Flashcards
Leibniz
Cards in this deck (15)
- 1How does Leibniz argue against atomism?Using the principle of sufficient reason. Since there cannot be any reason for placing three perfectly alike bodies in one order rather than another, God would never produce such things, and so they cannot exist in nature.
- 2What are some possible responses to Leibniz on atomism?Clarke: sometimes the sufficient reason just is the will of God.
If we deny haecceitism, then there is no question of God considering two alternative worlds to create, one in which three identical bodies are placed in order abc and one in which they are placed in order bca. For there is no trans-world identification of one body with another, and so these two alternatives are really the same world. - 3What are some of the different versions of the PSR?Principle of logic
Principle requiring maximum variety
Principle requiring greatest moral good
Principle requiring that every event has a cause - 4What is the Predicate-in-Notion principle?"in every true affirmative proposition, necessary or contingent, universal or singular, the concept of the predicate is included in some way or other in that of the subject:… or else I do not know what truth is." —Leibniz
- 5What is the principle of the identity of indiscernibles?"There are never in nature two beings which are precisely alike, and in which it is not possible to find some difference which is internal, or based on some intrinsic denomination." (Leibniz in Monadology)
- 6How does Leibniz use the PII and the "static shift" to argue against the reality of absolute space? Is there a difficulty here related to the difficulty with his argument against atomism?The statically shifted universe is indiscernible from the real universe, and so (according to the PII) there is in fact no difference between them, which there would be under the assumption of absolute space. Ergo, absolute space does not exist.
Again, we may question the haecceitist presupposition here—why are we to suppose that, under the assumption of absolute space, there would be a real difference between our universe and the statically shifted one? Presumably, only if we allow the trans-world identification of space points. - 7What are two different ways the PII can be understood?1. As deriving from the PSR: God could have no sufficient reason for choosing between indistinguishable things, or indiscernible states of affairs.
2. The epistemic objection that the idea of there being empirically undeterminable facts about the world is unacceptable (think nelectricity etc.) - 8Why according to Tim Maudlin, does the static shift scenario not imply that there are empirically undeterminable matters of fact? How is the kinematic shift different?We can easily determine whether the universe is located here in absolute space or 1000 miles N-E of here—the universe is located here!
The kinematic shift is different: on the assumption of absolute space, the question of the absolute velocity of the universe through space is an empirically undeterminable fact. - 9What is the "complete concept" of an individual, and how did Leibniz deduce that such a thing exists?The "complete concept" of an individual contains all the predicates that can be truly attributed to that individual. That every individual should have such a complete concept follows from God's omniscience—at the very least, the complete concept of each individual exists in God's mind.
- 10What is the "individual concept" of an individual? How does it relate to the complete concept?The individual concept contains all the predicates of an individual that are such that the individual would cease to be *that* individual were any of them missing.
Leibniz's doctrine of individual substance amounts to an identification of the individual concept of an individual with the complete concept (also called the Predicate-in-Notion Principle). - 11Consider a categorical proposition such as: "all A is B". How does the intensional interpretation differ from the extensional interpretation? What was Leibniz's favoured interpretation?Extensional: "the class of B includes the class of A"
Intensional: "the concept of A contains the concept of B" - 12How would Leibniz (intensionally) interpret a singular proposition such as "Matt ate cereal for breakfast this morning"?"The concept of Matt contains the predicate of eating cereal for breakfast this morning." Given this interpretation, a simple conceptual substitution of the term "Matt" with a conjunction of the predicates which the concept of Matt contains will reduce the statement to an identity, as Leibniz believed must always be possible.
- 13How did Leibniz interpret particular affirmative propositions such as "some A is B"? Why might Leibniz have resisted giving singular affirmative propositions the same treatment?"Some A is B" means "the concept of A, with some consistent addition, contains the concept of B".
Let us assume we wish to construct an intensional interpretation of singular propositions such that "not-(x is F)" means "x is not-F". Expanding out this requirement in Leibnizian terms, we require that if the concept of x does not contain the concept of F, then the concept of x should contain the concept of not-F. But this will be the case iff the concept of x is a complete concept. - 14Leibniz distinguishes two kinds of necessity. Explain this distinction.Absolute necessity: the contrary implies a contradiction.
Hypothetical necessity: given Q, it is necessary that P
‘And although God is sure always to choose the best, that doesn’t stop something less perfect from being and remaining possible in itself, even though it won’t happen—for what makes God reject it is its imperfection, not its being impossible, which it is not.’—Leibniz - 15—
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- PSR and PII; Leibniz's theory of truth; individual substances; conceptual containment; contingency.
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