Flashcards
Scepticism
Flashcards do conjunto (20)
- 1In the meditations, which considerations push Descartes deeper and deeper into doubt?1. Senses sometimes unreliable, so can never trust them entirely
2. No certain indications by which to distinguish wakefulness from sleep
3. The possibility of an evil genius deceiving him even about a priori truths - 2What is a sceptical possibility? What are some examples? Why are they (prima facie) possible?A sceptical possibility is a logically possible world that is doxically identical to the actual world, but in which almost everything believed is false. (Two situations are doxically identical for S iff S would have exactly the same beliefs in them.)
e.g. (1) we might be dreaming
(2) we might be a brain-in-a-vat (BIV)
Sceptical possibilities all exploit the idea that my thinking or believing that some fact holds is connected to that fact by intermediate links, and that these intermediate links could arise independently of whether the fact holds. - 3What is Nozick's theory of knowledge, as detailed in "Knowledge and Scepticism"?Knowledge as "belief that tracks the truth".
S knows that p iff:
(1) p is true
(2) S believes that p
(3) if p were not true, S would not believe that p
(4) if p were true (under slightly changed circumstances), S would believe that p - 4How do the subjunctive conditions in Nozick's theory differ from statements of entailment?E.g. the mere existence of a possible situation in which p is false and yet S believes that p does not violate (3). (3) is about the situation that actually would obtain if p were false, not about all possible situations where p is false (i.e. (3) is about "neighbourhood" possible worlds)
- 5What do the subjunctive conditions imply about the closure of knowledge under known logical implication?They imply that knowledge is not closed under known logical implication.
e.g. consider the claims "I know that I was born in London" and "I know that I was born on Earth". Obviously, being born in London entails being born on Earth. But maybe only the first claim clearly satisfied the subjunctive conditions... - 6What is Nozick trying to do in addressing the sceptic?He is trying to show how knowledge is possible, without denying that the sceptic's possibilities are genuine possibilities.
- 7How does Nozick's account of knowledge work against sceptical arguments?The sceptic does not typically describe possibilities in the not-p neighbourhood. The actual situation that would obtain if, e.g., I didn't have hands, is not the sceptical possibility, but rather one in which I would know that I don't have hands. So my claim to know that I do have hands does not fall foul of the subjunctive conditions, even given the possibility of the BIV scenario etc.
- 8In what way can it be argued that the sceptic is inconsistent?One part of the sceptic's argument uses the fact that knowledge involves truth and belief varying together (this is the bite of the BIV scenario—if you were a BIV you would still think you weren't, so you don't know that you aren't).
Another part of the sceptic's argument (the "short step" from possibility of being a BIV to not knowing that I have hands) presupposes that knowledge does not involve such variation (because it presupposes the closure of knowledge under known logical implication). - 9What is the epistemic regress problem?Most plausible accounts of knowledge require that, for a belief to constitute knowledge, it must be epistemically justified. But if it is justified by inference from another belief, then this belief too must be justified. And so we get a regress.
- 10What is foundationalism?An attempt to avoid the epistemic regress problem by locating a class of beliefs that are genuinely justified, but not inferentially dependent on any other beliefs for their justification. These "basic beliefs" can therefore terminate the regress.
- 11What is epistemic justification? How does it differ from other kinds of justification?Epistemic justification consists in reasons that make it likely that the belief is true. BonJour considers it to be a fundamentally normative concept—one has an intellectual duty to accept beliefs that are epistemically justified and not accept beliefs that are not.
Other kinds of justification include moral and pragmatic justification. - 12Give an objection to the notion of a basic belief.The feature of empirical beliefs that allows them to qualify as basic beliefs must also constitute an adequate reason for thinking the belief is true. So the person for whom a belief is basic must also believe, with justification, (a) that the belief has the feature in question, and (b) that beliefs having that feature are likely to be true. But then the belief in question is not basic after all, since it depends, for its justification, on the other beliefs (a) and (b).
- 13What is the externalist solution?Though there must be a reason why the basic belief is likely to be true, the believer need not have any cognitive grasp of that reason. Instead, all that is required is that the believer stand in the right sort of relation to the world—the epistemic justification of a basic belief need not, therefore, involve any other beliefs or cognitive states.
- 14Explain the thermometer-model of non-inferential knowledge.Just as the readings of a functioning thermometer lawfully reflect the temperature, so one's basic beliefs should lawfully reflect the states of affairs that make them true. It is in virtue of this reliability that the basic beliefs are justified.
- 15What are some arguments against externalism?1. The case of the reliable clairvoyant who doesn't know they're clairvoyant.
2. Analogy to moral philosophy—the moral worth of an act to be determined from the external perspective, independent of the agent's own conception of the situation?
3. Disrupts connection between knowledge and rational action—from the externalist standpoint it can be more rational to act on merely reasonable belief than to act on knowledge. - 16What are some externalist defences?1. Restrict non-inferential knowledge to the common-sense varieties—sense perception and introspection.
2. The majority of cases that are (common sense) instances of knowledge are ones where only the externalist justification is present.
3. It is no objection that there seem to be cases where the externalist conditions are epistemically unjustified—externalism embraces this. - 17What thesis does Peter Unger argue for?"every human being knows, at best, hardly anything to be true"
This includes lacking knowledge of simple mathematical facts, and knowledge that the sceptical thesis is true. However, it may still be reasonable to believe many things, and one of these things, says Unger, is the sceptical thesis. - 18If scepticism is right, then the terms of knowledge will hardly ever be used to make simple positive assertions that are true. Why does this not bother Unger?This is a particular instance of a general phenomena that afflicts all absolute terms in our language. It will also hardly ever be true, strictly speaking, to say that something is flat (unlike saying that something is curved or bumpy).
"Certain" is another such absolute term. - 19To what does Unger attribute the fact that many philosophers have come to think that knowing does not require being certain?Taking too seriously "casual talk".
This can be brought out by emphasis. Consider "He knows that it is raining, but he isn't certain of it," vs "He really *knows* that it is raining, but he isn't certain of it."
We get a feeling of contradiction reading the latter, which might lead us to suspect that maybe the former is in fact also inconsistent. - 20What is the advantage of externalist accounts of knowledge in responding to the sceptic?Externalism can support Moore’s arguments against scepticism. Moore would argue: If this is a hand, then there is an external world; this is a hand; therefore, there is an external world. Externalism can be a way of reconciling Moore’s claim that he knows “this is a hand” with the sceptical arguments that suggest he cannot know that he knows this.
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- Descartes' Meditations, the sceptical possibility, the subjunctive condition for knowledge (Nozick), the (non-) closure of knowledge under logical implication, the problem of epistemic regress, foundationalism, externalism, Armstrong and response from BonJour, Unger's defence of scepticism.
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