Quiz
Sexual Acts
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Questions in this quiz (41)
1Statute:
Sexual Offences Act 1956:
1. Rape of woman or man..
2. Procurement of woman by threats..
3. Procurement of woman by false pretences..
4. Administering drugs to obtain or facilitate intercourse...- ATrue
- BFalse
2Misra (2004)
- AThe two appellant doctors were convicted of gross negligence manslaughter following the death of a post-operative patient under their care. The patient developed an infection in the wound which was undiagnosed and therefore untreated despite obvious symptoms.
Conviction quashed
A doctor would be told that grossly negligent treatment of a patient which exposed him or her to the risk of death, and caused it, would constitute manslaughter. - BThe two appellant doctors were convicted of gross negligence manslaughter following the death of a post-operative patient under their care. The patient developed an infection in the wound which was undiagnosed and therefore untreated despite obvious symptoms.
Conviction upheld
A doctor would be told that grossly negligent treatment of a patient which exposed him or her to the risk of death, and caused it, would constitute manslaughter.
- AThe two appellant doctors were convicted of gross negligence manslaughter following the death of a post-operative patient under their care. The patient developed an infection in the wound which was undiagnosed and therefore untreated despite obvious symptoms.
3Hyam (1975)
- AThe appellant had been having a relationship with a Mr Jones. Mr. Jones then took up with another woman Mrs Booth and they were soon to be married. On hearing this news, the appellant drove to Mrs Booth's house at 2.00am and poured petrol through the letter box and ignited it with matches and newspaper. She then drove home and did not alert anyone of the incident. Mrs Booth and her young son managed to escape the fire but her two daughters were killed.
Foresight of death or GBH is not sufficient mens rea for murder
Conviction quashed - BThe appellant had been having a relationship with a Mr Jones. Mr. Jones then took up with another woman Mrs Booth and they were soon to be married. On hearing this news, the appellant drove to Mrs Booth's house at 2.00am and poured petrol through the letter box and ignited it with matches and newspaper. She then drove home and did not alert anyone of the incident. Mrs Booth and her young son managed to escape the fire but her two daughters were killed.
Foresight of death or GBH is highly occur sufficient mens rea for murder
Conviction upheld
- AThe appellant had been having a relationship with a Mr Jones. Mr. Jones then took up with another woman Mrs Booth and they were soon to be married. On hearing this news, the appellant drove to Mrs Booth's house at 2.00am and poured petrol through the letter box and ignited it with matches and newspaper. She then drove home and did not alert anyone of the incident. Mrs Booth and her young son managed to escape the fire but her two daughters were killed.
4Clarence (1888)
- AThe defendant had sexual intercourse with his wife knowing that he was infected with gonorrhoea. He passed the infection to his wife and was convicted under s.47 and s.20 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 and appealed.
Conviction was upheld. The wife had consented to sexual intercourse and therefore no technical assault or battery occurred
was irrelevant that the wife was unaware of the infection or whether she would have removed consent had she known since at the time a wife was deemed to consent to sexual intercourse with her husband.
1) nature of act 2) identity of person - BThe defendant had sexual intercourse with his wife knowing that he was infected with gonorrhoea. He passed the infection to his wife and was convicted under s.47 and s.20 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 and appealed.
Conviction was quashed. The wife had consented to sexual intercourse and therefore no technical assault or battery occurred
was irrelevant that the wife was unaware of the infection or whether she would have removed consent had she known since at the time a wife was deemed to consent to sexual intercourse with her husband.
1) nature of act 2) identity of person
- AThe defendant had sexual intercourse with his wife knowing that he was infected with gonorrhoea. He passed the infection to his wife and was convicted under s.47 and s.20 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 and appealed.
5Williams (1923)
The defendant was a singing coach. He told one of his pupils that he was performing an act to open her air passages to improve her singing. In fact he was having sexual intercourse with her. It was held that her consent was vitiated by fraud as to the nature and quality of the act.
1) nature of act medical procedure was false) 2) identity of person:- ATrue
- BFalse
6Linekar (1995)
- AA prostitute had sexual intercourse with the defendant on the understanding that he would pay her £25. He in fact never paid and never intended to pay. It was held that the fraud did vitiate consent as to the nature or quality of the act. The defendant’s conviction for rape was upheld
- BA prostitute had sexual intercourse with the defendant on the understanding that he would pay her £25. He in fact never paid and never intended to pay. It was held that the fraud did not vitiate consent as to the nature or quality of the act. The defendant’s conviction for rape was quashed.
7R v Richardson (1998)
- AA dentist carried out work on patients after being suspended from practice. The patients stated they would not have consented to the treatment had they known she had been suspended.
The patients had consented to the treatment. There was fraud as to the identity of the person performing the treatment. The fraud did not related to the defendant’s right to practice Dentistry. She was liable for ABH.
1) nature of act 2) identity of person - BA dentist carried out work on patients after being suspended from practice. The patients stated they would not have consented to the treatment had they known she had been suspended.
The patients had consented to the treatment. There was no fraud as to the identity of the person performing the treatment. The fraud related to the defendant’s right to practice Dentistry. She was not liable for ABH.
1) nature of act 2) identity of person
- AA dentist carried out work on patients after being suspended from practice. The patients stated they would not have consented to the treatment had they known she had been suspended.
8Elebkkay (1995)
- AThe appellant had been out drinking with a couple and they retired to the couple's flat. They continued drinking at the flat and the complainant went to bed leaving the appellant and her boyfriend in the living room. The boyfriend fell asleep on the sofa. The appellant climbed into bed with the complainant. She assumed it was her boyfriend and said, "I love you". He then started to have intercourse with her. After about 20 seconds she realised it was not her boyfriend. She punched him and cut him with a knife and then woke her boyfriend. The appellant was found guilty of rape and appealed contending she had consented to sexual intercourse.
Appeal allowed. Conviction quashed. The rule relating to impersonation of a husband applied equally to impersonation of a boyfriend. - BThe appellant had been out drinking with a couple and they retired to the couple's flat. They continued drinking at the flat and the complainant went to bed leaving the appellant and her boyfriend in the living room. The boyfriend fell asleep on the sofa. The appellant climbed into bed with the complainant. She assumed it was her boyfriend and said, "I love you". He then started to have intercourse with her. After about 20 seconds she realised it was not her boyfriend. She punched him and cut him with a knife and then woke her boyfriend. The appellant was found guilty of rape and appealed contending she had consented to sexual intercourse.
Appeal dismissed. Conviction upheld. The rule relating to impersonation of a husband applied equally to impersonation of a boyfriend.
- AThe appellant had been out drinking with a couple and they retired to the couple's flat. They continued drinking at the flat and the complainant went to bed leaving the appellant and her boyfriend in the living room. The boyfriend fell asleep on the sofa. The appellant climbed into bed with the complainant. She assumed it was her boyfriend and said, "I love you". He then started to have intercourse with her. After about 20 seconds she realised it was not her boyfriend. She punched him and cut him with a knife and then woke her boyfriend. The appellant was found guilty of rape and appealed contending she had consented to sexual intercourse.
9Tabassum (2000)
- AThe appellant was a lecturer in ICT. He was convicted on three counts of indecent assault. He had told the complainants that he worked for Christies hospital and was compiling a database on breast cancer. He carried out physical examinations on their breasts and demonstrated how they should conduct examinations on themselves to detect signs of breast cancer. In each case the women had consented to the examination, however, the women only consented because they believed he was medically qualified
There was true consent. They were consenting to touching for medical purposes to indecent behaviour, there was consent to the nature of the act and quality
consent to quality of act (touch breast) and no fraud of identity (medically qualified) - BThe appellant was a lecturer in ICT. He was convicted on three counts of indecent assault. He had told the complainants that he worked for Christies hospital and was compiling a database on breast cancer. He carried out physical examinations on their breasts and demonstrated how they should conduct examinations on themselves to detect signs of breast cancer. In each case the women had consented to the examination, however, the women only consented because they believed he was medically qualified
There was no true consent. They were consenting to touching for medical purposes not to indecent behaviour, there was consent to the nature of the act but not its quality.
no consent to quality of act (touch breast) and fraud of identity (medically qualified)
- AThe appellant was a lecturer in ICT. He was convicted on three counts of indecent assault. He had told the complainants that he worked for Christies hospital and was compiling a database on breast cancer. He carried out physical examinations on their breasts and demonstrated how they should conduct examinations on themselves to detect signs of breast cancer. In each case the women had consented to the examination, however, the women only consented because they believed he was medically qualified
10Dica (2004)
- AThe defendant was diagnosed as being HIV positive. Knowing of this he had unprotected sexual intercourse with two women.
Those who, knowing that they are suffering HIV or some other serious sexual disease, recklessly transmit it through consensual sexual intercourse, and inflict grievous bodily harm on a person from whom the risk is concealed and who is not consenting to it will be not liable under s.20. - BThe defendant was diagnosed as being HIV positive. Knowing of this he had unprotected sexual intercourse with two women.
Those who, knowing that they are suffering HIV or some other serious sexual disease, recklessly transmit it through consensual sexual intercourse, and inflict grievous bodily harm on a person from whom the risk is concealed and who is not consenting to it will be liable under s.20.
- AThe defendant was diagnosed as being HIV positive. Knowing of this he had unprotected sexual intercourse with two women.
11B (2006)
- AThe appellant (B) appealed against a conviction for rape. The victim (V) and B had sexual intercourse on the floor in a recess area of a street following their meeting outside a nightclub in the early hours of the morning. girl ran to deliver man and to call police for rape.
HELD: Appeal allowed
(1) B’s failure disclose his HIV status was not relevant to the issue of consent under s 74 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 and should have been excluded under s 78 of the 1984 Act.
(2) The issue for the jury was whether or not V consented to sexual intercourse, not whether she consented to intercourse with a person suffering from a sexually transmitted disease
exclusion of HIV disclosure was irrelevant to consent, the act in activity remains a consensual act - BThe appellant (B) appealed against a conviction for rape. The victim (V) and B had sexual intercourse on the floor in a recess area of a street following their meeting outside a nightclub in the early hours of the morning. girl ran to deliver man and to call police for rape.
HELD: Appeal not allowed
(1) B’s failure disclose his HIV status was not relevant to the issue of consent under s 74 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 and should have been excluded under s 78 of the 1984 Act.
(2) The issue for the jury was whether or not V consented to sexual intercourse, not whether she consented to intercourse with a person suffering from a sexually transmitted disease
exclusion of HIV disclosure was irrelevant to consent, the act in activity remains a consensual act
- AThe appellant (B) appealed against a conviction for rape. The victim (V) and B had sexual intercourse on the floor in a recess area of a street following their meeting outside a nightclub in the early hours of the morning. girl ran to deliver man and to call police for rape.
12R v Golding (2014)
- ANon disclosure of herpes is not offence, constituted GBH of harm of recklessness under s. 20 (2)
- BNon disclosure of herpes is an offence, constituted GBH of harm of recklessness under s. 20 (2)
13Kozani (2005)
- Anon disclosure of HIV is a risk imposed by v, not D to brace risk of sex (informed GBH)
that HIV could be recklessly transmitted in which case consent had to be informed, willing or conscious consent (including D's honest belief).
The victims in this case consented to the risk of HIV, not to being given the disease.
The victims did not give a willing or informed consent to the risks of contracting the HIV virus from the D and the convictions remained - Bnon disclosure of HIV is a risk imposed by D, not victims to brace risk of sex (informed GBH)
that HIV could be recklessly transmitted in which case consent had to be informed, willing or conscious consent (including D's honest belief).
The victims in this case consented to the risk of HIV, not to being given the disease.
The victims did not give a willing or informed consent to the risks of contracting the HIV virus from the D and the convictions remained
- Anon disclosure of HIV is a risk imposed by v, not D to brace risk of sex (informed GBH)
14Donovan (1934)
- Apre-brown, consent for sexual pleasure, is a defence to offence negate actus reus
- Bpre-brown, consent for sexual pleasure, is not a defence to offence negate actus reus
15AG Ref (No 6 of 1980)
- APre-Brown, can consent to fist fight falls under exception of sport, horseplay, etc
- BPre-Brown, cannot consent to fist fight unless excluded in sport, horseplay, etc
16Jones (Terrance) (1987)
- APre brown, consent to rough and undisciplined horseplay is a defence even no consent, allowed, genuinely belief there was consent
- BPre brown, consent to rough and undisciplined horseplay is nota defence with no consent, allowed, genuinely belief there was consent
17Atiken (1992)
- AThe appellants were RAF officers. During the course of celebrations on completing their training, as a practical joke, they had taken to setting fire to officers wearing their fire resistant clothing. They had done this to two officers and on each occasion the fire had been extinguished without injury. However, on the third occasion the officer sustained serious burns. The appellants were court martialled and convicted of GBH under s.20 Offences Against the person Act 1861.
Appeal allowed. If the officer had consented or the appellant’s believed that the officer had consented it was open for the judge to find that no offence had been committed
Pre brown, officer had consented or appellant believed had consented no offence (as to parts of scenario: one consent / second: wanted to stop - BThe appellants were RAF officers. During the course of celebrations on completing their training, as a practical joke, they had taken to setting fire to officers wearing their fire resistant clothing. They had done this to two officers and on each occasion the fire had been extinguished without injury. However, on the third occasion the officer sustained serious burns. The appellants were court martialled and convicted of GBH under s.20 Offences Against the person Act 1861.
Appeal disallowed. If the officer had consented or the appellant’s believed that the officer had consented it was open for the judge to find that no offence had been committed
Pre brown, officer had consented or appellant believed had consented no offence (as to parts of scenario: one consent / second: wanted to stop
- AThe appellants were RAF officers. During the course of celebrations on completing their training, as a practical joke, they had taken to setting fire to officers wearing their fire resistant clothing. They had done this to two officers and on each occasion the fire had been extinguished without injury. However, on the third occasion the officer sustained serious burns. The appellants were court martialled and convicted of GBH under s.20 Offences Against the person Act 1861.
18Brown (1994)
- AThe five appellants were convicted on various counts of ABH and wounding a under the Offences Against the Person Act 1861. The injuries were inflicted during consensual homosexual sadomasochist activities
The defence of consent can be relied on in offences under s.47 and s.20 OAPA 1861 where the injuries resulted from sadomasochist activities.
consensual violence is not criminalised as deemed lawful public exceptions - BThe five appellants were convicted on various counts of ABH and wounding a under the Offences Against the Person Act 1861. The injuries were inflicted during consensual homosexual sadomasochist activities
The defence of consent cannot be relied on in offences under s.47 and s.20 OAPA 1861 where the injuries resulted from sadomasochist activities.
consensual violence is criminalised as deemed unlawful public exceptions
- AThe five appellants were convicted on various counts of ABH and wounding a under the Offences Against the Person Act 1861. The injuries were inflicted during consensual homosexual sadomasochist activities
19Wilson (1996)
- AThe appellant branded his initials on his wife’s buttocks with a hot knife. She had asked him to do so. Her skin became infected and she sought medical treatment from her doctor. The doctor reported the matter to the police and the husband was charged with ABH under s.47 Offences Against the Person Act 1861.
The wife’s consent was not valid. The branding was more infliction of pain for sexual gratification. The court further held that consensual activity between husband and wife in the privacy of the matrimonial home was a matter for the courts. - BThe appellant branded his initials on his wife’s buttocks with a hot knife. She had asked him to do so. Her skin became infected and she sought medical treatment from her doctor. The doctor reported the matter to the police and the husband was charged with ABH under s.47 Offences Against the Person Act 1861.
The wife’s consent was valid. The branding was more akin to tattooing and cosmetic enhancement rather than infliction of pain for sexual gratification. The court further held that consensual activity between husband and wife in the privacy of the matrimonial home was not a matter for the courts.
- AThe appellant branded his initials on his wife’s buttocks with a hot knife. She had asked him to do so. Her skin became infected and she sought medical treatment from her doctor. The doctor reported the matter to the police and the husband was charged with ABH under s.47 Offences Against the Person Act 1861.
20Emmett (1999)
- AThe defendant appealed against conviction after being involved in sexual activity which he said was not intended to cause harm but clearly did risk harm. On the first occasion he tied a plastic bag over the head of his partner. On the second, he poured lighter fluid over her breasts and set them alight
Post brown, consent irrelevant as the act caused pain, went beyond line of creating risk, not danger of life. - BThe defendant appealed against conviction after being involved in sexual activity which he said was not intended to cause harm but clearly did risk harm. On the first occasion he tied a plastic bag over the head of his partner. On the second, he poured lighter fluid over her breasts and set them alight
Post brown, consent irrelevant as the act caused pain, went beyond line of creating risk, danger of life.
- AThe defendant appealed against conviction after being involved in sexual activity which he said was not intended to cause harm but clearly did risk harm. On the first occasion he tied a plastic bag over the head of his partner. On the second, he poured lighter fluid over her breasts and set them alight
21Richardson v Irwin (1999)
- ADD two students lifted another over a balcony and dropped him about 12 feet to the ground, causing him serious injuries. During horseplay following an evening's drinking
post brown, intoxication does not substitutes for mens rea in offence, engaged in horseplay, ought to foreseen consequences and risk of sober and reasonable person
question was not what another person would have foreseen but what DD themselves would have foreseen had they been sober. - BDD two students lifted another over a balcony and dropped him about 12 feet to the ground, causing him serious injuries. During horseplay following an evening's drinking
post brown, intoxication substitutes for mens rea in offence, engaged in horseplay, ought to foreseen consequences and risk of sober and reasonable person
question was not what another person would have foreseen but what DD themselves would have foreseen had they been sober.
- ADD two students lifted another over a balcony and dropped him about 12 feet to the ground, causing him serious injuries. During horseplay following an evening's drinking
22Barnes (2005)
- APost brown, consent to sport (type), injury occurred alternative to civil remedy, exception of lawful acts) state of mind of the nature of the act was the degree of force an extent to risk, as there was an agreement for sport lawful acts
- BPost brown, consent to horseplay (type), injury occurred alternative to civil remedy, exception of lawful acts) state of mind of the nature of the act was the degree of force an extent to risk, as there was an agreement for horseplay lawful acts
23DPP v Smith (1961)
- AA policeman tried to stop the defendant from driving off with stolen goods by jumping on to the bonnet of the car. The defendant drove off at speed and zigzagged in order to get the police office off the car. The defendant argued he did not intend to harm the policeman. The policeman was knocked onto the path of an oncoming car and killed
Held not liable for his actions as the court decided to move towards the subjective test
If you are satisfied that ... he must as a reasonable man have contemplated that grievous bodily harm was likely to result to that officer ... and that such harm did happen and the officer died in consequence, then the accused is guilty of capital murder. ... On the other hand, if you are not satisfied that he intended to inflict grievous bodily harm upon the officer - in other words, if you think he could not as a reasonable man have contemplated that grievous bodily harm would result to the officer in consequence of his actions - well, then, the verdict would be guilty of manslaughter - BA policeman tried to stop the defendant from driving off with stolen goods by jumping on to the bonnet of the car. The defendant drove off at speed and zigzagged in order to get the police office off the car. The defendant argued he did not intend to harm the policeman. The policeman was knocked onto the path of an oncoming car and killed
Held liable for his actions as the court decided to move towards the objective test
If you are satisfied that ... he must as a reasonable man have contemplated that grievous bodily harm was likely to result to that officer ... and that such harm did happen and the officer died in consequence, then the accused is guilty of capital murder. ... On the other hand, if you are not satisfied that he intended to inflict grievous bodily harm upon the officer - in other words, if you think he could not as a reasonable man have contemplated that grievous bodily harm would result to the officer in consequence of his actions - well, then, the verdict would be guilty of manslaughter
- AA policeman tried to stop the defendant from driving off with stolen goods by jumping on to the bonnet of the car. The defendant drove off at speed and zigzagged in order to get the police office off the car. The defendant argued he did not intend to harm the policeman. The policeman was knocked onto the path of an oncoming car and killed
24Sexual Offences Act 2003 briefly:
s.1 rape s.2 assault by penetration s.3 sexual assault s.4 causing a person to engage in sex activity without consent- ATrue
- BFalse
25s.18 OAPA:
grievous means really serious, unlikely reasonable man would believe to inflict GBh likely occur if no would be manslaughter if yes would be murder
1) either wounding or cause GBh
2) wound cause GBH be done maliciously
3) wounding cause GBH be done unlawfully
4) intention to do GBH to any person or to resist or prevent the lawful apprehension of any person- ATrue
- BFalse
26s.74 Sexual Offence Act 2003
- Aconsent definition: a person consents if he agrees by choice, and has the freedom and capacity to make that choice.
- Bcapacity definition: a person who has the legal capacity of an adult has the ability to make a choice whether influenced of drugs or alcohol, exception be limited intelligence or age under
27Jheeta (2007)
- AThe appellant had a relationship with a student which began in 2002 and continued until 2006. During the relationship the complainant (C) started receiving anonymous threatening text messages. Unknown to her, the messages were in fact sent by her boyfriend, the appellant. C confided in her boyfriend and he would comfort her and promise to keep her safe. Eventually C became anxious about the messages and wished to go to the police. The appellant told her not to worry he would go to the police and report it. He then sent her text messages from a fictitious policeman asking for her to send her statement via text. The malicious text messages continued. The appellant sent a message to C from the fictitious policeman offering a protection service whereby her home would be kept under surveillance for a fee of £1,000 pa. C gave money to the appellant in the belief that he was taking it to the police to pay for the protection service.
His conviction was upheld. The appellant was responsible for the 'menacing pressures' which led the complainant to part with her money. blackmailing, rape, of sexual intercourse, etc. - BThe appellant had a relationship with a student which began in 2002 and continued until 2006. During the relationship the complainant (C) started receiving anonymous threatening text messages. Unknown to her, the messages were in fact sent by her boyfriend, the appellant. C confided in her boyfriend and he would comfort her and promise to keep her safe. Eventually C became anxious about the messages and wished to go to the police. The appellant told her not to worry he would go to the police and report it. He then sent her text messages from a fictitious policeman asking for her to send her statement via text. The malicious text messages continued. The appellant sent a message to C from the fictitious policeman offering a protection service whereby her home would be kept under surveillance for a fee of £1,000 pa. C gave money to the appellant in the belief that he was taking it to the police to pay for the protection service.
His conviction was quashed. The appellant was not responsible for the 'menacing pressures' which led the complainant to part with her money. blackmailing, rape, of sexual intercourse, etc.
- AThe appellant had a relationship with a student which began in 2002 and continued until 2006. During the relationship the complainant (C) started receiving anonymous threatening text messages. Unknown to her, the messages were in fact sent by her boyfriend, the appellant. C confided in her boyfriend and he would comfort her and promise to keep her safe. Eventually C became anxious about the messages and wished to go to the police. The appellant told her not to worry he would go to the police and report it. He then sent her text messages from a fictitious policeman asking for her to send her statement via text. The malicious text messages continued. The appellant sent a message to C from the fictitious policeman offering a protection service whereby her home would be kept under surveillance for a fee of £1,000 pa. C gave money to the appellant in the belief that he was taking it to the police to pay for the protection service.
28Bree (2007): Whether a person can consent to sexual activity when intoxicated.
- ABree went to visit his brother. They went out for the evening with his brother's friends, including the complainant. They all drank a considerable amount of alcohol. The complainant remembered little about getting home, but once home remembers being sick and that Bree and his brother washed her hair. The complainant remembered nothing after this until regaining consciousness and finding Bree penetrating her sexually. The complainant agreed that she had not said ‘no', but contended that she had never consented. Bree accepted that the complainant was intoxicated but claimed that she was capable of consenting, had undressed herself and appeared willing
D has involuntarily consumed even substantial quantities of alcohol, but nevertheless remains capable of choosing whether or not to have intercourse, and in drink agrees to do so, this would be rape.” - BBree went to visit his brother. They went out for the evening with his brother's friends, including the complainant. They all drank a considerable amount of alcohol. The complainant remembered little about getting home, but once home remembers being sick and that Bree and his brother washed her hair. The complainant remembered nothing after this until regaining consciousness and finding Bree penetrating her sexually. The complainant agreed that she had not said ‘no', but contended that she had never consented. Bree accepted that the complainant was intoxicated but claimed that she was capable of consenting, had undressed herself and appeared willing
D has voluntarily consumed even substantial quantities of alcohol, but nevertheless remains capable of choosing whether or not to have intercourse, and in drink agrees to do so, this would not be rape.”
- ABree went to visit his brother. They went out for the evening with his brother's friends, including the complainant. They all drank a considerable amount of alcohol. The complainant remembered little about getting home, but once home remembers being sick and that Bree and his brother washed her hair. The complainant remembered nothing after this until regaining consciousness and finding Bree penetrating her sexually. The complainant agreed that she had not said ‘no', but contended that she had never consented. Bree accepted that the complainant was intoxicated but claimed that she was capable of consenting, had undressed herself and appeared willing
29S.76 Sexual Offences Act 2003
- AConclusive presumptions about consent
1)
If in proceedings for an offence to which this section applies it is proved that the defendant did the relevant act and that any of the circumstances specified in subsection (2) existed, it is to be conclusively presumed—
.
(a)
that the complainant did not consent to the relevant act, and
.
(b)
that the defendant did not believe that the complainant consented to the relevant act.
.
(2)
The circumstances are that—
.
(a)
the defendant intentionally deceived the complainant as to the nature or purpose of the relevant act;
.
(b)
the defendant intentionally induced the complainant to consent to the relevant act by impersonating a person known personally to the complainant. - BEvidential presumptions about consent:
Evidential presumptions about consent
.
(1)
If in proceedings for an offence to which this section applies it is proved—
.
(a)
that the defendant did the relevant act,
.
(b)
that any of the circumstances specified in subsection (2) existed, and
.
(c)
that the defendant knew that those circumstances existed,
.
the complainant is to be taken not to have consented to the relevant act unless sufficient evidence is adduced to raise an issue as to whether he consented, and the defendant is to be taken not to have reasonably believed that the complainant consented unless sufficient evidence is adduced to raise an issue as to whether he reasonably believed it.
- AConclusive presumptions about consent
30Devonald (Stephen) (2008)
- AEmbarrassed due to brake up with his daughter, he intentionally deceived the complainant to the nature of the act
There was no basis for overturning a conviction of causing a person to engage in sexual activity without consent in the case of a male defendant who had, with the object of embarrassing his victim, posed as a young woman, engaged in an online correspondence with the victim and persuaded him to masturbate in front of a webcam.
There was a deception of acting as a female, appeal dismissed - BEmbarrassed due to brake up with his daughter, he intentionally deceived the complainant to the nature of the act
There was no basis for overturning a conviction of causing a person to engage in sexual activity without consent in the case of a male defendant who had, with the object of embarrassing his victim, posed as a young woman, engaged in an online correspondence with the victim and persuaded him to masturbate in front of a webcam.
There was no deception of acting as a female, appeal allowed
- AEmbarrassed due to brake up with his daughter, he intentionally deceived the complainant to the nature of the act
31s. 76 (2) (6) SOA 2003
- AConclusive presumptions about consent; circumstances are
the defendant intentionally induced the complainant to consent to the relevant act by impersonating a person known personally to the complainant. - BConclusive presumptions about consent:
the defendant intentionally deceived the complainant as to the nature or purpose of the relevant act;
- AConclusive presumptions about consent; circumstances are
32s.75 SOA 2003
- AEvidential presumptions about consent:
The circumstances are that—
.
(a)
any person was, at the time of the relevant act or immediately before it began, using violence against the complainant or causing the complainant to fear that immediate violence would be used against him;
.
(b)
any person was, at the time of the relevant act or immediately before it began, causing the complainant to fear that violence was being used, or that immediate violence would be used, against another person;
.
(c)
the complainant was, and the defendant was not, unlawfully detained at the time of the relevant act;
.
(d)
the complainant was asleep or otherwise unconscious at the time of the relevant act;
.
(e)
because of the complainant’s physical disability, the complainant would not have been able at the time of the relevant act to communicate to the defendant whether the complainant consented;
.
(f)
any person had administered to or caused to be taken by the complainant, without the complainant’s consent, a substance which, having regard to when it was administered or taken, was capable of causing or enabling the complainant to be stupefied or overpowered at the time of the relevant act. - BEvidential presumptions about consent:
If in proceedings for an offence to which this section applies it is proved—
.
(a)
that the defendant did the relevant act,
.
(b)
that any of the circumstances specified in subsection (2) existed, and
.
(c)
that the defendant knew that those circumstances existed,
.
the complainant is to be taken not to have consented to the relevant act unless sufficient evidence is adduced to raise an issue as to whether he consented, and the defendant is to be taken not to have reasonably believed that the complainant consented unless sufficient evidence is adduced to raise an issue as to whether he reasonably believed it.
- AEvidential presumptions about consent:
33S. 78 SOA 2003
- ASexual definition: penetration, touching or any other activity is sexual if a reasonable person would consider that—
(a)
whatever its circumstances or any person’s purpose in relation to it, it is because of its nature sexual, or
(b)
because of its nature it may be sexual and because of its circumstances or the purpose of any person in relation to it (or both) it is sexual.] - B
Exposure definition
A person commits an offence if—
(a)
he intentionally exposes his genitals, and
(b)
he intends that someone will see them and be caused alarm or distress.
(2)
A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable—
(a)
on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or both;
(b)
on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 2 years.]
- ASexual definition: penetration, touching or any other activity is sexual if a reasonable person would consider that—
34R v H (2005)
- AThe victim was walking her dog one evening. The defendant touched her tracksuit bottoms
D's act was not unambiguously sexual, not governed by s. 78 (a) but s. 78 (b): to a reasonable person could be sexual if yes (2) the circumstances in view or purpose in touching is in fact sexual, therefore liable
held liable for sexual assault - BThe victim was walking her dog one evening. The defendant touched her tracksuit bottoms
D's act was not unambiguously sexual, not governed by s. 78 (a) but s. 78 (b): to a reasonable person could be sexual if yes (2) the circumstances in view or purpose in touching is in fact sexual, therefore liable
held not liable for sexual assault but for causing abh
- AThe victim was walking her dog one evening. The defendant touched her tracksuit bottoms
35George (1956)
- Awhere D tried to remove a shoe from a woman's foot to derive perverse sexual pleasure, the court held that this was an indecent assault because there were circumstances of indecency, unambiguously sexual, sexual assault
- Bwhere D tried to remove a shoe from a woman's foot to derive perverse sexual pleasure, the court held that this was not an indecent assault because there were no circumstances of indecency, not unambiguously sexual (only sexually gratifying)
36Court (1988)
- Aasked a 12-year-old girl when she visited the shop, if she would let him spank her. She said "No". Thereupon he seized her, pulled her over his knee and spanked her 12 times on her buttocks.
held not unambiguously sexual but found indecent, not fall under s.78 (b) but fell under s.78 (c) - Basked a 12-year-old girl when she visited the shop, if she would let him spank her. She said "No". Thereupon he seized her, pulled her over his knee and spanked her 12 times on her buttocks.
held not unambiguously sexual but found indecent, not fall under s.78 (a) but fell under s.78 (b)
- Aasked a 12-year-old girl when she visited the shop, if she would let him spank her. She said "No". Thereupon he seized her, pulled her over his knee and spanked her 12 times on her buttocks.
37S.1 SOA 2003
- ADefinition of Rape:
(1)
A person (A) commits an offence if—
.
(a)
he intentionally penetrates the vagina, anus or mouth of another person (B) with his penis,
.
(b)
B does not consent to the penetration, and
.
(c)
A does not reasonably believe that B consents.
.
(2)
Whether a belief is reasonable is to be determined having regard to all the circumstances, including any steps A has taken to ascertain whether B consents.
.
(3)
Sections 75 and 76 apply to an offence under this section.
.
(4)
A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable, on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for life. - B
Assault by penetration
.
(1)
A person (A) commits an offence if—
.
(a)
he intentionally penetrates the vagina or anus of another person (B) with a part of his body or anything else,
.
(b)
the penetration is sexual,
.
(c)
B does not consent to the penetration, and
.
(d)
A does not reasonably believe that B consents.
.
(2)
Whether a belief is reasonable is to be determined having regard to all the circumstances, including any steps A has taken to ascertain whether B consents.
.
(3)
Sections 75 and 76 apply to an offence under this section.
.
(4)
A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable, on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for life.
- ADefinition of Rape:
38S. 2 SOA 2003
- A
Assault by penetration
.
(1)
A person (A) commits an offence if—
.
(a)
he intentionally penetrates the vagina or anus of another person (B) with a part of his body or anything else,
.
(b)
the penetration is sexual,
.
(c)
B does not consent to the penetration, and
.
(d)
A does not reasonably believe that B consents.
.
(2)
Whether a belief is reasonable is to be determined having regard to all the circumstances, including any steps A has taken to ascertain whether B consents.
.
(3)
Sections 75 and 76 apply to an offence under this section.
.
(4)
A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable, on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for life. - B
Sexual assault
.
(1)
A person (A) commits an offence if—
.
(a)
he intentionally touches another person (B),
.
(b)
the touching is sexual,
.
(c)
B does not consent to the touching, and
.
(d)
A does not reasonably believe that B consents.
.
(2)
Whether a belief is reasonable is to be determined having regard to all the circumstances, including any steps A has taken to ascertain whether B consents.
.
(3)
Sections 75 and 76 apply to an offence under this section.
.
(4)
A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable—
.
(a)
on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or both;
.
(b)
on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years.
- A
39S.3 SOA 2003
- A
Sexual assault
.
(1)
A person (A) commits an offence if—
.
(a)
he intentionally touches another person (B),
.
(b)
the touching is sexual,
.
(c)
B does not consent to the touching, and
.
(d)
A does not reasonably believe that B consents.
.
(2)
Whether a belief is reasonable is to be determined having regard to all the circumstances, including any steps A has taken to ascertain whether B consents.
.
(3)
Sections 75 and 76 apply to an offence under this section.
.
(4)
A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable—
.
(a)
on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or both;
.
(b)
on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years. - B
Causing a person to engage in sexual activity without consent
.
(1)
A person (A) commits an offence if—
.
(a)
he intentionally causes another person (B) to engage in an activity,
.
(b)
the activity is sexual,
.
(c)
B does not consent to engaging in the activity, and
.
(d)
A does not reasonably believe that B consents.
- A
40S.79 (8) SOA 2003
- ATouching includes touching—
(a)
with any part of the body,
(b)
with anything else,
(c)
through anything,
and in particular includes touching amounting to penetration. - B(8)
References to an image of a person include references to an image of an imaginary person.
(a)
“Mental disorder” has the meaning given by section 1 of the Mental Health Act 1983 (c. 20).
(b)
References to observation (however expressed) are to observation whether direct or by looking at an image.
- ATouching includes touching—
41S.4 SOA 2003
- A
Causing a person to engage in sexual activity without consent
.
(1)
A person (A) commits an offence if—
(a)
he intentionally causes another person (B) to engage in an activity,
(b)
the activity is sexual,
(c)
B does not consent to engaging in the activity, and
(d)
A does not reasonably believe that B consents. - B
Rape of a child under 13
.
(1)
A person commits an offence if—
.
(a)
he intentionally penetrates the vagina, anus or mouth of another person with his penis, and
.
(b)
the other person is under 13.
.
(2)
A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable, on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for life.
- A
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- Law (Criminal law) Quiz on Sexual Acts , created by richard.w2020 on 21/03/2015.
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- richard.w2020
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