(3) International Crises and Tensions 1904 -11

The first Moroccan Crisis 1905-6
1. The Kaiser and Bulow also decided to provoke the Moroccan crisis of 1905-6 in the hope of breaking the Anglo-French Agreement.
2. Morocco had become an accepted French sphere of influence in the latter half of the nineteenth century. In March 1905 Wilhelm II melodramatically landed at the Moroccan port of Tangier and made a speech in which he upheld the independence of the Sultan and supported German interests
3. The Tangier incident was a clear German challenge and it shocked many in European capitals. Bulow demanded an international conference to review the question of Morocco, confident that it would show that the Anglo-French Agreement was flimsy and that Britain was not a reliable partner
4. He hoped to humiliate France and to score a major German diplomatic victory. Germany suffered a major humiliation. Apart from Austria, it found itself diplomatically isolated and France essentially got its way over Morocco. More significantly, the whole crisis had actually strenghened the Anglo-French relationship, which developed in to the Entente Cordiale.
5. The new British Liberal Government had become concerned about the brinkmanship (Pushing one's opponent to the edge in dangerous situation to force them to concede) of German foreign policy
  1. The foreign Secretary quickly came to believe that Germany was a threat to the balance of power in Europe and to the British Empire
    1. With in months he initiated secret military conversation between Britain and France.
6. The Moroccan Crisis had ended in a diplomatic humiliation for Germany, with an outcome for Anglo-French relations with was the reverse of what Germany had intended
The Bosnian Crisis 1908-09
1. The Balkans had long been a major problem in international relations:
  1. The Ottoman Empire had been in decline and had lost it power and influence in southern Europe.
  2. The Slavic people (Serbs, Croats and Slovences) wanted to be independent and to create their own state (and were supported by Russia, as fellow Slavs
  3. Austria hoped to keep control over the southern Slavs within its empire to prevent it being eaten away by external forces (especially Russia and its close fellow Slav state, Serbia).
2. Bismarck had tried to dissuade Austria from its ambitions in the Balkans. Yet, Bulow was increasingly prepared to back Austria with its aim of maintaining its empire against Balkan nationalism, mainly because Germany could no longer ignore its one major ally
3. In 1908, Austria annexed the neighbouring province of Bosnia, which it had administrated since 1878, but was nominally part of the Ottoman Empire. As that empire declined in the face of Slavic nationalism, Austria feared that its own Slav people peoples might break away to join their brothers to the south
4. The Triple Entente demanded an international conference, but Austria bluntly refused to co-op and the possibility of war dragged on for five months.
  1. Although Germany did not want to alienate Turkey, as they enjoyed good relations, Bulow felt obliged to give full support to Austria.
    1. Indeed, in January 1909 Helmuth von Moltke, the German Chief of General Staff, made it clear to his Austrian equivalent that Germany would be prepared to mobilise it Serbia and Russia took military action.
5. Tensions continued and came to a head when Germany asked Russia to recognise the annexation. This amounted to an ultimatum.
  1. Russia was weak and embarrassed by the Japanese- Russo War 1904 and the Revolution of 1905, and France was unprepared to commit itself over Bosnia.
  2. Eventually in March 1909, the annexation was recognised and war was avioded
6. The Bosnian crisis was a diplomatic triumph for Germany.
  1. In the short term, Germany with Austria could claim victory over the incident; it strengthened the alliance between Austria and Germany , while it highlighted the weakness of the Triple Entente
  2. The implications were costly, causing increased resentment and distrust.
    1. Serbia was embittered with Russia publicly humiliated. Both were determined not to back down again.
    2. Doubt within the Triple Entente about the true purpose of German Foreign policy were markedly Growing
The Second Moroccan Crisis
1. The crisis blew up in April 1911 over Morocco, when French troops were sent to the town of Fez following the outbreak of a revolt.
2. In a way Germany did have real grievance over this French action, which was in conflict with the Algeciras agreement of 1906. Even France implied that some Compensation from the French Empire was appropriate.
3. Unfortunately, the German Foreign Minister with his combative approach mishandled the situation. In his hope of pulling off a "great stroke" to impress public opinion, he sent a Gunboat to the port of Agadir in southern Morocco
  1. Ostensibly, this was to protect German Citizen, in which only one could only be found
4. In reality it was intended as a lever to win the whole of the French Congo as compensation for the French action. Instead, Kiderlan's diplomacy went wrong.
  1. France broke off negotiations and Britain stood by its side, which developed into a major Anglo-German dispute.
5. In the face of what was regarded as German intimidation, the British Chancellor, bluntly warned Germany in a major speech that Britain's interests were at stake. In growing tensions the Royal Navy was put on alert; once again Britain had diplomatically stood firmly by France, its entente partner.
6. The Germany government was not prepared to force the issue and risk war. Instead, by the agreement in November 1911, it backed down and accepted a narrow strip of the French Congo as compensation and France secured its domination of Morocco
7. In fact, little was gained by the episode and much was lost. Kiderlen may have enjoyed broad support from the conservatives for his patriotic bombast; yet the political tension had sharply increased, particularly between Britain and Germany. The press in both Countries stirred up hatred of each other and pressed for further increases in arms expenditure.
8. Once again German clumsiness had made things worse, and within a year Britain and France had concluded a naval agreement whereby the Royal Navy would concentrate in the North sea and the French in the Mediterranean. This gave Britain an informal commitment to defend the French Channel ports, which proved to be significant in 1914.

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(3) International Crises and Tensions 1904 -11

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	Created by Marcus Danvers almost 11 years ago