Security Cooperation

Security Cooperation

1. Milestones

   • ZOPFAN '71
     • Call for regional autonomy in managing great power intervention
       • Lacked a clear, concise definition
         • Soft and open-ended agreement on broad principles previously laid out in the '67 Bangkok Declaration; not a framework of legalistic measures
     • Need to reconcile different security perspectives before security cooperation could take place
       • P & T concerned with implications on their Alliance relationship with US
       • I security complex; more concerned with devt of 'regional resilience' through national resilience instead of seeking guarantee from major powers
       • S convinced her interests best served by maintaining involvement of all powers in the region
   • TAC Feb '76
     • Authoritative affirmation of ASEAN's principles and policies on interstate behavior
     • High Council of Ministerial Representatives set up
       • Never been used
         • Aversion against raising acrimonious issues within ASEAN framework; avoidance of legal and formal procedures under ASEAN Way
           • S M referred PB to ICJ '94
           • M's preference to refer Ligitan and Sipadan dispute to ICJ '97
   • ARF '94
     • Loss of US as a regional counterweight; power vacuum, strategic uncertainties
     • Pursue security framework based on multilateralism and engagement of external powers
     • Forum for political consultations on the new security situation in SEA
     • Question ARF's real impact on regional security
       • Focus on dialogue and confidence-building rather than concrete military cooperation
         • Not meant as a military alliance; forum for consultation and confidence-building
           • Intended to be a talk shop; promote mutual understanding, create channels of communication
     • Turn towards ASEAN's engagement of major powers and new multilateralism; huge leap from old modalities (ZOPFAN)
     • Relevance of ASEAN's leadership in ARF
       • Dialogue could stagnate
     • ASEAN Way ie. conflict avoidance and management insufficient to address real security problems which cannot be swept under the carpet
       • Lack of capacity to resolve more intractable regional conflicts ie. South China Sea
     • SEANWFZ '95
       • Mooted in '71 with ZOPFAN Declaration
         • Twenty years lag
         • Lack of common perspective and interests; delay ASEAN cooperation
       • Turning point in ASEAN's approach to regional security
         • Hitherto reluctance to embrace formal and legalistic mechanisms for arms control

2. Case Studies

   • Sabah '68
     • March '68: Eruption of the 'Corrigedor Incident'; suspension of P-M relations in Oct '68
     • Bilateral tensions continued to escalate
       • Late Nov '68: M and P Ambassadors withdrawn from each other's capitals
     • Dec '69: 3rd Ministerial Meeting; Tunku Abdul Rahman announced resumption of P-M bilateral relations
     • ASEAN used as a platform for 'informal discussions' and diplomatic efforts vs. bilateral dispute in official ASEAN forum
       • Aug '68: Second ASEAN Ministerial Meeting; issue not officially raised in meeting; agreed to a "cooling-off period" outside of meeting
       • Failed to prevent escalation of tension and withdrawal of Ambassadors in Nov '68
     • Could not and did not resolve the dispute; did not play the role of conflict mediator in a formal sense
       • Succeeded in preventing any further escalation of the crisis to armed hostilities and destroying the organization through indirect measures
     • Important milestone in ASEAN's early approach to conflict avoidance
   • V Reunification
     • Implications on ASEAN
       • Prospects for regional peace and security + possible major power intervention
     • Indochinese Asylum-seekers
       • Illegal immigrants issue; security concern; potential of communist subversion by agents in the exodus
       • Concerted ASEAN stand based on "human considerations" to give shelter and assistance; but ruled out granting permanent settlement
       • Explicitly requested V to "discourage the illegal outflow of its people; to accept the return of those who do not meet international criteria for refugee status; and to expand the Orderly Departure Programme"
   • VK Invasion
     • Diplomatic efforts
       • Official collective stand deplored; called for "the immediate and total withdrawal of the foreign forces from K territory"
         • Active collective diplomacy for a political settlement throughout the 80s
           • Jakarta Informal Meetings
           • Proposals for "cocktail meetings" discussed 86-88
       • Internationalized the conflict; lobbied for international diplomatic opposition to Vietnam
         • Supported CGDK at international forums
         • Lobbied for diplomatic support from official dialogue partners
     • Divergent interests
       • Different perceptions of threat among member states; yet still need to maintain common collective diplomatic response
         • T and S hardliners; T directly threatened because of shared borders; S small state and predominantly concerned with upholding ASEAN principles of non-aggression and non-intervention
         • M and I softliners; more concerned with the involvement of major powers; perceived the threat to emanate from major power involvement
         • Kuantan Principle; crack in ASEAN's collective position; dropped upon strong T opposition to legitimacy of V's K claim
       • Difference in approach
         • March '83: Five-Plus-Two Talks; proposed by Malaysia; rope in Vietnam and Laos for discussions towards settlement of imbroglio
           • Resulted in nothing; opposition from T and Chinese that CGDK would not be represented at the talks
         • T policy to pursue ec opportunities with V; hoped to enhance T influence wrt K issue
           • Seen negatively by other ASEAN members; worried softening of stance might lead to further V intransigence
     • Severe test of ASEAN's informal conflict management mechanisms, accommodation of various interests, norm-building and community-building in SEA
       • Remarkable solidarity underlying the firm position it steadfastly took; collective diplomacy pursued in spite of moral pressures
     • Ultimately the UN which negotiated the way out of the imbroglio
   • South China Sea
     • Produced the ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea; ascertained ASEAN norms wrt peaceful settlement of disputes
       • Limitation in applicability to China
         • ARF Meeting '95; China rejected role of ARF in the dispute; spoke of China's "indisputable sovereignty over the islands"
     • Brought the dispute into international limelight; diplomatic cost for Beijing should it use force
     • Limits to how far ASEAN was willing to push the PRC