Flashcards
COM Protection Competitors Art 102
Cards in this deck (23)
- 1False PositivesCOM authority incorrectly concludes that pro-competitive behaviour is abusive
Harm to firms and consumers
Law is over-inclusive - 2False negativesCOM authority incorrectly concludes that anti-competitive behaviour is not illegal
Harm to consumers
The law is under-inclusive
Protection competitors worse if more concerned - 3Art. 82 EC...
- 4Art. 102 TFEU...
- 5Commercial Solvents v Commission 1974ECJ more willing to presume anti-competitive effects when a competitor is excluded from the market
- 6Michelin I 1979ECJ: Dominant company has special responsibility not to allow its conduct to impair genuine undistorted competition in the Common Market
View => If markets are more open competition will weed out the less efficient firms - 7Public Consultation DG Competition Discussion Paper on the application of Art 82 to exclusive abuses 2005Essential objective COM law = protection of competition on the market, to enhance customer welfare and ensure efficient allocation of resources
- 8Neelie Kroes 20051. Competition and not competitors to be protected
2. Ultimately, the aim is to avoid consumer harm
Aggressive competition may hurt competitors as long as it ultimately benefits consumers - 9British Airways 2007Inconsistent with new approach Commission: efficiency for the benefit of consumers
Court did not refer to Discussion Paper
AG Kokott: DP is not law and is irrelevant to conduct that took place before it was published
Whether the conduct challenged was capable of foreclosing competitors - not whether it was likely to do so/had actually done so - 10Guidance on Commission's Enforcement Priorities in Applying Art 82 2008 Para 5Para 5: The Commission [...] will direct its enforcement to ensuring that markets function properly and that consumers benefit from the efficiency and productivity which result from effective competition between undertakings
- 11Guidance on Commission's Enforcement Priorities in Applying Art 82 2008 Para 6Para 6: The Commission is mindful that what really matters is protecting an effective competitive process and not simply protecting competitors. This may well mean that competitors who deliver less to consumers in terms of price, choice, quality and innovation will leave the market.
- 12Guidance on Commission's Enforcement Priorities in Applying Art 82 2008 Para 23Para 23: The Commission will normally only intervene where the conduct concerned has already been or is capable of hampering competition from competitors which are considered to be as efficient as the dominant undertaking.
- 13Guidance on Commission's Enforcement Priorities in Applying Art 82 2008...
- 14Post Danmark ISelective Price Cuts
Did not amount to an abuse since an as-efficient competitor could, as a rule, compete against prices that covered the bulk of the dominant company's costs of providing services to that one customer.
Language strongly echoes Guidance Paper
ECJ: Art. 102 did not seek to ‘ensure that competitors less efficient than the undertaking with the dominant position should remain on the market' - 15TomraCommission's pre-Guidance Paper approach
In the rebates context
For the purpose of establishing an infringement of Art. 102, it is sufficient to show that the abusive conduct of the undertaking in a dominant position tends to restrict competition or, in other words, that the conduct is capable of having that effect.' - 16Hoffman-La RocheExclusive dealing an loyalty rebates are prima facie prohibited as abusive
Exclusionary effects of exclusive dealing and rebate schemes (whether formally conditional upon exclusivity or having the same effects in practice) need not be shown
such effects are assumed to be the necessary consequence of their implementation - 17Intel 2009ECJ reiterated that it is not necessary to carry out an analysis of the actual or likely exclusionary effects for them to be caught by Art 102
Only objective justifications remain
General Court
rejects the use of the ‘as-efficient competitor’ test in relation to exclusivity rebates
exclusivity rebates: ‘by their very nature’ capable of restricting competition - 18Intel AG WahlNot expressly endorsing the Guidance Paper (only cites in footnote) - appears to endorse its approach
criticised the General Court’s Intel judgement for dismissing the relevance of the Commission’s ‘as efficient competitor’ AEC test
Exclusivity rebates should not be treated as a separate category of rebates - instead, form part of the 3rd category (loyalty inducing)
for which no competitive analysis is necessary
loyalty-inducing rebates require an assessment of all the circumstances
Competition law analysis should not be purely abstract and should not deal with mere possibilities
because ultimately, ‘EU competition rules seek to capture behaviour that has anticompetitive effects.' - 19Rebates 1: Volume-based rebatesPay out based on the volume of a customer's purchases: Reflecting gains in efficiency and economies of scale, volume-based rebates are presumptively lawful;
- 20Rebates 2: Rebates conditioned on EXCLUSIVISITYRequire a customer to obtain all or most of its requirements from the dominant company in order to get the rebate:
Exclusivity rebates have been condemned in a number of past cases, including Hoffmann-La Roche, Michelin, British Airways, Intel and Tomra, following a relatively abstract, form-based analysis. These cases have treated exclusivity rebates as restrictive of competition by their very nature, so do not require proof of anticompetitive effects - 21Rebates 3: Loyalty-inducing rebatesPossess a loyalty-building mechanism without being directly linked to exclusive or quasi-exclusive supply: These require an assessment of all the circumstances to determine whether the rebate is likely to foreclose equally efficient competitors.
- 22Deutsche Telekom, TeliaSonera, Posy Danmark(General) Court of Justice stresses the importance of protecting the process of competition for the benefit of consumers.
(Applies to all 3) CoJ goes out of its way to stress that Art 102 protects only ‘as-efficient’ competitors, and not inefficient ones
(Applies to all 3) CoJ required evidence of the actual or likely exclusionary impact of a practice - 23Hoffman-La Roche AbuseObjective concept relating to the behaviour of an undertaking in a dominant position
which is such as to influence the structure of a market
where, as a result of the very presence of an undertaking in question the degree of competition is weakened and
which, in products or services on the basis of transaction of commercial operators, has the effect of hindering the maintenance of the degree of competition still existing in the market or the growth of that competition
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- Flashcards on COM Protection Competitors Art 102, created by Birgit Verbeek on 15/04/2018.
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- Birgit Verbeek
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