9823714
| Question | Answer |
| Brock v DPP 1993 | A case to illustrate the issue of interpreting words where they have more than one meaning. What is meant by 'type'? Does it mean the same as 'breed'? The Queen's Bench Divisional Court decided that 'type' had a wider meaning than 'breed'. It could cover dogs which were not pedigree pit bull terriers, but has a substantial number of the characteristics of such a dog. |
| R v Judge of the City of London Court 1892 | Under the literal rule judges must give words their plain, ordinary and literal meaning. Lord Esher said: 'if the words of an act are clear then you must follow them even though they lead to a manifest absurdity. The court has nothing to do with the question of whether the legislature has committed an absurdity. |
| Whiteley v Chappell 1868 | A case example of the use of the literal rule. D was charged under a section which made it an offence to impersonate 'any person entitled to vote'. D had pretended to be a person whose name was on the voters' list, but who had died. The court held that D was not guilty since a dead person is not, in the literal meaning of the words, 'entitled to vote'. |
| London & North Eastern Railway Co. v Berriman 1946 | A case example of the use of the literal rule. A railway worker was killed while doing maintenance work, oiling poits along a railway line. His widow tried to claim compensation because there had not been look-out provided by the railway company in accordance with a regulation under the Fatal Accidents Act which stated that a look-out should be provided for men working on or near the railway line 'for the purposes of relaying or repairing it'. The court took the words 'relaying' and 'repairing' in their literal meaning and said that oiling points was maintaining the line and not relaying or repairing so that Mrs Berriman's claim failed. |
| Jones v DPP 1962 | The narrow interpretation of the golden rule. Lord Reid said: 'it is a cardinal principle applicable to all kinds of statutes that you may not for any reason attach to a statutory provision a meaning which the words of that provision cannot reasonably bear. If they are capable of more than one meaning, then you can choose between those meanings, but beyond this you cannot go'. |
| Adler v George 1964 | A case example of the narrow interpretation of the golden rule. The Official Secrets Act 1920 made it an offence to obstruct Her Majesty's Forces 'in the vicinity' of a prohibited place. D had caused an obstruction in the prohibited place. It was argued that he was not guilty as the literal wording of the Act did not apply to anyone in the prohibited place. It only apply to those 'in the vicinity', i.e. outside but close to it. Using the golden rule, the Divisional Court found D guilty as it would be absurd if those causing an obstruction outside the prohibited place where guilty, but anyone inside were not. The words should be read as being 'in or in the vicinity of' the prohibited place. |
| Re Sigsworth 1935 | A clear example of the use of the wider application of the golden rule. The son had murdered his mother. The mother has not made a will, so normally her estate would have been inherited by her next of kin according to the rules set out in the Administration of Justice Act 1925. This meant that the murder son would have inherited as her next of kin of 'issue'. There was no ambiguity on the words of the Act, but the court was not prepared to let a murder benefit from his crime. It was held that the literal rule should not apply; the golden rule would be used to prevent the repugnant situation of the son inheriting. |
| Heydon's Case 1584 | There are four points the courts should consider when using the mischief rule: 1. What was the common law before the making of the act? 2. What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide? 3. What was the remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the commonwealth? 4. The true reason of the remedy |
| Smith v Hughes 1960 | A case illustrating the mischief rule being used to interpret s.1(1) Street Offences Act 1959 which said it shall be an offence for a common prostitute to loiter or solicit in a street or public place for the purpose of prostitution. The court considered appeals against the conviction of six different women. In each case the women had not been 'in a street or public place'. One had been on a first-floor balcony of a hose and the others had been at the windows of ground floor rooms, with the window either half open or closed. In each case the women were attracting the attention of men by calling to them or tapping on the window. It was argued that they were not guilty since they were not literally in a street or public place. Lord Parker said that the mischief was aimed at cleaning up the streets to enable people to walk along the street without being molested or solicited by common prostitutes therefore it shouldn't matter where the prostitute is soliciting. |
| Eastbourne Borough Council v Stirling 2000 | A taxi driver was charged with 'plying for hire in any street' without a licence to do so. His vehicle was parked on a taxi rank on the station forecourt, not on a street. He was found guilty as, although the taxi was on private land, he was likely to get customers from the street. The Court referred to Smith v Hughes and said that it was the same point. |
| Royal College of Nursing v DHSS 1981 | In this case the wording of the Abortion Act 1967, which provide that a pregnancy should be 'terminated by a registerd medical practitioner', was in issue. When the Act was passed in 1967 the procedure to carry out on abortion was such that only a doctor (a registered medical practitioner) could do it. From 1972 onwards improvements in medical technique meant that the normal method of terminating a pregnancy was to induce premature labour with drugs. The first part of the procedure was carried out by a doctor, but the second part was performed by nurses without a doctor present. The court had to decide if this procedure was lawful under the Abortion Act. The case went to the House of Law where the majority, 3:2, held that it was lawful. The three judges in the majority based their decision on the mischief rule. They pointed out that the mischief Parliament was trying to remedy was the unsatisfactory state of the aw before 1967 and the number of illegal abortions which put the lives of women at risk |
| R v Registrar-General, ex parte Smith 1990 | A case example of the use of the purposive approach. The court had to consider s.51 Adoption Act 1976... Charles Smith applied for information to enable him to obtain his birth certificate. Mr Smith had made his application in the correct manner and was prepared to see a counsellor. In a literal view of the Act the Registrar-General had to supply him with the information, since the Act uses the phrase 'shall supply'.. The problem was that Mr Smith had been convicted of two murders and was detained at Broadmoor as he suffered from recurring bouts of psychotic illness. A psychiatrist thought that it was possible he might be hostile towards his natural mother. The Court of Appeal decide that the case called for the purposive approach and that Parliament could not have intended to promote serious crime and the risk to his natural mother, if he discovered her identity, was enough to rule that the Registrar-General did not have to supply any information. |
| R (on the application of Quintavalle) v Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority 2003 | The House of Lords had to decide whether organisms created by cell nuclear replacement (CNR) came within the definition of ‘embryo’ in the Human Embryology and Fertilisation Act 1990. S.1(1)(a) of this Act states that ‘embryo means a live human embryo where fertilisation is compete’. CNR was not possible in 1990 when the Act was passed and the problem is that fertilisation is not used in CNR. Lord Bingham said: ‘the courts task, with permissible bounds of interpretation is to give effect to Parliaments purpose. Parliament could not have intended to distinguish between embryos produced by, or without, fertilisation since it was unaware of the latter possibility. |
| Hobbs v CG Robertson Ltd 1970 | A case example of the ejusdem generis rule. A workman injured his eye when brickwork that he was removing splintered. He claimed compensation under the Construction (General Provision)) Regulations 1961. These regulations made it a duty for employers to provide goggles for workmen when 'breaking, cutting, dressing or carving of stone, concrete, slag or similar material'. The specific words were 'stone, concrete, slag' and the general words 'or similar material'. The court held that brick did not come within the term 'a similar material'. Brick was not ejusdem generis with stone, concrete, slag. The reason was that all the other materials were hard, so that bits would fly off them when struck with a tool, whereas brick was soft material. This ruling meant that the workman's claim for compensation failed. |
| Allen v Emmerson 1944 | There must be at least two specific words in a list before the general word or phrase for this rule to operate. The court had to interpret the phrase 'theatres and other places of amusement' and decide if it applied to a funfair. As there was only one specific word, 'theatres', it was decided that a funfair did come under the general term 'other places of amusement' even though it was not of the same kind as theatres. |
| Tempest v Kilner 1846 | Where there is a list of words which are not followed by general words, then the Act applies only to the items in the list. The court had to consider whether the Statute of Frauds 1677 applied to the contract for the same of stocks and shares. The list 'goods, ware and merchandise' was not followed by any general words, so the court held that only contracts for those three types of things were affected by the statute; because stocks and shares were not mentioned they were not caught by the statute. |
| Inland Revenue Commissioners v Frere 1965 | A word is known by the company it keeps. This means that the words must be looked at in context and interpreted accordingly; it involves looking at other words in the same section or at other sections in the Act. This case involved interpreting a section which set out rules for 'interest, annuities or other annual interest'. The first use of the word 'interest' on its own could have meant any interest paid, whether daily, monthly or annually. Because of the words 'other annual interest' in the section, the court decided that 'interest' only meant annual interest. |
| Harrow LBC v Shah and Shah 1999 | A court may look at other sections in the Act to help interpret a section. D's were charged under s.13(1)(c) of the National Lottery Act 1993. This subsection does not include any words indicating either that mens rea is required or not, nor does it contain any provision for a defence of 'due diligence'. However, another subsection, s.13(1)(a), clearly allows a defence of 'due diligence'. The inclusion of a 'due diligence' defence in subsection (1)(a) of s.13 but not in the section under which D's were charged, was an important point in the Divisional Court coming to the decision that s.13(1)(c) was an offence of strict liability. |
| Cheesman v DPP 1847 | A dictionary was used in this case to help interpret the meaning of the word 'passenger' |
| Pepper v Hart 1993 | The House of Lords relaxed the rule that Hansard could not be used in the interpretation of statutes. |
| Mendoza v Ghaidan 2002 | An example of the effect of the Human Rights Act on interpretation which involved the interpretation of the Rent Act 1977. The Rent Act applied where a person who had the tenancy of a property died. It allowed unmarried partners to succeed to the tenancy as is stated that 'a person who was living with the original tenant as his or her wife or husband shall be treated as the spouse of the original tenant'. The question was whether same sex partners had the right to take over the tenancy. A previous House of Lords' decision, made before the Human Rights Act came into effect, had ruled that same sex partners did not have the right under the Rent Act to take over the tenancy. In this case the Court of Appeal held that the Rent Act had to be interpreted to conform to the European Convention on Human Rights which forbids discrimination on the grounds of gender. In order to make the Act compatible with human rights, the Court of Appeal read the words 'living with the original tenant as his or her wife or husband'. This allowed same sex partners to have the same rights. |
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