Theft:Theft is the dishonest appropriation of property belonging to another with the intention to permanently deprive the other of it. s.1 of the THEFT ACT 1968.S.2 There is no definition of what is meant by acting dishonestly in the THEFT ACT 1968. Under s.1 (2) D can be dishonest where he appropriates property without a view to gain. Under s.2 (2) an appropriation can be dishonest even if D is wiling to pay.Negative definitions:D will not be dishonest if he believes he has a right in law to deprive the other of it - s.2 (1) (a).D will not be dishonest if he believes he would have had the other's consent if he knew the circumstances - s.2 (1) (b).D will not be dishonest if he believes the person to whom the property belongs cannot be found by taking reasonable steps - s.2 (1) (c). D's belief has to be genuine, but not reasonable: SMALL. If non of the negative definitions apply, the test for dishonesty is the GHOSH test: Does the jury think that D's actions were dishonest by the standards of an ordinary honest person? Does the jury think that D would have thought his actions would be dishonest by those standards. s.3 Appropriation is any assumption of the rights of an owner. This means that D only has to assume one of the owner's rights: MORRISIf property is acquired innocently it can later be appropriated by D keeping it or dealing with it as though they were the owner. There can be an appropriation where the owner consented to D taking it: GOMEZThere can be an appropriation even where the owner has legally gifted the property: HINKSs.4s.4 (1) states that property includes money and all other property, personal and real, including things in action or other intangible property. Money means coins and banknotes. Real property is land. This can be stolen if: D removes topsoil or trees, D, as a tenant, removes fixtures, e.g. a kitchen cupboard Picking mushrooms, flowers, foliage, is theft if it is taken for sale, a reward or other commercial purpose: s.4 (3). Personal property includes all movable items, including body parts where they have been treated for teaching purposes: KELLY AND LINDSAY.Wild creatures are not personal property unless they have been tamed or are normally kept in captivity: s.4 (4)A thing in action is a right enforced against another, e.g. a right to copyright or a trademark. Intangible property refers to things which do not exist in a physical sense, e.g. a patent. s.5Property belongs to another if they have possession or control of it or having any proprietary right or interest: s.5 (1).It is possible to steal your own property if it is under the possession or control of someone else: TURNER (No.2)Someone can be in control of something even if they do not know it is there: WOODMANUnder s.5 (3) where money is handed to D for a particular purpose, the money still belongs to V: DAVIDGE v BUNNETT / HALLWhere property is received by mistake and there is a legal obligation to give it back, then it still belongs to another: ATTORNEY-GENERALS REFERENCE (NO 1 of 1983)Property does not belong to another where it has been abandoned. s.6D will have the intention to permanently deprive if he picks it up and then has a change of mind and puts the property back: VELUMYLUnder s.6 a person will have intention to permanently deprive even if D does not intent for V to lose the property permanently, but has the intention to dispose of it regardless of the other's rights. This applies where D takes V's property with the intention of selling it back to V: DPP v LAVENDERBorrowing money is not theft as D does not have the intention to permanently deprive. Under s.6 it can be where it is for a period of time making it an outright taking or disposal. - D borrows property but intends to return it in such a changed state that all its goodness, virtue or practical value has gone: LLOYD.
Robberys.8 of the THEFT ACT 1968 - He steals, and immediately before or at the time of doing so, and in order to do so, he uses force on any person or puts or seeks to put any person in fear of being there and then subjected to force. Actus reusAll elements of theft must be present. The moment the appropriation is complete there is a robbery, D does not need to escape with the property: CONCORAN v ANDERTON.Under s.8, force can be used on any person in order to steal or D can put any person in fear of force in order to steal. Where D uses force, the force can be small: DAWSON AND JAMES Force must be used or threatened in order to steal. Force must be used or threatened on any person: P v DPPThe person on whom the force is used does not have to be the person from which the theft occurs: HALE Force must be used or threatened immediately before or at the time of theft.For robbery, an appropriation can be a continuing act and it should be left to the jury to decide when it has stopped: HALEIt is not robbery if D gets V to part with the property by threatening to use force in the future (this could be blackmail).Mens reaProsecution must prove the mens rea of theft by showing D was acting dishonestly and had the intention to permanently deprive V of the property. If D has not committed theft, he cannot be convicted of robbery, even though he uses force to deprive V: ROBINSONWhere D uses force or puts any person in fear of force, D must have intended to use or threaten force on any person in order to steal. Where D only seeks to put any person in fear of force in order to steal, then the prosecution must show that it was D's intention to cause V to apprehend that force might be used in order to steal: B AND R v DPP
BurglaryThere are two ways to commit burglary under s.9 (1) of the THEFT ACT 1968. Under s.9 (1) (a) a person is guilty of burglary if he enters any building or part of a building as a trespasser with intent to: steal; or inflict GBH; or do unlawful damage to the building or anything in it. The emphasis is on D's mens rea.Under s.9 (1) (b) a person is guilty of burglary if having entered any building or part of a building as a trespasser: He steals anything in the building; or He inflicts GBH on any person in the building. The emphasis is on the actus reus. The common actus reus elements that must be proved by the prosecution are: Entry Of any building or part of a building As a trespasser Entry is a question of fact for the magistrates or jury to decide in each individual case: RYAND must enter a building or part of a building: STEVENS v GOURLEY Under s.9 (4) of the THEFT ACT 1968 vehicles and vessels can also be burgled. Large storage containers are buildings when they have no wheels: B AND S v LEATHLEY but not when the wheels are still attached, even when it hasn't moved: NORFOLK CONSTABULARY v SEEKINGS AND GOULD Ultimately, this is a question for the jury to decide in each case. D may enter part of a building. This may be a part of the building D does not have permission to enter or any separate area of a room: WALKINGTOND must be a trespasser. This means D voluntarily enters without the permission of the occupier. If D has permission to enter one part of a building, but then enters another, he will be trespassing. If D has been banned from the building, he will be a trespasser when he enters. Where D gains entry through fraud, there is no genuine permission to enter and D is trespasser. To be guilty of burglary under s.9 (1) (b) D must also commit the actus reus of theft or inflict GBH.To satisfy the mens rea, D must have the mens rea both in respect of trespassing and the ulterior offence.For both s.9 (1) (a) and s.9 (1) (b) D must know or be reckless as to whether he is trespassing: COLLINS (1973)D may have permission to enter a building but still be a trespasser if he knowingly or recklessly goes beyond that permission when he enters the building.: JONES AND SMITHFor s.9 (1) (a) the mens rea is intent to: steal; or inflict GBH; or do criminal damage to the building or anything in it The mens rea must be present at the time of entry as a trespasser. D need not actually commit one of the ulterior offences. In many cases, D's intent may be conditional in that he intends to steal if there is anything worth stealing. Such conditional intent will not prevent D from being guilty even if it turns out there was nothing worth stealing in the building: ATTORNEY - GENERAL'S REFERENCE (Nos 1 and 2 of 1979).for s.9 (1) (b) the mens rea is that of the ulterior offences. Thus, D must have the mens rea of theft or intend to do some GBH. The mens rea must be present at the time of committing the actus reus of the relevant ulterior offence.
BlackmailUnder s.21 of the THEFT ACT 1968. A person is guilty of blackmail if, with a view to gain for himself or another or with intent to cause loss to another, he makes any unwarranted demand with menaces.Actus reusThe making of unwarranted demands with menaces. The demand can be spoken word, conduct or writing. The demand need not be made explicitly to V: COLLISTER AND WARHURSTV need not hear or receive the demand. Where the demand is sent in the post, the demand is considered made at the point the letter is posted: TREACY v DPPUnder s.21 any demand made with menaces is unwarranted unless D genuinely believed: He had reasonable grounds for making the demand; and The use of menaces was a proper way of reinforcing the demand The jury need to be satisfied that D himself believes both these things: HARVEY, ULYETT AND PLUMMER The unwarranted demand must be made with menaces. Menace is an ordinary word which in most cases a jury will understand.It covers threats of violence to persons, as well as threats to damage property and to make damaging allegations against V whether truthful or not. There will be a demand with menaces if a normal person would be affected by the threat: CLEARThe law will not treat as a menace words or conduct which would not intimidate or influence anyone to respond to the demand: HARRYWhere a threat is made which would not affect a normal person but would affect a timid one; this can still be menaces if D was aware of the likely effect on the vulnerable victim: GARWOODThe fact that V does not give into the menaces does not prevent D from being guilty. Mens reaAt the time of the unwarranted demand with menaces D acted with a view to gain for himself or another; or D acted with the intent to cause loss to another. S.34 (2) (a) of the THEFT ACT 1968 makes it clear that: The intended gain or loss must be of money or other property The intended gain or loss can be temporary Gain is not limited to D making a profit: LAWRENCE AND POMROY Gain includes a gain by D keeping what he has Loss includes a loss by V not getting what they should get
Fraud by false representationUnder s.2 (1) of the FRAUD ACT 2006. Fraud by false representation is committed when D: Dishonestly makes a false representation, and Intends, by making the representation: to make a gain for himself or another, or to cause loss to another or to expose another to a risk of loss Actus reusD must make a representation which is falseUnder s.2 (3) representation can be: As to a fact - using a false identity as to law - an untrue statement about the effect of a document as to the state of mind of an individual - saying you will pay a bill tomorrow when you have no intention of doing so Under s.2 (4) a representation can be express or implied express representation could be written, spoken or on a website - over quoting for work or giving a false reference: SILVERMAN A representation may be implied through D's conduct - implying you are collecting for a charity by wearing a badge: LAMBIE / BARNARD Ordering and eating a meal in a restaurant is a representation that the meal will be paid for before D leaves: DPP v RAY paying by cheque is a representation that the bank will honour the cheque: GILMARTIN use of a cheque guarantee card represents that the bank will meet any cheque up to the limit on the card: MPC v CHARLES Under s.2 (5) the representation can be made to a person or to any system or device where there is no human involvement, e.g. D entering his PIN on a CHIP and PIN machineUnder s.2 (2) the actus reus of a false representation is that it is untrue or misleading. it is a matter of fact whether something is true or not A representation is probably misleading if it was less than wholly true and capable of interpretation to the detriment of V Mens reaD must: be dishonest; and know or believe the representation to be untrue or misleading; and have an intention to make a gain or cause a loss or to expose another to a risk of loss. The GHOSH test for dishonesty used in theft cases applies here: Was D's conduct dishonest by the ordinary standards of reasonable and honest people? Did D realise his act would be regarded as dishonest by those standards? Under s.2 (2) (b), to make a false representation D must know that the representation he is making is, or might be, untrue or misleading The focus is on what D knew If D believes he is making a true statement, he is not guilty By making the false representation, D must intent to make a gain or cause a loss or to expose another to a risk of loss. The prosecution need only prove an intended gain or loss, not both The intended gain or loss must be of money or other property The intended gain or loss can be temporary Gain includes a gain by D keeping what he has loss includes a loss by V not getting what they might expect this is a mens rea issue so no gain or loss need actually be made. It is not necessary for the fraud to succeed.
Obtaining Services DishonestlyUnder s.11 of the FRAUD ACT 2006It is an offence if: D does a dishonest act resulting in the obtaining of services for D or another; For which payment is required; and D fails to pay the full price for the services; and D knows that the services are to be paid for or might have to be paid for; and D intends to avoid payment in whole or part Actus ReusD does a dishonest act resulting in the obtaining of services for which payment is requires and fails to pay the full price. This offence requires an act; it cannot be committed by an omission. The services must actually be obtained by D. Services are not defined in the Act, but the offence under s.11 applies to services for which payment it required, e.g. illegally downloading music D only has to obtain the service dishonestly. It is not necessary to show that he deceived anyone. The offence is only committed if D does not pay anything or does not pay in full for the service. If D has made a false statement, but pays in full by credit card, he has not committed an offence under s.11 but he will have committed the offence of fraud by false representation. Mens reaIt must be proved by the prosecution that D: was dishonest under the GHOSH test; and knew that the services were to be paid for or might have been to be paid for; and intended to avoid payment in whole or in part for the services. If D thought that someone had already paid for the services then he would not be guilty of s.11 FRAUD ACT 2006.
Making off without paymentUnder s.3 of the THEFT ACT 1978Any person who, knowing that payment on the spot for any goods supplied or service done is required or expected of him, dishonestly makes off without having paid as required or expected and with intent to avoid payment of the amount due shall be guilty. Actus reusD makes off when D leaves the spot or place where payment is required. There is no need to run away or leave by stealth. D does not have to leave V's premises, just the spot where payment is required: McDAVITT If V permits D to leave the spot where payment is required for a temporary purpose, D commits the offence if he fails to return D must not have paid on the spot as required of him. it is a question of fact whether D has paid or not. Payment must be due: VINCENT / TROUGHTON v MPC Goods must be supplied or a service done. Goods are supplied where V delivers them to D. The service must be done or completed: TROUGHTON v MPC Under s.3 (3) THEFT ACT 1978 the goods supplies or service done must be lawful. If the supply of goods is unlawful (e.g. cigarettes to someone under 16), then no offence has been committed. Mens reaD must make off: dishonestly knowing that payment on the spot is required or expected of him with intent to avoid payment. The GHOSH test for dishonesty used in theft cases applies. D does not ave to be dishonest when ex orders the meal, for example. It is sufficient that he is dishonest at the point of making off. If D does not know that payment is required on the spot, he is not guilty of this offence. Where D believes payment is to be made by another, he does not commit the offence as he is neither dishonest not knows payment is requires of him. The House of Lords held that D must have no intention of paying ever: ALLEN
Basic offence of criminal damageUnder s.1 (1) of the CRIMINAL DAMAGE ACT 1971. A person who without lawful excuse destroys or damages any property belonging to another intending to destroy or damage any such property or being reckless as to whether any such property would be destroyed or damaged will be guilty. Actus reusProperty must be destroyed or damaged. the jury or magistrates decide this: ROE v KINGERLEE Damage need only be slight and temporary, but the property must be physically altered, harmed or impaired: GAYFORD v CHOULER Property can be damaged even if nothing is broken - e.g. removing an integral part of a machine. It is likely to be criminal damage if it costs money, time and/or effort to remove: ROE v KINGERLEE / HARDMAN v CHIEF CONSTABLE OF AVON AND SOMERSET CONSTABULARY It is likely to be criminal damage if it cases the property to be temporarily unfit for use: FIAK If there is no cost or effort in cleaning up and the property can continue to be used, there is usually no offence: A (A JUVENILE) v R The type and purpose of the property may be relevant: MORPHITIS v SALMON Property is defined in s. 10 (1) of the CRIMINAL DAMAGE ACT 1971.Property means property of a tangible nature, whether real or personal, including money. Real means land and buildings or other structures attached to the land. Property includes wild creatures which have been tamed or are ordinarily kept in captivity, as well as any other wild creatures of their carcasses if they are in someone's possession. The definition of property is similar to theft but differs slightly: Land is property which can be damaged, although it can not normally be stolen. Property for the purposes of criminal damage does not include mushrooms growing wild on any land or flowers, fruit or foliage of a plant growing wild on any land. Plant includes shrubs and trees. intangible rights - e.g. patents and copyrights cannot be damaged. The property must belong to another. This is defined in s.10 (2) of the CRIMINAL DAMAGE ACT 1971:Property belongs to any person: having the custody or control of it; or having in it any proprietary right or interest; or having a charge on it. Mens reaD must intend to destroy or damage property belonging to another. It is not enough that D intends to do the act which causes damage unless he intends to do the damage itself: PEMBLITON D must intent to damage property belonging to another. D will lack the mens rea if he is under the mistaken belief that the property is his: SMITH The prosecution could prove that D was reckless as to destroying or damaging property belonging to another: G AND R D must destroy or damage any property belonging to another without lawful excuse.The 1971 Act defines two lawful excused in s.5.Where D honestly believes that: the owner would have consented to the destruction or damage: s.5 (2) (a) other property was at risk and in need of immediate protection and what he did was reasonable in all the circumstances: s.5 (2) (b) It does not matter whether the belief was justified or not, provided it is honestly held: JAGGARD v DICKINSON For s.5 (2) (b) D must destroy or damage property belonging to another that he honestly believed was in need of immediate protection: HUNT In order for s.5 (2) (b) to succeed the item that D is trying to protect must be property: CRESSWELL AND CURRIE v DPP The CRIMINAL DAMAGE ACT 1971 does not provide a defence where D believes he is acting to protect a person from harm: BAKER AND WILKINS
Aggravated Criminal DamageUnder s.1 (2) of the CRIMINAL DAMAGE ACT 1971A person who without lawful excuse destroys or damages any property, whether belonging to himself or another: Intending to destroy or damage any property or being reckless as to whether any property would be destroyed or damaged; and Intending by the destruction or damage to endanger the life of another or being reckless as to whether the life of another would be thereby endangered; s.1 (2) creates aggravated offences of criminal damage and arson. Aggravated criminal damage is similar to the basic offence but there are some differences: The additional mens rea in s.1 (2) (b). Because of s.1 (2) (b) aggravated criminal damage is more serious and carries a maximum sentence of life imprisonment. The destruction or damage does not have to be to property belonging to another. The lawful excuse defence does not apply. Actus reusThe danger to life must be cause by the danger or destruction, not merely by D's act: STEERLife does not actually have to be endangered. It is enough that D intends or is reckless as to endangering life: PARKERDestruction or damage may be to D's own property or belonging to another: MERRICKMens reaUnder s.1 (2) Intention or recklessness as to destroying or damaging any property; and Intention or recklessness as to whether the life of another is endangered by the destruction or damage
ArsonUnder s.1 (3) of the CRIMINAL DAMAGE ACT where an offence under s.1 of the 1971 Act is committed by destroying or damaging property by fire. Max sentence is life imprisonment. D must have committed the basic offence of criminal damage under s.1 (1) of the 1971 Act, but the destruction or damage of property must be cause by fire. Arson can be contrary to s.1 (1) and s.1 (3) - basic offence of criminal damage. Arson can be contrary to s.1 (2) and s.1 (3) - aggravated offence of criminal damage The offence of arson can be committed by an act or omission if D was under a duty to act: MILLER The lawful excuse defence under s.5 can be used for the basic offence: DENTON. If the destruction or damage is done with intention or recklessness as to whether the life of another is endangered, the lawful excuse cannot be used.
Defence of Duress Relevant where D has committed the offence because he has been threatened with death or serious injury. If D is told to commit a specific offence 'or else' it is known as duress by threats. If D decides to commit an offence because of the surrounding circumstances, it is called duress of circumstances. It is a general defence to all crimes except murder, attempted murder and some forms of treason. The burden is on the prosecution to disprove it beyond reasonable doubt. Duress by threats According to the House of Lords in HASAN, the elements of duress by threats are: There must be a threat of death or serious injury (confirming GRAHAM) That the threat must be made to D or his immediate family or someone close to him or someone for whom D would reasonably regard himself as responsible. D must reasonably believe that he had good cause to fear death or serious injury His response must be one which might be expected of a sober person of reasonable firmness There must be no reasonable opportunity to escape the threat D cannot rely on threats to which he has voluntarily laid himself open. Was there a threat of death or serious injury?It is probable that a threat to cause serious psychiatric injury could amount to duress: BAKER v WILKINSWas the threat made to D or someone for whom D would reasonably regard himself as responsible?In WRIGHT threats against D's boyfriend sufficed. Did D reasonably believe that he had good cause to fear death or serious injury and was his response one which might be expected of a sober person of reasonable firmness. It was held in BOWEN that when deciding if D reacted 'reasonably' they could take into account the following characteristics: D's age or sex D was pregnant If D had a serious physically disability If D had a recognised mental illness (e.g. battered woman's syndrome) A low IQ would not be taken into account as it does not affect D's ability to resist the threat. Was the crime nominated by the duressor?Someone must have said 'commit this crime or else': COLEWas there a reasonable opportunity to escape the threat? The threat need not be capable of being carried out immediately, as long as it was still effective at the time D performs the crime - i.e. D must reasonably believe that the threat could be carried out immediately or almost immediately: HASAN The defence will not be available where D has a reasonable opportunity to contact the police or escape: GILL When the threat is withdrawn or becomes ineffective, D must stop committing the crime as soon as he reasonably can. Has D voluntarily laid himself open to the threats?According to HASAN, if D voluntarily associates with criminals, he will not normally be able to use the defence for any crime he commits die to threats of violence by those criminals. Can use only if he did not foresee that they might try and make him commit an offence through threats and a reasonable person would not have foreseen either. Duress of Circumstances This is where D is forced to commit a crime because he reasonably believes there is a risk of death or serious injury arising from the circumstances in which he finds himself, not because of a threat to commit a specific offence. The Court of Appeal held that duress of circumstances applied to all crimes except murder, attempted murder and some forms of treason after the defence was extended in the case of POMMELL. The same principles apply to duress of circumstances as to duress by threats: HASAN. One difference is that the defence of duress of circumstances may be used for any offence which is a reasonable response to the danger posed by the circumstances.
Self Defence/ Prevention of Crime There is a common law defence of self-defence/ defence of another. It is a complete defence and D will be acquitted if it succeeds. The right of private defence is the right to use force in defence of oneself, in defence of property or in defence of another against an unjustifiable attack. There is a statutory defence of prevention of crime under s.3 of the CRIMINAL LAW ACT 1967. It is a complete defence and D will be acquitted if it succeeds. The right of public defence is the right to use force on someone in the public interest to either prevent crime or lawfully arrest someone. Private and public defence is a general defence to any crime of which the use of force is an element. When D raises either defence, the burden is on the prosecution to disprove it beyond reasonable doubt. Destruction or damage to property may be justified if D is acting in self defence. there are two main points to be decided for both defences. These are: Was the use of force necessary? If it was, then Was the amount of force used reasonable in the circumstances? D must honestly believe that the circumstances are such that the use of force is necessary. D is not under a duty to retreat if faced with a threat from another. The possibility of retreat is merely a relevant factor to determine whether D's use of force was necessary: s.76 (6a) of the CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND IMMIGRATION ACT 2008. If the attacker was running away, it is unlikely the force will be considered necessary: HUSSAIN AND ANOTHER D does not have to wait to be attacked before he can use force to defend himself. D may make a preemptive strike or make preparations to defend himself if he apprehends an attack: ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REFERENCE (NO.2 of 1983) If D genuinely made a mistake about being threatened or needing to act to prevent a crime, he is to be judged on the facts as he believed them to be. This is so even if the mistake was unreasonable: s.76 (3) CJIA 2008. However a mistaken belief caused by D's voluntary intoxication is not sufficient for the defences of self-defence or the prevention of crime: s.76 (5) CJIA 2008: O'GRADY. It must be that a reasonable person would have used that amount of force in the circumstances as D believed them to be. The degree of force used by D will not be reasonable if it was disproportionate in the circumstances: s.76 (6) CJIA 2008. In householder cases, the degree of force used by D against a burglar will not be reasonable if it is grossly disproportionate in the circumstances: s.76 (5a) CJIA 2008. D may not be able to weigh to a nicety the exact measure of any necessary action: s.76 (7) (a) CJIA 2008. Where D only did what he honestly and instinctively thought was necessary is strong evidence that only reasonable action was taken: s.76 (7) (b) CJIA 2008. In deciding whether the degree of force used by D was reasonable in the circumstances, the court must ignore any psychiatric condition that might cause D to perceive much greater danger than the average man: MARTIN
IntoxicationThe defence covers intoxication by alcohol, drugs or other substances such as glue-sniffing. Intoxication rarely succeeds as a defence but may do if it negates D's mens rea. Intoxication is a general defence and D will be acquitted if it succeeds. When D raises the defence, the burden is on the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that D had the mens rea. Whether D can use the defence depends on: Whether the intoxication was voluntary or involuntary; and Whether the offence charged is one of specific or basic intend. The distinction between specific and basic intent crimes was made in DPP v MAJEWSKI Specific intent offences are generally those where the mens rea is intent only - e.g. theft, robbery, making off without payment, blackmail, fraud by false representation and obtaining services dishonestly. Basic intent offences are generally those where the mens rea includes recklessness. Voluntary intoxication is where D has chosen to take the intoxication substances. It can also occur where D knows that the effect of a prescribed drug will be to make them intoxicated. Involuntary intoxication is where D did not know he was taking an intoxicating substance. For example: A soft drink has been 'spiked'. The taking of a prescribed drug has the unexpected effect of making D intoxicated. A drug commonly known to calm someone down has the unexpected opposite effect. Where D is voluntarily intoxicated, D will have a defence to a specific intent crime provided he is so intoxicated that he has not formed the mens rea for the offence: SHEEHAN AND MOORE.Where D has the mens rea despite his voluntary intoxication, then he is guilty of the specific offence. the intoxication does not provide a defence: A-G FOR NORTHERN IRELAND v GALLAGERWhere the offence charged is one of basic intent then voluntary intoxication is not a defence. D is seen as reckless in getting intoxicated so has the mens rea for the basic intent offence: DPP v MAJEWSKIInvoluntary intoxication will not provide a defence if D has the mens rea at the time of the offence. This is so even though D would not have committed the offence without the intoxication lowering his resistance to committing the offence: KINGSTONWhere D did not have the necessary mens rea due to his involuntary intoxication: He will not be guilty of a specific intent offence He will not be guilty of a basic intent offence unless he has been reckless in becoming intoxicated: HARDIE