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post/non semantic analysis

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quantitative
- Quantitative research, on the contrary, produces “numerical data” or information that can be converted into numbers.
  - Simply put, quantitative research is all about numbers and figures. It is used to quantify opinions, attitudes, behaviors, and other defined variables with the goal to support or refute hypotheses about a specific phenomenon, and potentially contextualize the results from the study sample in a wider population (or specific groups). As quantitative research explicitly specifies what is measured and how it is measured in order to uncover patterns in – for example – behavior, motivation, emotion, and cognition, quantitative data collection is considered to be much more structured than qualitative methods.
    - Quantitative techniques typically comprise various forms of questionnaires and surveys, structured interviews as well as a behavioral observation based on explicit coding and categorization schemes.
      - After data collection, quantitative analysis techniques and statistics can be applied, such as t-tests and ANOVAs, to non-parametric methods. This often necessitates much bigger sample sizes compared to qualitative research but allows you to make more solid conclusions, that are backed up with data.
  - The areas of math you mention—trigonometry, calculus, and basic algebra (polynomials)—when studied for “practical applications” will amount to, in essence, a collection of tools. The actual symbolic manipulations will be straightforward, if sometimes tedious. The “trick” will be in recognizing which tool to use for which problem. That is, when approaching a physics problem, to figure out how to set it up as a math problem, and then when working through the math, to identify which techniques are best suited to solve it. From this viewpoint, the study of what is for the most part high school mathematics will consist of learning and practicing many different methods for solving math problems, and the rules for how to use them. Some of these methods will get used all the time later on, and some will be specialized niche tricks that only rarely come up. The main thing is not to memorize everything, but to get a handle on the basic ideas so that if and when you need to use a given theorem,
    - you know what it is called, or at least where you can look it up again later.
    - For example, physics and engineering faculty at universities continually stress that what they want their incoming students to have above all is procedural mastery of mathematics as a language - it is, after all, the language of science, as Galileo observed - and the ability to use various mathematical tools and methods to solve problems that arise in physics and engineering. Since even first-year physics and engineering involve use of tools such as partial differential equations, there is no hope that incoming students can have conceptual understanding of those tools and methods. But by a remarkable feature of the human brain, we can achieve procedural mastery without understanding. All it takes is practice. One of the great achievements of mathematics over the past few centuries has been the reduction of conceptually difficult issues to collections of rule-based symbolic procedures (such as calculus). Thus, one of the things that high school mathematics education should definitely pr
      - roduce is the ability to learn and be able to apply rule-based symbolic processes without understanding them.
      - That does not mean we should not provide explanations. Indeed, as a matter of intellectual courtesy, I think we should. But we need to acknowledge, both to ourselves and our students, that understanding can come only later, as an emergent consequence of use. (No shame in that. It took 300 years from Newton's invention of calculus to a properly worked out conceptual basis for its rules and methods.)
      - it is important always to have the objective of that learning in mind, firstly so that you can plot an efficient course towards it (thereby hopefully avoiding wasting your time on unproductive detours and irrelevant distractions), and secondly so that you'll know when you have reached it. Mathematics is a kind of language (in fact, it is many, many different but interrelated languages), and so there are parallels between learning mathematics and learning languages. When you decide to learn a foreign language, you must first choose the language you want to learn, and this choice will be guided by such considerations as the fol
        If you want to use mathematics to solve practical problems, then your choice of mathematical subjects will depend on what sort of practical problems you are interested in. But all 'practical' mathematical problem solving will require certain basic skills, and familiarity with some of the more generic tools of mathematics, such as algebra, geometry, calculus, combinatorics, probability and statistics.
        make extensive use of annotation; underline, highlight or otherwise mark significant words, sentences and equations so that they will stand out on subsequent re-reading. And you should always read everything at least three times; firstly, with a light, skimming preview to get the general gist of the material; then, with a detailed 'in-view' in which you immerse yourself in the material and attempt to achieve a complete understanding of it; and, finally, with a review, in which you revisit the important points you highlighted in the in-view and incorporate them into a higher-level framework for ease of recall (I find mind-mapping an invaluable tool for constructing this framework).
        Proofs constitute a lot of higher mathematics, so getting used to them early is important. On the whole, don't jump straight into anything below the line without having an understanding of the stuff above the line unless you like being confused. For each course, either study the book* from start to finish, or, more efficiently, find a syllabus for such a course, either by asking a local teacher/professor or by snooping around online.
        Moral of the story is that you should try finding the root of the subject for yourself. For example one of my key principles is that of addition and 90% of my number theoretic knowledge rests on my intuition on addition. The other concept is the 'real line', a rather abstract concept that lies at the heart of analytic, algebraic and differential geometry, not to mention the whole of calculus.
        If there's something in math you don't understand, take one step back and play with what precedes it, over and over again, until you truly master it, and it leads you into what you don't understand. Then you'll get the "a-ha!" experience, and everything will become much easier. In math, you must understand all the foundations before you can proceed to the next level. You can't pick that up later, or you'll end up just going through the motions with no understanding, and you will become lost and unable to apply your skills if a similar but not identical problem comes along.
        People learn depth-first by cycling down from coarser details to finer ones. They learn in steps. To quote Prof. Patrick Winston of AI fame, you only learn that which you almost already know. Trying to teach in fuzzy alternate ways, teaching by trickery, emphasizing word problems or case study, teaching two or three paths at the same time, all of that stuff does not work for technical and mathematical subjects, pure and simple.
        Know yourself, and how you learn. People either tend to be visual, auditory or kinesthetic learners. Figure out which you are and make sure that you are getting that kind of information. All people benefit from all styles, but you will have one that you learn better form than the others, and you should make sure to make use of that.
        process learning idas: https://docs.google.com/document/d/1d5gPpkLxkd-ExqYeg6yupkYPVP-pXDZMdPW0r0ao90c/edit
        https://docs.google.com/document/d/1dH9bbL8rXq9AnMKRTt2yt6TMF43-9qk_25OZaGFet54/edit
        https://docs.google.com/document/d/1PUx8ecpsUQvdaE_aG4ZOFuAPulB9cminmz-M0jsYHMM/edit
        notetaking https://cyanhighlighter.tumblr.com/
qualitative
- In a nutshell, qualitative research generates “textual data” (non-numerical)
  - Qualitative research is considered to be particularly suitable for exploratory research (e.g. during the pilot stage of a research project, for example). It is primarily used to discover and gain an in-depth understanding of individual experiences, thoughts, opinions, and trends, and to dig deeper into the problem at hand. The data collection toolkit of a qualitative researcher is quite versatile, ranging from completely unstructured to semi-structured techniques. The most commonly applied qualitative methods include individual interviews, group discussions (focus groups), and behavioral observations.
    - Typically, qualitative research focuses on individual cases and their subjective impressions. This requires an iterative study design – data collection and research questions are adjusted according to what is learned. Often, qualitative projects are done with few respondents and are supposed to provide insights into the setting of a problem, serving as a source of inspiration to generate hypotheses for subsequent quantitative projects.
- Post-semantic analysis of content (first is language, then groups of language = concepts like phil)
see research book for mixed methods and continuations of research process
- https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/analysis/s6.html
  - eyhics of authencitiy ch 8
    - i am a strange loop, godel escher bach
prediction: a means to an end , ie with a hypothesis. stat models requies us to amke approximations (map and model?) models are simplications, but useful. test leaving in or out a certain detaiil. language and traslation are approximations. when we understand outrselves we can undertand the way we interpret and distort the signals we recieve to make better prediications.
- thousands of little pieces (atomic) of infromation put otgether one vector at a time. key is determining if the data you recieve is signal or noise: good predications.,more evidence = closer to truth. bayes says ratinality is a probablitisc matter. probablity anlysis = waypoint b/w knowledge and ignorance. cinditional prob: probablity that a theory or hyp is true if some event has alreayd happened.
  - process: pg 244 and on of signal and noise , pg 257, pg 312 on poker, pg 450
    - pg 147 of signals and boundaries
      - Visualize with maps and graphs, fit to the form of the data ‘Circles of casuality: analyze influences on a system Create networks of each critical thinking questions and possibilities
  - veracity of resarch: can it makes accurate replications in real world? usually donesnt. ie most resrach doesnt contribute to knowleddge in a truly cumulative way. predications moreprone to failure in big data era. more info = more hypotehse. so much info, but the number of meaninfukl relationshups in data ie that speak to causality and not correlation to testify how it works - is way less. false positives.
    - causes: psychological biases, method errors, misaligned inventives. flawed statistical thinking. application of bayes: how can we think smth is likeluy before experimenting on it? this lead to frequentism. makes bias less likely. idea that uncertainty in a stat problem results just from collecting data among a sample of pop rather than whole. sampling errors are main error, ie how we are biased to sample one thing and not another. uncertainty is intrinstic; accept black swan. assumes that the underlying uncertainly follows bell curve. disadvantge: rejects context and plausiblity like bayes encourages ie the prior. this leads to false correlation.
      - data analysis of data analysis process, ie a study of a wide variety of studies and results?
        data useless w/o context. we shoiudl think about which correlations imply causation and which dont. bayes prior: the odds at which you are willing to palce a bet. practice and observing results results in less confusion for whats signal and whats noise.
        subj or obj prbability esitamtes: we cant achieve full objevtivity bc its an ideal, we can ahcieve what we can achieve and do what we will with it. but not all prior beliefs are equally vvalid: use logic laws. strive to be less subjective compared to current state. making predications based on beliefs is best way to test ourselves. prediction=seeing how clossely aligned out personal perceptions are with the greater truthh. bayesian reasoning is best, our beliefs converge towards each other over time, toward truth as we get more evidence over time and stack up predictions. dialectic syntesis on both an internal, external-seeing, and greater scientific paradigm scale. it accumulates, a little like concept of dialectism. complexify this idea and degrees of intentionality for converging.
        if truth is a creative construction, that doesnt mean its not valid within its own system of concepts
        truth/process as algorithim. degrees of algorithimicity in a process and uses
        analysis: tracing/making/understanding/analysis induction and deduction assumptions and conclusions from semantic and syntactic data (combo w quan?) . action analysis: all previous and cause and effct, and modal
        Contextualize: go thru critical thinking questions and determine logic of the object, disource analysis bounded rationaliy Contextualize: go thru critical thinking questions and determine logic of the object, disource analysis bounded rationaliy
        Everything is One if you try hard enough. degrees and types of attempts at unification w / causality etc?
        analyze assumptions in process behind q semantic or quan statement
        problems as creaiton
        https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Problem_structuring_methods
        ai: still subject to us as we are the originators. chess is an exmaple of prediction: we start with the info of 32 possibel moves and use strats to navigate the domain with limited agents. the strats represent different hypthesis (is any action hypothesis?, therefore follow the assumption of that...) winning of game= best hypoth. chess = deterministic, no real element of luck percieved from our POV. knowledge of systems like chess n weather are subject to imperfections. knowledge of initial conditions is incomplete, we know the rules of behavior, we we have incomplete info about the molecules of clouds, so we cann only use prbablity bc materially some stuff is out of reach. for pragmatic purposes, we odnt even need it. (thinking of real world objects as distant abstraction or could a commbination object exist? objects that are material-made-abstract and therefore synthesize to a new type of object in our heads)
        chess shows our limited info processing ability. need for prediction arised not bc of uncertainty but bc understanding it fully is beyond us. has a pragmatic purpose at various degrees and uses, whether typical or commonly acknoeldged or not. predicaitons need simplification. those ar emodels, bur heuristics is better term: emplying rules of thumb determiend by evollution ie survival of fittest. heuristi capprach to probl solving is emplying rules of thumb when a determinsitic solution to problem is beyond our capabilities. they can produce biasses and blindspots tho.. winning a game = identifying blind spots before the other.
        apply to lang games? (blindspots of info, how new info changes and then analyze these changes to find what type of info is most useful)
        identifying blind spots in semnatic and syn info by survey resarch in experiemnts, and use analysis of past states? combo w bayesian or similar prob method
        evolutionary simulator programs but applied to other systems like syntax and semantic use in predication and probablity esitimates
        chess: 3 stages, beginning middle end. each phase tests diff untellectual and emotional skill. player must break a game down into intermediate goals i e capturing pawn. comps dont do well with purely sta opparoches for forecasting bc not suffient data amt. ie in comp-human game, comp does best in middle of volume of stat info available vs the human who is not as sophistacted and detailed. good chess platers look for a good move not a perfect one- the are forecasting how the move could favorabky dispose their position rather than going thru every possible possility like the comp. keeping this in mind as a form of self awareness when making chocies and anlyzing is helps make best choice in situations that need forecasting. but humans can see the bigger [ic compared to the comp. from the branches of the desicion tree, they see it as one holistic thing and an ultimate goal - comp only sees it as it happens in th emoment. this is not strategic and is a blindspot in the comp. comps break
        probs down into discrete elements. humans can focus on most important elements, and seeing the strategic whole, which can be more than sum of parts. hard to explain result = often bugs. consider all aspects and alternatives: caulcuate alternattives andcombine w past data - predict method. computers are good at equations and stuff like weather, not creativity or developeing theories about how the world works. the better understood the root cause the better we can predict. most fields of know and use lie b/w thsoe poles, data is good not great and we have some understanding of the systems and processes that generate the numbers and resuls bu tnot a perfect one. can imrpove pred. via trial and error
        would it be possible and useful for comp program to be a theory-maker and tester, rapid? situation and modal tester of quan n potentially qual/semantic data? woul dbe useful for resource optimization and making/using or using afte ri make equations for resource tracking and use
        root cause analysis both quan and semantic paired with outcomes within a system: detect patterns
        all searching is also experimentation, and a degree of creativity/creation. prediction=experiment. good judges which articles are most useful based on huamn judged degreees of usefulness for each. ie pagerank as a signal to approximate human judgement of the apges. googel comes up with ideas and harnesses data to put them to the test, survival of fittest. refines algrotihims, never done.
        make degrees of usefulness system
        signal or noise? requires scientific and self knowledge. accept things we cant know, or predict, know what we can and have judgement to determine what is what and when.
        What is the definition of Direct observation? For instance, how many layers of theoretical observation can be applied, before you are no longer directly observing and before the theory laden tools compromise the term "direct observation".
        analysis of computer code
  - The good regulator is a theorem conceived by Roger C. Conant and W. Ross Ashby that is central to cybernetics. It is stated that "every good regulator of a system must be a model of that system".[1] That is, any regulator that is maximally successful and simple must be isomorphic with the system being regulated. This result is obtained by considering the entropy of the variation of the output of the controlled system, and shows that, under very general conditions, that the entropy is minimized when there is a mapping from the states of the system to the states of the regulator. The minimum is obtained when the map is an isomorphism, that is, when the regulator models the system. With regard to the brain, insofar as it is successful and efficient as a regulator for survival, it must proceed, in learning, by the formation of a model (or models) of its environment.
    - The theorem does not explain what it takes for the system to become a good regulator. The problem of creating good regulators is addressed by the ethical regulator theorem,[2] and by the theory of practopoiesis.[3] When restricted to the ODE (ordinary differential equations) subset of control theory, it is referred to as the internal model principle, which was first articulated in 1976 by B. A. Francis and W. M. Wonham.[4] In this form, it stands in contrast to classical control, in that the classical feedback loop fails to explicitly model the controlled system (although the classical controller may contain an implicit model).[5]
processes, seee note too: http://jumed19.weebly.com/uploads/3/0/9/8/30989335/chapter910.pdf
- https://books.google.com/books?id=tPjfI0TkhXsC&pg=PA343&lpg=PA343&dq=unifying+semantic+and+quantitative+data&source=bl&ots=lpvj_MOdMf&sig=ACfU3U1QBXXCY1hTSvekF-W895IkvKgRBQ&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjbhPGkz8jpAhVlmuAKHUMjBusQ6AEwBHoECAsQAQ#v=onepage&q=unifying%20semantic%20and%20quantitative%20data&f=false
- https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Marie_Pailloux/publication/220444176_IOS_Press_Unifying_Framework_for_Rule_Semantics_Application_to_Gene_Expression_Data/links/02bfe50cb520def52c000000/IOS-Press-Unifying-Framework-for-Rule-Semantics-Application-to-Gene-Expression-Data.pdf
- https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/9e85/083324eb450c9c9ad8da20e8a977249e8abd.pdf
  - https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.5555/783106.783120?download=true
    - file:///C:/Users/CJ/Downloads/elhadad_robin_92.pdf
      - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conceptual_model
        https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Entity%E2%80%93relationship_model
        https://slideplayer.com/slide/12650627/
        http://www.klemens.sav.sk/fiusav/doc/filozofia/2016/3/220-230.pdf
        https://www.stat.auckland.ac.nz/~iase/serj/SERJ9(2)_Petocz_Newbery.pdf
        FOR ALL see psot semantic section
        https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pattern_recognition_(psychology)
        https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pattern_recognition
Paradigms
- ideology
  - When Žižek uses the term "ideology," he is using it in a Marxist sense. For Karl Marx, ideology is a series of discourses that push false ideas on people. When people buy into these false ideas, they develop a "false consciousness" about the world, how it works, and their place in it. According to Marx, without ideology, no society could function for very long.
    - As an example, in Medieval Europe, religion was used as an ideology to support the structure of society. Serfs were told that the people in charge were put there by God and that the way the world worked was the only divinely ordained way it could work. No wonder people who were essentially slaves didn't rise up; they were told God wanted them at the bottom.
    - While for Marx, ideology is a conscious exercise, Žižek suggests that ideology is also a subconscious phenomenon that helps to shape the world we live in
      - Žižek is building off Althusser, who fused the idea of ideology with the psychology of Jacques Lacan. According to Lacan, we don't interact with the world as it is, but rather as we represent it through language. Because of this disconnect, ideology moves down from being about the world as it is to being about how we view the world to begin with.
        "Ideology does not 'reflect' the real world but 'represents' the 'imaginary relationship of individuals' to the real world; the thing ideology (mis)represents is itself already at one remove [sic] from the real. … .In other words, we are always within ideology because of our reliance on language to establish our 'reality'; different ideologies are but different representations of our social and imaginary 'reality.'"
        With this understanding, ideology takes on a new role. It no longer merely hides how the world works from people but helps to shape how they view and talk about it in the first place. To help understand this, have a joke that Žižek likes to tell.
        Ideology, which influences how we subconsciously view the world, is one of the factors that determines if we see our black coffee as lacking cream or milk. This line of thinking can be applied to everything, not just coffee. Crucial for Žižek is his argument that we are all influenced by the prevailing ideology even if we think we aren't. In the same way that we may think we are looking at the world as it really is when we think of all black coffee as "coffee without milk," ideology can cause us to look at things in a very subjective way while also telling us we are entirely objective about it.
        Žižek argues that this very line of thinking is an example of ideology in action. It isn't that there aren't alternatives to our current model of capitalism — there are — it's that people are so taken in by capitalist ideology that they cannot even fathom an alternative way of organizing a society. The brilliance of it is that they don't think they're being taken in by anything; they'll tell you they're neutral and objective the entire time! This mechanism makes ideologies self-sustaining and so difficult to critique or escape from.
        seemingly self propelling"" ideas
        Crtiical thinking: Phislopshical midwifery: socrates mother was a midwife, he found it a fitting metaphor
        Thus, the most immediate use of this idea might be the simplest. Remember that you're probably not as objective as you think and that things that you think are obvious, common sense, and far beyond political discussion may be none of those things. Žižek wants you to question everything about society, especially when something seems to be so obvious it shouldn't be questioned.
        ideaology within/of ideology ? asusmptons w/i assumptions? incomplteness. must critize all steps, complexifying and therefore increasing the amoubt of elements we are working with. more elements the more need to simplify back down again, however possible and necessary.
- subjevitity and objectivity of percieved paradimgs: personal paradigms and perception of bigger ones.
  - paradigms shifts: like threshold in BH.
    - paradigms: threshold moment/limit/objects: at which a change is perciveved and something new is made then seen. can also apply to concept formation and use in general.
      - where the change/newness/synbtheis occurs vs the moment at which we percieve it, then we use it. ex within semantic usage and rule usage; barriers na dlmits of rules
  - A paradigm is a global organizing model or theory with great explanatory power. An immature science is preparadigmatic -- that is, it is still in its natural history phase of competing schools. Slowly, a science matures and becomes paradigmatic.
    - What then of truth and reality? Kuhn asserts that a new paradigm must resolve generally recognized problems and it must preserve a large part of the problem solving ability of the older paradigm. But paradigm change does not carry us ever closer to truth. Kuhn writes: "there is no theory independent way to reconstruct phrases like 'really there'." Science is a unidirectional and irreversible process in the sense that later theories are: -- wider and scope, -- more accurate in prediction, -- and solve more problems, but still that does not get us closer to the Truth, according to Kuhn. Thomas Kuhn is correct at least in part. Like the rest of us, scientists see what they expect to see. Facts come clothed in history and colored by context. Science is less a statement of truth than a running argument.
      - If the researcher went about his work without any pre-conceived opinion, how should he be able to select out those facts from the immense abundance of the most complex experience, and just those, which are simple enough to permit lawful connections to be evident?" Because of the social contexts of science and religion, in both, novelty emerges only with difficulty, in the face of resistance and against the background provided by expectation. Therefore, science is not purely synonymous with "objective." Theories are systems of meaning explaining observed facts, and meaning is contingent on many psychological, sociological, and cultural factors that inevitably makes it less than completely certain.
- Resisting the urge to systemize and paradigmize: think in instances?
  - resource evoltion: based on evolving resources. resource use in sysems
learning
- 1. understanding within own domain and method of analysis 2. learn how to use and the structure of the conceppts and ystsems are created within. learning as creation and synthesis.
  - proofs as process of understanding of concepts: https://www.iep.utm.edu/geo-meth/
    - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proof_(truth) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proof_procedure https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proof_of_concept
      - http://www.faculty.umb.edu/gary_zabel/Phil_100/Spinoza_files/guide%20to%20spinozas-ethics.pdf http://www.gutenberg.org/files/3800/3800-h/3800-h.htm Combine w logic? Building on Descartes’ basic premises and methods, Spinoza worked out a systematic philosophy by deducing the consequences of a set of basic axioms and definitions https://undsoc.org/2010/02/14/symbolic-logic-and-ontology/
    - Proof theory is a major branch[1] of mathematical logic that represents proofs as formal mathematical objects, facilitating their analysis by mathematical techniques. Proofs are typically presented as inductively-defined data structures such as plain lists, boxed lists, or trees, which are constructed according to the axioms and rules of inference of the logical system. As such, proof theory is syntactic in nature, in contrast to model theory, which is semantic in nature. Some of the major areas of proof theory include structural proof theory, ordinal analysis, provability logic, reverse mathematics, proof mining, automated theorem proving, and proof complexity. Much research also focuses on applications in computer science, linguistics, and philosophy.
      - In mathematics, model theory is the study of classes of mathematical structures (e.g. groups, fields, graphs, universes of set theory) from the perspective of mathematical logic. The objects of study are models of theories in a formal language. A set of sentences in a formal language is one of the components that form a theory. A model of a theory is a structure (e.g. an interpretation) that satisfies the sentences of that theory. Model theory recognizes and is intimately concerned with a duality: it examines semantical elements (meaning and truth) by means of syntactical elements (formulas and proofs) of a corresponding language: in a summary definition, dating from 1973, universal algebra + logic = model theory.[1] Model theory developed rapidly during the 1990s, and a more modern definition is provided by Wilfrid Hodges (1997): model theory = algebraic geometry − fields. Other nearby areas of mathematics include combinatorics, number theory, arithmetic dynamics, analytic function
        This article focuses on finitary first order model theory of infinite structures. Finite model theory, which concentrates on finite structures, diverges significantly from the study of infinite structures in both the problems studied and the techniques used. Model theory in higher-order logics or infinitary logics is hampered by the fact that completeness and compactness do not in general hold for these logics. However, a great deal of study has also been done in such logics. Informally, model theory can be divided into classical model theory, model theory applied to groups and fields, and geometric model theory. A missing subdivision is computable model theory, but this can arguably be viewed as an independent subfield of logic.
        process https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Model_theory
        Universal algebra (sometimes called general algebra) is the field of mathematics that studies algebraic structures themselves, not examples ("models") of algebraic structures. For instance, rather than take particular groups as the object of study, in universal algebra one takes the class of groups as an object of study.
        In mathematics, more specifically in abstract algebra and universal algebra, an algebraic structure consists of a set A (called the underlying set, carrier set or domain), a collection of operations on A of finite arity (typically binary operations), and a finite set of identities, known as axioms, that these operations must satisfy. Some algebraic structures also involve another set (called the scalar set).
        to what degree can apply to semantic and syntax analysis?
        processes and uses: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Algebraic_structure
      - Provability logic is a modal logic, in which the box operator is interpreted as 'it is provable that'. The point is to capture the notion of a proof predicate of a reasonably rich formal theory. As basic axioms of the provability logic GL (Gödel-Löb), which captures provable in Peano Arithmetic, one takes modal analogues of the Hilbert-Bernays derivability conditions and Löb's theorem (if it is provable that the provability of A implies A, then A is provable). Some of the basic results concerning the incompleteness of Peano Arithmetic and related theories have analogues in provability logic. For example, it is a theorem in GL that if a contradiction is not provable then it is not provable that a contradiction is not provable (Gödel's second incompleteness theorem). There are also modal analogues of the fixed-point theorem. Robert Solovay proved that the modal logic GL is complete with respect to Peano Arithmetic. That is, the propositional theory of provability in Peano Arithmetic is
        completely represented by the modal logic GL. This straightforwardly implies that propositional reasoning about provability in Peano Arithmetic is complete and decidable. Other research in provability logic has focused on first-order provability logic, polymodal provability logic (with one modality representing provability in the object theory and another representing provability in the meta-theory), and interpretability logics intended to capture the interaction between provability and interpretability. Some very recent research has involved applications of graded provability algebras to the ordinal analysis of arithmetical theories.
        Ordinal analysis is a powerful technique for providing combinatorial consistency proofs for subsystems of arithmetic, analysis, and set theory. Gödel's second incompleteness theorem is often interpreted as demonstrating that finitistic consistency proofs are impossible for theories of sufficient strength. Ordinal analysis allows one to measure precisely the infinitary content of the consistency of theories. For a consistent recursively axiomatized theory T, one can prove in finitistic arithmetic that the well-foundedness of a certain transfinite ordinal implies the consistency of T. Gödel's second incompleteness theorem implies that the well-foundedness of such an ordinal cannot be proved in the theory T.
        Reverse mathematics is a program in mathematical logic that seeks to determine which axioms are required to prove theorems of mathematics.[4] The field was founded by Harvey Friedman. Its defining method can be described as "going backwards from the theorems to the axioms", in contrast to the ordinary mathematical practice of deriving theorems from axioms. The reverse mathematics program was foreshadowed by results in set theory such as the classical theorem that the axiom of choice and Zorn's lemma are equivalent over ZF set theory. The goal of reverse mathematics, however, is to study possible axioms of ordinary theorems of mathematics rather than possible axioms for set theory. In reverse mathematics, one starts with a framework language and a base theory—a core axiom system—that is too weak to prove most of the theorems one might be interested in, but still powerful enough to develop the definitions necessary to state these theorems. For example, to study the theorem "Every bounde
        "Every bounded sequence of real numbers has a supremum" it is necessary to use a base system that can speak of real numbers and sequences of real numbers.
        The informal proofs of everyday mathematical practice are unlike the formal proofs of proof theory. They are rather like high-level sketches that would allow an expert to reconstruct a formal proof at least in principle, given enough time and patience. For most mathematicians, writing a fully formal proof is too pedantic and long-winded to be in common use. Formal proofs are constructed with the help of computers in interactive theorem proving. Significantly, these proofs can be checked automatically, also by computer. Checking formal proofs is usually simple, whereas finding proofs (automated theorem proving) is generally hard. An informal proof in the mathematics literature, by contrast, requires weeks of peer review to be checked, and may still contain errors.
        https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intermediate_logic
    - discrete math processes http://discrete.openmathbooks.org/pdfs/dmoi-tablet.pdf
      - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mathematical_analysis apply to discrete structures
      - http://home.iitk.ac.in/~arlal/book/mth202.pdf
    - some aspects: how can self awraeness be applied? whats the origin of the concept?
      - Internal vs external perspective of life/philosophy, w degrees of self awareness. see: Thought as a system
        Justification in philosophy. How? Limits? In own “frame”? Limits within own frame, combined with the frame we impose like LOA
  - try to pay close attention to when you’re not really understanding something. a good benchmark is “could i explain this to someone else?” (or “can i prove this” but honestly i think those are isomorphic). it’s very easy to go “meh, this makes sense” when really it doesn’t. be wary of ending up with gaps in your knowledge, because they compound over time. if you don’t quite understand something and then the book goes on to build on that thing, you won’t quite understand the second thing either.
    - proof method: https://docs.google.com/document/d/1ljeEfV5Pk9aEr5NtN0iurtqaSJSNTbTE_tZt1cvMB44/edit
concepts:
- Network the ideas on the one subject: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Idea_networking https://monoskop.org/images/f/ff/Alexander_Christopher_Notes_on_the_Synthesis_of_Form.pdf the networking and creation of concepts
the external
- occurences in the world (externality)
  - control
    - A great predictor of someone’s likelihood of taking action is their perceived ability to influence outcomes. The more you can ensure they influence outcomes the more they participate. The less control someone feels over the outcome, the less likely they are to act. This is a problem when we’re attempting to motivate people to do what we want them to do. because it’s what we want them to do. People take actions to satisfy a future emotional state.
      - Degrees of influence, degrees of self awanreness, combine
        Understand my scope - levels
        scope = external possiblies, quantifying this? see other external proj
        I think the big question is: to what extent can we control the world around us in our current state? What degree of perspective should we keep?
    - A control system manages, commands, directs, or regulates the behavior of other devices or systems using control loops.
      - For continuously modulated control, a feedback controller is used to automatically control a process or operation. The control system compares the value or status of the process variable (PV) being controlled with the desired value or setpoint (SP), and applies the difference as a control signal to bring the process variable output of the plant to the same value as the setpoint. For sequential and combinational logic, software logic, such as in a programmable logic controller, is used.
        types https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Control_system
      - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network_planning_and_design
  - causality
    - Material + human factors system analysis (see external social project)
      - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Institutional_analysis_and_development_framework
    - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ishikawa_diagram
    - Order theory applied to causation logic and then applied to history and the future
      - Order theory is a branch of mathematics which investigates the intuitive notion of order using binary relations. It provides a formal framework for describing statements such as "this is less than that" or "this precedes that". This article introduces the field and provides basic definitions.
        https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Order_theory
      - https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Amor_fati
    - Force dynamics is a semantic category that describes the way in which entities interact with reference to force. Force Dynamics gained a good deal of attention in cognitive linguistics due to its claims of psychological plausibility and the elegance with which it generalizes ideas not usually considered in the same context. The semantic category of force dynamics pervades language on several levels. Not only does it apply to expressions in the physical domain like leaning on or dragging, but it also plays an important role in expressions involving psychological forces (e.g. wanting or being urged). Furthermore, the concept of force dynamics can be extended to discourse. For example, the situation in which speakers A and B argue, after which speaker A gives in to speaker B, exhibits a force dynamic pattern.
      - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Force_dynamics
      - semantic process
    - http://econ.ucsb.edu/~sleroy/downloads/causal10-3.pdf
      - https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/causation-metaphysics/
        https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Causality
        https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Teleology see see also section
        https://www.academia.edu/6570467/Causation_in_Analytical_Philosophy
        https://www.researchgate.net/publication/264437388_How_to_cut_across_the_catch-all_A_philosophical-cultural_framework_for_assessing_sustainability
        https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Causation_(sociology)
        https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proximate_and_ultimate_causation
        https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Correlation_does_not_imply_causation
    - The past and casualty, branching alternate past futures
      - possibility
        https://www.bloomsburycollections.com/book/a-critical-introduction-to-the-metaphysics-of-modality/introduction-framing-the-debate
        https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/On_the_Plurality_of_Worlds
  - consequences
    - ideas have consequcnes book; process
  - pragmatism/materialism
  - decision theory & choice
    - Nozick views human rationality as an evolutionary adaptation. Its delimited purpose and function may be responsible for biases and blind spots, possibly accounting for philosophy's difficulty with perennial questions that are remote from the exigencies that drive natural selection. He offers a reformulation of the decision theory that was developed in the twentieth century to explain rational action. It should include the symbolic meaning of actions as well as a new rule of rational decision that maximizes decision value. These have implications for long-standing issues such as the Prisoner's Dilemma and for Newcomb's Problem. His proposal about rational belief has an internalist element of support by reasons that make the belief credible, and an externalist element of generation by a process that reliably produces true beliefs. Rational belief has an intellectual component, for one should not believe any statement less credible than some incompatible alternative. It also has a practic
      - al component, for one should believe a statement only if the expected utility (or decision value) of doing so is greater than that of not believing it.[1]
        The Nature of Rationality
      - In philosophy, practical reason is the use of reason to decide how to act. It contrasts with theoretical reason, often called speculative reason, the use of reason to decide what to follow. For example, agents use practical reason to decide whether to build a telescope, but theoretical reason to decide which of two theories of light and optics is the best.
        method https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Practical_reason
        Matching mental rationality to external structure- creates harmony and ease and maximum optimization at any time. Rationality as optimization
        Unrelenting self awareness is the only chance at escape
        https://www.researchgate.net/publication/305218678_The_Cogito_and_the_Limits_of_Neo-materialism_and_Naturalized_Objectivity
        methods http://www.logicinaction.org/docs/lia.pdf
        Situated and bounded rationality
        https://www.researchgate.net/publication/40906545_Controlling_Uncertainty_A_Review_of_Human_Behavior_in_Complex_Dynamic_Environments
        Future minded book
    - action: we choose to act
      - Action theory, Subfield of philosophy of mind that is specially important for ethics; it concerns the distinction between things that happen to a person and things one does or makes happen. Action theorists consider issues such as motive, desire, purpose, deliberation, decision, intention, trying, and free will. A central problem is the question of volition, or what connects intention with bodily movement; in Ludwig Wittgenstein’s formulation, “What is left over if I subtract the fact that my arm goes up from the fact that I raise my arm?”
        agency (linked to conotrl)
        It has been common to motivate a central question about the nature of action by invoking an intuitive distinction between the things that merely happen to people — the events they undergo — and the various things they genuinely do. The latter events, the doings, are the acts or actions of the agent, and the problem about the nature of action is supposed to be: what distinguishes an action from a mere happening or occurrence? For some time now, however, there has been a better appreciation of the vagaries of the verb ‘to do’ and a livelier sense that the question is not well framed
        It is natural to protest that this is not the sense of “do” the canny philosopher of action originally had in mind, but it is also not so easy to say just what sense that is. Moreover, as Harry Frankfurt [1978] has pointed out, the purposeful behavior of animals constitutes a low-level type of ‘active’ doing. When a spider walks across the table, the spider directly controls the movements of his legs, and they are directed at taking him from one location to another. Those very movements have an aim or purpose for the spider, and hence they are subject to a kind of teleological explanation. Similarly, the idle, unnoticed movements of my fingers may have the goal of releasing the candy wrapper from my grasp. All this behavioral activity is ‘action’ in some fairly weak sense.
        levels of action
        Thus, there are different levels of action to be distinguished, and these include at least the following: unconscious and/or involuntary behavior, purposeful or goal directed activity (of Frankfurt's spider, for instance), intentional action, and the autonomous acts or actions of self-consciously active human agents. Each of the key concepts in these characterizations raises some hard puzzles.
        It is frequently noted that the agent has some sort of immediate awareness of his physical activity and of the goals that the activity is aimed at realizing. In this connection, Elizabeth Anscombe [1963] spoke of ‘knowledge without observation.’ The agent knows ‘without observation’ that he is performing certain bodily movements (perhaps under some rough but non-negligible description), and he knows ‘without observation’ what purpose(s) the behavior is meant to serve [
        rich and suggestive, but her conception of ‘knowledge through observation’ is problematic. Surely, one wants to say, proprioception and kinesthetic sensation play some role in informing the agent of the positions and movements of his body, and it is uncertain why these informational roles should fail to count as modes of inner ‘observation’ of the agent's own overt physical behavior. What Anscombe explicitly denies is that agents generally know of the positions or movements of their own bodies by means of ‘separably describable sensations’ that serve as criteria for their judgements about the narrowly physical performance of their bodies
        However, when a person sees that there is a goldfinch in front of him, his knowledge is not derived as an inference from the ‘separably describable’ visual impressions he has in seeing the goldfinch, but this is an instance of knowledge through observation nonetheless.
        David Velleman [1989] describes knowledge of one’s present and incipient actions as ‘spontaneous’ (knowledge that the agent has achieved without deriving it from evidence adequate to warrant it), and as ‘self-fulfilling’ (expectations of acting that tend to produce actions of the kind expected). For Velleman, these expectations are themselves intentions, and they are chiefly derived by the agent through practical reasoning about what she is to perform. Thus, Velleman is what Sarah Paul (2009) calls a Strong Cognitivist, i.e., someone who identifies an intention with a certain pertinent belief about what she is doing or about to do.
        Weak Cognitivist, in Paul's terminology, is a theorist that holds that intentions to F are partially constituted by but are not identical with relevant beliefs that one will F. For instance, Paul Grice (1971) held that an intention to F consisted in the agent’s ‘willing’ herself to F combined with a belief that she will actually F as a more or less immediate consequence of her having so willed.
        forms and expectations of self dteremination: ie bootstraps vs fighting for rights
        process analysis: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/action/
        Pragmatist philosophy, degrees of influence language and actions have
        specify our types of actions: ie analyzing vs types of action. not all series of objects in our mind are the same. linear or nonlinear processes? Can be either?
        https://www.felsemiotica.com/descargas/Horn-Laurence-R.-and-Ward-Gregory-Ed.-The-Handbook-of-Pragmatics.pdf see analyses
        Nevertheless, a great deal of human action has a richer psychological structure than this. An agent performs activity that is directed at a goal, and commonly it is a goal the agent has adopted on the basis of an overall practical assessment of his options and opportunities. Moreover, it is immediately available to the agent's awareness both that he is performing the activity in question and that the activity is aimed by him at such-and-such a chosen end. At a still more sophisticated conceptual level, Frankfurt [1988, 1999] has also argued that basic issues concerning freedom of action presuppose and give weight to a concept of ‘acting on a desire with which the agent identifies.’
        pragmatism
        https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2939682.pdf
        What people believe in abstract vs actions : can make study? resaerch
        Threshold of when we change pieces of information to general feeling units and general abstract ideas and then to action?
        https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Satisficing
        concepts as temporal, dynamic, orbabiltiy
        https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bayesian_inference
        Existing within your own sphere of influence
        https://zwischenstadt.tumblr.com/post/190206113709/jon-las-heras-politics-of-power-engaging-with
        and see homepage of this blog
        lang in thot and action book
        https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/On_the_Plurality_of_Worlds
        https://bibliotecamathom.files.wordpress.com/2012/09/the-philosophy-of-action-an-introduction.pdf
        http://library.nothingness.org/articles/SI/en/display/35
        Agency and the material world, mathematical, philsoohpical tulpa
        http://xixax.com/halfborn/3.html
        Determinism and the scripts we follow, limits of language
        The physical manifestations of ideas
        https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_actions
        https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Autonomy_and_heteronomy
        Topology and visualizations of politicos theory and actions
        narrative
        https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_Narrative
        https://sci-hub.tw/https://doi.org/10.1111/psj.12172
        discusrive agency process
        i am a strange loop
        https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indexicality
        game theory
        method http://web.stanford.edu/~clark/1990s/Using%20language/Clark.Ch2.UsingLanguage.1996.pdf
        https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Game_theory
        https://www.investopedia.com/articles/financial-theory/08/game-theory-basics.asp
        can also see books
        file:///C:/Users/CJ/Downloads/9781601989093-summary.pdf
        https://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/gametheory.asp
        Aim of the game
        behavior
      - Engaging beliefs with senses- visualizing etc
        Central to my personal way of learning is that I have a large overview of the world in mind, and everything that I learn gets added to this structure as just another detail of the overview. Some parts of this structure are very sparse, and some are heavily laden with detail, depending on my personal knowledge of a given area of knowledge, but there is always the possibility of adding to the structure, and the structure relates that knowledge to everything else that you know.
        https://medium.com/datadriveninvestor/merleau-ponty-and-the-a-i-d8f1ffcfe1ba
    - Set theory + decision theory
      - quantifying objects within a domain to make a desicion in/for/with?
      - Decision theory (or the theory of choice not to be confused with choice theory) is the study of an agent's choices.[1] Decision theory can be broken into two branches: normative decision theory, which analyzes the outcomes of decisions or determines the optimal decisions given constraints and assumptions, and descriptive decision theory, which analyzes how agents actually make the decisions they do.
        https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Decision_theory types of choices and methods
        https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Structure_and_agency
    - A decision tree is a decision support tool that uses a tree-like model of decisions and their possible consequences, including chance event outcomes, resource costs, and utility. It is one way to display an algorithm that only contains conditional control statements.
      - combo w other diagram in caus sna effct
        https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sociogram https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Decision_tree
    - functions and end goals: Teleology (from τέλος, telos, 'end', 'aim', or 'goal,' and λόγος, logos, 'explanation' or 'reason')[1] or finality[2][3] is a reason or explanation for something as a function of its end, purpose, or goal.[4] A purpose that is imposed by a human use, such as that of a fork, is called extrinsic.[
      - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Teleology
        Start with the sentence: work backwards to optimize
    - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_engineering_(political_science)
  - change
  - process-specific ie modeling
    - Webs and networks and systems
  - time
    - history
      - future
        https://docs.google.com/document/d/1_5ntpFhK8kJwGCQoO_s5vYeYklx6pVI5LfdYyuGpgfM/edit
        The future is the trigger of freedom, a firearm aimed at oneself
        So I always have a lot of principles in mind, and I play them off against each other. For example, how ought the principle of parsimony to be interpreted in light of the principle of plenitude? For me, the empirical world is just an application of principles, and principles guide us to a lot of counter-factuals not realized in the actual world, but no less valid. This is especially important in relation to future studies, which must always keep in mind alternative pathways for future history. Almost everything I write is the attempt to either formulate a principle or apply a principle.
        https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inductive_probability
        Reliazations of the future
        https://archive.org/details/seeressofprevors00kern/page/6/mode/2up
      - narrative
        time naraitve history: see methods
        http://www.al-edu.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Paul-Ricoeur-Time-and-Narrative-vol1.pdf
        https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Narrative_history
      - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy_of_history
        https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cliodynamics
    - The present as a necessity and not an accessory to the future
    - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy_of_space_and_time
      - can adapt different ones depending?
      - The many worlds forking paths as a system of trade
- other people/society
  - Social ontology is the study of the nature and properties of the social world. It is concerned with analyzing the various entities in the world that arise from social interaction. A prominent topic in social ontology is the analysis of social groups. Do social groups exist at all? If so, what sorts of entities are they, and how are they created? Is a social group distinct from the collection of people who are its members, and if so, how is it different? What sorts of properties do social groups have? Can they have beliefs or intentions? Can they perform actions? And if so, what does it take for a group to believe, intend, or act?
    - Social ontology also addresses more basic questions about the nature of the social world. One set of questions pertains to the constituents, or building blocks, of social things in general. For instance, some theories argue that social entities are built out of the psychological states of individual people, while others argue that they are built out of actions, and yet others that they are built out of practices. Still other theories deny that a distinction can even be made between the social and the non-social. A different set of questions pertains to how social categories are constructed or set up. Are social categories and kinds produced by our attitudes? By our language? Are they produced by causal patterns? And is there just one way social categories are set up, or are there many varieties of social construction?
      - social laws (Mill 1843, Spencer 1895); social facts (Durkheim 1894, Mandelbaum 1955); social groups (Oppenheim & Putnam 1958, Gilbert 1989, Tuomela 2013); human kinds (Boyd 1991, 1999b; Millikan 1999, Mallon 2016); institutional facts (Searle 1995); social objects and social properties (Macdonald & Pettit 1981, Ruben 1985); social predicates (Kincaid 1986);
        social practices (Bourdieu 1977, Giddens 1984, Schatzki 1996); and social processes (Whitehead 1929, Rescher 2000, Livet & Nef 2009). Some theories focus on a category because it is significant, but do not claim that it comprehensively covers the social world. Others choose a category of social entities in order to be comprehensive. In doing this, a theory may aim to set up an exhaustive determination claim: for instance, it may claim that all social objects are composed of individual people interacting with one another, or that all social properties supervene on individualistic properties, or that all social facts are grounded by physical facts
        To many theorists, individual people are paradigmatically non-social. Many philosophers, however, argue that individuals are socially constituted (see sections 1.2, 3.1.2, and the sections A.3.2, and A.4.2 of the supplement on the history of social ontology). Thus some projects in social ontology look for a middle ground. They intend to accommodate the social nature of individuals, and yet to account fully for the social in terms of individuals
        A second difficulty in analyzing social entities is in distinguishing ontological from merely causal relations.
        Many cases, however, are less straightforward, and it is not always easy to distinguish when entities stand in ontological rather than causal relations.
        Furthermore, there might be instantaneous or even backward causation
        The more significant complication, however, is that ontological relations need not be synchronic. For a mental state to be a memory, for instance, it must be caused by the event of which it is a memory. Likewise, a mark’s being a footprint partly depends on historical events: it requires that the mark was made by the strike of a foot
        Some theories of the social world insist that a social entity can only ontologically depend on synchronic facts about the world. Classical structuralism, influenced by Saussure 1916, regards social structures as synchronic, with the social structure at time t being a product of the mental states of individuals at time t (see section 4.1). John Searle’s theory of institutional facts (Searle 1995, 2010) also regards social entities as being synchronically dependent: the institutional facts at time t are a product of attitudes in the community at time t together with a synchronic residue of historical events that Searle calls the “background”.
        Work in a variety of domains, however, argues for an ontological role of historical factors. Among these are theories of semantic content (Kripke 1972, Putnam 1975, Davidson 1987), biological and social kinds (Millikan 1984), artworks (Levinson 1980), and artifacts (Bloom 1996, Thomasson 2003).
        People interested in the building blocks of the social world often discuss different relations apart from supervenience, including identity, parthood, fusion, aggregation, set membership, constitution, and grounding (see entry on ontological dependence,
        Clarifying the “building relations” is part of understanding the different roles that even a single kind of building block can play in making the social world. Certain theories, for instance, propose that social entities are built out of individual people’s psychological states. But psychological states play a different role in the first inquiry—see section 3.1—than they do in the second—see section 4.1.
        Many theories aim to remove the mystery from the social world by characterizing a non-social “determination base”: i.e., a domain of non-social entities that exhaustively determines the social. Some put forward a strong claim about the relation between the social and the non-social: for instance, they claim that social entities are reducible to some particular set of non-social entities (see entry on scientific reduction). Others make weaker claims, such as that the set of social properties globally supervenes (see section 2.3) on some set of non-social properties.
        Psychologism is the view that social facts are composed exclusively out of the psychological states of individual people. This is the view advanced by Mill 1843 (see section 1.2 and also section A.3.1 of the supplement on the history of social ontology) and endorsed by subsequent theorists of the “social mind” such as Tarde 1898, 1901. Economists in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries also advocated psychologism (Jevons 1871, Wicksteed 1910, Pareto 1916), as did mid-century social theorists (Popper 1945, Watkins 1952). The term ‘psychologism’ is a little confusing. Karl Popper, for instance, uses this word as a pejorative regarding a particular kind of methodology in social science. But when it comes to ontology, he endorses Mill’s view
        Theories also differ when it comes to which psychological states determine social entities or facts. The theories of group attitudes just mentioned hold that group attitudes are determined not just by psychological states in general, but by particular attitudes on the part of members. Broader versions of psychologism (e.g., Mill’s) are less specific about which psychological states are involved.
        Many agents gathered together have emergent traits and a structure that they don't alone.
        Social atomism (or atomistic individualism) holds that the social world is built out of individual people understood as isolated “atoms”. As Taylor 1985 points out, the term ‘atomism’ is mostly used by its enemies, so its characterization often depends on what it is used to be a foil for. But, typically, atomism is a combination of two claims: the view that society is exclusively built out of individual people, and that individual people are somehow isolated from one another, as opposed to being mutually interdependent.
        ‘Atomism’ is taken fairly literally by theories that apply the methods of statistical physics to society. The idea is to model societies as large aggregates of people, much as liquids and gases are aggregates of molecules, or ant colonies aggregates of ants.
        animals are useful metaphors but dont confuse them with human structural traits. not equivalent but you can study animal colonies and see if anything exactly matches with humans
        The term ‘atomism’ is also used to indicate theories that neglect the causal or historical influences of society on individuals. A model may neglect social conditioning altogether, for instance by treating individual preferences as exogenous or given parts of a social model. Or, instead, people at a historical starting point may be regarded as isolated or non-social. ‘Atomism’ in this sense is applied to Hobbesian or “state or nature” views that give an account of the development of society starting with non-social individuals encountering one another
        Another example is Edith Penrose’s “resource theory” of the firm (Penrose 1959). Penrose proposes that firms (corporations, partnerships, etc.) be understood as collections of distinctive resources, including real estate, capital goods, and material processes.
        resource focused analysis - analyze individuals and social system from pov of resource status, quantify, how behavior and chocie changes with resources. game theory. quantified method - internal quantification of resources (resources can be intenrla objects/sets of knowledge or external objects, enviro.) and external resource quantification equation that optimizes resource use . LoAs and set theory. can make into program
        general theory of how we quantify internal objexts/systems and quantify external objexts/ssyttems under diffeerent conditions and for different pramatic purposes. semantics/ling, survivial aspects, even everyday situatoins, problem solving/engineering. optimize internal resources (time, spatio-abstract undertandings, lang is considered internal resource) with the external. self awareness + the external
        1. observe how we do it - collect and analyze the data and study our tendencies at vairous loas- linguistic, survivial etc 2. how we SHOULD - optimize w equations etc at various loas. game theory, lang games - so it would be kind of game theory w externals + lang games optimization combo
        https://www.google.com/search?q=intenral+resources&rlz=1C1CHBF_enUS892US892&oq=intenral+resources&aqs=chrome..69i57.1408j0j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8
        specify our types of actions: analyzing vs types of action. not all series of objects in our mind are the same. linear or nonlinear processes? can be either?
        we play intrtnal language games with ourselves; incoporate with ideas and process of self awareness. how do these internal lang games interact with external lang games ie social?
        see pg 30 of idea of a social science
        so all in all its internal and ext resource use (as studied) and then a process of optimization for various pruposes
        Make new word: the perception that is inner life combined with perception of outer world (material and social) as system narrative
        worldwide brain net is kind of example of this. internal info to external interaction network (making international w computers)
        spatio-abstract: the map is not reality. space and time in our minds psychoogically is not the same time and space that exist in the material world, but they are both their own loas and systems that interact w each other. the objexts in our mind correlate with the external and interact with them in a mutual system that we make actions toward but not ARE them. always specify this - loas are a way of sorting this.
        systems theory of semantic collections/objects: words exist in relation to objects and have functions and changes, effect each other. loas and can be seeb as system. observe how changing one aspect changes the rest statisticall yand logicallt
        http://www.it-hiroshima.ac.jp/institution/library/pdf/research51_017-024.pdf and see note
        https://books.google.com/books?id=XVUmCAAAQBAJ&pg=PA92&lpg=PA92&dq=internal+language+game&source=bl&ots=Key-9TbRUN&sig=ACfU3U3FPig-61QsM2G7vVafsqzVhfS7MQ&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjX4vHMh9DpAhWrTd8KHZPrBU8Q6AEwCXoECAwQAQ#v=onepage&q=internal%20language%20game&f=false
        https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/content-externalism/
        Games on various scales
        see comp sci doc for project section
        Despite such examples, it is often unclear whether such theories genuinely take goods and resources to be ontologically related to social entities. Or instead, whether they regard resources to interact causally with social entities, but not to constitute them. Moreover, even in models that include resources, often only individual choices are modeled as having causal powers: resources have no causal import except as mediated by the attitudes and actions of individuals. Even Penrose’s theory of the firm focuses most of its attention on “capabilities”, understood as knowledge and skills of human actors, and subsequent literature derived from Penrose focuses even more on capabilities as the exemplar of resources (e.g., Teece et al. 1997).
        Many theorists in social ontology reject the approaches discussed in section 3.1. It is fruitless, they hold, to search for non-social building blocks of the social world. That does not mean, however, that they renounce analysis of the social altogether. Instead, they try to shed light on the determination of the social in terms of other social components.
        Some of these projects make similar claims to the ones in the last section. That is, they propose sets of entities that exhaustively determine the social world—but they propose sets consisting of social entities. Other projects are more modest. They aim at partial accounts, rather than exhaustive ones. Just as one might break a car down into chassis, engine, transmission, etc., one might break social entities into mid-sized parts even if that breakdown is not fully exhaustive, and even if those parts are not themselves analyzed.
        For those projects that do attempt to give an exhaustive analysis of the social in terms of other social building blocks, a recurring worry is whether they can avoid being circular. If we were trying to explain the nature of water, it would hardly do to say that it is built out of watery parts. Likewise, it is unclear what we have accomplished if we argue that social entity x is ontologically determined by social entity y, and then that y in turn is partly ontologically determined by x.
        ongestion games are a class of games in game theory first proposed by American economist Robert W. Rosenthal in 1973. In a congestion game the payoff of each player depends on the resources it chooses and the number of players choosing the same resource. Congestion games are a special case of potential games. Rosenthal proved that any congestion game is a potential game and Monderer and Shapley (1996) proved the converse: for any potential game, there is a congestion game with the same potential function.
        https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Congestion_game
        More recent theories depart from psychologism by introducing additional entities into the determination base of social entities. Kincaid 1986, for instance, claims that the social supervenes on individualistic properties and relations and actions. Other theories argue that among the constituents of the social are also resources and other features of the world.
        we can observe at different levels of systems: the individdula alone which interacrts with the social, or the social as a whole
        pragmatist theorization methods = choosing the most useful without imposing structure. do not make systtems for the sake of it, espeically not in our human attempts to make "an ultimate theory/system of everythuing"
        choosing what theory is most theory for pragmatic end goal. end goal determines the process: reverse engineering processes
        A more unequivocal turn away from mentalism and toward the external world in constituting social entities occurred in the 1980s in sociology and anthropology. Theorists in these fields began to pay a great deal of attention to how bodies cope in the practical world
        The most prominent theories arguing for non-social building blocks of the social are individualistic in either a narrow or broad sense. Either the social is exhaustively determined by the psychological states of individual people, or by these plus behaviors, bodies, and actions, or by these plus resource bundles allocated to individuals. An alternative is to reject individualism altogether, and instead regard the determination base of the social to include (at least potentially) any physical entities whatever (see Epstein 2009, Hindriks 2013, Ylikoski 2014). Physicalism is often understood to be the view that all facts—the social ones included—are physical facts
        Clarifying the thesis of physicalism involves circumscribing what counts as “physical”, just as individualism involves clarifying what counts as “individualistic”. If the physical entities are to be a non-social “base” that exhaustively determines the social, then it is required that the social not be included in that base. (See sections 3.2 and 3.3 on the separation of the social from the nonsocial.) Clarifying physicalism likewise requires clarifying what dependence relation various facts are taken to stand in, with regard to the physical. Are social facts, for instance, taken to be physical facts? To supervene on physical facts? To be exhaustively grounded by physical facts?
        Third, it is unclear if physicalism is true. In fact, certain social entities seem to be good candidates for counterexamples to at least some versions of physicalism. One widely discussed problem with a supervenience interpretation of physicalism, for instance, is the “grounding” problem regarding the modal properties of coinciding objects
        i dont care about other academics interpreation based on if its "true" or not in the regular philo sense. acquire the process via reason and logic and the end goal - always justify end goal and process both before and during. structure idea process for communicating ideas:
        1. idea in system a. axioms and assumptions behind it b. justify in relation to end goal and in relation to other parts of idea ystem c. justify its place in system d. how it interacts with other parts of system and why e. LoA for the idea itself and then place that specific LoA (a small system itself) in the larger LoA system that makes up the whole series of ideas. how they relate to each other and justify each other; logic and sets within each other. each LoA is a set object within the larger LoAs - implies hierarchy based on set logic. ideas within ideas; systems within systems,
        basically make overall LoA process for pragmatic creation and explaination puposes: type sof LoAs you could use: explination LoAs, LoAs for analysis, Loas for justification, Loas for creation, not the same and each has different methods but can exist in a larger system together.
        make w self awareness: to what degree am i IMPOSING a structure on this? am i appying a fallacy or assumption? justify assumptiosn and axioms,
        degreees and types of imposing a structure on internal resources and extenral resources (cnocepts in mind, semantic information pieces etc). sometimes it can be useful in relation to end goal to impmose stryucture, but have justification method, ilike spinozas system of logic.
        you can have an end goal pragmatic creation, OR just want to analyze. different processes. can be short term or long term. but we always should keep our ultimate end goal in mind, which we always do have, even when analyzing and not directly imposing action on the world and creating.
        is analyzing a form of creation? identify types of creation,
        But, we might ask, what sets up the category cha-cha? Why do the moves determine what dance it is, rather than the material of floor they are dancing on or the brand of shoes they are wearing? What makes it the case that dances are categorized into cha-chas versus sambas versus salsas; or, for that matter, certain sequences of movement into dances versus strolls versus marches? Here are a few options one might start with: A crude mentalistic theory: the fact that the dance is a cha-cha is a product of the fact that I believe it is a cha-cha. A crude naturalistic theory: social categories are natural features of reality, with the physical structure of the world breaking reality down into categories, one of which is the cha-cha. A crude linguistic theory: we define the word ‘cha-cha’, and that definition specifies the conditions for an entity to be a cha-cha.
        Section 4.1 discusses theories that are both mentalistic and individualistic: i.e., those holding that the metaphysical source of a person’s social categories is that person’s own mental states. Section 4.2 discusses mentalistic theories that involve many or all the mental states of people in a community, rather than each person for herself. Section 4.3 discusses theories that regard social categories to be set up by patterns of properties and causes. Section 4.4 discusses theories that include practices in setting up social categories, and section 4.5 discusses pluralistic and heterogeneous theories. Section 4.6 discusses the potential roles for language in setting up social categories.
        Importantly, any given theory of the source of social categories can take different positions on the topics discussed in section 3—i.e., on what the constituents or building blocks of social entities are. A set of theorists might disagree about how cha-chas (or other social entities, or entities in general) are constituted—e.g., by people, or patterns, or physical configurations of atoms, or sensible particulars, or impressions, etc. And yet all might agree that a person’s categories are set up by that person’s own mental states (compare, for instance, Berkeley 1710, Russell 1929, and Dennett 1991). Conversely, a set of theorists might all agree on how cha-chas are constituted, yet disagree on what metaphysically sets up that category.
        make theory according to the context, or choose what theory to analyze it with based on pragmatic end goal. is having an end goal in general , whihc we do for most things, considered pragmatic?
        Many philosophical traditions investigate how individuals mentally construct, organize, categorize, or represent social objects—and objects more generally. Some views regard social categories to be concepts that individual minds assemble in order to organize subjective impressions. An example is a Lockean “nominal essence” theory of social categories (see section A.2.4 of the supplement). In this theory, a given person’s social category cha-cha is an idea in that person’s mind, formed out of combinations of impressions or other ideas internal to that person’s mind.
        https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/social-ontology/ see 4.1 and on for social categories and processes
        https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dependence-ontological/
        The standard rough characterization of an artifact is that it is an object created by people to perform some function (see Hilpinen 1992a, Dipert 1993; entry on artifact). This characterization excludes objects that are used to perform functions but are not made by a person.
        documentationism analysis - primary, secondary, realtino to end goal
        the law, money, language analysis
        psychpolitic analysis: The construct of psychopolitical validity runs in opposition to "mainstream psychology's traditions [that] reinforce oppressive institutions even when individual psychologists have no such goal in mind,".[3] In addition this evaluation technique questions mainstream positivism. Psychopolitical validity asks the researcher and activist to think about power and how it affects fundamental epistemological and transformational values. What are the political and psychological implications for the researcher and the researched? What is the value of a given research question? What are the implications of a community intervention developed from said research question? How and why is research put into practice?
        https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Psychopolitical_validity
        Some things propel themselves: they self-affirm in their place in reality like an object , it is not refutable
        https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14442211003720588?journalCode=rtap20 self other analysis process
        https://research.unl.pt/ws/portalfiles/portal/5917267/9_Baumann.pdf see for creating a process
        https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Documentality
        https://lucian.uchicago.edu/blogs/mediatheory/keywords/logocentrism/
        http://www.politicseastasia.com/studying/setting-up-a-discourse-analysis-of-political-texts-from-east-asia/
        https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Critical_theory
        process for each type of social object analysyis
        In anthropology, folkloristics, and the social and behavioral sciences, emic and etic refer to two kinds of field research done and viewpoints obtained:[1] emic, from within the social group (from the perspective of the subject) and etic, from outside (from the perspective of the observer).
        https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emic_and_etic
        pragmatic social
        In new pragmatism, economics is seen as a science that is: descriptive, explanatory and evaluative alike – a description is a point of departure and imminently leads to a normative (prescriptive), that is evaluative perspective; contextual – analyses and syntheses are not conducted in isolation from reality, in “pure” economic models but, instead, with reference to specific dynamic and variable complex circumstances, determinants, constraints and possibilities; complex – it combines elements of analysis and synthesis from various economic schools, from behavioral economics to political economics, as well as microeconomics with macroeconomics and global economics; multidisciplinary – the analysis of economic reality takes account of findings and methods of other disciplines of social sciences, most of all history, geography, philosophy, sociology, psychology, law and anthropology; comparative – the comparison of economic, cultural, geographic and political reality is treated as the bas
        sic research method. New pragmatism sees globalization – the historical and spontaneous process of liberalizing and integrating various markets into one interconnected and internally consolidated worldwide system – as an irreversible phenomenon.[4] Hence, what becomes the fundamental economic problem of modern times is an effective coordination of economic policy and developmental strategies at a national and global level and rebuilding the institutional structure of global economy.[5]
        Solipsism and the Problem of Other Minds
        If the relationship between having a human body and a certain kind of mental life is as contingent as the Cartesian account of mind implies, it should be equally easy – or equally difficult – for me to conceive of a table as being in pain as it is for me to conceive of another person as being in pain. The point, of course, is that this is not so. The supposition that a table might experience pain is a totally meaningless one, whereas the ascription of pain to other human beings and animals that, in their physical characteristics and/or behavioral capabilities, resemble human beings is something which even very young children find unproblematic.
        a pragmatic evaluation
        Only of a living human being and what resembles (behaves like) a living human being can one say: it has sensations; it sees; is blind; hears; is deaf; is conscious or unconscious.
        If there is no logical connection between the physical and the mental, if the physical forms no part of the criteria that govern my ascription of psychological predicates, then I would be able to conceive of an inanimate object such as a table as having a soul and being conscious. But I cannot attach any intelligibility to the notion of an inanimate object being conscious. It follows therefore that there is a logical connection between the physical and the mental: the physical does form part of the criteria that govern my ascription of psychological words.
        Consequently, the belief that there is something problematic about the application of psychological words to other human beings and that such applications are necessarily the products of highly fallible inferences to the “inner” mental lives of others, which require something like the argument from analogy for their justification, turns out to be fundamentally confused. The intersubjective world that we live with other human beings and the public language-system that we must master if we are to think at all are the primary data, the “proto-phenomena,” in Wittgenstein’s phrase.
        Our psychological and non-psychological concepts alike are derived from a single linguistic fountainhead. It is precisely because the living human being functions as our paradigm of that which is conscious and has a mental life that we find the solipsistic notion that other human beings could be “automatons,” machines devoid of any conscious thought or experience, bizarre and bewildering. The idea that other persons might all in reality be “automatons” is not one which we can seriously entertain.
        We are now in a position to see the essential redundancy of the argument from analogy. First, it is a misconception to think that we need any inferential argument to assure us of the existence of other minds. Such an assurance seems necessary only so long as it is assumed that each of us has to work “outwards” from the interiority of his/her own consciousness, to abstract from our own cases to the “internal” world of others. As indicated above, this assumption is fundamentally wrong – our knowledge that other human beings are conscious and our knowledge of their mental states at a given time is not inferential in nature at all, but is rather determined by the public criteria that govern the application of psychological concepts.
        To ascribe pain to a third party, on the other hand, is to identify a concrete individual as the possessor of the pain. On this point alone Wittgenstein concurs with the exponent of the argument from analogy. However, Wittgenstein here calls attention to the fact that the asymmetry is not one that exists between the supposedly direct and certain knowledge that I have of my own mental states as distinct from the wholly inferential knowledge which, allegedly, I have of the mental states of others. Rather, the asymmetry is that the ascriptions of psychological predicates to others require criterial justificatory grounds, whereas the self-avowals or self-ascriptions of such predicates are criterionless
        It thus transpires that the argument from analogy appears possible and necessary only to those who misapprehend the asymmetry between the criterial bases for third-person psychological predicate ascription and the non-criterial right for their self-ascription or self-avowal for a cognitive asymmetry between direct and indirect knowledge of mental states. The Cartesian egocentric view of the mind and of mental events that gives rise both to the specter of solipsism and attempts to evade it by means of the argument from analogy has its origins in this very misapprehension.
        Wittgenstein distinguishes two senses of the word “private” as it is normally used: privacy of knowledge and privacy of possession. Something is private to me in the first sense if only I can know it; it is private to me in the second sense if only I can have it. Thus the thesis that experience is necessarily private can mean one of two things, which are not always discriminated from each other with sufficient care: (a) only I can know my experiences or (b) only I can have my experiences.
        https://www.iep.utm.edu/solipsis/
        There is a temptation to say that solipsism is a false philosophical theory, but this is not quite strong or accurate enough. As a theory, it is incoherent. What makes it incoherent, above all else, is that the solipsist requires a language (that is a sign-system) to think or to affirm his solipsistic thoughts at all. Given this, it is scarcely surprising that those philosophers who accept the Cartesian premises that make solipsism apparently plausible, if not inescapable, have also invariably assumed that language-usage is itself essentially private. The cluster of arguments – generally referred to as “the private language argument”
        I defend an alternative to the two traditional accounts of the relationship between metacognition and social cognition: metacognition as primary versus social cognition as primary. These accounts have complementary explanatory vices and virtues. They also share a natural assumption: that interpretation in terms of mental states is “spectatorial”, aiming exclusively for an objective description of the mental facts about self and others.
        I argue that if one rejects this assumption in favor of the view that interpretation in terms of mental states also plays important regulative roles with respect to minds and behavior, a new and superior conception of the relationship between metacognition and social cognition comes into view. On this conception, person-level metacognitive concepts are socio-cognitive tools that shape us into better cognitive agents and more predictable cognitive objects, thereby enhancing our abilities at social coordination.
        Mastery of these metacognitive concepts relies on subpersonal, non-conceptual, procedural metacognition. This reconceptualization of the relationship between metacognition and social cognition combines the complementary explanatory virtues of the two traditional conceptions, while avoiding their complementary explanatory vices.
        https://sci-hub.tw/10.1007/s11229-019-02477-2 process of metacog
        mans epistolmological undertand of reality influences natur eof society and social realtions. the minds contact w reality: relation of thought to actual phyiscal thing. mental images functions simply in words/semantic systems. ex: i say mount everest to refer to physical thing; words refers to something as a purpose. nauture of meaning + realtionship b/w thought and reality. method of connection could be definition; proposed use defined socially. we do not know if 2 things are to be regarded the same or not unless told context in which it arrives no 2 things are the same in reality.; dependent on context and purpose. onnly in terms of a given rle ccan we attach a sepcfic sense to the words "the same". word "same" and "rule" are interwoven , like the words "true" and "proposition". for this formula, we must use in context always; real life application.
        A variant of psychologism takes an externalist approach to mental states. Externalism is the view that mental states ontologically depend on facts about the external world. It holds that, for instance, the content of a person’s concept of water partly depends on the actual structure of samples of water in the person’s environment
        and likewise that the content of a person’s concept of the U.S. Government partly depends on the external entity that is the U.S. Government
        https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/content-externalism/
        Externalist psychologism, if correct, would pare down the determination base of the social world to one kind of (partly social) entity. It faces hurdles, however. First, it must explain how it avoids circularity—that is, social entities depend on attitudes toward those entities that depend on the social entities themselves. Second and more seriously, it needs to explain why this is a plausible determination base for the social. According to this view, the external world figures profoundly into the determination of the social—but only when it is a constituent of attitudes. Strangely, when the external world is not a constituent of attitudes, it plays no role in the determination of the social.
        Other theorists argue that people or selves are socially constituted. Husserl argues that even the content of an individual’s sensory perception is conditioned by the community of other conscious individuals. A person’s subjectivity thus depends on intersubjectivity
        A view like this—much like the externalist psychologism discussed above—can be seen as individualistic in some sense. Though it does not argue that the social world is determined by non-social or pre-social individuals, it still holds that the social is determined by individuals.
        Scheler 1913 that the fundamental kind of experience is experience-with-one-another; Mead 1913, 1934 that individual experience and self-consciousness emerge from a social matrix of communication processes; and Berger and Luckmann 1966 that individuals are constituted by the social roles with which they identify. MacIntyre 1984 argues that selves are constituted by social narratives; Taylor 1989 that the self is constituted through the participation in moral frameworks; and Davis 2003 develops a social narrative theory of the individual in economics.
        make a matrix of internal and external games/processes? see left side for resource proj ideas
        Work on the relation between minds and bodies strongly influences arguments about social dualism. In particular, many philosophers of social science have adopted anti-dualist strategies pioneered by philosophers of mind, especially the “non-reductive physicalism” developed by Davidson, Putnam, Fodor, Kim, and others. As applied to minds, this is the view that there may be in-principle obstacles to reducing mental properties or facts to physical properties or facts, even though the mental is exhaustively determined by the physical. Philosophers of the social sciences applied this to social entities in the form of “non-reductive individualism”. There may be obstacles, this view holds, to the reduction of social phenomena to individualistic ones, even though the social is exhaustively determined by the individualistic
        https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spatial_network
        Other views focus on the social constitution of the body. Foucault 1976, 1977a and Butler 1988, 1990, 1993, among others, hold that an adequate theory of the self involves the construction of bodies as much as it does the construction of mental states. And they argue that human bodies are largely products of discourse and the exercise of social power. However, in interpreting these views it is important to distinguish claims about the constituents of selves and bodies from claims about how kinds and categories are set up. At least to some extent, these are theories of how narratives and practices set up categories for classifying bodies
        To be useful, it is not necessary to provide a complete account of the social world, nor to analyze social entities “all the way down” to some fundamental level. It can also be illuminating even to give a partial account of one particular social entity in terms of others.
        Popper and his students put forward a hybrid methodology for social science, which favors individualistic explanations in a local context or “situation”, but takes institutions as background conditions that are treated as exogenous. This methodology is often known as “institutional individualism” (Agassi 1975, J.S. Coleman 1990, Jarvie 1998, Udehn 2001). This, however, is an approach to methodology, not a claim about the nature of the social. These models do not generally commit themselves to ontological claims either about the nature of these entities or about which social entities the various components constitute. Popper, for one, argues for the indispensability of institutions in social explanation, but has a psychologistic ontology of institutions
        identify the logical assumptions within the semantics and syntax we choose (linguistic determinism = conceptual determinism??)
        phil = applying a predetermined structure on observations/knwoeldge to some degree for pragmatic end goal of sorting or analysis, psych = observatino and analtsis without imposing strucutre
        Although it is common to distinguish individualism and holism as the two poles in debates over social ontology, the range of views discussed in sections 3.1 and 3.2 show that individualism is not the only alternative to holism. Even among those in 3.1—ones that take the social to be built out of non-social components—there are both individualistic and non-individualistic alternatives to holism.
        Dualism about the social is the view that social and non-social entities—such as societies and individuals, or structures and agents—are distinct, and neither is grounded in the other. In the mid-twentieth-century individualism/holism debates (see Jarvie 1972, O’Neill 1973), holists were widely understood as endorsing versions of dualism. In those debates, defenders of holism did not deny the existence of the non-social. Instead, they argued that the social cannot be reduced to individualistic entities.
        not the same but interacting systems?
        Other approaches reject any ordering or hierarchy of entities altogether. Some views deny that the sciences can be divided into hierarchies, but allow that certain entities are composed of others. A more radical view is that there is no building at all among entities. A prominent example is Actor-Network Theory (Latour 2005, Callon 1999, Law 2009). All entities, in this approach, are potentially on a par with one another. Even identifying an entity or a class of things as “social” is a mistake, according to Latour. Latour distinguishes certain roles that objects can play: they can act as “mediators”, transforming meaning, and they can act as “intermediaries”, transmitting meaning without transforming it. An atom, a person, a machine, a mountain, or a bank, have equal potential to play these roles. All the scientist—social or natural—can do is to write narratives that trace associations. Other approaches to flat ontology include “assemblage theory” (DeLanda 2006), “object-oriented ontol
        ogy” (Harman 2005), and “scale-free metaphysics” (Thalos 2013).
        different approaches to the set theoery of the ideas
        In the social sciences, framing comprises a set of concepts and theoretical perspectives on how individuals, groups, and societies, organize, perceive, and communicate about reality. Framing can manifest in thought or interpersonal communication. Frames in thought consist of the mental representations, interpretations, and simplifications of reality. Frames in communication consist of the communication of frames between different actors.[1] In social theory, framing is a schema of interpretation, a collection of anecdotes and stereotypes, that individuals rely on to understand and respond to events.[2] In other words, people build a series of mental "filters" through biological and cultural influences. They then use these filters to make sense of the world. The choices they then make are influenced by their creation of a frame.
        Framing is also a key component of sociology, the study of social interaction among humans. Framing is an integral part of conveying and processing data on a daily basis. Successful framing techniques can be used to reduce the ambiguity of intangible topics by contextualizing the information in such a way that recipients can connect to what they already know.
        frame building for existing concpept reporting, frame setting by applying existing schema, survival of fittest among ideas, efects how we thiink of an issue.
        Perhaps because of their use across the social sciences, frames have been defined and used in many disparate ways. Entman called framing "a scattered conceptualization" and "a fractured paradigm" that "is often defined casually, with much left to an assumed tacit understanding of the reader".[15] In an effort to provide more conceptual clarity, Entman suggested that frames "select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described".[15]
        Entman's[15] conceptualization of framing, which suggests frames work by elevating particular pieces of information in salience, is in line with much early research on the psychological underpinnings of framing effects (see also Iyengar,[20] who argues that accessibility is the primary psychological explanation for the existence of framing effects). Wyer and Srull[21] explain the construct of accessibility thus: People store related pieces of information in "referent bins" in their long-term memory.[21] People organize "referent bins" such that more frequently and recently used pieces of information are stored at the top of the bins and are therefore more accessible.[21] Because people tend to retrieve only a small portion of information from long-term memory when making judgments, they tend to retrieve the most accessible pieces of information to use for making those judgments.[21]
        Chong and Druckman suggest framing research has mainly focused on two types of frames: equivalency and emphasis frames.[25] Equivalency frames offer "different, but logically equivalent phrases", which cause individuals to alter their preferences.[1] Equivalency frames are often worded in terms of "gains" versus "losses"
        frame alignment: part of problem solving https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Framing_(social_sciences)
        also see for media/encoutnering creation analysis process
        analyze your own and other's frames
        https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thematic_apperception_test
        In psychology, apperception is "the process by which new experience is assimilated to and transformed by the residuum of past experience of an individual to form a new whole."[2] In short, it is to perceive new experience in relation to past experience. The term is found in the early psychologies of Herbert Spencer, Hermann Lotze, and Wilhelm Wundt. It originally means passing the threshold into consciousness, i.e., to perceive. But the percept is changed when reaching consciousness due to the contextual presence of the other stuff already there, thus it is not perceived but apperceived.
        self awareness
        According to Johann Friedrich Herbart apperception is that process by which an aggregate or "mass" of presentations becomes systematized (apperceptions-system) by the accretion of new elements, either sense-given or product of the inner workings of the mind. He thus emphasizes in apperception the connection with the self as resulting from the sum of antecedent experience. Hence in education the teacher should fully acquaint himself with the mental development of the pupil, in order that he may make full use of what the pupil already knows
        Apperception is thus a general term for all mental processes in which a presentation is brought into connection with an already existent and systematized mental conception, and thereby is classified, explained or, in a word, understood; e.g. a new scientific phenomenon is explained in the light of phenomena already analysed and classified. The whole intelligent life of man is, consciously or unconsciously, a process of apperception, in as much as every act of attention involves the appercipient process
        Acceptance of the other: situations and ethics
        The face-to-face relation (French: rapport de face à face) is a concept in the French philosopher Emmanuel Lévinas' thought on human sociality. It means that, ethically, people are responsible to one-another in the face-to-face encounter. Specifically, Lévinas says that the human face "orders and ordains" us. It calls the subject into "giving and serving" the Other.[1][2]
        Buber's main proposition is that we may address existence in two ways: The attitude of the "I" towards an "It", towards an object that is separate in itself, which we either use or experience. The attitude of the "I" towards "Thou", in a relationship in which the other is not separated by discrete bounds. One of the major themes of the book is that human life finds its meaningfulness in relationships. In Buber's view, all of our relationships bring us ultimately into relationship with God, who is the Eternal Thou.
        The "It" of I–It refers to the world of experience and sensation. I–It describes entities as discrete objects drawn from a defined set (e.g., he, she or any other objective entity defined by what makes it measurably different from other entities). It can be said that "I" have as many distinct and different relationships with each "It" as there are "Its" in one's life. Fundamentally, "It" refers to the world as we experience it.
        By contrast, the word pair I–Thou describes the world of relations. This is the "I" that does not objectify any "It" but rather acknowledges a living relationship. I–Thou relationships are sustained in the spirit and mind of an "I" for however long the feeling or idea of relationship is the dominant mode of perception.
        Buber's two notions of "I" require attachment of the word "I" to a word partner. The splitting into the individual terms "I" and "it" and "thou" is only for the purposes of analysis. Despite the separation of "I" from the "It" and "Thou" in this very sentence describing the relationship, there is to Buber's mind either an I–Thou or an I–It relationship. Every sentence that a person uses with "I" refers to the two pairs: "I–Thou" and "I–It", and likewise "I" is implicit in every sentence with "Thou" or "It". Each It is bounded by others and It can only exist through this attachment because for every object there is another object. Thou, on the other hand, has no limitations.
        The major difference between Buber's account of the I and Thou relation and the ethics of the face-to-face encounter is the application of Lévinas' asymmetry towards the other. For Buber, ethical relation meant a "symmetrical co-presence," while Lévinas, on the other hand, considers the relation with the other as something inherently asymmetrical: the other as they appear, the face, gives itself priority to the self, its first demand even before I react to it, love it or kill it, is: "thou shalt not kill me". Such a demand for Lévinas is prior to any reaction or any assertion of freedom by a subject.
        ace-to-face is similar to Mikhail Bakhtin's ethical concept in art and answerability and Martin Heidegger's concept of the authentic guilt (present/face-to-face) as opposed to an inauthentic other.
        In some of the most difficult sections of Being and Time, Heidegger now begins to close in on the claim that temporality is the ontological meaning of Dasein's Being as care. The key notion here is that of anticipatory resoluteness, which Heidegger identifies as an (or perhaps the) authentic mode of care. As we have seen, anticipation is the form of Being-towards in which one looks forward to a possible way to be. Bringing resoluteness into view requires further groundwork that begins with Heidegger's reinterpretation of the authentic self in terms of the phenomenon of conscience or Being-guilty. The authentic self is characterized by Being-guilty.
        For Heidegger, conscience is fundamentally a disclosive rather than an ethical phenomenon. What is more important for the project of Being and Time, then, is the claim that the call of conscience interrupts Dasein's everyday fascination with entities by summoning Dasein back to its own finitude and thereby to authenticity. To see how the call of conscience achieves this, we need to unpack Heidegger's reformulation of conscience in terms of anticipatory resoluteness.
        https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/heidegger/
        In a further hermeneutic spiral, Heidegger concludes that temporality is the a priori transcendental condition for there to be care (sense-making, intelligibility, taking-as, Dasein's own distinctive mode of Being). Moreover, it is Dasein's openness to time that ultimately allows Dasein's potential authenticity to be actualized: in authenticity, the constraints and possibilities determined by Dasein's cultural-historical past are grasped by Dasein in the present so that it may project itself into the future in a fully authentic manner, i.e., in a manner which is truest to the mine-self.
        Know your relationship with the types of others: informs all else
        topological games: A topological game is an infinite game of perfect information played between two players on a topological space. Players choose objects with topological properties such as points, open sets, closed sets and open coverings. Time is generally discrete, but the plays may have transfinite lengths, and extensions to continuum time have been put forth. The conditions for a player to win can involve notions like topological closure and convergence. It turns out that some fundamental topological constructions have a natural counterpart in topological games; examples of these are the Baire property, Baire spaces, completeness and convergence properties, separation properties, covering and base properties, continuous images, Suslin sets, and singular spaces. At the same time, some topological properties that arise naturally in topological games can be generalized beyond a game-theoretic context: by virtue of this duality, topological games have been widely used to describe ne
        w properties of topological spaces, and to put known properties under a different light. There are also close links with selection principles. make a discrete human version for optimization and self understanding?
        https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Topological_game set up and process of games
        https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sociogram visual depctions of social processes
        Sociograms were developed by Jacob L. Moreno to analyze choices or preferences within a group.[2][3] They can diagram the structure and patterns of group interactions. A sociogram can be drawn on the basis of many different criteria: Social relations, channels of influence, lines of communication etc. Those points on a sociogram who have many choices are called stars. Those with few or no choices are called isolates. Individuals who choose each other are known to have made a mutual choice. One-way choice refers to individuals who choose someone but the choice is not reciprocated. Cliques are groups of three or more people within a larger group who all choose each other (mutual choice).
        obbjects in social processes:
        Now relatives and friends seem in a hurry to forget the dead. The symbol of death has been reduced to the fact of death. The last vestiges of ritual in a wedding are the white dress (that obviously means nothing in an age in which most brides are far from being virgins), the ring and the flowers. These will disappear too as people start realizing that it's all a big waste of money.
        Humanity is rapidly removing rituals from its existence. We are removing symbols from our material life. Only the facts are left: A and B got married; he drank his tea. Symbols, of course, still exist in our minds, but humanity is increasingly reserving symbols for creative activities (not traditional activities) such as science and art.
        go from traditional types of symbols/semiotic to computational semiotics/symbols processes
        Symbols created art, music, math, science and technology that eventually killed rituals and demoted all symbols while promoting facts. Symbols helped humans to find a balance between being in harmony with nature and being independent from nature. Now there is a third way: being a machine, made with natural materials according to natural alws, but that is neither in harmony with nature nor independent from nature. The result is a transition from a symbolic existence to a factual existence not so different from the life of a machine.
        The key premises of his linguistic theory, which work equally well as general premises for Social Semiotics, are: ‘Language is a social fact’ (1978:1) i.e., social relationships constitute language. This is the case with all semiotic codes. ‘We shall not come to understand the nature of language if we pursue only the kinds of question about language that are formulated by linguists’ (1978:3) That is, autonomous linguistics and semiotics alike are incapable of understanding the nature of their object in disciplinary isolation. ‘Language is as it is because of the functions it has evolved to serve in people’s lives’ (1978:4). That is, a functional perspective is a key to the inseparable relationship between semiotics and society, structure and function. There are three functions, or ‘metafunctions’, of language (1978:112): ideational (‘about something’); interpersonal (’doing something’) and textual (‘the speaker’s text-forming potential’). The semiotic interpersonal and textual fun
        ctions are more obviously social, but are inseparable in semiotic practice from the interpersonal. Language is constituted as ‘a discrete network of options’ (1978:113). The idea of systems and networks (systems organised as networks) proposed by Halliday before the ‘Network Society’ has applications to all aspects of Social Semiotics that are yet to be fully explored.
        Semiotics is the minimal framework for the study of social meanings because there are complex patterns of similarities and differences across different codes, and because social meanings typically flow continually between different codes. Social meanings cannot be tracked only in one code, even in verbal language as the dominant one. The supposed dominance and autonomy of the verbal code is indeed an ideological assumption whose taken-for-granted truth needs to be questioned by social semiotics. The unitary object of social semiotics is constituted by a series of dialectics: between Halliday’s interpersonal and ideational functions, between ‘text’ (‘a string of messages which is ascribed a semiotic unity’ 1988:263) and ‘discourse’ (‘the social process in which texts are embedded’ 1988:6); and more generally between ‘semiosis’ (‘the processes and effects of the production and reproduction, reception and circulation of meaning in all forms’ 1988:261) and ‘mimesis’ (‘implying some versio
        (s) of reality as a possible referent’ 1988:262). Power and solidarity are key dimensions of social structures and related meanings, inseparably related in social semiotic practice. Ideology, a key category in Marxism, is also central in social semiotic analysis, but inflected by social semiotic principles to become the idea of the ideological complex. Instead of the usual assumption that ideology is false consciousness, consistent with itself but misrepresenting reality on behalf of ideologues, the minimal unit of meaning in an ideological complex is its functional set of contradictions, motivated by the need for ideologues to balance issues of power and solidarity for their relations with those they are addressing. The relationship with reality, treated as a problem for semiotic theory in most forms of semiotics, is seen as constitutive in social semiotic practice. Reality-claims and their contestation are woven into every semiotic act, and determine their social effect. Systems,
        markers, traces and effects of ‘modality’ (‘the presumed relation of its mimetic content to a world of referents’ 1988:264) are therefore central objects of interest for social semiotic analysis. Transformations occur everywhere in social semiosis, in texts and systems of classification, as semiosic activity works over different versions of reality for many reasons, all of which have social origins and meanings. The concept of transformations (taken from Chomsky but transformed) is a crucial strategy for analysing the diachronic dimension (time, change) which in its different scales is part of every social semiotic fact, interacting inseparably with relations as they exist within any given time.
        Foucault’s concept of the ‘discursive regime’ (1972) is both a powerful contribution to social semiotics, and in need of a social semiotic framework. A ‘discursive regime’ is an abstract social system which specifies who can speak and what they can speak about, in what circumstances. There are crucial social semiotic questions about who institutes these regimes and how, and what lies outside their scope. The problematic status of ‘reality’ in discourse analysis, which seemingly cannot appeal to ‘reality’ outside of discourse, can be resolved in a Social Semiotic framework, in which there are too many alternative semiotic modes accessing the different objects of discourse for any discursive regime to be fully successful as an instrument of control, and in which the complex mechanisms by which ‘reality’ is specified and controlled (‘modality’ systems) are themselves transparent and available to analysis.
        Multimodality has two general strengths that have contributed to its popularity. Firstly it has demonstrated the important role played by the semiotic characteristics of communication even in one media, verbal discourse of print media. They showed the systematic role played by layout and design, within a print text and between print and graphic elements. They called these different semiotic channels ‘modes’, so that ‘multimodality’ signals the need for a semiotic analysis, not merely a mono-modal analysis as in discourse analysis (and critical linguistics). Secondly, this view of media texts as always multi-modal applies especially well to the new media, whose multimedia forms, structures and processes severely challenge older mono-modal forms of analysis.
        Finding communities within an arbitrary network can be a computationally difficult task. The number of communities, if any, within the network is typically unknown and the communities are often of unequal size and/or density. Despite these difficulties, however, several methods for community finding have been developed and employed with varying levels of success
        https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Community_structure#Algorithms_for_finding_communities
        processes: growing artifical societies book and modeling agents
        https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Towards-a-cognitive-linguistic-reconstruction-of-%3A-G%C3%B6rz-Ilyushechkina/d19e79b199f046bd1c4da19ba4d0da36f8f80154
        https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/A-Cognitive-Science-Approach-to-the-Semantics-of-Carstensen/68a1403fafa2d9ea5e23252b6083c43932eac7c9
        https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Ontology-driven-translation-of-geospatial-data-Schade/0c74ac3f860d9b606b4db7945f848890e2b9aa41
        https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/BFb0020984
        Information metabolism, sometimes referred to as informational metabolism or energetic-informational metabolism, is a psychological theory of interaction between biological organisms and their environment, developed by Polish psychiatrist Antoni Kępińsk
        In order to explain psychological phenomena encountered in humans, he starts with the consideration of most basic organisms and how they are different from inanimate matter. First of all, any organism may be treated as an autonomous but open system, separated from its environment by means of a boundary (skin or cell membrane). As an open system, it is engaged in a continual exchange with its surroundings. That exchange may be regarded as twofold i.e. energetic and informational. For the sake of analysis, one may think of energy metabolism and information metabolism as separate processes. Kępiński postulates that life is sustained if both metabolisms are occurring, and it stops if one of them is ceased.[3]
        https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information_metabolism
        Materialism, also called physicalism, in philosophy, the view that all facts (including facts about the human mind and will and the course of human history) are causally dependent upon physical processes, or even reducible to them.
        The word materialism has been used in modern times to refer to a family of metaphysical theories (i.e., theories of the nature of reality) that can best be defined by saying that a theory tends to be called materialist if it is felt sufficiently to resemble a paradigmatic theory that will here be called mechanical materialism.
        Another common relaxation of the paradigm is that which allows as compatible with materialism such a theory as epiphenomenalism, according to which sensations and thoughts do exist in addition to material processes but are nonetheless wholly dependent on material processes and without causal efficacy of their own.
        A similar departure from the paradigm is a form of what might be called “double-aspect materialism,” according to which in inner experience one is acquainted with nonphysical properties of material processes, though these properties are not causally effective. A form of double-aspect theory in which these properties were allowed to be causally effective would be a species of emergent materialism.
        The distinctive features of dialectical materialism would thus seem to lie as much in its being dialectical as in its being materialist. Its dialectical side may be epitomized in three laws: (1) that of the transformation of quality into quantity, (2) that of the interpenetration of opposites, and (3) that of the negation of the negation. Nondialectical philosophers find it hard, however, to interpret these laws in a way that does not make them into either platitudes or falsehoods.
        this is a form of imposinng-analysis
        According to the analytical behaviourist, there is no more of a problem for the materialist in having to identify mind with something material than there is in identifying such an abstraction as the average plumber with some concrete entity.
        Analytical behaviourism differs from psychological behaviourism, which is merely a methodological program to base theories on behavioral evidence and to eschew introspective reports. The analytical behaviourist usually has a theory of introspective reports according to which they are what are sometimes called “avowals”: roughly, he contends that to say “I have a pain” is to engage in a verbal surrogate for a wince.
        Epistemic materialism is a theory that can be developed either in the direction of central-state materialism or in that of analytical behaviourism and that rests on the contention that the only statements that are intersubjectively testable are either observation reports about macroscopic physical objects or statements that imply such observation reports (or are otherwise logically related to them).
        David K. Lewis, an American philosopher of science and language, developed a translation form of central-state materialism on the basis of a theory regarding the definition of theoretical terms in science. According to this theory, entities such as electrons, protons, and neutrons are defined in terms of the causal roles that they play in relation to observational phenomena—e.g., phenomena in cloud chambers—but the method of definition is able to do justice to the causal and other interrelations between the theoretical entities themselves. Lewis applied this account to commonsense psychology.
        Since mental entities, such as pains, are defined in commonsense psychology in terms of their causal roles (in relation to observable behaviour) and since there is empirical reason to ascribe the same causal roles to brain processes, Lewis identified mental events, processes, and states with brain events, processes, and states.
        In Feyerabend’s view, commonsense introspective reports are irreducibly immaterialist in content. He argued, however, that this admission does not show the untenability of materialism.
        The influential American philosophers W.V. Quine and Wilfrid Sellars also held theories that could be regarded as disappearance forms of physicalistic materialism, though there is a Kantian twist to Sellars’s philosophy that makes it hard to classify. Sellars held that mentalistic concepts cannot be eliminated from the commonsense picture of the world, which he called “the manifest image.
        he held that, although the manifest image is inescapable, it does not give metaphysical truth about the world as it really is in itself. This truth is given, instead, by “the scientific image”—i.e., by theoretical science, which is physicalist. In the case of Quine, there is a certain Platonism in that he believes in the objective reality of some abstract, or nonspatiotemporal, entities—viz., those that are the subject matter of pure mathematics
        The Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein, who was for part of his career professor of philosophy at the University of Cambridge, has sometimes been interpreted as a behaviourist, though his insistence that “an ‘inner process’ stands in need of outward criteria” could possibly be interpreted as a sort of epistemic and central-state materialism. Nevertheless, to count Wittgenstein as a materialist would be to take considerable liberties with him; for, while displaying at times a certain mystical attitude, he also held very strongly that the business of a philosopher is not to put forward any metaphysical theory but to clear up conceptual confusions—as he put it, “to shew the fly out of the fly bottle.”
        clear up conceptual confusions by self analysis and semantic analysis and then make a metaphyical hteory or otherwise that is pragmatic and useful
        chomsky: The physicalist can stress, however, that the investigator’s ignorance need not lead him to assume that he will never be able to find an explanation of intelligence and of linguistic abilities in terms consonant with his present notion of a physical mechanism. (There is also the possibility that physical laws not yet discovered might be needed to explain the workings of the brain. So long as these turned out to be basic laws of physics, such discoveries would not imply a shift to emergentist materialism.)
        J.R. Lucas, tried to produce positive arguments against a mechanistic theory of mind by employing certain discoveries in mathematical logic, especially Kurt Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem, which implies that no axiomatic theory could possibly capture all arithmetical truths. In general, however, philosophers have not found such attempts to extract an antimaterialist philosophy from mathematical logic to be convincing. Nevertheless, the problems of mechanizing intelligence, including the mathematical abilities of human beings, do pose unsolved problems that the materialist is obliged to take seriously.
        Perhaps the most common challenge to materialism has come from philosophers who hold that it cannot do justice to the concept of intentionality, which the German philosopher Franz Brentano made the distinguishing mark between the mental and the nonmental. (A related objection is that materialism cannot do justice to the distinction between behaviour and mere bodily movements.) Brentano held that mental events and states somehow point toward objects beyond themselves (or have a “content”). Many contemporary philosophers agree with Brentano that purely physical entities cannot have this property.
        If it is said, for example, that magnetized spots on a hard disk can refer beyond themselves in the way that thoughts do, then it is commonly replied that, in themselves, the spots on the disk have no reference or content—for this belongs only to the thoughts in the mind of a person who reads the disk. The materialist reply may be to argue, however, that there is a fundamental unclarity in the very notion of intentionality (this is roughly Quine’s position) or else to argue that purely physical systems can, after all, possess intentionality.
        https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Materialism more objections
        an intentional reduction level
        Manifestation of the ideal to material. The material as the mysterious, it is frightening to me
        https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logical_intuition
        All should be made for the Individial, as it is all we can conceive. And so it will stay, it is too late for everyone to consent to true communalism on a material and mental (psycho-political level) because we have this consciousness now even tho we might have that in the future Communing with The self-narrative system- how we interact with the self narrative system
        Realization that you are the caveman- honor this awareness and seek to transcend; make communion with the large and small lives that live in the future, commune
        For more discussion of the distinction between “causal” and “constitutive” social construction, see Kukla 2000, Haslanger 2003. Discussion of non-causal determination relations can be found in the recent literature on “grounding” and “ontological dependence”, including Rosen 2010, Audi 2012, Correia & Schnieder 2012, Fine 2012, Raven 2015, the entry on metaphysical grounding, and the entry on ontological dependence.
        What is being claimed by a theorist who argues, as Bratman does, that group intentions are “built out of” the attitudes of group members? Or, as Dretske does, that footprints are “partly built out of” a foot-strike? A social entity (a group intention or a footprint) is held to stand in some relation R1 to other entities (member attitudes or a past foot-strike). What is this relation R1—and is there just one such relation, or are there many ways that social entities are “built out of” their constituents?
        it is useful to break social ontology down into two broadly different inquiries. One inquiry is to analyze the constituents or essential properties of social entities. A second is to analyze the metaphysical sources or generators of social kinds or categories.
        process https://is.muni.cz/el/1423/jaro2013/SOC911/um/HABERMAS_One_the_logic_of_social_sciences.pdf
        possible: statistical generalizations about prbable outcomes with end goal of understaniding smth. never 2 same cases; sheer complexity of elements of social situations we cannot comprehend and therefore are difficult to simulate exactly as they happened irl. for human behavior, indivudlal divergences are to be xplained by operation of laws on highly diverse social situations. so broad statical geernatlizations are ultimatel ynot enough: they must be connected deductively with the laws of nature from which they result. the "laws" are statements of uniformities.. task of disocveting lowest levels empirical laws is dependent to historian. popper: difference b/w trends and laws in society. mills said no diff b/w natural laws and social: but no, notion of human society involves scheme of concepts incompatible with natural sciences and therefore this effects the theory and use of materialism to some degree. physical changes are not concpetual changes. ie linguistically, a cat writithing in
        pain is different than saying a tree is writhing. it is not just a difference in complexity, but the very concepts and implications of the words used to describe.
  - ethics
    - moral philo
      - Sharp fluctuations of moral absolutism and moral relativism are also among the attitudes of intellectuals revealed in this study. The moral absolutism is reserved for the stern judgments of their own society, while a pragmatic moral relativism appears when they give the benefit of the doubt to certain dictators and their political systems as long as they find them fundamentally praiseworthy and well intentioned. It follows that the centrality and consistent use of the critical faculties of intellectuals has often been overestimated.
        but it is still pragmatic to follow the universal established morals. the pragmatist relativity is more theoretical rather than applied in practice
        But the philosophy that killed off truth proclaims unlimited tolerance for the 'language games' (i.e., opinions, beliefs and doctrines) that people find useful. The outcome is expressed in the words of Karl Kraus: 'Alles ist wahr und auch das Gegenteil.' 'Everything is true, and also its opposite.'
        but morals can depend on semantic truth? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Truth-conditional_semantics as determined by society and externals in a certain context. lang games are not general, neither are semantic usages of truth. realizing and acknowledging the relevance of context on morals is not encouraging immortality. truth-semantic lang games = self awareness and method for evaluation
        https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/13ca/d0643660c81589756b73dc316d9ac9913939.pdf
        https://link.springer.com/article/10.1023/A:1006739117848
        The inescapable conclusion is that subjectivity, relativity and irrationalism are advocated [by Richard Rorty] not in order to let in all opinions, but precisely so as to exclude the opinions of people who believe in old authorities and objective truths. This is the short cut to [Antonio] Gramsci's new cultural hegemony: not to vindicate the new culture against the old, but to show that there are no grounds for either, so that nothing remains save political commitment. Thus, almost all those who espouse the relativistic 'methods' introduced into the humanities by Foucault, Derrida and Rorty are vehement adherents to a code of political correctness that condemns deviation in absolute and intransigent terms. The relativistic theory exists in order to support an absolutist doctrine. We should not be surprised therefore at the extreme disarray that entered the camp of deconstruction, when it was discovered that one of the leading ecclesiastics, Paul de Man, once had Nazi sympathies. It i
        "objective truth" an different philo = differnt level of abstraction and coneption of results of a social analysis. look at the pragmatic consequcnes of both in a certain context and evalute based on that.
        relativism = absolutism? not by logical necessity but according to the users end goals who have used realvitism to futher own immoral goals pragmatically, yes
        evalute morality based on goals, ex is how killing for defense is less bad than homicide. implication of a chain of causality that bears on thejudgement. this is also a form of relativism - the opposite of this would be a lack of consideration of context and against relativity, which sounds absolutist to me!
        It has previously been noted as a characteristic of judicial moralism that ordinary moral wrongs can become demoralized in relation to "correct" political or religious beliefs. This move is easily conformable to a relativistic moralism, where mere personal crimes can be excused in various ways, but political crimes are inexcusable. Thus, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn observed that political prisoners under the Tsars had privileges -- they were not ordinary criminals. But under the Communists, the situation was reversed, and ordinary criminals were given privileges over the politicals. They were not, after all, heretics.
        Dr. Dalrymple observes that mere violence, against women or otherwise, tends to be excused among his underclass patients, by themselves and by the intelligentsia, both on the principle of "who are we to judge?" and on the reasoning that lower class crime is the result of social injustice, in which the true criminals are corporations, capitalists, financiers, etc. This is an extreme demoralization of all ordinary moral judgment, against which the lone moral certainty is something like, "It's sexist" -- a slogan that trumps the politically incorrect assertion of a factual and prudential truth about the respective physical strengths of the sexes. The foolish invocation of a political certainty in the face of indubitable moral and prudential truths is the perfect stuff of moralistic relativism.
        all resulted from illlogical applicatino of ideaology
        what is logical app of ideology?
        The central claim of the paper is that some modern ethical theories fail to account for motive in their theories, producing a sort of schizophrenia because the agent is unable to use his reasons or motives as a basis for his actions. According to Stocker, motive is important to ethics and should be considered as well, rather than only "duty, rightness and obligation" which he believes are the main focuses of current theories. Stocker believes that this focus is not compatible with the motives required for goods such as love and friendship.
        https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Schizophrenia_of_Modern_Ethical_Theories
        relativism is just moral judgements with a different end goal. abolutism: end goal is consistency, relativism end goal is that we should see the futility of our own social cognition and acnkolwdges the reality of variety. being moral and acknowlding realtivity are not mutually exclusie in pricniple.
        At some point in the 1980s, not being "judgmental" became the highest form of virtue -- although the left is plenty judgmental about things they don't like, such as white males, smokers, Christianity, Wal-Mart, Fox News, talk radio and NASCAR. Liberals are so determined not to stigmatize anybody that their solution is always to make all of society suffer instead...
        conditional judgement: this is a misunderstanding of the liberals goals and methods of judgement. they judge based on the end results of the actions: this depends on context. it is not bad or always/inherently illogical to just consider context in moral judgements,
        The form of moralistic relativism would be evident in an assertion like this: "Because all values are relative, you have no right to impose your value judgments on others; but if you are not a progressive in politics, you are a fascist and so cannot be allowed to express your vicious and hateful opinions in public, or even private, discourse." These attitudes are rarely stated in such stark juxtaposition; but finding them actually held by the same persons, and voiced in separate contexts, is not difficult.
        this "repression" of speech is based on the end result. it is not right to silence those opinions that dont have a true or likely true materially immoral end result but there are different degrees to which speech can be silenced for pragmatic purposes backed up by moral judgement,. this is the social language game: the interaction of my words with the world vs the interaction of your words with the world.
        It is not unusual to find theories, and people, insensibly shifting back and forth between moralism and moral aestheticism. Since there actually are separate domains of value, it is difficult to deal with life from absolutely consistent moralistic or morally aesthetic viewpoints. Today this is most conspicuous in doctrines, which are often political ideologies, that present themselves in relativistic and morally aesthetic ways (i.e. "multiculturalism," with all its talk about "diversity," which may be based on ideas of cultural relativism, etc.), but then begin to dictate extremely moralistic, dogmatic, and even totalitarian political principles for behavior (the "political correctness" that follows from politicized "multiculturalism"). The heteronomous relativism of recently popular historicism -- which condemns societies that absolished slavery, e.g. the United States, but excuses it in societies that did not, e.g. in ʾIslâm -- easily leads to this. It is the fundamental paradox of t
        Paul Craig Roberts characterizes the resulting attitudes [of Western and American intellectuals] as a "fusion of moral scepticism with the demand for moral perfection..." He also points out that the high, moralistic demands on the part of intellectuals are almost invariably directed at their own society, rarely at those opposed to it.... In other words, the intellectuals discussed alternate between moral absolutism and moral relativism
        There is a close and obvious connection between the embrace of Marxist socialism and the social critical impulse. Marxism is a philosophy of intense moral indignation -- a worldview that helps to organize and systematize moral passion and which provides a seemingly scientific foundation for protesting social injustice. Marxism performs additional religious functions by pointing towards a better future which will arrive as a combined result of both the inexorable forces of history and the freely chosen effort of individuals who achieved the proper understanding of social forces. Leszek Kołakowski concluded his monumental study of Marxism as follows: The influence Marxism has achieved, far from being the result or proof of its scientific character, is almost entirely due to its prophetic, fantastic and irrational elements...Almost all the prophecies of Marx and his followers have already proved to be false, but this does not disturb the spiritual certainty of the faithful...for it is a
        certainty not based on any empirical premises or supposed 'historical laws', but simply on the psychological need for certainty. In this sense Marxism performs the function of religion....
        The combination of moralism and moral aestheticism thus results from a secular rejection of traditional religion and its morality (the morally aesthetic aspect) together with an unconscious and unreflective revival and adaptation of the religious impulse, in its most dogmatic and irrational forms (the moralistic aspect), to political purposes. The result is an oxymoronic "secular religion" which duplicates and magnifies all the evils identified in secular critiques of religion itself. The Spanish Inquisition, usually regarded as the most monstrous example ever of religious fanaticism and tyranny, thus pales besides the tortures, brain washing, purges, murders, slave labor
        self analysis: analyze own elements and implications of dogmatism in thought and analysis of the words and intentions relation to history ie historical assumptions and the ideal and material histry of subject. each analysis exxists w/i own system
        The irony of Marxism being a "philosophy of intense moral indignation" is that Marx himself didn't believe it was about morality at all: The unconscious moralism is concealed behind the pseudo-scientific obscurantism of "dialectical" reasoning. A fierce, murderous moralism than cannot even call itself morality is both symbol and substance of the combination of moralism and moral aestheticism.
        fallacy of picking and choosing what is bad at a certain time: elminate double standards in logic and evaluation by determining initial axioms and judgements and staements and comparing each back
        In moral aestheticism it replaces morality. It is true, however, that, just as moral rigorism tends to moralism, aestheticism tends to moral aestheticism. Thus, Paglia says: Mademoiselle de Maupin demonstrates how the aesthete's infatuation with the visible is at the expense of the invisible or ethical. The aesthete is an immoralist....He [D'Albert, a character in the novel] says, "It is a real torture to me to see ugly things or ugly persons."....Here are the origins of Wilde's aesthetic, with its arrogant exclusiveness. The old or ugly are valueless to the poet of the visible world. D'Albert makes the high Greek claim, "What is physically beautiful is good, all that is ugly is evil." The Apollonian is always cruel. Only Dionysius gives empathy. Aestheticism invests in art objects the affect withdrawn from persons [Ibid. p. 410.]
        rying to use the descriptive principles of relativism as absolute moral injunctions.
      - pg 1 of elements of momral philo: ex of a judgement process, evaluate, see all exaples like starting pg 18. pbserve his process. can i choose my process and therefore application of theory based on the situation i concieve of, thoeretical or in real life? pragmatic based on end goal, which would be being a moral agent as below
        The first is G.E. Moore's investigation into the nature of ethical terms (e.g., good) in his Principia Ethica (1903), which identified the naturalistic fallacy. Along with Hume's famous is/ought distinction, the naturalistic fallacy was a major topic of investigation for analytical philosophers.
      - minimum conception og morality: morality is the effort to guide ones conduct by reason and prinicples - to do what are the best reasons and to give equal weighr to the interests of each inviidual who will be affected by ones conduct in the world. concentius moral agent is concerened with this; they sift facts and examine implications of actions and thoughts , accepts principles of conduct after ensuring theyre sound, revises convictions based on new evidence, and acts on results of these deliberations
      - Due to the commitments to empiricism and symbolic logic in the early analytic period, early analytic philosophers often thought that inquiry in the ethical domain could not be made rigorous enough to merit any attention.[24] It was only with the emergence of ordinary language philosophers that ethics started to become an acceptable area of inquiry for analytic philosophers.[24] Philosophers working with the analytic tradition have gradually come to distinguish three major types of moral philosophy. Meta-ethics which investigates moral terms and concepts;[25] Normative ethics which examines and produces normative ethical judgments; Applied ethics which investigates how existing normative principles should be applied to difficult or borderline cases, often cases created by new technology or new scientific knowledge.
        The second is in logical positivism and its attitude that statements which are unverifiable are meaningless. Although that attitude was adopted originally to promote scientific investigation by rejecting grand metaphysical systems, it had the side effect of making (ethical and aesthetic) value judgments (as well as religious statements and beliefs) meaningless. But because value judgments are of major importance in human life, it became incumbent on logical positivism to develop an explanation of the nature and meaning of value judgements. As a result, analytic philosophers avoided normative ethics, and instead began meta-ethical investigations into the nature of moral terms, statements, and judgments.
        The logical positivists opined that statements about value—including all ethical and aesthetic judgments—are non-cognitive; that is, they cannot be objectively verified or falsified. Instead, the logical positivists adopted an emotivist theory, which was that value judgments expressed the attitude of the speaker. For example, in this view, saying, "Killing is wrong", is equivalent to saying, "Boo to murder", or saying the word "murder" with a particular tone of disapproval.
        While non-cognitivism was generally accepted by analytic philosophers, emotivism had many deficiencies, and evolved into more sophisticated non-cognitivist theories such as the expressivism of Charles Stevenson, and the universal prescriptivism of R.M. Hare, which was based on J.L. Austin's philosophy of speech acts.
        These theories were not without their critics. Philippa Foot contributed several essays attacking all these theories. J.O. Urmson's article "On Grading" called the is/ought distinction into question.
        A significant feature of analytic philosophy since approximately 1970 has been the emergence of applied ethics—an interest in the application of moral principles to specific practical issues. The philosophers following this orientation view ethics as involving humanistic values, which involve practical implications and applications in the way people interact and lead their lives socially.[27]
        information applications
        file:///C:/Users/CJ/Downloads/Floridis_Philosophy_of_Information_and_Informatio.pdf
        https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/analysis/s6.html
        Much of the book is a judicious historical account that distinguishes (perhaps too neatly) four stages in the development of analytic philosophy: logical realism, logical positivism, ordinary language analysis, and what Smith calls linguistic essentialism. It begins with a sympathetic discussion of Moore's Principia Ethica, which, mainly through the discussion in its first chapter of simple and complex properties, and of definitions, inaugurated analytic ethics, indeed, together with Russell's "On Denoting," analytic philosophy generally.
        Moore's 732 PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH This content downloaded from 143.89.105.150 on Wed, 16 Dec 2015 10:11:25 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions chief interest was in substantive ethical propositions, e.g., that personal affection and aesthetic appreciation are the greatest goods, but his successors usually did not go beyond the first chapter, which alone is included in the standard anthologies.
        According to Smith, all four stages used "the method of linguistic analysis." But while Moore was an "analytical," he was not a "linguistic" philosopher. He disclaimed any interest in "verbal" matters, though, like Russell, he did think of himself as looking for the "simple" constituents of "complexes"-as engaged in a sort of philosophical chemistry.
        Even those working on traditional topics-not just the language of science or the philosophy of language-seem to rely on what "we" would or would not say; or to seek definitions, lexical or stipulative but certainly not real; or to accord privileged role to their "intuitions," which seem to be their inclinations about what to say, not deliverances of what earlier in the century was called intuition
        https://sci-hub.tw/10.2307/2653554
      - The phrase that most clearly encapsulates existentialist ontology is: “existence precedes essence” (Jean Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness,1943). This assertion is designed to challenge the notion that we are born with a pre-established human nature, particularly in regard to our consciousness. We become conscious, at some point, and find ourselves in the world. As we make choices, we define our nature, or character as opposed to discovering an innate character (or soul) pre-existing in us. If this awareness of being “thrown” into the world is an accurate reflection of reality, it follows that each individual is radically free to make choices which in turn define who they are.
        But the idea that being precedes essence has other metaphysical implications. Existentialists (with the notable exception of Soren Kierkegaard) take the absence of a human essence to reflect a universe absent of any significant essence, e.g., God. Thus, our existence is not only free of a pre-existing human essence, it is also free of any divine essence that would create or impose necessity on our existence. Therefore, since we, as finite beings, exist in the absence of both human and divine essence, there is no necessity to our existence at all. That is, there is no more reason for us to exist than for us not to exist; our existence is absurd (lacking transcendent value). The normative moral view resting on the metaphysical assertion that "being precedes essence" maintains that moral obligation is created or arises out of the choices we make as absolutely free agents. Actions have no intrinsic moral value, nor do we as individuals have intrinsic moral value, hence the only true virtu
        e for the existentialist is authenticity. Authenticity is the disposition to acknowledge and embrace the choices we have freely made and to accept any obligation that might follow there from.
        ethics of authencitiy
        Sartre’s existentialist understanding of what it is to be human can be summarised in his view that the underlying motivation for action is to be found in the nature of consciousness which is a desire for being. It is up to each agent to exercise his freedom in such a way that he does not lose sight of his existence as a facticity, as well as a free human being. In so doing, he will come to understand more about the original choice which his whole life represents, and thus about the values that are thereby projected. Such an understanding is only obtained through living this particular life and avoiding the pitfalls of strategies of self-deceit such as bad faith. This authentic option for human life represents the realisation of a universal in the singularity of a human life.
        In existential works, ethics generally refers to a system, much like computer programming logic — a formalized method of determining “right” and “wrong” in any situation based upon set formulas. Morals are practices dictated by probability, producing a conformity of behavior among a community. In other words, what might be moral in a situation is not necessarily ethical behavior in the view of an existentialist. The use of these terms interchangeably in normal discourse presents a problem. According to some existential works, what is moral might not be ethical, while most people would argue what is not ethical is not moral. Since the individual is the primary concern of existentialists, personal morality and ethics supersede social morality and popular ethics.
        How can something be ethical, yet not moral? Ethics are defined systems, while morality is often based on a personal belief. If a lawyer is legally compelled to represent a confessed killer, the lawyer is bound by legal ethics to offer the best representation possible. The morality of representing a confessed killer is not part of the question — a lawyer has chosen to adhere to an established ethical system.
        None of the preceding is sufficient, I admit, to dismiss a basic challenge to existential ethics: if the individual defines a personal morality, how can an ethical system be developed? Was Sartre not merely trying to fit his own “mainstream” ethics into existentialism? Nietzsche is far more radical when rejecting societal ethics. Maybe we do try to rationalize our impulses, our instinctive morality. Scientists are finding some evidence for evolutionary ethics. If existential ethics, at least as presented by Sartre, are nothing more than an attempt to fit beliefs into a “logical” framework, then what does this say of free will?
        ex of the process of imposing structure on perception
        In this book Sartre redefines the focus of existentialism as the individual understood as belonging to a certain social situation, but not totally determined by it. For the individual is always going beyond what is given, with his own aims and projects. In this way, Sartre develops a ‘regressive-progressive method’ that views individual development as explained in terms of a movement from the universal expressed in historical development, and the particular expressed in individual projects. Thus, by combining a Marxist understanding of history with the methods of existential psychoanalysis which are first presented in Being and Nothingness, Sartre proposes a method for understanding a human life.
        This, he applies in particular to the case of an analysis of Flaubert. It is worth noting however that developing an account of the intelligibility of history, is a project that Sartre tackled in the second volume of the Critique of Dialectical Reason, but which remained unfinished.
    - see for processes https://www.friesian.com/ethics.htm
    - The ethical regulator theorem[1] builds upon the good regulator theorem[2], which is ambiguous because being good at regulating does not imply being good ethically. "The ethical regulator theorem claims that the following nine requisites are necessary and sufficient for a cybernetic regulator to be both effective and ethical:
      - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethical_regulator
    - meta ethics: judgement and sorting of of existing ethical theories
    - theories
    - zoom into pics
    - for all judgement processes logical or not, see philo toolkit book