Causation In Law

Causation In Law

1. The court may find that D's negligence was not a 'cause in law' of the injury where:

   • 1. Damage is too remote (Unforeseeable)
   • 2. There is an Intervening Act or Event has Broken Chain of Causation

2. Remoteness of Damage

   • The purpose of the remoteness rules is to avoid disproportionate liability being imposed. They bring a ‘sensible’ halt to liability.
   • Palsgraf v Long Island Railroad Co = Man gets on train with fireworks, fireworks fall from his hand & caused an explosion. Miss Palsgraf witnessed the incident when conductor helps the man on the train & the fireworks falling. Machinery then fell on Miss Palsgraf, this caused her to have speech impairment.
     • Held; Defendant could not be liable for injury that was not reasonably foreseen. Not foreseeable that a shuff of a passenger would cause machinery to fall.
   • What is the Test for Remoteness? See Wagon Mound
     • The Wagon Mound = Leaked oil at a wharf, cotton debris became embroiled in the oil & sparks from some welding works ignited the oil.
       • Held; Established the ‘Foreseeability Test’ – if damage suffered is of a foreseeable type then it is not too remote, notwithstanding that the extent of the damage or the manner of its occurrence might not have been foreseeable.
   • Huges v Lord Adovcate = Defendants were roadworkers, Ds left uncovered manhole and paraffin lamp unguarded on the street. Claimant was an 8-year-old, went over to the man hole. He trips over a paraffin lamp & claimant falls down hole. An explosion is caused. Claimant suffers burns.
     • Held; C’s damage was not too remote: Lord Reed - ‘it was not to be expected that the injuries would be as serious as those which C in fact sustained. But a defender is liable, although the damage may be a good deal greater in extent than was foreseeable. He can only escape liability if the damage can be regarded as differing in kind from what was foreseeable’
   • Type of Damage was drawn broadly in Jolley. But in Pike this was drawn narrowly
     • Jolley v Sutton LBC = D negligently failed to remove a rotten, abandoned boat and a 14 year old and his friend discovered the boat, they wanted to repaint the boat and fix the rotting wood. With the aim of using at sea. 14-Year-old was injured when it fell on top of him. Key issue was remoteness of damage. Defendants argued that claiming on the boat was a foreseeable damage, but the boat falling on top of someone was not a foreseeable damage.
       • Held; The judge's broad description of the risk as being that children would "meddle with the boat at the risk of some physical injury" was the correct one... The actual injury fell within that description.’
     • Tremain v Pike = Negligent claim which was brought against a farmer who caused a number of rats to become out of control, claimant worked on the farm and contracted weil’s disease. He would contracted this disease through rat urine.
       • Held; This was too remote as not of foreseeable type of damage. Damage by rat bite or injury caused by eating food contaminated by rats was foreseeable damage. But in this case, it wasn’t foreseeable.
   • *Egg Shell Rule - Defendants can be liable for injury that was completely unforeseeable. D cannot claim that the damage would have been less severe if it had not been for C’s susceptibility
     • Smith v Leech Brain & Co = Expresses rule as ‘tortfeasor takes his victim as he finds him’ (Lord Parker). Defendant employers had negligently allowed Mr Smith to be splashed by molten metal, this caused a burn on lip. Unknown to defendants, Mr Smith had susceptibility to skin cancer, burn caused a fatal cancer. Defendants argued damage was too remote, death was an unforeseeable type of damage. Held; as long as initial injury is of foreseeable type doesn’t matter that susceptibility results in something unforeseeable.
     • The law draws no distinction between an ‘egg shell skull’ and an ‘egg shell personality’. Therefore, the eggshell skull rule applies where the extent of C’s psychiatric injuries are due to C’s particular susceptibility to mental harm:
       • Page v Smith = Claimant involved in very low speed collision, he has history of mental health problems. He suffered psychiatric harm, he develops a full blown occurrence of his chronic fatigue syndrome he can’t work again. Held; Defendants liable for whole extent of injuries.

3. Novus Actus Interveniens

   • a) intervening act of the claimant b) Intervening act of a third party c) Intervening act of nature
   • a) Intervening Act of the Claimant =
     • C's act may break the chain if 'unreasonable'
       • McKew v Holland = D’s negligence caused slight injury meaning that C occasionally lost control of his left leg. C went down a flight of stairs without a handrail and carrying a small child – his leg gave way and he broke his ankle – was D liable for this further injury? Held; No liability for this second injury, C’s conduct was so unreasonable that it broke the chain.
     • Reasonableness was revisted in Spencer
       • Spencer v Wincanton = C, who had suffered an amputation due to his employer’s negligence, ‘hopped’ across a petrol station forecourt without the aid of his prosthetic leg or walking stick. He then consequently fell causing damage to left leg. Permanently confining him to a wheelchair
         • Held; Reasonableness of C’s actions was only part of the assessment – No break in chain. Ultimately the question was one of ‘fairness’: it was fair to treat the chain of causation as surviving the fall (Mr Spencer’s poor judgement was better reflected by a finding of contributory negligence). Claimant would have to be highly unreasonableness before the severe the connection. Spencer raises bar, it has to be highly unreasonable to break chain.
     • Where D's act breaks the chain, after incident does the act of suicide break the chain?
       • Corr v IBC = Corr had been injured by negligence of employer, physical injury to head causing need for reconstructive surgery. It had huge impact on his life, he developed depression and difficulty adjusting to injuries. 6 years after injury, Mr Corr threw himself off a multi story car park. Was the defendant liable?
         • Held: C’s suicide could break the chain of causation where it was found that it was the result of a voluntary and informed decision to end C’s life;
       • There is an exception to the ruling in Corr that a suicide may, in appropriate circumstances, break the chain of causation. See Reeves. I.e. defendants have a particular duty of care to take steps to prevent someone from self-harm.
         • Reeves v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis = Defendant police had man in custody who they knew was a suicide risk. However, police failed, they were negligent in terms of looking an adequate lookout on man. Prisoner was later found hanging in his cell. Held; Ruled out novus actus all together, if you owe a DOC to take reasonable steps to prevent self-harm. You can’t use that very act of self-harm to say the chain has been broken.
   • b) Intervening Act of Third Parties
     • An innocent act by a third party is unlikely to break the chain, a negligent act may break the chain
     • Recklessness by a third party is increasingly likely to break the chain and a deliberate or criminal act by the third party is very likely to bring a halt to D’s liability.
     • Knightley v Johns = Mr Johns had accident in tunnel, car was overturned. Police arrive, police officers says to colleague, you need to stop entry to tunnel. You need drive on wrong side of road to stop traffic coming through. Police officer had collision.
       • Held; Break in chain, negligence by police officer breaks chain, this was unforeseeable act of negligence. It was so extreme in the form it took it broke the chain.
     • But it depends on the type of negligence whether it breaks the chain:
       • Rouse v Squires = Negligent driver, he has accident and his lorry is left obstructing two lanes on motorway. C was driving and saw accident, stopped car and gets out to try & help. He is hit & killed by another driver. Court said he was extremely negligent, driving too fast in poor conditions. But this extreme negligence doesn’t break chain. But ‘but for’ his negligence there would be another accident.
         • Held; It was foreseeable that other drivers might also be negligent and collide with the crash site. So, doesn’t break the chain. –LJ Buckley: ‘one must bear in mind that not all users of the highway will be exercising that degree of care and circumspection which constitutes a proper lookout’. Arguably not fair on original driver, but court proportion liability between two drivers. Original driver 75% liable for death of good Samaritan.
     • Medical treatment will not not break the chain
       • Webb v Barclays Plc = Claimant suffers injury at work from employer’s negligence. He gets medical advice, has amputation based on negligent medical advice.
         • Held; Advise from medical practitioners was negligent. But it wasn’t so negligible to break chain. Negligence in medical treatment necessitated by D’s tort would not normally break the chain – Henry LJ ‘only medical treatment so grossly negligent as to be a completely inappropriate response to the injury inflicted by the defendant should operate to break the chain of causation.’
   • c) Intervening Act of Nature