Welfare to work programmes

Welfare to work programmes

1. employment programmes that fund providers on the bases of how many people they successfully place in employment rather than simply on the number of people they provide services for.

2. subcontracting practises/marketization of labour market

   • Increased Marketization is a key point

3. (Blackbox contracting)flexibility giving to private providers who use their skills to deliver services for jobseekers because their income is largely dependent upon long-term sustained employment

   • PROVIDERS ARE ABLE TO OFFER PRSONALISED NETWORS THAT TARGET INDIVIDUAL NEEDS. BIDS FOR CONTRACTS TO INCREASE COMPETATIVNESS. 
   • WELFARE TO WORK REFORM

4. active labour market policies( ALMP)

5. PRIME PROVIDERS AND SUPPLY CHAIN

6. Supply side addresses lack of education and skills, availability of childcare and the cost, family issues such as ill health and disabilities, long-term jobless, geographical location in terms of employment and transport

7. Assumptions underpinning marketization are

   • 1, completion between providers, better value for money 2, freedom, flexibility, competition that will be innovative and tailored 3, H M revenue and customs receives more taxes and national insurance with the overall aim of reducing welfare expenditure With an overall all outcome of a more effective and efficient labour market with an overall impact of rational behaviour towards the labour market. 

8. BY SUB CONTRACTING PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT SERVIES IT HAS- Created a market in back to work services

9. SORTS OF CONTRACTS (OUTCOME BASED)

   • Shifts the emphasis from the services that are provided to the participant and places emphasis on the outcomes that the provider has achieved. 1,payment upfront for a participant that has been enrolled2, Payments by results, this is outcome based3, Part flat fee and part income basedIN OUTCOME BASED THE WEIGHT IS PUT HEAVILY ON THE PARTICIPANT AND TO WHICH GROUP THEY ARE ATTACHED TO, SUCH AS HARD TO PLACE GROUPS, OR THOSE EASIER TO PLACEOutcome based contracts were typically paid out if the participant sustained in employment for up to 13 and/or 26 weeks

10. EMPLOYMENT STATISTICTS (OFFICE OF NATIONAL STASTICITS)

    • employment for 16 to 64 year olds from dec 2012 to feb 2013 has virtually unchanged since sep 2012 with 29.70 people employed compare to 2.56 million people unemployed with 70,000 more people being unemployed between dec 2012 and feburary 2013 than September to November 2012.

11. PROBLEMS OF CREAMING , PARKING ,FREUD AND CHERRY PICKING ASSOCIATED WITH OUTCOME BASED SYSTEMS

    • CREAMING- happens when a provider will work with easier to place in employment groups as a means to achieving outcomes instead of working with hard to place groups that may in fact gain more out of the service in the long term. PARKING- happens when the subcontractor or their staff provide only minimal services for those who are harder to place in employment and instead focus upon those who are closer to employment. 

12. PAYMENTS BY RESULTS CONTRACTS

    • provider may deliver the services at the right time, using the right skills, in the manner required without the participant being able to sustain employment for the period of time required.

13. NEW LABOUR IMPLEMENTED NEW DEAL IN 2006 BEST WELFARE POLICY IS WORK

    •  JOB SEEKER PLUS- INTRODUCTION OF PRIME PROVIDERS, PRICE COMPETITION AND JOB OUTCOME REQUIREMENTS WITH SIGNIFICANTLY LESS PROVIDERS AS A MEANS TO REDUCE TRANSACTION COSTS AND RATIONALISE SERVICE PRIVDERS TO COMPETE AND BECOME MORE FLEXIABLE. 

14. HAS CREATED A WELFARE MARKET IN WHICH COMPETION AND FLEXIBILTY OF PROVIDERS HAS SEEN THE MARKETAZIATION OF EMPLOYMENT SERVICES FOR LONGTERM UNEMPLOYED BY CLAIMING TO PROVIDE BETTER SEVICE THAN J S P FOR THOSE WHO ARE HARDER TO PLACE INTO EMPLOYMENT.

15. NEW LABOUR COMMINISSIONED FREUD REPORT (2007), TO REVIEW WELAFRE TO WORK PROGRAMME SINCE 1997 FLEXIABLE NEW DEAL LABOUR GOVERNEMT

    • LABOUR GOVERNMENT ACCEPTED HIS PROPOSALS AND INTRODUCED FLEXIABLE NEW DEAL TO CATER FOR ALL LONG TERM UNEMPLOYED WITH SERVICES FROM RIME PROVIDERS OFFERING INDIVIDUAL PROGRAMMES FOR PARTICIPANTS. fREUD SUGGESTED THAT jsp SHOULD CONCENTRATE ON THOSE EASIER TO PLACE IN EMPLOYMENT.WITH SUPPORT TO THE HARDEST TO HELP COMING FROM THE VOLUNTARY AND AND PRIVATE SECTOR.

16. COALLITION GOVERNMENT (2010) CAME INTO POWER AND FLEXIABLE NEW DEAL WAS ABONDENED FOR THE WORK PROGRAMME BY BECOMING ONE SINGLE SUBCONTRACTED W P INSTEAD OF HAVING 20 EXSISTING EMPLOYMENT PROGRAMMES

    • The DWP does not issue quotas but outline a code of conduct with principles that should guide behaviour between providers and their supply chain. 

17. DWP AND PROVIDERS HAVE DEVELOPED A MERLIN STANDARD OF CODE OG CONDUT

    • AN ENFORCEMENT TOOL THAT NOW REGULATES COMPLIANCE WITH THE CODE OF CODUCT.  PRINCIPLES ARE SUPPLY CHAIN DESIGN, COMMITTMENT, CONDUCT AND REVIEW.

18. NATIONAL AUDIT OFFICE ESTIMATED THAT THE W P WOULD COST 651 MILLION AND HAS SUGGESTED THAT THE ECONOMIC SITUATION OF THE UK WILL IMPACT AND WE MAY BEING TO SE THE W P BECOME VUNERABLE AND CONTRACT WITH PROVIDERS UNDERMIND

19. DEPARTMENT EXPECTED THAT THE PROGRAMME WOULD SECURE INCREASED JOB OUTCOMES TARGET SPECIFICALLY AT THE YOUNG AND LONGTERM UNEMPLOYED RECIEVING JOB SEEKERS ALLOWANCE

    • PROVIDERS HAVE LONGER TO WORK ITH PARTICIPANTS AND THE OUTCOME BASED CONTRACT ALLOWS THE GOVERNMENT TO PAY OUT IF LONG TERM EMPLOYMENT HAS BEEN SASTAINED.

20. ALONGSIDE THOSE WITH ILLNESS OR DISABILITIES THAT HAVE BEEN ASSESED AS FIT FOR WORK WHILE RECIEVING ESA

    • PROVIDERS MUST WITH WITH L T E FOR A PERIOD OF 2 YEARS AND WILL RECIEVE PAYMENTS FOR 2 YEARS IF A HARD TO PLACE CLAIMANT SUSTAINS WORK FOR A PERIOD OF TWO YEARS.

21. JCP STIL RETAINS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF ENFORCING PARTICIPATION IN THE W P WHILE ALSO DETERMINING REPRECISSIONS FOR CLAIMANT NON PARTICIPATION IN THE W P

22. PRIVATE VOLUNTARY SECTOE DID NOT POSE WELL AGAINST PUBLIC J S P PROGRAMMES,

    • STEVE DAVIES- PRIVATE VOLUNTARY SECTOR DID NOT PERFORM AS WELL AS PUBLIC. ERSA SAID THAT THINGS HAD CHANGED AND THE PARTICIPANTS CHOICE OF SERVICE PROVIDER, AND THE EXTRA COMPETATIVENESS BETWEEN PROVIDERS WILL BRING INNOVATION, BETTER CUSTOMER SERVICES AND IMPROVED PERFORMANCE.

23. LEWIS ET, AL ARGUE THAT FREEDOM OF BROKER CHOICE IS NOT WORKING PARTICULARLY WELL