870472
| Question | Answer |
| POLITICAL LIBERALISM: HABERMAS vs RAWLS | HABERMAS: Shall examine: 1. whether the OVERLAPPING CONSENSUS, on which the THEORY OF JUSTICE depends, plays: a) a COGNITIVE (whether it primarily contributes to the FURTHER JUSTIFICATION of the theory) or b) merely INSTRUMENTAL role (whether it serves, in light of the prior justification of the theory, to EXPLICATE A NECESSARY CONDITION of SOCIAL STABILITY) 2. Connected with this-- the question of the sense in which Rawls uses the PREDICATE 'REASONABLE': a) as a predicate for the VALIDITY of MORAL JUDGMENTS b)or the REFLECTIVE ATTITUDE OF ENLIGHTENED TOLERANCE. |
| 1. HABERMAS: Does the OVERLAPPING CONSENSUS play a COGNITIVE or merely INSTRUMENTAL role? a) RAWLS uses REFLECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM to pin down underlying normative ideas. But if these have already been sedimented in society, then such a reconstructive appropriation can appomplish more than merely a HERMENEUTIC CLARIFICATION of a contingent tradition | What HABERMAS says: -REFLECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM used by Rawls to pin down the underlying NORMATIVE ideas: Arriving at the BASIC CONCEPT of the MORAL PERSON and supplementary concepts of the POLITICALLY AUTONOMOUS CITIZEN, of FAIR COOPERATION, of the WELL-ORDERED SOCIETY etc, via a RATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION of PROVEN INTUITIONS (Intuitions actually found in the practices and traditions of a democratic society) -REFLECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM achieved the moment the philosopher has attained the assurance that those involved CAN NO LONGER REJECT WITH GOOD REASONS intuitions reconstructed and clarified in this manner -But if experienced associated with an incipiently successful institutionalisation of principles of justice have already become sedimented in exisitng political culture, such a RECONSTRUCTIVE APPROPRIATION can accomplish more than merely the HERMENEUTIC CLARIFICATION of a contingent tradition -NONETHELESS- the concept of justice WORKED OUT on this basis must be examined once again as to whether it can expect to meet with acceptance in a PLURALISTIC SOCIETY |
| HABERMAS: b)i)HOW is this 2nd step related to the 1st stage of JUSTIFICATION of the 2 HIGHEST PRINCIPLES? ii) Is it even properly a 2nd step of JUSTIFICATION? | WHAT HABERMAS SAYS: In view of the FACT OF SOCIAL AND IDEOLOGICAL PLURALISM, Rawls wants to examine whether the THEORETICAL CONCEPTION OF JUSTICE falls under the "ART OF THE POSSIBLE" and hence is "PRACTICABLE" 1. The CENTRAL CONCEPT of the person, on which the theory ultimately rests, must be SUFFICIENTLY NEUTRAL to be ACCEPTABLE from the interpretive perspective of DIFFERENT WORLDVIEWS. -Hence- must be shown that JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS can form the basis of an "OVERLAPPING CONSENSUS" 2. BUT the test of NEUTRALITY of the basic normative concepts with respect to conflicting worldviews now rests on different premises-- it is different from a hypothetical examination of the capacity of a society already organised in accordance with principles of justice to reproduce itself. 3. Rawls himself DISTINGUISHES in his present work between "2 stages" of theory formulation a) the principles justified at the first stage must be exposed to public discussion at the second stage b) only when the theoretical design is completed can the FACT OF PLURALISM be brought into play and the ABSTRACTIONS of the ORIGINAL POSITION revoked. c) the theory AS A WHOLE must be subjected to criticism by citizens IN THE FORUM OF PUBLIC REASON. d)BUT this now refers NOT to the FICTIONAL citizens of a just society about whom statements are made within the theory, but to REAL CITIZENS of flesh and blood. e) THEREFORE the theory must leave the OUTCOME of such a TEST OF ACCEPTABILITY UNDETERMINED. |
| HABERMAS: c) This misleading methodological parallel casts in the wrong light the "OVERLAPPING CONSENSUS" with which the PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE are supposed to CONVERGE. | WHAT HABERMAS SAYS: a) Because Rawls situates the "QUESTION OF STABILITY" in the foreground, the OVERLAPPING CONSENSUS merely expresses the FUNCTIONAL CONTRIBUTION that the theory of justice can make to the peaceful institutionalisation of social cooperation b) But in this, the INTRINSIC VALUE OF A JUSTIFIED THEORY must ALREADY BE PRESUPPOSED c) From this FUNCTIONALIST PERSPECTIVE, the question of whether the theory can meet with PUBLIC AGREEMENT-- from the perspective of different worldviews in the forum of the public use of reason-- would lose an epistemic meaning essential to the theory itself d) the OVERLAPPING CONSENSUS would then be merely an INDEX OF THE UTILITY, and no longer a CONFIRMATION OF THE CORRECTNESS of the theory -it would no longer be of interest from the point of view of ACCEPTABILITY, and hence VALIDITY, but only from the PoV of ACCEPTANCE (securing social stability) |
| 1. HOW RAWLS RESPONDS: | The answer is given by the 3rd idea of JUSTIFICATION- PUBLIC JUSTIFICATION, and by how it connects with the 3 further ideas of: a) A REASONABLE OVERLAPPING CONSENSUS b) STABILITY for the RIGHT REASONS c) LEGITIMACY |
| HABERMAS: d) RAWLS must make a SHARPER DISTINCTION between ACCEPTABILITY and ACCEPTANCE | WHAT HABERMAS SAYS: a) A PURELY INSTRUMENTAL understanding of the theory is ALREADY INVALIDATED by the fact that citizens must first be CONVINCED by the proposed conception of justice BEFORE such a consensus can come about b)The conception of justice must not be POLITICAL in the wrong sense and should not merely lead to a MODUS VIVENDI. -the theory itself must furnish the premises "that we and others recognise as TRUE, or as REASONABLE fo the purpose of reaching a WORKING AGREEMENT on the FUNDAMENTALS OF POLITICAL JUSTICE" c)BUT if Rawls RULES OUT a FUNCTIONALIST interpretation of JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, he must allow some EPISTEMIC relation between the VALIDITY of his theory and the prospect of its NEUTRALITY towards competing worldviews being confirmed in public discourses d) The STABILISING effect would then be explained in COGNITIVE terms, that is, in temrs of the CONFIRMATION of the assumption that JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS is NEUTRAL toward "COMPREHENSIVE DOCTRINES" e) But Rawls hesitates to assert this -He associates the characterisation 'POLITICAL' with the proviso that the theory of justice should NOT be burdened with an EPISTEMIC claim and that its anticipated practical effect should not be made contingent on the rational acceptability of its assertions f)THEREFORE we have reason to ask WHY Rawls does not think his theory admits of TRUTH and IN WHAT SENSE he here uses the PREDICATE 'REASONABLE' in place of the predicate 'TRUE' |
| HABERMAS: 2. Q: WHY does Rawls not think his theory admits of TRUTH? -IN WHAT SENSE does he use the predicate 'REASONABLE' in place of the predicate 'TRUE'? | WHAT HABERMAS SAYS: a) On a WEAK interpretation: -the claim that a theory of justice cannot be true or false has merely the unproblematic sense that normative statements do not describe an independent order of moral facts b) On a STRONGER interpretation: -His thesis has the VALUE-SCEPTICAL sense that behind the VALIDITY claim of normative statements there lurks something PURELY SUBJECTIVE: feelings, wishes or decisions expressed in a grammatically misleading fashion BUT for RAWLS-- BOTH MORAL REALISM and VALUE SCEPTICISM are EQUALLY UNACCEPTABLE. |
| HABERMAS: WHY Rawls introduces the predicate 'REASONABLE' as a complementary to 'TRUE' | WHAT HABERMAS SAYS: Rawls wants to secure for NORMATIVE STATEMENTS--- and for the THEORY OF JUSTICE as a whole-- a form of RATIONAL OBLIGATORINESS founded on JUSTIFIED INTERSUBJECTIVE RECOGNITION, but WITHOUT according them an EPISTEMIC MEANING |
| HABERMAS: Q: What sense is the one a 'COMPLEMENTARY CONCEPT' to the other? | WHAT HABERMAS SAYS: a)Either we understand 'REASONABLE' i the sense of a PRACTICAL REASON as synonymous with 'MORALLY TRUE' (as a validity concept analogous to TRUTH and on the same plane as PROPOSITIONAL TRUTH) b) Or we understand 'REASONABLE' in more or less the same sense as 'THOUGHTFULNESS' in dealing with debatable views whose truth is for the present UNDECIDED -then 'REASONABLE' is employed as a HIGHER-LEVEL PREDICATE concerned with 'REASONABLE DISAGREEMENTS' and hence with the falliblistic consciousness and civil demeanor of persons, than with the validity of their assertions Rawls seems to favour reading b) |
| HABERMAS: iv) Rawls calls NORMATIVE statements OBJECTIVE and he explains "OBJECTIVITY" in a PROCEDURAL MANNER with reference to a public use of reason that satisfies certain COUNTERFACTUAL conditions: | POLITICAL CONVICTIONS (which are also moral convictions) are OBJECTIVE-- actually FOUNDED on an ORDER OF REASONS-- if: a)REASONABLE and RATIONAL persons would eventually ENDORSE those convictions, b) provided that these persons know the relevant facts and have sufficiently surveyed the grounds that bear on the matter under conditions favourable to due reflection -Rawls does add that grounds are only specified as GOOD grounds in light of a RECOGNISED CONCEPT of JUSTICE, but this concept must in turn meet with AGREEMENT under the SAME IDEAL CONDITIONS -HENCE Rawls must be understood to mean (in his view as well) that the PROCEDURE OF PUBLIC USE OF REASON remains the FINAL COURT OF APPEAL for normative statements -THEREFORE predicate 'REASONABLE' points to VALIDITY claim-- synonymous with MORAL TRUTH |
| HABERMAS: Do we understand REASONABLE to mean a) MORALLY TRUE? | WHAT HABERMAS SAYS: a) Rawls introduces the REASONABLE as a property of MORAL persons. i) People count as REASONABLE who possess a sense of JUSTICE and thus are both WILLING and ABLE to take account of FAIR CONDITIONS of COOPERATION, ii) but who are also aware of the FALLIBILITY of KNOWLEDGE iii) and-- in recognition of these "burdens of reason"-- are willing to JUSTIFY THEIR CONCEPTION of political justice PUBLICLY. b) CONTRAST persons act merely RATIONALLY so long as they are prudently guided by THEIR CONCEPTION as the good c) In terms of the PRAGMATIC dimension of a public sphere and the process of PUBLIC REASONING: i) The public use is in a sense inscribed in reason ii) PUBLICITY is the common perspective from which the citizens MUTUALLY CONVINCE one another of what is just and unjust by the force of THE BETTER ARGUMENT iii) This perspective of the PUBLIC USE OF REASON, in which we all participate, first lends MORAL CONVICTIONS their OBJECTIVITY |
| HABERMAS: BUT Rawls does not intend the predicate 'reasonable' to be a claim of validity, as this undermines his entire theory: | WHAT HABERMAS SAYS: 1. If Rawls intended to use 'reasonable' as a synonym for 'morally true,' he would not say that worldviews need NOT be true even when they are reasonable, and vice versa. 2. a) The problem is NOT Rawls' rejection of moral realism or the consequent rejection of a semantic truth predicate for normative statements, b) but the fact that he DOES attach such a truth predicate to worldviews (COMPREHENSIVE DOCTRINES) c) He thereby PRECLUDES THE POSSIBILITY of exploiting the epistemic connotations of the term 'reasonable, d) Connotations which he must NEVERTHELESS ATTRIBUTE to his OWN conception of justice if this is to lay claim to some sort of normative binding force |
| HABERMAS: Do we understand REASONABLE to mean b) 'THOUGHTFULNESS'? | WHAT HABERMAS SAYS: a) On Rawls' conception, metaphysical doctrines and religious world-interpretations admit of truth and falsity b) as a consequence, a POLITICAL CONCEPTION OF JUSTICE could only be true if: i) it were not merely compatible with such doctrines, ii) but also DERIVABLE from a true doctrine. c) HOWEVER, from the PoV of political philosophy that is NEUTRAL toward worldviews, we cannot determine whether and when this is the case. d)From this SECULAR viewpoint, i) the truth claims of all reasonable worldviews have EQUAL weight, ii) where those worldviews count as reasonable which compete with one another in a reflexive attitude (i.e. on the assumption that one's own truth claim could prevail in public discourse in the long run only through the force of better reasons) e) Thus "Reasonable comprehensive doctrines" are ultimately distinguished by their recognition of the BURDENS OF PROOF, which enables groups with competing ideologies to accept-- for the time being-- a "reasonable disagreement" as the basis of their peaceful coexistence. |
| HABERMAS: the REFLEXIVE ATTITUDE does not necessarily ultimately lead to TRUTH: | WHAT HABERMAS SAYS: a) since disputes concerning metaphysical and religious disputes REMAIN UNRESOLVED under conditions of enduring pluralism, b) only the REASONABLENESS of this kind of REFLEXIVE CONSCIOUSNESS can be transferred as a VALIDITY PREDICATE to a political conception of justice compatible with all reasonable doctrines. c)By way of this transference, a reasonable conception of justice preserves an oblique relation to a truth claim projected into the future. d) BUT it cannot be certain that one of the reasonable doctrines from which it is derivable is also the TRUE one. |
| HABERMAS: RAWLS prioritises the RIGHT over the GOOD (i.e. accommodating for comprehensive doctrines, rather than ensuring justice): | a) QUESTIONS OF JUSTICE-- MORAL QUESTIONS-- admit of JUSTIFIABLE ANSWERS (justifiable in the sense of RATIONAL ACCEPTABILITY) because they are concerned with what, from an IDEALLY EXPANDED PERSPECTIVE, is in the EQUAL INTEREST OF ALL. b) ETHICAL QUESTIONS do NOT admit of such impartial treatment-- they refer to what, from the 1st-person perspective, is in the long-run good for me.for us-- EVEN IF this is NOT EQUALLY GOOD FOR ALL. c) META/RELIGIOUS WORLDVIEWS- based on answers to ETHICAL QUESTIONS d) BUT then it is IMPOSSIBLE to make the VALIDITY of a conception of justice contingent on the TRUTH of a WORLDVIEW, however reasonable it may be. e) thus, under these premises, it makes sense to analyse the different validity claims that we associate with descriptive, evaluative and normative statements INDEPENDENTLY of the validity claims obscurely fused together in religious and meta. interpretations of reality. |
| 2. HOW RAWLS RESPONDS: | a) Political liberalism does not use the concept of MORAL TRUTH applied to its own POLITICAL (always MORAL) judgments b) Political judgments are here said to be REASONABLE or UNREASONABLE; and it lays out POLITICAL IDEALS, PRINCIPLES, AND STANDARDS AS CRITERIA of the REASONABLE. c)These criteria are in turn connected with 2 basic features of REASONABLE PERSONS AS CITIZENS: i)Their willingness to PROPOSE and to ABIDE BY, if accepted, what they think others as EQUAL CITIZENS with them might reasonably accept as fair terms of social cooperation ii) Their willingness to recognise the burdens of judgment and accept the consequences thereof. d) for the POLITICAL PURPOSE of discussing questions of CONSTITUTIONAL ESSENTIALS and BASIC JUSTICE, POLITICAL LIBERALISM views this idea of the REASONABLE as SUFFICIENT. e) The use of the concept of TRUTH is not rejected or questioned, but left to comprehensive doctrines to use or deny, or use some other idea instead. d) Finally-- the reasonable EXPRESSES A REFLECTIVE ATTITUDE to TOLERATION, since it RECOGNISES THE BURDENS OF JUDGMENT, and this in turn leads to LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE and FREEDOM OF THOUGHT. |
| RAWLS' RESPONSE: HABERMAS has not explained why political liberalism cannot avoid the questions of TRUTH and the PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTION of the person | a) POLITICAL LIBERALISM AVOIDS reliance on both these ideas and substitutes others-- the REASONABLE in one case, and the conceptions of persons viewed as FREE AND EQUAL in the other. b) When in civil society we set up justice as fairness, or indeed any political conception these ideas are always described and expressed by conceptions and principles within the political conception itself. c)UNTIL this way of proceeding is shown unsatisfactory, or to fail in certain ways, political liberalism NEED NOT GIVE GROUND. |
| WHAT RAWLS SAYS: 3 KINDS OF JUSTIFICATION 1 PRO TANTO JUSTIFICATION | a) In PUBLIC REASON the justification of the political conception takes into account ONLY POLITICAL VALUES b) I assume that a political conception properly laid out is COMPLETE, i.e. political values specified by it can be suitably ordered, or balanced, so that those views alone give a REASONABLE ANSWER by PUBLIC REASON to all, or nearly all, questions concerning constitutional essentials and basic justice. = PRO TANTO JUSTIFICATION c) By examining a wide range of POLITICAL QUESTIONS to see whether a political question can always provide a REASONABLE ANSWER we can check to see if it seems to be complete. d) BUT since POLITICAL JUSTIFICATION is PRO TANTO, it may be OVERRIDDEN by citizens' COMPREHENSIVE DOCTRINES once all the values are tallied up. |
| RAWLS: 2. FULL JUSTIFICATION | a) FULL JUSTIFICATION is carried out y an individual citizen as a member of CIVIL SOCIETY (we assume that each citizen affirms BOTH a POLITICAL CONCEPTION and a COMPREHENSIVE DOCTRINE) b) In this case, the citizen ACCEPTS a political conception and fills outs its justification by EMBEDDING it in some way to the citizen's COMPREHENSIVE DOCTRINE as either TRUE or REASONABLE, depending on what that doctrine allows. c) THEREFORE it is left to each citizen, individually or in association with others, to say how the claims of political justice are to be ordered, or weighed, against non-political values. d)The POLITICAL CONCEPTION gives NO GUIDANCE on such questions-- it does not say HOW non-political values are to be counted. This guidance belongs to citizens' comprehensive doctrines. |
| RAWLS: 3. PUBLIC JUSTIFICATION BY POLITICAL SOCIETY | a) PUBLIC JUSTIFICATION BY POLITICAL SOCIETY= a basic idea of POLITICAL LIBERALISM b) Works in tandem with the other 3 ideas: i) REASONABLE OVERLAPPING CONSENSUS ii) STABILITY FOR THE RIGHT REASONS iii) LEGITIMACY c) PUBLIC JUSTIFICATION happens when ALL THE REASONABLE MEMBERS of POLITICAL SOCIETY carry out a justification of the shared political conception by embedding it in their several reasonable comprehensive views d) In this case, REASONABLE CITIZENS take one another into account as having REASONABLE COMPREHENSIVE DOCTRINES that ENDORSE that political conception e) This MUTUAL ACCOUNTING shapes the MORAL QUALITY of the public culture of political society f) CRUCIAL POINT: although PUBLIC JUSTIFICATION of the POLITICAL CONCEPTION for political society depends on REASONABLE COMPREHENSIVE DOCTRINES, this justification does so only in an INDIRECT WAY -the express contents of these doctrines HAVE NO NORMATIVE ROLE in public justification -rather- take into account and give some weight only the FACT- THE EXISTENCE- of the REASONABLE OVERLAPPING CONSENSUS itself. |
| RAWLS: PUBLIC JUSTIFICATION AND REFLECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM | a) This basic case of PUBLIC JUSTIFICATION is one in which the shared political conception is the COMMON GROUND and all reasonable citizens taken COLLECTIVELY (but not acting as a corporate body) are in GENERAL and WIDE REFLECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM in affirming the political conception on the basis of their several reasonable comprehensive doctrines. b) ONLY when there is a REASONABLE OVERLAPPING CONSENSUS can political society's POLITICAL CONCEPTION OF JUSTICE be publicly, though never finally, JUSTIFIED. c) This is because granting that we should give some weight to the considered convictions of other reaosnable citizens, GENERAL and WIDE REFLECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM with respect to a PUBLIC JUSTIFICATION gives the BEST JUSTIFICATION of the political conception that we have at ANY GIVEN TIME. d) THEREFORE: i) there is NO PUBLIC JUSTIFICATION for political society without a REASONABLE OVERLAPPING CONSENSUS ii) Such justification also connects with the ideas of STABILITY for the RIGHT REASONS as well as of LEGITIMACY |
| RAWLS: DISTINCTION between 2 different ideas of CONSENSUS: | 1. consensus idea from everyday politics where the task of the politician is to find agreement: a)looking at various EXISTING INTERESTS and CLAIMS, the politician tries to put together a COALITION or POLICY that ALL/a SUFFICIENT NUMBER can support to gain a MAJORITY b)This idea of a consensus is the idea of an overlap that is ALREADY PRESENT/LATENT and could be articulated by the politician's skill in bringing together existing interests the politician knows intimately 2. CONSENSUS IN POLITICAL LIBERALISM- VERY DIFFERENT-- REASONABLE OVERLAPPING CONSENSUS a) =political conception of justice is worked out first as a FREESTANDING VIEW that can be JUSTIFIED PRO TANTO WITHOUT looking to, or trying to fit, or even knowing what are, the EXISTING COMPREHENSIVE DOCTRINES. b)Tries to put NO OBSTACLES in the path of all reasonable doctrines endorsing a POLITICAL CONCEPTION by ELIMINATING from this conception any idea which goes BEYOND the POLITICAL and which NOT ALL REASONABLE DOCTRINES could reasonably be expected to endorse (to do that VIOLATES MUTUALITY) c) When the political conception meets these conditions and is also COMPLETE, we hope the reasonable comprehensive doctrines affirmed by reasonable citizens in society can SUPPORT it, and that in fact it will have the capacity to shape those doctrines toward itself |
| RAWLS: In a DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY marked by REASONABLE PLURALISM, showing that STABILITY for the right reasons is possible is also part of PUBLIC JUSTIFICATION | This is because when citizens affirm reasonable though different comprehensive doctrines, seeing whether an OVERLAPPING CONSENSUS on the POLITICAL CONCEPTION is possible is a way of checking whether there are SUFFICIENT REASONS for proposing JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS (or some other reasonable doctrine) which can be SINCERELY DEFENDED before others without criticising or rejecting their deepest religious and philosophical commitments If we can make the case to affirm justice as fairness as their working political conception, then the conditions for their LEGITIMATELY EXERCISING COERCIVE POLITICAL POWER over one another-- something we inevitably do as citizens by VOTING-- are satisfied. |
| RAWLS: What STABILITY FOR THE RIGHT REASONS shows | The argument, if successfulm would show how we can REASONABLY AFFIRM and APPEAL to a POLITICAL CONCEPTION OF JUSTICE as citizens' shared basis of reasons, all the while supposing that others, no less reasonable than we, may also affirm and recognise that same basis THEREFORE despite the FACT OF REASONABLE PLURALISM, the CONDITIONS for DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY are fulfilled. |
| RAWLS: Such consensus means the achievement of the DEEPEST and MOST REASONABLE BASIS of SOCIAL UNITY available to us as citizens of a modern democratic society, yielding STABILITY FOR THE RIGHT REASONS | WHY STABILITY FOR THE RIGHT REASONS? a) The BASIC STRUCTURE of society is effectively regulated by the MOST REASONABLE political conception of justice b) This political conception of justice is ENDORSED by an OVERLAPPING CONSENSUS comprised of all the REASONABLE COMPREHENSIVE DOCTRINES in society and these are in an enduring majority with respect to those rejecting that conception c) Public political discussions, when CONSTITUTIONAL ESSENTIALS and matters of BASIC JUSTICE are at stake, are always (or nearly always) reasonably decidable on the basis of the reasons specified by the most reasonable political conception, or by a REASONABLE FAMILY of these conceptions |
| RAWLS: Why this basis of SOCIAL UNITY is the MOST REASONABLE and the DEEPEST: | 1) MOST REASONABLE since the political conception of justice is the most reasonable one and is endorsed/ in some way supported by, all reasonable (or the reasonable) comprehensive doctrines in society 2) DEEPEST because: a) the fundamental ideas of the political conception are ENDORSED by the reasonable comprehensive doctrines b) These doctrines represent what citizens regard as their DEEPEST CONVICTIONS |
| RAWLS: Contrast to such social unity through CONSENSUS: MODUS VIVENDI | A society which when citizens are grouped by their FULL JUSTIFICATIONS, their POLITICAL CONCEPTIONS are NOT EMBEDDED IN/CONNECTED WITH, a shared political conception Thus only MODUS VIVENDI, and society's stability depends on a BALANCE OF FORCES in contingent and possibly fluctuating circumstances |
| RAWLS: addressing the Q: If political justification is always PRO TANTO, how can PUBLIC JUSTIFICATION of the political conception of justification be carried out? | A: 1. Because of the existence and PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE of a REASONABLE OVERLAPPING CONSENSUS 2. Thus citizens embed their SHARED POLITICAL CONCEPTION in their REASONABLE COMPREHENSIVE DOCTRINES 3. Then we hope that citizens will judge (by their comprehensive view) that political values are normally (though not always) ordered prior to, or outweigh, whatever NON-POLITICAL VALUES may conflict with them |
| RAWLS: Why such public justification on the basis of overlapping consensus is NOT UNREALISTIC: | 1. a) Those holding a reasonable comprehensive doctrine must ask themselves on what POLITICAL TERMS they are ready to live with other such doctrines in an ongoing free society b) Since reasonable citizens hold reasonable doctrines, they are ready to offer/endorse a political conception of justice to specify the terms of fair political cooperation c) Hence, they may well judge from within their reasonable comprehensive doctrines that POLITICAL VALUES are VERY GREAT VALUES to be realised in the framework of their political and social existence, and a shared public life on terms that all reasonable parties may reasonably be expected to endorse. 2. LEGITIMACY: a) Reasonable citizens understand this idea to apply to the general structure of political authority. b) They know that in political life UNANIMITY CAN RARELY IF EVER be expected on a basic question c) Thus a democratic constitution must include PROCEDURES OF MAJORITY or OTHER PLURALITY VOTING to reach decisions. d) It is UNREASONABLE not to propose or endorse such arrangements. |
| RAWLS: Why this understanding by reasonable citizens that unanimity is rarely reached enables their recognition between JUSTICE and LEGITIMACY: | Citizens recognise the distinction between: a) Accepting as (sufficiently) just and legitimate a constitution with its procedures for fair elections and legislative majorities, b) And accepting as LEGITIMATE (even when NOT JUST) a particular statute or a decision in a particular matter of policy. |
| RAWLS: Why the Quakers' rejection of the concept of 'just war' does not put their allegiance in doubt: | 1. As with any reasonable doctrine, many political and non-political values are represented and ordered within it. 2. With that granted, allegiance to a JUST and ENDURING constitutional government may win out within the religious doctrine 2. Illustrates how political values can be OVERRIDING in upholding the constitutional system itself, even if particular reasonable statutes and decisions may be rejected, and as necessary protested by civil obedience or conscientious refusal. |
| IN SUMMARY: | 1. HABERMAS: a) OVERLAPPING CONSENSUS is supposed to carry a FUNCTIONAL PURPOSE, by explaining how STABILITY is guaranteed. But it cannot do this because it is introduced PRIOR to when the political conception of justice has even been accepted, so it is UNDETERMINABLE whether stability will be guaranteed. b)So the only hope for stability is as COGNITIVE-- in order to FURTHER JUSTIFY the ADVANTAGES of the theory. But it can't even do this because the overlapping consensus is meant to serve a functional, instrumental purpose, not a justification RAWLS: The overlapping consensus is connected to PUBLIC JUSTIFICATION, which is STAGE 3 (after pro tanto justification (Original position stage), and full justification (people have incorporated and correlated political conceptions into their own comprehensive doctrines and have accepted and endorsed them)) so it DOES serve an effective instrumental purpose, introduced at the right stage, using a different methodology accordingly. The social unity achieved results in stability, and serves as a necessary condition for STABILITY for the RIGHT REASONS. (Stability FOR THE RIGHT REASONS cannot be guaranteed any other way in a society with REASONABLE PLURALISM) |
| SUMMARY (CONT.) | 2. HABERMAS: Rawls uses the idea of REASONABLE to express the VALIDITY of judgments, not merely to express a reflective attitude to enlightened tolerance. But the validity of judgments for Rawls rests on overlapping consensus with comprehensive doctrines, which relies on ethics (looking out for what is best for you in the long run) not morals (looking out impartially what is best for EVERYONE), which priorities RIGHT over the GOOD. There is no reason why Rawls cannot determine MORAL VALIDITY INDEPENDENTLY of religion and metaphysics. RAWLS: because starting with ORIGINAL POSITION/DEVICE OF REPRESENTATION, establish principles that are good for all, and cannot deny reasonable pluralism. Also, citizens understand the BURDENS OF JUDGMENT, so will not impose on others arguments that the other cannot reasonably accept on their own terms. It works, and DOESN'T talk about truth. Can only be criticised on grounds of EXCLUDING the concept of truth, which Habermas has not done (Has misinterpreted Rawls as actually INCLUDING truth) |
Want to create your own Flashcards for free with GoConqr? Learn more.