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- 1Theory of mind hypothesis- Individuals with autism fail to “impute mental states to themselves and others” (Premack and Woodruff, 1978)
- 2The unexpected transfer test of false belief (Wimmer and Perner, 1983).- Watches sequence of dolls
- Maxi puts chocolate in cupboard
- Mum moves it to the fridge
- Participant makes judgement about where the doll will look - 3Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith (1985) Sally-Anne task- Sally puts ball in basket and goes away
- Anne moves ball
- Where will Sally look?
- Asked reality question (where is it really?) and memory (where was it in the beginning)
- 80% (16/20) children with autism failed unexpected transfer test and concluded that have a deficit in their ToM - 4The deceptive box (Perner, Frith, Leslie & Leekam, 1989).- Children shown smarties tube and asked to guess the content
- Tube is revealed to shown unexpected pencil
- Pencil returned to tube and child asked to predict what another child would think
- 4 y/o report false belief ‘smarties’, younger report current content - 5Williams and Happe (2009)- A new unexpected contents task which allowed the self test to only be passed with false belief competence.
- Participants never explicitly verbalise their belief that the plasters box contains plasters, although by selecting this box when asked to help the experiments, participants demonstrated their false belief unambiguously.
- 21.1% autistics failed the Plasters Self question despite passing the Plasters Other-person question and 3.8% showed opposite performance.
- Found it significantly more difficult to report their own prior false belief than to predict the false belief of another person. - 6Happe (1994) – this is problematic for the 20% who passed tests of FB The deficit is not universalAt least 3 ways of explaining this
- FB tests requires multiple skills and, those autistics that do pass do it in a different way than those without. Revealing which way people pass is important
- Passing FB task only possible for anyone with a representational ToM. This means ToM hypothesis is untenable as doesn’t take into account that some do pass.
- ToM may explain some cognitive impairments but doesn’t fully explain all facets of the disorder. - 7Baron-Cohen (1989) proposed that ToM was a delay rather than a deficit Second-order false belief task (I think he thinks she thinks)- 90% of TD children as did DS children
- But no autistics passed
- Although some can pass first-order ToM tasks, can’t do second- order and therefore don’t have a fully representational ToM. - 8Bowler (1992)challenged ideal that ToM development is delayed in autism
- 73% young adults with AS passed second-order belief tasks
- Universal ToM deficits not universal in autism - 9(Happe, 1995)Development delay argument supported in meta-analysis
- Strong association between verbal mental age and false belief task performance in A children.
- Found probability of passing a false belief task was highly predicted by verbal mental age.
- Participants with verbal mental age of 12+ almost certain to pass.
- TD children succeed by 4 (Wellman, Cross and Watson, 2001) - 10Perner & Wimmer (1985) 2nd order belief attribution- Mary and John saw ice cream van in park
- Mary goes home, John sees van move to church
- Mary unexpectedly sees van at church so her belief about the location remains true
- John sets out to look for Mary whom, he is told, has gone for ice cream.
- Where does John think Mary has gone?
- TD pass age 7 - 11Strange Stories test (Happe, 1994) Different type of ToM task. Move away from false belief.- 24 stories to provide a more naturalistic challenge to individuals with autism
- Simple accounts of everyday events about different motivations that lay behind utterances that are not literally true.
- Accompanied by picture and 2 questions:
- Was it true, was x said? And justification question why did x say that?
- Mental state justifications given in response to why question “because Emma is pretending he banana is a telephone” provided evidence of ToM.
- Varying degrees of success – some failed, some passed first-order, some passed second-order
- Importantly, even those who passed 2nd order, gave incorrect mental state justifications for some stories, unlike NT adult participants. - 12Jolliffe and Baron-Cohen (1999a) replica study- Asperger Syndrome and HFA. Even very highest functioning autistics had difficulty comprehending nonliteral language.
- 13Baron-Cohen et al (1997) Eyes Task- Adult groups of AS/HFA, Tourette syndrome and normal group
- Showed photographs of eye region of people’s faces and asked if they could infer the mental states. Select one of four choices.
- Adults with autism performed significantly less well.
- Control Emotion Task, participants judge whole faces displaying basic emotions. Performed well so ruled out explanation deficits in understanding basic emotional expressions as explanation.
- Baron-Cohen believed this provided support that autistics have specific impairment reading mentalistic info from the region of the eyes.
- Several psychometric problems - 14(Back, Ropar and Mitchell, 2007)- Participants significantly worse at recognising mental states from faces with frozen eyes suggesting that when the eyes were dynamic and informative they were reading information from the region.
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- Karteikarten am Ohne Titel, erstellt von lucy wilson am 25/04/2018.
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