Learning Pitstop 2 (WK4-5)

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Flashcards on Learning Pitstop 2 (WK4-5), created by kayle sands on 11/04/2018.
kayle sands
Flashcards by kayle sands, updated more than 1 year ago
kayle sands
Created by kayle sands about 6 years ago
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What is the difference between top-down and bottom-up theories of delusion? Top-down - delusions reflect higher acting belief evaluation processes which are damaged or biased. Two factor (evaluation and perception). Bottom-up - delusions are low level and are intrinsically linked to perceptual experience. Belief evaluation is secondary.
Evidence for bottom-up accounts and problems - Aberrant salience in schiz delusion *salience not inconsistent with top-down *unclear, contradictory (motivation) *patient data *delusions of normals
What is Maher's (1974) account of delusions? Evidence for this? Seek to 'explain' AE using delusions (2 stage). Explanation is based on normal reasoning processes. Maintained same way as strong belief and reduces anxiety which makes it resistant to change. Delusions as adaptive function. Irrational beliefs in normal. Maher- no reasoning deficit in deluded evidence. Langdon & Coltheart (2000) = AE necessary bizarre D, biases contribute content. Biases important for milder D.
What are the criticisms of Maher's account? - Chapman & Chapman (1988) = delusions in absence of AE (not necessary) -Bell et al. (2008) = D-H not diff H+D or norm -Garety & Hemsley (1994) = biases in reasoning theory - Slade & Bentalll (1988) = misattribution theory^(both suggest reasoning not intact) -AE insufficient warrant D explanation, why accepted over realistic? -May only be a suitable account for bizarre D. _Are D explanations of other things?
What is Garety & Hemsley's (1994) account of D? Examples of biases? Based on Chapman & . (1988) cognitive slippage. Multi-factorial model (D have many causes, sometimes perceptual anomalies, others internal biases) where reasoning is different than normals. JTC (Driven by Intolerance ambiguity, overconfidence, fail generate alternatives
What is the JTC and what is the evidence for it? Originally thought error in probabilistic reasoning where individuals don't seek sufficient evidence before making decisions, now thought to be data-gathering bias. Garety (1991) = Beads task - D less info to make decision (2.2 vs 4/5) *Maher (1992) counterargued controls overcautious, 2.2 in line Bayesian probability estimates - but variability in D group and half made decision off one bead. Warman et al. (2007) = D JTC, overconfident, inaccurate Replicated diff tasks, Dp, manipulaations
What re the limitations of the JTC view? - Where does the overconfidence stem from? -Patients found to change mind quickly when hypothesis changed, against notion D resistant (prolonged exposure required?), doesn't explain why maintained.
How does a failure to generate alternatives link to JTC and what is the evidence for this? Rapid acceptance of judgements may constrict consideration of alternatives - related failure generate realistic explanations. Freeman et al. (2004) = 75% D offered no alternative explanation , more AE and a JTC. May be due to other explanations not being obvious/reasoning biases/content more distressing D (reduce anxiety).
How does intolerance for ambiguity relate JTC and what is the evidence? IT is the over-reliance to resort to black/white solutions and usually involves premature closure (resulting in rapid and overconfident judgements). Evidence for ITA in delusional/ psychotic and normal individuals
What is Friths (1987) account of D? AE (e.g. hearing voices) due to failure in system which monitors ones own actions and their preceding intention > self-monitoring deficit. D arise from inability to represent beliefs/thoughts/intentions of other people (meta-representation).
What is apophenia and how may it be important for delusion formation? Apophenia is seeing connections and meaning between unrelated things (e.g. patterns in noise). For example, meaningful interpretation of stimuli whose spatio-temporal arrangements elicit inferences of non-random origins. Apophetic thought processes may be important in delusion formation, and these may reflect disinhibition in associative processing within knowledge-based systems (e.g. semantic) > therefore need to study semantic processing.
What is used to study semantic processing and how has this highlighted apophatic thought processes in deluded individuals? Lexical Decision Tasks - respond quickly to second of two words flashed in quick succession Semantic priming - faster responses when words are semantically related. Maher et al. (1987) - semantic priming effects larger in schiz - thought disorder and D associated disinhibition in semantic system Spitzer et al. (1993) - spreading activation through semantically (indirect) related network in schiz with thought disorder - disinhibited associations of distant concepts Weisbrod et al. (1998) - found specifically in right- hem
Evidence for associative thought in normal (prone) population? Pizzagalli et al. (2001) = indirect priming effects greater in paranormal believers (+ R-Hem). Para believers similar to thought disorder and therefore present apophatic thought - schizotypal Gianotti et al. (2001) = Bridge-associative-gap task (BAG) = believers more original associations between unrelated stimuli > cognitive systems capable creative insight may be vulnerable to disordered thoughts, leading to D. *non-D scientists?
What is the chance-baseline-shift (Blackmore & Troscianko, 1985)? Believers in the paranormal have a biased view of chance events and randomness. Believers perform worse in probabilistic reasoning/judgement tasks Dagnall et al. (2007) = PBS + 4 tasks - only poor perform in perception of randomness task predicted paranormal beliefs > belief associated with specific bias in POR rather than probabilistic reasonng
How does belief in the paranormal link to delusion formation? Lawrence & Peters (2004) = strong beliefs associated with higher scores delusional ideation, more errors in deductive reasoning. Reasoning probs in Dp suggests it could be a factor in D formation *also experience not necessary for belief
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