Flashcards
Fiscal policy

Flashcards do conjunto (96)
- 1What is the governments per period budget constraint?It is an identity that states next period (t+1) public debt level is equal to the previous period debt level and interest on that level and t+1government spending net of tax receipts. It ignores money printing
- 2What is the government inter temporal budget constraint?it is the key constraint governments are subject to when setting fiscal policy. It states if the government owes amount Dt (in real terms) then this debt must eventually be repaid by achieving a primary surplus in the future/
- 3Does it really have to be repaid though?Not quite, the government can verify the GIBC since paying interest on debt forever is equivalent in present terms to paying debt back immediately
- 4What is important to the government about the GIBCin the short term all that matters is the present value of the budget surpluses needed in the future so as to equate the initial value of debt
- 5How are fiscal policy decisions related?They are INTERDEPENDENT of each other - for a given path of government expenditure over time, low taxes today imply greater takes at some point in the future
- 6How do we analyse debt sustainability?What matters is the Debt-to-GDP ratio over time for the GIBC. We get this by dividing every term of the GIBC by Yt+1 and getting growth variables (remember Yt/Yt+1 = reciprocal of growth of Y)
- 7what is d equal to?real discounted debt, that is debt multiplied by r net of g tilda (growth rate of the economy and population g+n) less the primary surplus to GDP ratio. If a deficit we have a double negative so d increases
- 8How do we keep d constant? stabilise it so to speakgovernments need to run a bigger ps for a given level of debt if interest rates are greater than economic growth (g+n)
- 9Why does this matter?the greater the difference between interest rates and g the greater the primary budget needs to be. But if growth is low and government is being austere to run a ps then growth in turn may be even lower. this is a self enforcing mechanism. This is due to the crowding out effect of higher taxes reducing investment and consequently g, this can have lasting, generational effects
- 10What else do learnThe intergenerational effects of debt are severe. A large d now will constrain future governments
- 11Why else does recession matter?In european countries with high debt there is very low growth and low tax revenues, d is increasing rapidly and markets have lost confidence. they now require even higher rates of return for the perceived risk. this means there is high pressure on governments to run large surpluses and bring d under control
- 12Sum this up:It is very difficult to turn deficits into surpluses in a few years, partially in recessions where higher ps is need, so stabilising d is hard
- 13Facts about d?In UK d increased from 1.25 to 2 1918-1933 despite government running a PS, this was due to deflation and negative growth (i-pi-g)d became (i+pi+g)d
- 14Any more?US debt fell sharply to about 0.5 in the 1950s due to robust growth
- 15Are there structural issues for d?Without addressing an ageing population (lower n as well), falling tax receipts, healthcare reform and pensions reform; the government face a serious to challenge to get/maintain a sustainable d
- 16What model do we use to look at this ?the OLG model set in discrete time and for competitive markets, so a decentralised CE is found. there are many firms and 2 generations of households, all with perfect foresight. Rentals of K and L equal MPs and there are CRS so function can be written in intensive form
- 17What is the households problem?They face a consumption choice involving two periods (30-40 years long). Young households work for all of t and then make a consumption decision at the end of the period. anything they don't consume is invested and then at the end of t+1 the household receives principal + interest consumes it all and dies. there are no bequests
- 18Numerically what is this?The household maximise Ut with logarithmic consumption and a subjective discount factor. there is double subscripts. wt is labour income, r a constant interest rate, the return on investments is the same as the return on debt

- 19How do we solve this problem?The household wants to maximise its utility. We set up a lagrangian to find 2 FOCs and substitute to get the optimality condition (euler)
- 20What are the solutions?Household consumes 1/1+B of income the rest is invested, this is called a(t+1). c2 is simply a x interest (return)

- 21What about the problem for firms?Cobb-Douglas production function where alpha is share of capital and At a technology index that grows exogenously at rate g. AtLt grows at tilda (g+n)
- 22What else do we know? MPK..firms maximise profits by choosing optimal K and L. There are no adjustment costs . Firms equalise MP to rental rates, this is the demand for inputs given their prices

- 23Aggregation for firmsWe aggregate supply of K at t+1. Given there are only two OLGs Kt+1 must be equal to assets held by the old, that is
Lt x at+1
(remember we already know at+1 - 24So what is productive stock of capital?It is built form the savings of individuals born in previous periods. then in equilibrium w must be equal to demand by firms. So by subbing in MPL we can get the transition equation
- 25What is the transition equation?

- 26What do we use the transition equation for?The TE is the evolution of capital per effective worker over time. We can solve it to find the steady state level of capital. It is constant and given by:

- 27How do we study the steady state?We can graph it. Plotting a certainty line we can show that kt converges to k* over time

- 28What does the graph show about k*?If the curve shifts up (rotates still going through 0,0) then k* will be higher: it shifts due to lower g, lower n, higher beta (more emphasis on c2 and hence more saving) and if alpha increase (when kt is big)
- 29Is this better than the neoclassical growth model?This has better micro-foundations so is good for studying intergenerational distribution effects. So far we have only looked at the basic model not its extensions
- 30What is the Golden Rule?rGR=n+g. The decentralised equilibrium we have found does not normally give this. rGR
- 31What is the alternative outcome?rGR>rCE, this is dynamically inefficient. here there is excessive capital accumulation. a reduction in the saving rate of the young would benefit all generations
- 32Where does the GR come from?Many small agents acting as price takers that optimise their utility not taking into account the impact on other generations. The decentralised CE is not optimal though. Imagine a social benevolent planner that allocates the economy's resources between c1, at+1 and c2 so as to maximise steady state welfare of a generation, this optimal equilibrium gives the golden rule
- 33Golden rule in words:the golden rule of capital accumulation requires the real interest rate (net return of capital including depreciation) be equal to the economy's growth rate
- 34How do we adapt the model to include taxation?We use a model with no debt, and where a government always balances its budget by T=G, t is split into capital income taxation and labour income taxation. We look at a partial equilibrium and then a full equilibrium
- 35What are the main results?the financing of government expenditure can significantly crowd out capita accumulation. In the taxation case, greater generosity/expenditure on households by the government can have a serious negative impact on capital accumulation, output, and finally private consumption
- 36Describe the partial equilibriumThe wage and interest rate are given (unlikely since these must interact with individual behaviour). The equilibrium is set up to show that taxation can distort equilibrium choice between c1, c2, and leisure. we introduce leisure in this model to look at the impact of taxation on incentives to work
- 37Leisure when young and the partial equilibriumLeisure when young is given by (1-lt). Utility now depends on consumption in both periods and leisure in the first period. the household maximise its utility according to some constraints. these constraints now include taxation
- 38What are the constraints?this should make sense. consumption whilst young depends on labour income taxation when young. consumption when old then depends on capital income taxation on the return to assets

- 39What does the constraint show?It is very similar to the LBC in the basic model. But the prices in this case are net of taxation. these relative key prices are now distorted. By using the decomposition of a price change (hicks - substitution & income effect) we can predict the impact of taxation on consumption choices
- 40Since these goods are hicks substitutes ...If consumption of one good increases, then, for utility to remain constant the consumption of at least one of the other goods must fall
- 41So what is the impact of capital taxation, in words and using the decomposition of a price change?When capital income taxation increases the price of future consumption increases. Individuals wants to substitute future consumption for present consumption and more leisure. The reward for saving falls, and since the consumer is a saver there is a negative income effect
- 42Be more precise.. what happens?As long as c and l are normal goods individuals would respond to to an income effect by reducing all consumption and leisure. combined with the substitution effect c2 will definitely fall. But for leisure and c1 it is uncertain as the sub and income effect are in opposite directions
- 43What about the impact of labour income taxation? use the decomposition of a price changeSince the price of leisure (opportunity cost) goes down a high w tax should encourage leisure and reduce consumption in both periods (sub effect). but since the individual is a net producer of leisure there is a negative income effect. Therefore an increase in tax w will definitely reduce both period consumption but unsure for leisure
- 44Sum up:There are no unequivocal predictions, we also need to use maths to get explicit solutions. Quick note: just because c is going to fall doesn't mean a household is necessarily worse off. it depends on how governments redistribute the money
- 45How do we set up the lagrangian?The important results here are the euler condition and the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption

- 46How does this differ from the basic model?The euler condition discounts c1 by the tax rate, this is the only difference. The MRS is a new equation for this module but was common last year. If we substitute these two equations into the LBC we get solutions
- 47What are the solutions ?

- 48Summarise these results:When preferences are given by the about Ut household saving depends ONLY on labour income tax, in a negative way. Labour income tax penalises consumption in both periods. Leisure is independent of any tax rate. Capital income tax only has negative effect on future consumption.
- 49What about if leisure is a choice when old instead?if we impose no leisure in t=1, that is leisure =2-lt, lt=1 and ln(1)=0, we get the second line. Solving this the same as before we show that savings and leisure depend negatively on both taxes in t=1, and

- 50What about the full equilibrium? How does the government verify its GIBC?This does not use a lagrangian but aggregation and the MPs. We assume there is no debt and T=G. A new variable, gov, is introduced which is expenditure per worker. It grows at the rate of productivity growth.
- 51What is an important characteristic of gov?gov leaves the marginal utilities of consumption unchanged, it only enters additively into household utility

- 52Now into the method...we assume leisure is not valued and people work full time when young, we use the partial equilibrium solution for household savings a(t+1) and aggregate it

- 53What can we take from this result?It is clear government expenditure may crowd out capital accumulation from inspection of the equation. For any given wage, as long as labour income taxation is positive the next periods capital is always lower than it otherwise would be with government expenditure and taxation.
- 54Why so?Labour income taxation reduces the disposable income of the young, who in turn reduce consumption and savings. Lowe aggregate savings translate into lower aggregate investment
- 55What does the government budget constraint look like? Bare in mind we have a balanced budget Gt=TtWhat follows is intuitive:

- 56How do we manipulate this to show impact of taxation? Assume only labour income is taxed:once we put capital tax = 0 and manipulate the equations into per effective worker terms we can get the transition equation:

- 57What does the transition equation show?The greater the generosity of the state (bigger gov) the lower the steady state level of capital per effective worker
- 58Sketch this equation:

- 59what does all this mean?There is more crowding out when gov increases. however are people necessarily worse off? Lifetime utility depends on how useful the government expenditure is
- 60What about if capital income tax is implement and labour income tax = 0We have the same transition equation but "gov" has labour tax =0 instead. Saving is unaffected as we know capital income tax doesn't affect the young and hence government spending is not necessarily crowding out capital accumulation
- 61So is this a better way to fund gov?the government budget constraint changes. there is now a tax burden on the old. Is this tax burden to much though?

- 62What is that tax burden?The tax burden is this since gov (spending per worker) grows with productivity rate, but the burden will also increase if the population grows (we have g tilda).

- 63Is this better though?By contrast the burden on the young of labour income tax was just gov (with CT=0). Wether the burden is worse depends on the difference between g tilda and r. Since it is plausible that r>g one can conclude capital income tax is a better way to fund gov
- 64Why is it better sum up?1) Less crowding out capital accumulation so a result eventually of higher gross income
2) that tax burden on the individual is likely lower - 65Debt. What are its main features?It can be seen as deferred taxation
It must eventually be paid back
Paying interest on debt forever is equivalent to paying debt back immediately in real terms - 66A model for debtDebt has same r as private assets
the condition for equilibrium in the market is now: K(t+1)=LtA(t+1) - D(t+1).. that is the capital stock in the economy at t+1 is equal to net national wealth (wealth of private sector less government debt outstanding) - 67In the steady state with no gov, no debt and no taxes. Then gov=0.1 at t=0 is spent so that Gt=AtLtgovt. This is financed by issuing debt which will be paid back as a lump sum on workers to balance the budget in future yearsThat is: tax revenues will be set equal to government expenditures plus interest payments on debt (the government acts so that debt level stays constant)
- 68Assume k*=1/27. And the budget constraint at end to t=o is given by D(1)=G(0)=0.1A(0)L(0). This is what debt remains at. So what are taxes?where the second term of the third expression can be factorised since is grows at rate g tilda

- 69If g tilda=1, B=0.5 and alpha=1/3; each worker will pay taxes of (aggregate this):we simply sub in assets (from solving OLG) to our equilibrium constraint above, and then sub in the price of w that we get from MPL and put in per e worker terms


- 70If we subbed number/data in year on year we would see k falls, why? and what is the impact of this?1) the existence of debt crowds out capital accumulation as part of aggregate savings is now used to acquire public debt
2) taxes are now higher than the no debt case to cover interest = more crowding
3) there are redistribution effects. The first generation benefits at the detriment of all others - 71Debt v taxation. How are they similar? A government can achieve a balanced surplus by taxing g(o)=WTw(o) or by issuing one period debt d(1)=WTw(o) and then repaying the borrowed with interests (1+r)d. So..Let tax be a lump sum (1+r)WTw(o) so that a(1)=a(1,p)+d(1), we face the constraints (side note, c(2,1) is individual in old generation in t+1 when t=0):

- 72What does this all mean?These constraints are identical to the case with no debt when the individual must pay with tax when young. Hence the two ways of financing gov(o) are the same. What matters is the sum of fiscal policy (taxes and debt) on a generation t, not the split of the sum
- 73Achieving the GR with asset policy or debt policy (focus on the steady state, no productivity growth by assumption, just n). Debt policy first:government borrows d from each worker then pays it back (1+r*)d. the impact on households =0 and the government has total payments - receipts of (r*-n)L(t)d
- 74What about asset policy? the exact same but government lends the money instead of borrowing. So what does this mean for the GR? (bear in mind a is the same)We need a value of d to achieve the GR. it can be negative due to asset policy. So what is this value for d??

- 75Under the GR; k*=k=Normally there is under accumulation, that is rCE>rGR so the government should implement asset policy. Lending -d(GR) to the young allows them to acquire more private capital which translates into higher income, higher consumption, higher U

- 76What does this suggest? summarise:Society commonly UNDER ACCUMULATES because public debt is too large. Ultimately society would benefit from a reduction of debt to zero and beyond
- 77What are the two types of pensions that are most common?Unfunded pay as you go system: pay taxes when young and receive benefits b(t+1) when old. The young pays for the old in each period.
Fully funded defined contribution system: the pension received is proportional to the contributions made to system when young and the rate of return on those contributions - 78The major results of analysis on the two systems:Since the PAYG system is financed though taxation more generous crowding out has a greater crowding out effect
The introduction of a PAYG system benefits the old generation at the expense of all other. A fully funded system is always better if there are no issues of myopia, uncertainty, and lack of information - 79The PAYG system in an economy on a BGP with r>g (capital intensity below the GR) and pensions financed by labour income tax. Everyone in older generation receives a pension of b(t+1)Since taxes paid by young = benefits to old is said to be "balanced and sustainable".. formally we have:

- 80What is the rate of return on workers contribution? (Since wage is assumed to grow exogenously at the same rate as productivity and L(t+1)=(1+n)Lt), dividing by Lt we get :the rate return is therefore given by g tilda. that is the rate of return is given by the economy's growth rate. Lower n or g = lower rate of return
(this is for a balanced and sustainable unfunded PAYG system)
- 81How do this impact the households problem?The only different to the constraints facing the household is that c(2) includes b(t+1). Hence the we get:

- 82What does this actually mean for the household though? (we have seen an implied labour income tax rate equal to the [] aboveSince by assumption (and usually) since r>g a balanced and sustainable unfunded PAYG system has the same effect on capital and consumption as taxation does. Taking r as a give, a greater labour income tax results in a larger crowding out effect
- 83What about a fully funded defined pensions system? note that taxes are used as the contribution but the household gets a fair return on them and the government are just seen as levying taxesThe rate of return in this system is equal to the real rate of interest. The LBC is now:

- 84So how does the household adjust?Households keep consumption whilst young constant. a(t+1) is given the same equation as in the baseline tax model, but is in fact higher than the tax case
- 85What about aggregation?Total supply of capital at the beginning of (t+1) is equal to the sum assets held by the old L(t)a(t+1) plus the assets taken away from the generation that has just worked, that is L(t)w(t)LT(t), so:

- 86Overall where does this leave us in comparison to other cases?Since the aggregation equation is identical to the no government baseline scenario the transition equation and steady state level will be the same too, that is there is no crowding out. So in a world of forward looking, rational agents and under accumulation capital, the PAYG system will always leave us with lower k and y than a fully funded system
- 87SO taking r as a constant and >g what happens when a PAYG system is introduced at t=0?1) the whole generation born at t-1 receive a windfall equal to the aggregate level young's tax at t=0
2)The loss incurred by generation born at t=0 is equal to the difference in r and g tilda and the tax they pay - 88What is the loss to all generations born after t=0?when r>g :

- 89These losses would only occur under certain conditions that make the fully funded system better, what are they?fully rational agents, perfect capital markets, full information, exogenous supply of capital, non capital income taxes, exogenous factor prices for K and L (r&w)
- 90How would you describe such a policy change?It is just pure redistribution: in present value terms there are no aggregate income losses to society as whole. BUT the change will distort the labour maker and provide a positive marginal tax on the worker and likely reduce national savings and hence capital in the long run
- 91This seems pretty unanimous... why do we have a PAYG system then?1) voluntary arrangements are enough duck to imperfections in the financial markets (e.g. consumer has no knowledge about savings instruments
2)Individuals are not forward looking enough (e.g. they lack the discipline to save or their beta is too low) - 923) Some individuals try and free ride as they know governments dislike poverty and will attempt to help them - these individuals know enough other individuals are altruistic4) The government sometimes need to redistribute wealth across generations to i) help a generation who have fought a war ii)provide insurance for individuals across a lifetime since earnings are uncertain
- 93What about reform then?1)There are attempts underway to make the system fairer. But changing completely would mean people need to make double contributions. Also future gains in capital etc are in the long term so it is hard to reason
- 942) it is unrealistic to compare the risks of r and g. A capital marker has a much higher risk so requires a risk premium3)The administrative cost of a PAYG system is much lower
Overall there are changes being made to make the system more sustainable, to make a greater link between contributions and benefits and so on. The minimum age of pensions is also increasing - 95Is this the only PAYG system used in fiscal policy?No, the NHS can be seen as a PAYG system. When young households contribute with taxes, and then when they are old they receive the benefits of "free" healthcare. r is quite low for things like healthcare so it is a good system but needs reform due to ageing population (healthcare with technology is also making it more expensive)
- 96What is the conclusion on sustainability and fiscal policy?Societies face a serious problem due to age related expenditure. An ageing population, slower n, and lower g all contribute to a great burden on younger generations and governments.
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- Bachelors Degree Economics and Finance FlashCards sobre Fiscal policy, criado por Tom O'Neill em 09-05-2016.
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- Tom O'Neill
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