Principles/Context of the Criminal Law

The [blank_start]framework[blank_end] for liability is [blank_start]capacity[blank_end], [blank_start]fault[blank_end], conduct and [blank_start]defences[blank_end].

Criminal capacity can be tested by [blank_start]procedures[blank_end] listed in the [blank_start]Criminal Procedure Acts[blank_end] [blank_start]1964[blank_end] and 1991.

Fault is the [blank_start]mens rea[blank_end] element of the crime. Intention, [blank_start]recklessness[blank_end] and negligence are all crimes of [blank_start]strict liability[blank_end].

[blank_start]Conduct[blank_end] is the actus reus element of the [blank_start]crime[blank_end]. The law is concerned with punishing guilty [blank_start]acts[blank_end], not guilty minds.

[blank_start]Direct[blank_end] intention = [blank_start]aim/purpose[blank_end] Indirect intention = [blank_start]consequence of the act[blank_end] is a virtually certain one

R v [blank_start]Woolin[blank_end] Held: D could not be convicted of murder because it wasn't his [blank_start]intention[blank_end] to kill.

R v Maloney. Held: D did not have the necessary [blank_start]mens rea[blank_end] for murder. Lord [blank_start]Bridge[blank_end]: it is for the jury to decide whether D intended to [blank_start]kill[blank_end] or cause GBH.

Re A (2001) Held: performing the operation to separate Jodie and Mary would be the [blank_start]lesser of two evils[blank_end]. Although it meant that [blank_start]Mary[blank_end] would die, in the eyes of the law it is preferable that at least one autonomous being survives. This case distinguishes the difference between [blank_start]motive and intention[blank_end]. Intention = [blank_start]how[blank_end]? Motive = [blank_start]why[blank_end]? (Referred to as [blank_start]ulterior intention[blank_end])

[blank_start]Chandler v DPP[blank_end] (1964) D had wished to demonstrate their opposition to nuclear [blank_start]weapons[blank_end] so planned to break into an [blank_start]RAF station[blank_end] and immobilise it for 6 hours. They were convicted under the [blank_start]OSA 1911[blank_end]. They appealed, arguing that their purpose was in the [blank_start]interests of the state[blank_end]. Held: 'the motive behind the [blank_start]immediate action[blank_end] was irrelevant; they still intended the [blank_start]method[blank_end] of achieving it.'

Intention is different from [blank_start]motive[blank_end]. [blank_start]Intention[blank_end] = intending to perform the specific [blank_start]act[blank_end]. Motive = [blank_start]purpose[blank_end] for having the intention to [blank_start]perform[blank_end] the specific act.

[blank_start]R v Steane[blank_end] (1947) D was charged with intending to [blank_start]assist the enemy[blank_end]. Held: his [blank_start]motive[blank_end] was to save his family but his [blank_start]intention[blank_end] was to assist the enemy. Motive and intention cannot be [blank_start]separated[blank_end].

Objective recklessness = [blank_start]Caldwell[blank_end] recklessness Subjective recklessness = [blank_start]Cunningham[blank_end] recklessness

[blank_start]Subjective[blank_end] recklessness D acts recklessly if: (i) He believes his conduct will give rise to a risk of [blank_start]harm[blank_end]. (ii) It is [blank_start]unreasonable[blank_end] for D to run the risk that he foresees. [blank_start]Actual foresight[blank_end] is required.

R v [blank_start]Cunningham[blank_end] D interfered with a [blank_start]coin-operated gas meter[blank_end] in an unoccupied house to [blank_start]steal money[blank_end]. Gas escaped, seeped through the walls into an adjoining house and [blank_start]endangered[blank_end] the life of a person living there. Held: malice requires either intention or [blank_start]recklessness[blank_end]. D was liable.

R v [blank_start]Parker[blank_end] D slammed down a public [blank_start]telephone[blank_end] so hard that he broke it. Held: the Court rejected his defence that he was so enraged to even consider the [blank_start]risk[blank_end] of his conduct. He [blank_start]closed his mind[blank_end] to the idea of it and therefore he is [blank_start]liable[blank_end].

[blank_start]Objective[blank_end] recklessness D is guilty of causing damage [blank_start]recklessly[blank_end] if: (i) He does an act that creates an [blank_start]obvious risk[blank_end] that property would be destroyed or damaged, and (ii) When he does the act, he has either not given any thought to the [blank_start]possibility[blank_end] of risk or has recognised that there was some [blank_start]risk[blank_end] and has gone on to do it anyway.

MPC v [blank_start]Caldwell[blank_end] D set fire to a hotel whilst [blank_start]intoxicated[blank_end]. He was charged with an offence against s1(1) of the CDA 1971. Embraces gross [blank_start]negligence[blank_end] and advertent wrongdoing.

R v [blank_start]G and Another[blank_end] 2 children entered the [blank_start]backyard[blank_end] of a Co-Op shop and caused a fire. They apparently expected the newspapers to burn out and did not [blank_start]foresee[blank_end] the risk of the fire spreading. At trial, they were convicted of [blank_start]reckless arson[blank_end]. The HL quashed the conviction and overruled [blank_start]Caldwell[blank_end]. It was held to have misinterpreted [blank_start]Parliament's intention[blank_end] when enacting the [blank_start]Criminal Damage Act 1971[blank_end] and also labelled "[blank_start]unjust[blank_end]."

[blank_start]Negligence[blank_end] reflects fault on the part of D but does not require any [blank_start]particular state of mind[blank_end]. Where negligence is enough for liability, there is liability for intention or [blank_start]recklessness[blank_end]. D can [blank_start]foresee[blank_end] the AR without being [blank_start]reckless[blank_end], yet can still be negligent. D is [blank_start]negligent[blank_end] if the [blank_start]reasonable[blank_end] person in the same circumstances: (i) would have been aware of the [blank_start]risks[blank_end] of doing the AR; and (ii) would not have [blank_start]run[blank_end] those risks.

Result crimes place [blank_start]emphasis[blank_end] on the result of the crime. [blank_start]Conduct[blank_end] crimes are only concerned with D's [blank_start]behaviour[blank_end], not the consequence. [blank_start]Status[blank_end] crimes have no guilty conduct whatsoever, i.e. liability for [blank_start]omissions[blank_end].

John [blank_start]Donne[blank_end]: "[blank_start]no man is an island[blank_end]." We all have a [blank_start]social responsibility[blank_end] to one another.

The general rule in criminal law is that there is [blank_start]no liability[blank_end] for omissions. There are, however, exceptions to this rule: Duties arising out of a [blank_start]Relationship[blank_end] [blank_start]Contractual[blank_end] Duties Creation of a [blank_start]Dangerous Situation[blank_end] Duties arising from [blank_start]Statute[blank_end]

Duties arising out of a [blank_start]relationship[blank_end]: R v [blank_start]Gibbins and Proctor[blank_end] A parent who omits to feed or care for their child may face [blank_start]criminal repercussions[blank_end] for subsequent death or injury. The court held that this was so [blank_start]self-evident[blank_end] that it did not require [blank_start]analysis.[blank_end]

Duties arising out of a relationship: R v [blank_start]Stone and Dobinson[blank_end] A conviction for murder or [blank_start]manslaughter[blank_end] would arise where the [blank_start]neglect[blank_end] or lack of care by a parent is either [blank_start]intention[blank_end] or grossly negligent.

Contractual Duties: [blank_start]R v Pittwood[blank_end] A railway gatekeeper forgot to do his job and a [blank_start]pedestrian[blank_end] was killed as a result. Held: D was liable for his [blank_start]omission.[blank_end]

Creation of a [blank_start]dangerous situation:[blank_end] [blank_start]R v Miller[blank_end] A [blank_start]squatter[blank_end] fell asleep in someone's house and his [blank_start]cigarette[blank_end] was not put out. It smouldered the mattress and the house caught on fire. He was convicted of [blank_start]arson[blank_end] - he was under a duty to act as soon as the [blank_start]mattress[blank_end] became lit.

Duties arising from [blank_start]statute[blank_end] i.e. Failing to provide a [blank_start]specimen of breath[blank_end] at the roadside.