406349
| Question | Answer |
| Pagett (1983) | ‘But for’ D’s actions the V would not have died – convicted of manslaughter. |
| White (1910) | ‘But for’ D’s actions the mother would’ve died anyway so D is only guilty of attempted murder |
| Kimsey (1996) | J directed jury that D’s driving did not have to be ‘the principal, or a substantial cause of the death as long as you are sure that it was a cause and that there is something more than a slight or trifling link’ CA upheld conviction for death by dangerous driving |
| Blaue (1975) | V’s religious beliefs made the wound fatal but D was still guilty of causing her death as he had to take his V as he found her |
| Smith (1959) | D liable if the injuries caused are still operating and substantial |
| Cheshire (1991) | Medical treatment would only break the chain of causation if it is ‘so independent’ of D’s acts and ‘in itself so potent in causing death’. |
| Jordan (1956) | The medical treatment here was palpably wrong resulting in a break in the chain of causation. |
| Malcherek (1981) | Turning off a life support does not break the chain of causation. |
| Roberts (1971) | The reaction was foreseeable and proportionate so D was found to be liable for V’s injuries |
| Marjoram (2000) | Reasonably foreseeable that V would fear the threat of violence and attempt to use the only escape route, which was the window. |
| Williams (1995) | V’s actions were not foreseeable and proportionate to the threat and so D was not liable for his death as the chain had been broken. |
| Holland (1841) | D held to be liable as surgery was primitive and V greatly feared the procedure and consequence |
| Dear (1996) | CA held that provided the wounds were an operating and significant cause, the jury was entitled to convict D. Even if V had effectively decided to commit suicide by allowing the wounds to continue to bleed, the wounds were still the cause of death. |
Want to create your own Flashcards for free with GoConqr? Learn more.