
A possible world = a
complete way that things
could be. NOT 'another
world', i.e. a physical Earth
A possible world, exists a being
w/ maximal greatness. only if it
exists in every possible world.
DOESN'T MEAN G!
To be maximally great, a being only has to be present in every possible world.
hasn't accounted, in each world, there may be a being that is more powerful,
more knowing, more morally perfect, than this maximally great being. The fact
that these beings may only be found in 1 possible world is irrelevant.
To deal w/ this, concept of maximal excellence. Maximal
greatness entails maximal excellence. Maximal excellence
entails omnipotence, omniscience, + moral perfection.
1. There is a possible world in which
there is a being that is maximally
great. 2. It has maximal excellence
(entailed within maximal greatness). 3.
If omnipotent, omniscient, and morally
perfect, and maximally great, it is
existent in OUR world. IS a G.
Davies: even if we accept that a being w/
maximal excellence is POSSIBLE, +
therefore it is POSSIBLE that such a being
exists in our world, it doesn't follow that
such a being ACTUALLY exists. C =
maximal excellence is POSSIBLE, +
therefore G is POSSIBLE, not ACTUAL.
Vardy: Plantinga: all Malcolm has shown, the greatest possible
being exists in some possible world, but not necessarily in
the real world.
Vardy: To overcome this difficulty, differentiates between maximal
excellence (which entails omnipotence, omniscience + moral perfection) +
maximal greatness (which entails the property 'has maximal excellence in
every possible world'). If G has maximal greatness, G must exist in every
possible world. However, Plantinga himself, NO-MAXIMALITY = the property
in a world of having no maximally great being. If this is exemplified in 1
possible world, it could be exemplified in every possible world.
Ahluwalia: uses modal logic, concept of possible worlds.
response to, Proslogion 2
MUST exist BC of its perfection
not valid in this context. never
compares things of a like kind
Gaunilo, comparison between
Plantinga: islands have no intrinsic
maximum: can always be bettered
(add another lagoon, sandy beach)
Anselm: only G has
applies to G, only
G is 'TTWNGCBC',
only G is the GPB.
G would lack
Gaunilo: G is
being just as the
island is the
island = but this
ISN'T what Anselm
is saying. Anselm:
G is the greatest
only applies to G
Ahluwalia: can't bring something into existence just by defining it as superlative.
v Descartes, matches that definition IN REALITY, another Q
v Anselm, saying X EXISTS tells one nothing about X
(whereas X is FEMALE or TALL does). X IS doesn't give
info about X. The opp. statement, presents, paradox
If X EXISTS tells us about a property that X has, then X DOESN'T
EXIST denies that it has this property (or affirms that it lacks it).
But, how can that which doesn't exist LACK anything?
named, illegitimate jump from ideas to ontos ('reality').
Kant: necessity applies to propositions (like triangles have 3 angles) + not to anything in reality. NO necessary things.
Kant: true, 3 sides, doesn't mean that there are any triangles or any unicorns.
Kant: existence isn't a predicate or a perfection.
1. If something adds nothing to the concept
of a thing, then it is not part of the thing's
essence. 2. Existence adds nothing to
anything's concept - to say 100 thalers is real
rather than imaginary doesn't add any
characteristics to a thaler. 3. Existence isn't
part of a thing's essence; it is not a
Kant rejects 2.
Existence is a possible
much you develop the
idea, must go outside
it by getting evidence
from experience as to
whether or not it
exists. Kant: "a
merchant can better
his position by adding
a few noughts to his
cash account." -
'Critique of Pure
Anselm uses 'exist' incorrectly. can't be a predicate. If it were,
"Men exist. Santa is a man. Therefore, Santa exists." a syllogism.
Russell, not a property of things, but of the IDEAs of those
things. To say that "dragons don't exist" = of all the things that
exist, none of them are referred to by "dragon".
Therefore, IS = to provide an
intention. E.g. "A cow is
quadruped with udders",
intention = to describe a cow.
The fact that a cow exists
provides an EXTENSION to my
intension. EXISTENCE = an
EXTENSION of an INTENTION.
C = "TTWNGCBC" = simply the totality of
everything that can be conceived by the
mind. Doesn't have to be physical
existence, or even BE conceived, as long
as it is conceivable.
support Anselm's claim
that G is TTWNGCBC, but
not, belief that this proves
G's existence in reality
recognises Malcolm's attempt to distinguish between
existence + necessity. In relation to Frege's point, we can
accept existence only as a second-order predicate, but accept
necessity as a first-order predicate. Therefore, Malcolm's
argument: G is necessary; therefore G 'is'.
First-order predicates, NATURE of
something (the horses are brown).
Second-order predicates, CONCEPTS
(the horses are numerous). Frege's
objection to Anselm + Descartes: use
existence as a first-order predicate,
actually a second-order predicate.
"A pixie is a little man with
pointed ears. Therefore, there
actually exists a pixie." must exist
in order to have those pointed
ears, the reasoning unacceptable
'is': DEFINE something (e.g. a queen
is a female monarch). or, explain
that there actually IS something
(there is such a thing as a vampire)
the first use says nothing about
existence, in that it says nothing about
an existent queen. But, does explain
what 'queen' MEANS.
second use, not DEFINING
anything either. IMPLICTLY
SUPPOSING its existence.
C: Malcolm's argument favours moving on
from the premise 'A pixie is a little man w/
pointed ears' (first use) as a definition, to the
conclusion 'exist' (an example of the second
a priori: analysing the idea of G, doesn't depend on experience
"All bears have bones" = analytic.
"All bears are brown" = synthetic,
right or wrong, evidence.
Ontological, 'G exists' = analytic.
can't fail to be true.
starts, 'G exists' is 'de dicto necessary'.
De dicto necessity = how words, used.
de dicto = 'of words'
move from G's de dicto
necessity to G's de re
necessity (that G necessarily
exists in + of G's self,
substance called G that cannot not-exist)
Ahluwalia: Paul Tillich: G doesn't 'exist' in the
way that the things in the universe exist. G's
existence is different from the existence of
Ahluwalia: a. Explain Anselm's version of the ontological argument. Don't
need to go into detail about any other versions, but, could mention them in
passing. Plan, main features: purpose, definition, distinction, necessary +
contingent existence, differences between analytic + synthetic statements,
way in which he arrives at his conclusion. key terms, specialist vocab. a.
knowledge + understanding, save your criticisms. b. To what extent does
Gaunilo's criticism of Anselm's argument succeed in demonstrating that the
argument fails? Also show understanding of Anselm's response to it.
Assessment, evaluative comment. other criticisms (Kant), more successful
than Gaunilo's, deal w/ the issues explicitly raised in the Q.