Internal threats to the Soviet system: East Germany, Poland and Hungary

Internal threats to the Soviet system: East Germany, Poland and Hungary

1. Intro

   • Between 53-56, popular expectations of change in Eastern Bloc were encouraged developments within USSR, these included:
     • K's rise and denunciation of Stalin
     • K's acceptance that there were many roads to socialism
     • Better Soviet relations with West and Yugoslavia
   • Possibility of change limited due to fact that unity of Eastern bloc was crucial to USSR position in Cold War
     • Any break between countries would undermine Russia's prestige by implying that the people were unhappy with communism
       • Limits of Soviet new mood of tolerance were tested in 50s, particularly in Poland and Hungary

2. Berlin Rising June 1953

   • Following Stalin's death - USSR economic policy focused on consumer goods
     • East-Germany, hardline Stalinist leader Ulbricht continued to develop strict command economy
       • June 53, U raised workers quotas without upping pay - provoked demonstrations
         • 400,000 workers took to streets, calling for free elections, a general strike and lifting of quotas
           • Govt responded with force, arresting and executing protest leaders
   • Significance
     • Significant for Cold War relations because it demonstrated the unpopularity of traditional comm policies
       • Also exposed that USSR control over east EU was based on force not consent
         • Also indicated that USSR was unwilling to allow greater independence in Europe
           • Whilst USA made much of the rising in anti-Soviet propaganda, they didnt intervene - feared they'd provoke a war

3. Poland 1956

   • Death of Stalinist leader Beriut - Feb 1956 - sparked increasing calls for liberalisation in Poland
     • June - large demos in Poznan turned into anti-govt protests
       • Discontent spread - strong calls for Polish nationalist and moderate communist Gomulka to be given power
   • Oct - K visited Warsaw to resolve issue
     • K tried to force Gomulka to back down - eventually relented when he realised strength of movement
       • To stem unrest - K agreed to Gomulka being leader and that some economic reforms were allowed as long as Poland remained in Warsaw Pact
   • Reform in Poland was significant- showed clear divisions in comm world
     • until 1953 - Cold war has been struggle between superpowers
       • Events in Poland showed that there was an internal struggle in the communist camp
         • K had been forces to compromise with Polish - moreover Mao publicly supported the Poles
           • K's position clearly weaker in 56 than Stalin's had been in 53 so his position in Cold war was compromised

4. Hungary 1956

   • July 1956 - anti-Stalinist communist, Nagy, became premier of Hungary
     • Nagy's moderate policies failed to halt reform demands, By late Oct people were calling for:
       • multi-party democracy
       • a free press
       • Hungary to withdraw from Warsaw pact
   • To keep up with popular mood - Nagy agreed to the demands and declared Hungary neutral
     • USSR saw this as act of open revolt
       • 4 November - Red army tanks entered Budapest to reassert Soviet control
         • By 11 Nov - Soviets had crushed uprising and 'nationalist' Kadar replaced Nagy
           • Kadar's new govt reimposed comm control - arresting 35000 and executing 300 leaders of uprising
   • Hungary - like Poland, exposed problems with K's approach to Eastern Bloc
     • K encouraged limited reform, but this lead to demands that threatened to destroy the Eastern Bloc
       • This exposed dictatorial nature of USSR control
         • Hungary also exposed USA weakness
           • Hungarians were encouraged through Radio Free Europe by messages of support from Eisenhower
             • People assumed that US would send assistance
               • West refused to stop Red Army's brutal suppression of the rising
                 • Political and military realities meant that USA could not intervene to protect Hungary

5. Conclusion

   • USSR responded differently to the Polish and Hungarian crises
     • Poland - comm party stayed in control and Gomulka gave pledges of loyalty to USSR
       • Hungary - Comms lost control and Nagy's decision to seek neutral status undermined the USSR's defensive barrier in Eastern Europe
         • Soviet military action in Hungary demonstrated USSR's determination to preserve sphere of influence on its Western borders
           • After Hungary crisis, USSR concluded that USA was unlikely to intervene in the 'Soviet' part of Europe