406327
| Question | Answer |
| A-G’s Reference (No 3 of 1994) (1997) | violence towards a foetus which results in harm suffered after the baby has been born alive can give rise to criminal responsibility |
| Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins) (2000) | Defence of necessity Ward LJ also thought that M’s dependence on blood from J’s heart was the equivalent of a potentially fatal attack on J. |
| Beckford (1988) | Jury should have been allowed to consider whether D genuinely believed his own life was in danger Lord Griffiths: ‘a genuine belief in a fact which if true would justify self-defence [must] be a defence to a crime of personal violence because the belief negates the intent to act unlawfully’ |
| Clegg (1995) | Self-defence couldn’t be used as there was no danger when he fired [the initially considered] fatal shot. |
| Martin (Anthony) (2002) | Personality disorders can’t be taken into account when considering the defence of self defence |
| Vickers (1957) | Where a D intends to inflict GBH and the V dies, it has always been sufficient in English law to imply malice aforethought |
| Cunningham (1981) | Intention to cause GBH is sufficient for the MR of murder. |
| Airedale NHS Trust v Bland (1993) | There was no rule that a patient’s life be prolonged regardless of the quality of life. Sanctity of life was an important principle, but quality of life could also be considered. If it was in the best interests of the patient to discontinue life support, then that was allowed to happen |
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