Conscience Notes

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Conscience - Thomas Aquinas' View

St Thomas Aquinas; his account is detailed and developed and is interesting in its attempt to do justice to the complexity of human experience reflection on conduct.

Aquinas' view of conscience is sometimes described as a 'theological approach', but we must be careful not to see his idea as 'the voce of God' or some version of divine command theory.

It would be equally wrong to see his idea of conscience as some sort of intuitive little voice, which just knows what it right thing to do​

Aquinas and Ratio

Aquinas' approach is always reasoned, as may be seen from his treatment of intellect as a fundamental part of the soul which itself closely tied to the reason

Aquinas makes use of concept of ratio, which means rather more than itself translation as 'reason': it also contains a notion of concept or an idea.

This is important because of Aquinas' idea of practice ratio, that is, the use of reason in practice, which inevitably is always situational in the application

Practica ratio entails not merely being able to know what should be done, but also the practical way of thinking through how that which should be done and can be done by the agent with means available

Like Aristotle, Aquinas distinguishes between the theoretical or speculative parts of reason, such as those we use in drawing up scientific hypotheses and the practical

The moral life is a practical life- we have to work out carefully what is right and proper to do. There is not an invariable right answer, and so there is a relationship between skills of acting well and an artist doing well

Like Aristotle, Aquinas sees a distinction between the skills of an artist and those of prudence.

Both operate in world of variables. Both Aquinas and Aristotle, argue that an artist, such as an architect, has to reason through how to use the materials he has at hand to achieve some particular artefact - this is practical reasoning.

There is no absolute right building to be built: questions need to be asked about what the building is for, and then accommodate that need according to means, such as space, money and materials, which are available

A circumstance cannot be ignored, and the architect has to work within those constraints, The same is true for individuals in life. It's not enough to think of what should be done but also ask about what I can do from where theory of what is good but skills in practical reasoning to get good results.

Decisions about what to do in our lives have to begin from reality of out here and now. If someone asks us how to get to London, it would be useless to say, 'I wouldn't start from here', as here is where we must begin.

Aquinas is always insistent on the practical and immediate aspect of moral decision-making, which necessarily entails close attention to circumstance. For him, there is always a connection between conscience and practical reason (practice ratio)

Conscience and Prudence

There are close links between Aquinas' theory of natural law and his treatment of conscience.

Aquinas was insistent on the importance of careful judgement of what is right and proper to do in the circumstances.

One size doesn't fit all situations. The practical question of moral life means understanding the general principle, but also being able to apply it to particular circumstances.

The same is true in cases of conscience, both when we're judging what we need too, but also when we judge the past actions of others and ourselves. This is the realm of conscience. We ought to not, Aquinas thinks; to feel guilty for every action we have ever done which has turned out wrongly

Sometimes we couldn't have done differently; sometimes our best intentions

There's a close link between prudence and conscience. In his treatment of natural law, Aquinas, like Aristotle, insisted on need for intellectual virtue of prudence

As Aquinas tells us:

"Prudence entails not only consideration of reason but also application to action, which is goal of practical reason"

Prudence involves 3 intellectual skills: Understanding, judgement and good deliberation

The last of these is practical business of working out how, in the situation in which we find ourselves, to achieve what out judgement tells us we ought to do

Notice that in use of conscience, whether in deciding what we should do or in examining previous actions, judgement is essential part - did we perform right action in circumstances? Conscience like action is always examined circumstantially

The connection between prudence and conscience must never be forgotten, as they are useful caution against those who have attempted, on rather thin evidence, to interpret Thomas moral thought as indifferent to circumstance.

Conscience - Aquinas' View

Summary of Aquinas' view of conscience in Summa Theologica:

"Properly speaking, conscience is not a proper, but an act... The word 'conscience' comes from 'cum alio scientia"

We notice at once that this view of conscience is based on principle of reason. It is important that it entails an action of mind, because an act is always particular - it is this act, performed in here and now

There is something common with Joseph Fletcher 's in that it continues by considering the ways in which we make judgements not just about the cations we are now to do, but also about those we have done (or not done).

Notice how Aquinas always sensitive to language in use, is concerned to demonstrate how his description of conscience fits with way people use term in ordinary language

Synderesis and Conscientia

Aquinas' view of conscience is quite subtle, with many different strands within it, but forms a coherent whole, not just in itself, but also in relation to his entire understanding of morality

His account always pays attention to intellectual and rational nature of human choices as well as to how we should judge our actions

As always with Aquinas, we find how he gives close analysis of terms we use when we speak about ideas such as conscience or prudence

We find Aquinas making reference to synderesis

This is a concept with an interesting history, as Aquinas acknowledges. There term, which is not an original greek word, is first found in passage in St Jerome (347-420), when he comments on vision of Ezekiel, in which he sees a human, a lion, an ox and an eagle

As Aquinas rightly notes, for Jerome, 'synderesis' and 'conscience' are interchangeable terms

For Aquinas, syneresis is natural inclination to do good and avoid evil, desire which is universal, infallible and part of God's will for creatures her created

There are questions in Aquinas and other writers about whether synderesis is a habit a power or disposition, but these arguments can, for present purposes, be laid to one side.

Infallibility of synderesis is, for Aquinas, self-evident: it could never be wrong to wish to do good and avoid evil

Just because we have desire to do good and avoid evil, it does not follow that this infallible desire leads to right action

Conscientia is name Aquinas gives to intellectual process of forming our particular moral judgement in individual circumstances, which includes skill of prudence

Here, errors can be made, either because we are mistaken about facts of case for other reason, perhaps because we're blinded by desires, feel pressures from outside or simply too hasty in our judgements.

A Theological Account?

This distinction between synderesis and conscientia is valuable for considering whether we should see Aquinas as essentially theological in approach to moral questions

In important sense he is theological in that he believes we're the creatures we are because of will of God, and because God chose that we should be people we are, with skills of intellect and potential for good will that we have

In that sense, the ability to do right and avoid evil is god given

Nevertheless, as we have suggested, the actual business of choosing the right thing and making right judgements is for Aquinas, absolutely to be understood in terms of rational use of our minds (ratio)

Aquinas is very clear that, while reason is god given, it is like any use of thought, capable of error. Just as we can make mistakes in scientific reasoning, artistic judgement and any other use of our minds, so too the same as we shall see, true of that type of thinking when we think of as conscientious

If, as Aquinas thinks, particular judgements of conscience are neither merely feelings nor voice of god. It would be possible to construe his ideas on conscience in secular terms, as something that minds are capable of doing

Aquinas, as a believer, thinks that the mind is a god given, bit his analysis would seem to work equally well even if mind simply surprising natural fact

Moral Responsibility

A central concern for Aquinas, as for many medieval thinkers, was question of when we can ascribe moral responsibility

Plato notoriously believed, as Greek thought in general has done, that we do wrong only as a result of ignorance

For Plato, everyone desires the good, but most people (other than true philosophers) are now more or less ignorant of what true good is

Plato held common Greek view that if we know the good, we're bound to do it.

Aristotle disagreed. He thought that we can know good but fail to do it, perhaps because we've fallen into bad habits or lack courage to do what we know we should do

In Nicomachean Ethics, Book III, Chapters 1 & 2, Aristotle considers nature of moral responsibility, in terms which have had deep influence on later discussion

Aquinas, both in his Commentary on Nicomachean Ethics (Sententia Libri Ethicorum (1270-71)) and in Summa, is explicit about debt to Aristotle, and ideas should be seen as development of Aristotle's theories.

Aristotle considers 2 factors, which might excuse someone, from being blamed for an action. One of these is ignorance, the other, lack of choice.

In Aquinas, these ideas are developed, and Catholic moral theology, following Aquinas, still teaches that to commit a sin, one needs full knowledge and full consent

We should notice her that we can only determine degree of responsibility case-by-case: particular practical judgement is always situational

For Aquinas: someone might be under such pressure that their choice cannot be said to be free, nor their truly consenting to action

Many things, depending on individual and circumstances, can affect voluntariness of action.

In law, we may think someone not responsible for his actions. As in courtroom, there is clear need to look at each individual case before ascribing responsibility

Vincible and Invincible Ignorance

There is close connection between consent and knowledge. It seems impossible to give proper consent - 'informed' consent - if we are ignorant of facts

For Plato, ignorance was reason for blame: he advocated punishing person acted through ignorance to teach her to know better next time.

For Aristotle and Aquinas, on the other hand, forgivable ignorance gives good reason not punish wrongdoer

Aquinas distinguishes vincible ignorance from invincible ignorance. If someone is invincibly ignorant, then he's potentially blameworthy

This is ignorance which is avoidable and correctable. There are things which should be expected to know. If I visit another country and murder someone, it's no excuse for me to say I was brought up in Britain and could not be expected to know that killing people is illegal in Austria

My own common sense should tell me that it's wrong to murder, anywhere. If I were unaware of Austria law, there's always opportunities to ask.

Aquinas makes similar points. These ideas seem to match our common sense understanding. A court would unlikely to take seriously the driver who offered drunkenness excuse for dangerous driving.

Some ignorance isn't of this kind. In some cases, a person cannot be reasonably expected to foresee unfortunate consequences of their actions.

cannot possibly be expected to foreseen the tragedy. This for Aquinas, is invincible ignorance, an ignorance which in no sense was in their control

Invincible ignorance has many forms. We don't hold people responsible for their actions when they're insane. Insane people, due to their illness, accept things are true that others recognise as erroneous

It's not always possible to determine precisely when people are insane, and courts sometimes have difficulty in individual cases, but Aquinas' principle seems a just one.

Other forms of invincible ignorance could be result of being too young to know right from wrong. Even for adults, sometimes we're unable to get necessary facts, and our actions are forgiven.

Sometimes we're unable to look back invent and say honestly that we meant well - our intentions were best - but we would have acted differently if only we had known something we couldn't have known at the time

In those circumstance, we feel regret about what happened but cannot hold ourselves guilty of moral offence

We're sorry that we got things wrong, and wish things turned out differently, but cannot say our judgement was any way wicked at time. To be guilty is to act in way that was clearly wrong at time offence was committed.

The Demands Of Conscience

Aquinas is insistent that we have duty to always follow conscience. He was explicit about this primacy. Even if we're objectively wrong in decision made, he argues that we must still do as conscience dictates

if we happen to do what is objectively right thing, but do it against our conscience told us to do, e commit sin of not following conscience

His argument for always following conscience can be simply summarised:

We should always seek what's good and naturally inclined to do so (this is synderesis)

Reason decides what's good

Part of definition of 'good' is 'rationally chosen'

Therefore, what our reason (can be wrong) tells us is good to be pursued

If we don't follower reason, we're seeking something which our reason tells us isn't good

We must always follow our reason (otherwise called 'conscience')

This is linked to Aquinas' belief that we have free will and are agents capable of rational decisions

In circumstances of life, we're people who have to make decisions, and our actions are ours, to be judged in specific circumstances

God expects us to use our reason to best of out abilities and not simply be creatures of whom driven by irrational urges