Flashcards
The Problem of Induction
Cards in this deck (34)
- 1According to Hume, all objects of human reason can be divided into two categories. What are they? What are the main differences between them?"Relations of ideas" and "matters of fact"
Unlike relations of ideas, for matters of fact:
(i) The contrary is never demonstrable false
(ii) Reasonings founded on the relation between cause and effect
(iii) Do not come to knowledge a priori - 2What is the essence of Hume's presentation of the problem of induction?It does not follow from any process of reason that a body of similar sensible qualities should always be endowed with similar secret powers.
OR (pithily)
Why should we expect that the future will be conformable to the past? - 3How does Hume argue that no reasoning can justify inductive inferences?1. Inductive inferences cannot be justified demonstratively, because it implies no contradiction to think that the future will not be like the past.
2. Inductive inferences cannot be justified by appeal to probable arguments from experience, because this would be reasoning in a circle (all our experiential conclusions presuppose that the future will be like the past).
But all reasoning is either of type (1) or (2). So no reasoning can justify induction. - 4Why does Hume defend sceptical philosophy as a worthy object of study?Unlike other parts of philosophy, it is clearly not an attempt to put the gloss of reason over our passions, for 'every passion is mortified by it, except the love of truth.'
Scepticism will not destroy all human action and speculation—human nature will always prevail over any abstract speculations. - 5If no process of reasoning is involved, by what principle does Hume think we are impelled to make inductive inferences?We are determined to think this way by custom/habit.
The difference between fiction and belief lies in a sentiment/feeling attached to the latter and not the former (and one that is independent of the will). This sentiment is excited when we, e.g., see a billiard ball approaching another, and this is the basis of our inductive inferences. - 6Why does Popper think that the traditional statement of the problem of induction (i.e. "What is the justification for inductive inferences?") is badly formulated?It assumes there are such things as inductive inferences. Popper denies this.
- 7Why does Popper reject Hume's results? By introducing what principle does he attempt to avoid falling into the same trap?Hume's results imply an irrationalist epistemology—argument/reason plays only a minor role in our understanding. Hume's results also clash with scientific procedures.
Popper introduces the Principle of Transference: answers to the logical problem of induction must transfer to the psychological problem of induction (i.e. why do reasonable people all have expectations in which they place great confidence?) PoT guarantees elimination of irrationalist epistemology. - 8What is Popper's restatement of the logical problem of induction, and what is his answer to it?Can the claim that an explanatory universal theory is true or that it is false be justified by empirical reasons?
Answer: Yes, empirical reasons can sometimes justify the claim that an EUT is false. - 9Given that, according to Popper, we can never empirically justify the claim that a scientific theory is true, we need some principles of preference to favour some hypotheses over others. One just principle is to prefer non-refuted theories to refuted ones. What other principle does Popper suggest?We should prefer the best testable of the competing theories. This will be the one that:
(i) Can be submitted to more tests with the most ease
(ii) Has the greatest information content
(iii) Has the greatest explanatory power
(iv) Is prima facie most improbable - 10What is the degree of corroboration of a theory?Summary of past performance of a theory with respect its degree of testability and the severity of tests it has undergone (and of course how well it has stood up to these tests). Popper considers corroboration to be a way of stating "preference with respect to the truth".
- 11How does Wesley Salmon characterise "correct inductive inferences"?Any non-demonstrative inference that, while not necessitating its conclusion, does lend it weight, support it, or make it probable.
- 12What is an ampliative inference?An inference whose conclusion contains information that is not present, explicitly or implicitly, in the premises.
Valid deductive inferences achieve necessary truth preservation only by sacrificing any extension of content, i.e. by being non-ampliative. - 13What is the "petitio principii" fallacy?Assuming as a premise the conclusion to be proved. This is also known as premise circularity, or vicious circularity.
- 14Is the inductive argument for induction viciously circular?Not necessarily. E.g. Max Black gives the following argument: R has usually been successful in the past, therefore R will be successful in the next instance; where R is the rule to argue from “most instances of A’s examined in a wide variety of conditions have been B” to (probably) “the next A to be encountered will be a B”. The argument is governed by R, but it does not contain R as a premise.
- 15How does Salmon argue against the inductive argument for induction?We can construct self-supporting arguments of this kind for incorrect inductive inferences, as well as for correct ones. Consider, for example, the counter-inductive argument for counter-induction...
- 16How have some people tried to respond to the problem of induction by re-characterising the scientific method as a hypothetico-deductive method?Science does not proceed on induction by enumeration. Instead, a general theory is suggested, and from this together with some initial conditions, a specific prediction is made. The theory is then disconfirmed if the prediction is false, and confirmed to some extent if the theory is true. The more true predictions it makes, the more confirmed a theory becomes.
- 17How does Salmon object to this response to the problem of induction?The hypothetico-deductive method is not really a deductive method at all. The general theory ought to be the conclusion of the inference, not one of the premises. But in a deductive argument, the truth of the conclusion does not guarantee the truth of the premises.
- 18Why does high falsifiability coincide with low logical probability (and vice-versa)? Why does it coincide with high content?The more highly falsifiable a statement, the more possible states of affairs it excludes. (Tautologies lack content because they do not exclude any states of affairs.) The greater the number of excluded possible states of affairs, the greater the risk of being false, and so the lower the logical probability.
On the converse, the greater the number of states of affairs excluded by a theory, the more it does to pin down our actual world, and so the higher its content. - 19Why does Salmon conclude that ultimately Popper is forced to introduce some non-demonstrative inferences?We must push Popper on his "principles of preference". Why should we prefer (w.r.t. the truth), from among all the unfalsified hypotheses, the one that is most highly corroborated? Popper admits that a more corroborated theory is not "more probable" or anything like that. In order to answer this question, Popper must introduce some kind of inductive inference.
"Modus tollens without corroboration is empty; modus tollens with corroboration is induction."—Salmon - 20What are synthetic a priori statements? If they existed, what would they allow for?Synthetic statement = interpretation of a logically contingent formula (i.e. neither analytic truth nor self-contradiction)
A priori = truth or falsity can be established without recourse to any observational evidence.
The existence of synthetic a priori statements would allow for necessarily truth-preserving ampliative inferences (convince yourself of this). - 21What are some examples of suggested synthetic a priori truths?1. Nothing can be created out of nothing
2. The Principle of Sufficient Reason
3. No event temporally precedes itself
4. Anything coloured is extended
5. The statements of arithmetic and geometry (Kant) - 22Aside from lack of compelling examples, what is Salmon's general argument against the existence of synthetic a priori truths?The idea that we could establish by pure thought that some logically consistent picture of the real world is false seems miraculous. Even if we *were* to encounter an apparent example of a synthetic a priori truth, perhaps it would be wiser to assume we had failed to analyse it correctly than to conclude that we are indeed faced with such an epistemological miracle.
- 23What is the postulational approach to solving the problem of induction?Recognise that, without some synthetic assumptions about the world, inference from the observed to the unobserved is impossible. So we adopt some postulates of scientific inference that render the scientific method acceptable. (Russell)
- 24How does Salmon object to the postulational approach?Doesn't seem to discriminate between the variety of potential postulates suggested by the different theories of scientific inference.
‘Admission of unjustified and unjustifiable postulates to deal with the problem is tantamount to making scientific method a matter of faith.’ - 25Why does interpreting the conclusions of inductive inferences to be merely probable not help with the problem of induction?1. We are equally unjustified in thinking such conclusions are probable on the frequentist understanding of probability (since, for all we know, all future inductive inferences with true premises may have a false conclusion).
2. On the Bayesian understanding of probability, to say that the conclusion of an inductive inference is probable is to say that a person is rationally justified in assenting to it, which is to say that it is supported by the evidence, which is just to say that it is the conclusion of an inductive inference. The statement that the conclusion is "probable" in this sense is empty—there is no justification for thinking that "probable" conclusions will often be true. - 26What is the nature of the pragmatic justification of inductive inferences?Not an attempt to show that inductive inferences will be successful, but just that they will succeed if any other method could succeed, and therefore that it is a priori superior to any other method of making inferences, and we lose nothing by adopting it.
- 27How does the pragmatic justification go?Either there are reliable uniformities in nature or there are not. If there are, then induction will discover them, whatever they are. If there are not, then (obviously) no method could.
- 28How does van Cleve respond to Hume's dilemma concerning the justification of inductive inferences?Accepts that inductive inferences cannot be justified demonstratively. What in what way do inductive inferences presuppose the principle that the future will be like the past? Only in the sense that they would not be (deductively) valid unless augmented by this principle. But the inductivist is not claiming that inductive inferences are deductively valid, only that they confer justification from the premises to the conclusion.
- 29According to van Cleve, in what single circumstance is an argument viciously circular?If a necessary condition of using it to establish the conclusion is that one already have knowledge of the conclusion.
- 30Under what condition is an argument exhibiting rule circularity on that account epistemically circular?If knowledge of the correctness of the rule is a precondition to using the argument to gain knowledge.
- 31How might an externalist account of knowledge help support an inductive justification of induction?If we accept externalism, we can show that an argument can be rule circular without thereby being epistemically circular.
Suppose that an inductive argument for induction is *in fact* a probable argument. Then a person who reasons inductively to the conclusion that inductive inferences are probable arguments is justified in believing this conclusion, without needing to know if they are using a correct rule of inference. - 32According to van Cleve, what is it for an inference to be justified?An inference is justified iff any person who is justified in believing the premisses and who used the inference to draw a conclusion is prima facie justified in believing the conclusion.
- 33Exercise: Attempt to justify modus ponens without using modus ponens.Hint: you may struggle…
Things to consider:
(1) Would it be equally problematic if we must appeal to deduction to justify deduction as if we must appeal to induction to justify induction?
(2) Perhaps some inferences rest on an ineradicable element of logical intuition? - 34What is the analytic justification of induction? Does this really engage with Hume's problem?The inductive method of inference is constitutive of what it is to be rational.
BUT: Hume would agree that we *call* induction rational. Hume's problem is not about our use of words or conceptual landscape—it questions our epistemic justification for using induction (which our concepts may take for granted.)
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- Hume's presentation of the problem of induction; demonstrative vs ampliative inferences; Karl Popper's attempted solution; falsifiability and corroboration; the inductive justification of induction (van Cleve); vicious (premise) circularity vs rule circularity; "synthetic a priori" statements (Kant); the postulational approach; the probabilistic approach; the pragmatic approach (Reichenbach); ineradicable logical intuition and the analogy to deductive inferences.
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