88081
Description
Mind Map by alex.ariel, updated more than 1 year ago
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Created by alex.ariel
almost 12 years ago
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Art 101
- Agreement between Undertakings
- Object/Effect restricts competition?
- May effect on trade between MS?
- Ways of avoiding infringement
- NAOMI
- Threshold: HA = aggregate market share 10%;
VA aggregate market share 15%
- NOT cover hardcore restrictions:
price fixing and export bans
- Volk
- Threshold: HA = aggregate market share 10%;
VA aggregate market share 15%
- NAAT
- Aggregate market share under 5% AND
HA = aggregate annual turnover €40 mill;
VA Supplier’s annual turnover €40 mill
- Can exempt hardcore restrictions BUT
national enforcement agencies may not
- Aggregate market share under 5% AND
HA = aggregate annual turnover €40 mill;
VA Supplier’s annual turnover €40 mill
- Vertical Block Exemption (formerly Reg 330/2010)
- ONLY applies to Vertical Agreements:
Defined by Art 1(1)(a) BE
- Art 3(1) BE: Supplier and Buyer’s
share in their respective markets is under 30%
- Not cover restriction listed in Art 4 BE:
price fixing and passive sales (Art 4(b))
- Art 5 BE: non-compete provisions of
over 5 years are also excluded
- ONLY applies to Vertical Agreements:
Defined by Art 1(1)(a) BE
- Art 103(3)
- Art101(3): No breach if ALL 4 requirements met
- Agreements must improve production
or distribution of goods or the promotion
of technical or economic progress
- Consumers must get a fair
share of the resulting benefit
- Agreement imposes
indispensible restrictions
(they are necessary)
- Agreement does not allow for the
substantial avoidance of competition
- Agreements must improve production
or distribution of goods or the promotion
of technical or economic progress
- Art101(3): No breach if ALL 4 requirements met
- NAOMI
- ‘MAY’ = only need demonstrate potential effect
- Agreement outside EU which coordinate prices at which
GOODS SOLD IN THE EU can be sufficient: Woodpulp
- Wholly internal = national competition law
- STM test: sufficient to prove likelihood
trade would be affected
directly/indirectly, actually or potentially
- Ways of avoiding infringement
- Restriction Effect OR Object
sufficient: Polypropylene
- Art 101(1) TFEU: list of anti
competitive agreements
- Art 101(a): Price fixing e.g. AKZO
- Art 101(b) TFEU: Limiting markets
- 'Absolute Territorial Protection': Constan v Grundig
- BUT 'Exclusive Territory Agreements'
allowed: STM v MU
- Vertical export bans
- Possibility of anti-competitive effect: STM v MU factors = (i) Nature and quantity (ii)
Position and size of parties (iii) Isolated nature of agreement/position in series (iv)
Severity of clauses (v) Opportunities allowed for other commercial competitors
- 'Absolute Territorial Protection': Constan v Grundig
- Art 101(a): Price fixing e.g. AKZO
- May effect on trade between MS?
- NOT have to be formal
agreement: Quinine Cartel
- 'between undertakings' = 2 separate legal entities
- Vertical Agreement: Constan v Grundig
- Horizontal Agreement
- Inc agreement, association
decision and concerted practice
- Concerted practice: Dyestuffs - 'substituted
practical co-operation for risks of competition'
- Parallel conduct: behaviour such as immeditately
raising price after competitors will not be sufficient
(Woodpulp: alt explanation)
- More likely to be innocent parallel conduct in Oligopoly:
Dyestuffs: not Oligoply ∴ should have been competition
- More likely to be innocent parallel conduct in Oligopoly:
Dyestuffs: not Oligoply ∴ should have been competition
- Parallel conduct: behaviour such as immeditately
raising price after competitors will not be sufficient
(Woodpulp: alt explanation)
- Concerted practice: Dyestuffs - 'substituted
practical co-operation for risks of competition'
- Object/Effect restricts competition?
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