Non-reductive theories of mind

Biological Naturalism

John Searle - believes materialist reductionist theories are bound to fail because the ontologically subjective cannot be reduced to the ontologically objective

But also rejects dualism in that he believes one can account for the existence of consciousness without manifesting two distinct realms/properties. Searle argues that this distinction leads to too many problems concerning causality 

Searle argues that conscious states are real parts of the real world and can neither be eliminated nor reduced - mental processes are as much a part of our biological natural history as digestion, mitosis, meiosis etc. 

Water AnalogyAt the ordinary, macro-level of everyday experience we are aware that water is wet, odourless etc. but these properties are caused by the micro-level of water: molecules which aren't wet etc. Similarly conscious states (with qualia and intentionality) are caused by non-conscious micro-neurological states (without qualia and intentionality) Conscious states are not a distinct 'thing' to microphysical states but neither are they reducible to microphysical states. 

Objections to Searle -  He wants the best of both worlds = his view that consciousness is biological is materialist and his view that is is irreducibly subjective is dualist  Seems contradictory = ontologically non-reductive but causally reductive?  Collapses into property dualism = Searle argues that the physical universe is causally closed and ergo his mental states are epiphenomena  If consciousness is cause by brain processes then there are two distinct properties: microphysical brain processes and the effects of them (subjective, intentional mental states). This is property dualism. 

Searle's Responses: On the contradictory nature = causal reduction does not lead to an ontological reduction by redefinition, because the redefinition would take away the point of having the concept in the first place  On suggestions it is the same as property dualism = property dualism suggests consciousness is an extra, distinct, non-physical feature of the brain whilst Searle argues that consciousness is a state the brain can be in, in the same way water can be liquid or solid. 

Eliminative MaterialismThis theory suggests that we have taken for granted that mental states exist.All theories quantify over mental states as atomic theory quantifies over atoms. We can not see atoms but atomic theory gives us good reason to believe they exist.

Eliminativism about mental states There are generally accepted platitudes about the mind - that love is different from hate or that if Sally wants to buy a book and believes the bookshop is open she will go to buy the book.This is 'folk psychology'Folk psychology quantifies over beliefs, emotions, desires, pains and perceptions. According to eliminativism folk psychology is radically false

Reasons why 'folk psychology is false' It is a stagnant research program- how we talk about the mind has hardly changed for centuries. Folk psychology should be replaced by neuroscience. It fails to illuminate many features of our mental lives - sleep, vision, memory and learning are all ignored by it. It lacks evidence in other theories.

Defence of folk psychologyThe predicative success of folk psychology - predicting a persons movements through neuroscience is impossible but doing it through a study of their beliefs and desires is.

FictionalismThe doctrine that whilst mental states do not exist it is extremely useful to pretend that they do.This can be seen in the way we attribute mental states to chess playing computers even though there is nothing inside the machine that corresponds to these mental states.

Biological Naturalism

Eliminative materialism