Game Theory inInfrastructure Security (Incomplete)

Game Theory inInfrastructure Security (Incomplete)

1. classification

   • payoffs
     • zero-sum games
       • at least one equilibrium
       • one agent's loss, other agent's gain
     • non-zero-sum games
       • some don't have equilibrium
     • constant-sum game
       • sum of agent's payoff is same
   • timing of play
     • simultaneous games
       • agents choose their actions without knowing the actions of the other players
       • In Infrastructure Security
         • decisions that can be changed easily and rapidly may be modeled as simultaneous games
     • sequential games
       • in economics
         • leader-follower games
       • in security
         • attacker-defender (AD) games
         • defender-attacker (DA) games
       • agents act in certain order
       • the leader has a first-mover advantage (choices of the leader can limit the options of follower)
       • In Infrastructure Security
         • decisions about observable capital investments are typically modeled as sequential games
   • how much players know
     • complete information
       • payoffs of each combination are common knowledge
     • incomplete information
       • not common knowledge
       • Bayesian game
     • perfect information
       • all players know all past moves
     • imperfect information
       • at least one player does not know all past moves

2. concepts

   • equilibrium
     • pure
       • each agent has a unique and deterministic equilibrium
     • mixed
       • at least one agent is assumed to choose probabilistically among multiple equilibrium strategies
     • is any set of strategies where no player has an incentive to change it's strategy, if all players continue to play their equilibrium strategies
   • Game Theory
     • assumes that each player wishes to find its best strategy
       • this assumption makes possible for an analyst to make predictions about which strategies players would be likely to choose
     • 2. game-theoretic models
       • 3. limitations of game-theoretic models
         • Rationality of the agents
         • Common knowledge
         • Modeling challenges
         • Excessive conservatism
       • 2.1 Simultaneous AD games
       • 2.2 Sequential AD games
       • 2.3 Sequential AD games
       • 2.4 Sequential DAD games
       • 2.5 Simultaneous DD games