Game Theory inInfrastructure Security (Incomplete)

Description

Bier, Vicki M., and Sinan Tas. "Game theory in infrastructure security." WIT Transactions on State-of-the-art in Science and Engineering 54 (2012).
Iano Newb
Mind Map by Iano Newb, updated more than 1 year ago
Iano Newb
Created by Iano Newb over 7 years ago
30
1
1 2 3 4 5 (0)

Resource summary

Game Theory inInfrastructure Security (Incomplete)
  1. classification
    1. payoffs
      1. zero-sum games
        1. at least one equilibrium
          1. one agent's loss, other agent's gain
          2. non-zero-sum games
            1. some don't have equilibrium
            2. constant-sum game
              1. sum of agent's payoff is same
            3. timing of play
              1. simultaneous games
                1. agents choose their actions without knowing the actions of the other players
                  1. In Infrastructure Security
                    1. decisions that can be changed easily and rapidly may be modeled as simultaneous games
                  2. sequential games
                    1. in economics
                      1. leader-follower games
                      2. in security
                        1. attacker-defender (AD) games
                          1. defender-attacker (DA) games
                          2. agents act in certain order
                            1. the leader has a first-mover advantage (choices of the leader can limit the options of follower)
                              1. In Infrastructure Security
                                1. decisions about observable capital investments are typically modeled as sequential games
                            2. how much players know
                              1. complete information
                                1. payoffs of each combination are common knowledge
                                2. incomplete information
                                  1. not common knowledge
                                    1. Bayesian game
                                    2. perfect information
                                      1. all players know all past moves
                                      2. imperfect information
                                        1. at least one player does not know all past moves
                                    3. concepts
                                      1. equilibrium
                                        1. pure
                                          1. each agent has a unique and deterministic equilibrium
                                          2. mixed
                                            1. at least one agent is assumed to choose probabilistically among multiple equilibrium strategies
                                            2. is any set of strategies where no player has an incentive to change it's strategy, if all players continue to play their equilibrium strategies
                                            3. Game Theory
                                              1. assumes that each player wishes to find its best strategy
                                                1. this assumption makes possible for an analyst to make predictions about which strategies players would be likely to choose
                                                2. 2. game-theoretic models
                                                  1. 3. limitations of game-theoretic models
                                                    1. Rationality of the agents
                                                      1. Common knowledge
                                                        1. Modeling challenges
                                                          1. Excessive conservatism
                                                          2. 2.1 Simultaneous AD games
                                                            1. 2.2 Sequential AD games
                                                              1. 2.3 Sequential AD games
                                                                1. 2.4 Sequential DAD games
                                                                  1. 2.5 Simultaneous DD games
                                                              Show full summary Hide full summary

                                                              0 comments

                                                              There are no comments, be the first and leave one below:

                                                              Similar

                                                              USA stock market collapse
                                                              Emily Tisch
                                                              Speed, Distance, Time
                                                              Bradley Sansom
                                                              OCR Biology AS level (f211) flashcards/revision notes
                                                              Dariush Zarrabi
                                                              Gothic vocabulary
                                                              lizzie.lambrou
                                                              AQA GCSE Physics Unit 2.1
                                                              Matthew T
                                                              GCSE AQA Chemistry Atomic Structure and Bonding
                                                              mustafizk
                                                              GCSE AQA Computer Science - Definitions
                                                              James Jolliffe
                                                              Frankenstein Key Quotes
                                                              michelle.lau
                                                              GENERAL PRACTICE-1
                                                              Luis Felipe Chávez Choque
                                                              CST Module 6a
                                                              Jane Foltz