Accurate measurement of the effectiveness of nazi
propaganda is weakened by the absence of public opinion
surveys and the fact that in a society that resorted so readily to
coercion and terror, reported opinion did not necessarily reflect
the true feeling s and moods of teh public, especially if those
views were opposed to the regime.
However, this is not to say that public existence did not exist. After the nazi 'seizure
of power' in 1933 the Propaganda Minister, Josef Goebbels stressed the
importance of co-ordinating propaganda with other activities. In a dictatorship,
propaganda must address itself to large masses of people and attempt to move
them them to a uniformity of opinion and action.
The nazis also
understood that
propaganda was of
little value in isolation.
To some extent this
explains why Goebbels
impressed on all of his
staff in the Ministry of
Popular Enlightenment
and propaganda, the
imperative necessity
contsantly to gauge
public moods.
It would be an
over-simplification to
think of the german
public as a tabula
rasa, upon which the
regime drew
whatever picture it
wished. In any
political system
policy must be
explained, and the
public must either be
convinced of the
efficacy of
government
decisions or at least
remain indifferent to
them.
As a general statement it would be unfair
to say that propaganda tended to be more
effective when it was reinforcing existing
values and prejudices than when it was
attempting to manufacture a new value
system, or indeed, whenit was
encountering some resistence.
CREATE A NATIONAL COMMUNITY?
David Welch says that propaganda of the
national community failed to break down
objective class and social divisions, and,
more importantly, failed to destroy the
awareness of these divisions.
Two sections of the population in particular were
singled out as 'restricting' the blandishments of the
'national community' propaganda: the working
industrial call and the Catholics.
Tim Mason: the German
working class remained
largely resistant to the nazi
regime and its ideology.
Sopade reports suggested
that workers, while
remaining cynical about
incentives, were
nevertheless impressed
that certain measures to
improve working conditions
were being implemented.
POSITIVE RESPONSE
The Youth
Hitler Youth for boys and League of German Girls
By 1935, 60 per cent of all German youth belonged to the Hitler Youth.
Surprisingly, membership was not made compulsory intil the Hitler Youth
Law 1939.
However, the belief that
the Hitler Youth
successfully mobilised
all young people is
clearly an exaggeration.
By the late 1930s the
regimental nature of the
Hitler Youth was
alienating some young
people who were
forming independent
gangs.
The two
most
documented
groups are:
The Swing
Youth and the
Elderwiess
Pirates.
The swing Youth were
certainly not anti-fascist
and indifferent to national
socialism. In general, the
nazi's viewed them as a
minor irritant.
The Elderwieess Pirates on the otherhand reresented a
more serious threat to the social conformity that the Hitler
Youth intended to instil. They had a general oppositional
view towards what they say as the increasingly
para-military obligations of the Hitler Youth. However,
though they rejected the authoritarianism and hierarchical
lifestyle of the nazis, their non-conformist behaviour
tended to be restricted to petty provocation.
For the mass of German
Youth, however, the nazi
regime offered comradeship
and a pioneering role. it was
this generation after all that
would instil the nazi
Weltanschauung in their
national comrades, and lay
the foundations for the New
order in Europe.
In the sense that propaganda promiting
Volksgemeinschaft was attempting to
disseminate the idea of social and natinal
harmony as the ideological obverse of class
conflict, it can be said to had succeeded by
default. By turning large sections of the
population into passive consumers, the nazi
technique of organisation and atomisation led to
a gradual process of de-politicisation which
effectively achieved the desired consent.