Free Will + Determinism

1. Predictability

   Annotations:

   • What is predictable or not is not necessarily what is determinable. We make scientific discoveries all the time that seem to add to our knowledge of cause and effect. For instance, Newtownian Physics made gravity and other forces predictable for us but that is not to say that the laws of physics did not exist or function prior!
2. Religious Predestination

   Annotations:

   • This is the view that as God is omnipotent, God already knows every action we have taken and will take, and thus has already decided whether we will be saved or not. Consequently, efforts to achieve salvation are fruitless. There are no implications regarding a lack of ability to choose given any circumstance (i.e. predestination says nothing about being determined); predestination merely suggests that God already knows what we will do and so has already passed his judgement.
3. Fatalism

   Annotations:

   • Like religious predestination, fatalism does not necessarily argue that all our actions and choices are predetermined. Instead it simply states that the future is fixed, and that regardless of our actions, the outcome will not change. For instance, a fatalist would argue that I will get a certain grade for my Philosophy exam regardless of how much I revise, or whether I do at all. Human actions do not effect the causal chain.

Annotations:

• The label "action" carries implications of reasoning and intention. I move my queen to checkmate my opponent in a game of chess, this is only meaningful in the context of chess, and it can only possibly entail one conclusion. Bodily movements on the other hand can represent multiple things. I may raise my hand to wave at my friend, or I may raise my hand to catch a bus.

Annotations:

• It is argued that determinism talks about "causes", whereas compatibilism discusses "reasons". This is a compatibilist claim, which suggests that discussions of/the acceptance of determinism are not enough to undermine the concept of free will.
• Reasons can cite purposes. Reasons are "in order to..."; causal explanations cannot cite purposes.
• Reasons can be subject to value judgements- i.e. they can be "good" or "bad". We generally consider reasons such as "I hit him because his socks are purple" to be inadequate for justifying an action, conversely "I hit him as he attacked me and otherwise he could have continued hitting me" seems appropriate. This judgement cannot be made with causes.
• Causes always entail effects, whereas reasons do not strictly entail actions/effects. For instance, if you say "the cigarette started the fire", then it naturally follows that there was an effect- the fire started! However if you say "he intended to start a fire to keep us warm", this doesn't entail that he did actually start the fire, only the motivation behind that potential choice.

1. Argument 2: We have problems assigning praise/blame otherwise

   Annotations:

   • If we are always determined to perform certain actions and never had the choice (as ought implies can) of taking the lazy option/acting commendably, respectively, then how can we assign praise or blame to any human actions?
   1. Moral Responsibility
      1. "Ought" implies "can" (Kant)
         1. "Ought" does not imply "can"

            Annotations:

            • The acts of praising and blaming people for certain actions can encourage them/discourage them from attempting certain behaviours again. In other words, they have a causal effect.
            • Is this really moral responsibility, or is it controlling and classifying behaviour? Isn't that what we do with non-human animals, which are decidedly not moral agents? This seems no different than training people to act a certain way, and doing this in the first place carries the implicit suggestion that individuals are not morally responsibile.
2. Argument 1: We feel as if we could choose differently if we went back in time and were re-presented with the same situation

1. Objections to intial arguments
   1. Objection 2: This is merely a subjective Cartesian notion and as philosophers we should not just favour or abandon ideas on the basis of whether they suit us.
   2. Objection 1: We cannot test whether we would have acted in the same way, in the same circumstances; such an experiment is not possible.
2. Extra criticisms
   1. Choice between chocolate and bananas when you prefer chocolate.
      1. Choose bananas
         1. ... because I am on a diet
            1. Your desire to diet is stronger than your desire to eat chocolate.
         2. ... because I want to prove metaphysical free will
            1. Your desire to prove metaphysical free will is stronger than your desire to eat chocolate.
      2. Choose chocolate
         1. You chose chocolate as you prefer chocolate!

1. Chance as compatible with determinism

   Annotations:

   • Even if we feel like events are instigated "by chance", for instance, bumping into an old friend with no prior arrangement, both the events that led to you and them being present in the same place were physically caused. Does "chance" extend however to a physical level?
   1. Chaos Theory

      Annotations:

      • Chaos Theory is often misunderstood as demonstrating that different effects can be produced by different causes so similar as to be "the same", however in actuality it is completely deterministic. Chaos Theory dictates that different effects require different causes; the effect is still predictable in theory, but not in practice. Given the precise cause (such as a butterfly flapping its wings in a certain manner, at a certain time, in a certain place etc) the same chain of effects should always follow.
2. Actions and Causation

   Annotations:

   • Argument: 1. All causation is deterministic: wherever we find causation, we find determinism. 2. All human actions are caused.
   • This argument can bee challenged as it assumes that human actions are events in a causal chain. There are important differences between actions and events that call this assumption into question.
3. Human action as subject to Natural Laws

   Annotations:

   • 1. Physical objects in the world are determined by the laws of nature. 2. Fundamentally, human beings are made of the same matter as these physical objects.
   • Without gravity I would launch off into space. At a high enough temperature I would combust. When I run I am affected by wind resistance and friction. 
   1. Counter: Substance Dualism!
4. Human action as the inevitable consequence of our genes and environment

1. There is no moral responsibility with Hard Determinism.

   Annotations:

   • If every action I undertake is determined by the causal chain, then how can I be held responsible for it? If a bad childhood made me grow up to be aggressive and eventually that culminated in me assaulting somebody, that was [according to the hard determinist] determined due to my environmental factors.
   1. Why not compatibilism (with Soft Determinism)?
2. Quantum Mechanics
   1. This objection conflates predictability and being determined!
   2. Many physicists believe that we will discover a set of quantum laws in time.
      1. Many scientists have asserted claims in the past merely to be proven wrong
         1. We used to think the Earth was flat
         2. We used to believe the Heart was our thinking organ and the seat of our consciousness
         3. We used to think the sun orbited the Earth

1. Requires substance dualism to be true
   1. See René Descartes in Philosophers section
2. Having a mind separate from a body does not grant free will
   1. Epiphenomenalism
   2. Animals have minds but seem to lack free will
      1. Animals develop preferences and habits and do not seemingly deviate from them without cause
      2. Pets that are abused but have the physical capacity to defend themselves often will not out of a trained loyalty to their owners

1. Political/Social Free Will

   Annotations:

   • "The ability to act on our caused desires."
   1. The ability to act (or choose not to) without any external constraints

      Annotations:

      • "External constraints" in this instance can be defined to mean environmental influences, other people, etc etc. "Internal constraints" are things like desires, beliefs and the like- things which are sourced within you and which the blame for, according to Hume, lies on your shoulders.

1. Reasons cause actions.

   Annotations:

   • "Reasons" are sourced either internally (i.e. our beliefs, desires etc) or externally (the will of others physically imposed on us)
   1. If we act under external constraint we cannot be held morally responsible
      1. I.E. A bank teller held at gunpoint by a robber cannot be held morally responsible for complying and giving them money
         1. This creates problems for Hume. It is argued that we are always free from external constraint (i.e. I could refuse to comply with the robber and get shot).
            1. Conversely it can be argued we are never truly free from external constraint. After all, our desires, beliefs and motivations are externally caused.
               1. Hume himself identifies this problem but never provides a solution.
                  1. Others have offered a solution to this problem of defining external constraint. This line of argument involves incorporating reason into Hume's model, as opposed to simply judging based on causation.
                     1. It goes as thus: our desires may be externally caused (for instance, a lack of affection in childhood may cause me to have the compulsion to mutilate puppies), but the reasoning behind our actions is solely ours.
                        1. If I am a sadist, then when I harm other people I reason that my treatment of them causes pain, thus fulfilling my desire. Hurting things then is a rational action on my part. Did I need external factors in this instance in order to reason towards harming others? No! It was a rational decision on my behalf and the reasoning was my own.
                           1. I have agency over my actions. My parents would not be responsible for my individual behaviours when it was my line of reasoning that prompted them.
                              1. Genes and the environment are only responsible for the fact I am a bad person, but my actions are my own.

1. [Metaphysical] Free Will is evidenced by the fact we can ask whether we have it
2. "Ought implies can", free will as necessary for moral responsibility

1. "Determinism" is simply our way of trying to avoid the crushing responsibility of being absolutely free
2. "The French were the most free under the Nazi Occupation"

   Annotations:

   • What Sartre meant by this is that, as under Nazi occupation, the French civilians had to consider every action with the utmost care and thoroughness, they were "being for itself" (being for the sake of being) and so were the most true to themselves
3. You are your most free when you are honest to yourself and pursue your desires genuinely. "Being-for-itself"
   1. The opposite of this is "Being-for-others", when you "make yourself into an object" by acting in spite of your caused desires
      1. "Hell is Other People"

         Annotations:

         • What Sartre meant by this is that the observation of other people often causes us to act against our genuine desires. Consider his example of the man peering through the keyhole of a hotel-room door. (See next note)
         • Sartre says that so long as his attention is fully dedicated to the ongoings in the room, he is being-for-itself and has his focus dedicated to what he truly wants. He is free. If he was to suddenly become aware of somebody watching him from the hallway then this knowledge would pressure him to behave "for others" and make himself into an object.
         • This as a consequence is a great source of misery as Sartre cannot be free, and spends his life unfulfilled and en soi.

1. Substance Dualism

   Annotations:

   • "Substance Dualism" here is used to refer to the idea that the mind and the body are two separate entities, the former non-physical and the latter physical.
   1. Differences between body and mind; It does not make sense for something to hold two opposing qualities at once. Therefore mind and body cannot be one
      1. The Mind is indubitable but the body is subject to doubt
         1. You could argue that being indubitable or not is not a quality, it simply represents a measurement of your knowledge regarding the subject
      2. The mind is not physical whereas the body is physical.
         1. Dualism does not prove free will. Epiphenomenalists (who believe that physical events cause the mental but not the other way around) can argue that your mind is subject to causation
            1. Epiphenomenalism

               Annotations:

               • http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epiphenomenalism

1. Our idea of causation arises from an expectation and experience of uniformity in nature
   1. Human Nature generally is uniform.
      1. (Not Hume's example) If somebody who is typically cheery is grumpy one day, we presume there is a cause.
      2. Human action requires predictability. I interact with people in varying ways depending on how I predict they will react.
2. Talks about "liberty" and "necessity"

   Annotations:

   • "Liberty" as defined by Hume is a Political/Social freedom. Liberty is an absence from external constraint.
3. If your action is internally caused (by a combination of your beliefs, desires and such) it is a free action. If it is externally caused (i.e. through physical coercion) it is not free.

Annotations:

• http://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLO3MCcttgKqv6bzeQHyVUdH8oU2lPJxd1