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| Question | Answer |
| Sustainable development paradigm face resistance from capitalist power structures Need scientists as policymakers to reduce uncertainty – but scientists might have their own agenda – self interest | CARTER, N. 2007. |
| • Issue Attention Cycle: | public concern the government responds – not typically short-lived interest – sudden crisis – pressure groups |
| • Advocacy Coalition Framework | share same belief of how policy should be achieved – a policy network |
| • Little progress in terms of the consumption of resources – as energy producers are powerful | CARTER, N. 2007. |
| • Predict transport policy sector will grow – sustainable policy target supply and demand – few governments have the same paradigm | CARTER, N. 2007. |
| • Fear tax on basic needs provoke public hostility – like yellow Gillet France | CARTER, N. 2007. |
| • Bridge sustainable development and governance • Huge differences in forms of governance: approach, opinion and human value | JORDAN, A. 2008. |
| • Governance means multi-actors, travel between periods of times and locations • Co-ordinate power of networks and markets, decentralized approach • Never be a grand theory of governance | JORDAN, A. 2008. |
| • Private companies directed in ways which are accountable to their stakeholders • Better to interact with stakeholders during the process to reflect • Need newer forms of governance to SD | JORDAN, A. 2008. |
| • Long-term decline of state steering power – do little to change the dynamic of a capitalist economic system • Governance is messy due to sustainability and concern for future civilisation | JORDAN, A. 2008. |
| • Hybrid governance required rather than market and state taking the lead • Share knowledge and technology – positive participation • Incorporate lower level policy makers o Colonised countries depend on existing structures | LEMOS, C. AND AGRAWAL, A. 2006. |
| Bias view – indication of power – push own agenda and not benefit all – cynicism • Distribution of benefits not a hierarchy | LEMOS, C. AND AGRAWAL, A. 2006. |
| • Market involvement inefficiency of the state, no longer important actor – but will make profit | LEMOS, C. AND AGRAWAL, A. 2006. |
| • Climate impacts not felt for years so no urgency, even though responsibility lies with developed countries | LEMOS, C. AND AGRAWAL, A. 2006. |
| • NGOs influence the design and implementation of mechanism – monitor progress and use their scientific knowledge | LEMOS, C. AND AGRAWAL, A. 2006. |
| • Bureaucratic societies resilient to change – discourage behaviour change as it would be a long process | HOLLING, C.S. and MEFFE, G.K. 1996 |
| • Several ranges of scale, not a linear process to change from one to another | HOLLING, C.S. and MEFFE, G.K. 1996 |
| • Fundamental source is human population growth and consumption – manage this behaviour towards sustainable actions | HOLLING, C.S. and MEFFE, G.K. 1996 |
| • Fix rules lose of resilience need flexible management – require consistent monitoring of systems • Need to accept natural variation and constraints for long-term sustainable access | HOLLING, C.S. and MEFFE, G.K. 1996 |
| • Mechanism depends on the environmental problem • Mix of EI and C&C, to exceed policy-makers’ original expectations | HARRINGTON, W. and MORGENSTERN R.D. 2004. |
| • Governance can compete, merge, complement and replacement government • Need to go beyond theory and test instead to see what works – like china • Govern in a globalized and networked way – change order of rule, trial new methods, new era | JORDAN, A., WURZEL, R.K.W. AND ZITO, A. 2005. |
| • Government losing ability to steer society, too extremes of single state or self-organising – resistance • Governance designed and implemented by non-state actors which may work alongside the state | JORDAN, A., WURZEL, R.K.W. AND ZITO, A. 2005. |
| • UK have fused VAs, eco-taxes and tradeable permits together | JORDAN, A., WURZEL, R.K.W. AND ZITO, A. 2005. |
| • Regulation: still widely used, provides a function for other instruments to perform, address specific targets | JORDAN, A., WURZEL, R.K.W. AND ZITO, A. 2005. |
| • VAs can be complex to negotiate across borders, experience implantation problems | JORDAN, A., WURZEL, R.K.W. AND ZITO, A. 2005. |
| • Governance driven from privatisation, - may generate a new form of government • Change relationship between government, and non-governmental actors as they interact to steer society using different policy instruments – softer tools • Lines of governance, governments and regulation blurred | JORDAN, A., WURZEL, R.K.W. AND ZITO, A. 2005. |
| • Decisions are evidence based to promote confidence • Transparency complements governance, tackle, corruption, accountability, MBIs | GUPTA, A. 2010. |
| • Private sector getting off lightly • Power imbalance and conflicts over norms make transparency incomplete and limited, even with open participation, will it overcome this? | GUPTA, A. 2010. |
| • Global governance does not solve problems, just copes with them, will it transform existing norms? | GUPTA, A. 2010. |
| • Information Disclosure: Better than nothing, but doesn’t have high impact | GUPTA, A. 2010. |
| • Industry pollution information will spur better industrial performance • Industry driven by pre-empting regulations, to counter aggressive policies | STEPHAN, M. 2002. |
| • Citizens' ideologies: compel industries to perform well. More policy liberalism caused an increase in the percentage of risk reducers | STEPHAN, M. 2002. |
| • Leon in Mexico national campaign to improve water quality – VA had little impact • VAs undermined by gaps in legal, needed to make regulation effective • Lack capacity to implement regulations as enforcement required for standards | BLACKMAN, A. AND SISTO, N.P. 2005. |
| • VA created an appearance of progress – political cover to deflect public pressure • Need a range of structures to ensure commitments aren’t dodged • Threat to implement C&C if VA results in no compliance | BLACKMAN, A. AND SISTO, N.P. 2005. |
| • Created an equation for VEP effectiveness • VEP not affect polluting industries in the same way as regulation • VEP better for small environmental improvements that are relatively cheap | BORCK, J.C. and COGLIANESE, C. 2008. |
| • Linear links (clearly defined analysis) between agenda setting, decision-making and implementation | KEEELEY, J. and SCOONES, I. 2000. |
| • Policy-making is diverse and complicated, as policies compete and overlap | KEEELEY, J. and SCOONES, I. 2000. |
| • Rooted ideologies and history affect policy process and participation o This could however result in conflict over decisions, laws and implementation e.g. Promote tech to boost food production vs low input conservation agriculture | KEEELEY, J. and SCOONES, I. 2000. |
| • Things can change is established policies fragment, and other arguments are incorporated • Conflict of knowledge – whose position is established • Policy is determined by knowledge and power | KEEELEY, J. and SCOONES, I. 2000. |
| • Rise and fall depends on the success of actors, and creation of networks to create policy space • Need to understand origins of the policy to understand what and how policy changes for good intervention | KEEELEY, J. and SCOONES, I. 2000. |
| • Prescriptive: analyse how to make a policy so public demands are put into government action o Unrealistic difficult to describe a meaningful model to policy-makers straightforwardly • Continuously cycle through stages, policy making is not a single event | CAIRNEY, P. 2013. |
| • Agenda Setting: | define and prioritise issues that require government attention |
| • Policy Formulation: | set objectives, costs, and policy instruments |
| • Legitimisation: | the chosen policy instrument has support through consent and approval of networks |
| • Implementation: | an organization takes responsibility for planned operation, ensure they have the resources |
| • Evaluation: | to what extent was the policy successful, was it correct, did it have the desired effect o Consider if the policy should be continued, modified, or discontinued |
| • Multi-actors using the resource can affect the outcome • Works across disciplinary lines, linking broader contextual variable to situation variables to understand how social and ecological factors effect human behaviour | OSTROM, E. 2011. |
| • Some variables are more important that others, depends on research type • Need to develop methods to study evolution over time | OSTROM, E. 2011. |
| • New actors to make sense of current socio-political transformations | BIERMANN, F. AND PATTBERG, P. 2008. |
| • Increasing fragmentation and segmentation of governance system across levels o Governance has to co-exist between levels – vertically between national to local and horizontally between different rule making systems by different groups of actors | BIERMANN, F. AND PATTBERG, P. 2008. |
| • New definition of governance implies some degree of self-regulation | BIERMANN, F. AND PATTBERG, P. 2008. |
| • May bring in private actors as a solution – but who holds them to account? Legitimacy might be questioned depending on donors, member and what environmental good they seek • Transnational actors like the IPCC can seek to balance view and interests | BIERMANN, F. AND PATTBERG, P. 2008. |
| • Multiple actors coordinate action to make governance arrangements for a specific issue area | FALKNER, R. 2003. |
| • 20th century state regulatory role in the provisions of GEG, through this re-emergence of economic private governance and restructured state function • Rise of private forms of governance linked with the downfall of state led governance – state failed to govern common pool resources – inadequate | FALKNER, R. 2003. |
| • Corporate regulation reflects a need to respond to public pressure • Private governance meant a shift in ideology and authority – are global markets able to correct their wrongs | FALKNER, R. 2003. |
| • Activists groups shape global, press private actors into action, which alters the identity as non-state actors • Private environmental governance strengthens liberal paradigm and promotes global self-regulation • Not a straightforward shift to firms, but complex, interdependence between private and public actors (mix) | FALKNER, R. 2003. |
| • To solve problems need co-management across scales – no longer a hierarchy overcome mismatch | CASH, D. ET AL. 2006. |
| • Knowledge is a scale between traditional and modern | CASH, D. ET AL. 2006. |
| o Ignorance: analysing complex human behaviour can be ignored because it is too tricky to fathom | CASH, D. ET AL. 2006. |
| Asymmetry of information in Tobago has meant the development of cross-level mechanism through regional and national networks of organisation | CASH, D. ET AL. 2006. |
| Require coordination and complementary expertise to cross knowledge over the boundaries • When scalar and linkage problems are addressed with sustainable solutions = successful management | CASH, D. ET AL. 2006. |
| • Rethink dynamics by involving NGOs and movements to pursue goals | McCARTHY, J. 2005. |
| • Believes frameworks are too binary • NGOs enforce scalar relationships they are trying to reconfigure. Need a flexible approach, to engage with broaden scales, to not focus one single conceptions of scales. | McCARTHY, J. 2005. |
| • Concern whether NGO governance means more or less democracy • Capitalist ideologies are deeply interwoven – need to encompass this struggle | McCARTHY, J. 2005. |
| • Scale assists addressing sustainability issues and a globalizing world through interdisciplinary approach • Problems with scales of public goods arise when scales don’t match boundaries of government authorities | TERMEER, J.A.M, ET AL. 2010. |
| o Understand complex processes, governance systems, norms that evaluate and judge governance o Insight into politics framing scales and improve design and arrangements of governance | TERMEER, J.A.M, ET AL. 2010. |
| • Co-existence of approaches – both tradition and innovation are correct and can merge to allow variety | TERMEER, J.A.M, ET AL. 2010. |
| • Activism comes from perceived risks and linked to emerging political conflicts over society and globalisation | GARAVAN, M. 2007. |
| • Social movements evolve and have a historical context – the nature of human society | GARAVAN, M. 2007. |
| • Easier to mobilise present grievances in contrast to temporal, as they might not be easily solved | GARAVAN, M. 2007. |
| • Community framing of the problem continually shifted with new knowledge – reflected on culture, as they had the threat of a large business taking that from them | GARAVAN, M. 2007. |
| • Environmental discourse in the background of extra concerns eg health risk and their version of development – environment centre stage for other issues – greater complexity | GARAVAN, M. 2007. |
| • Official environmentalism: | Academic experts worked with state to establish environmental organisation |
| • Populist environmentalism | reflecting local community’s experience of development struggles |
| • Conflict arises from control and defence of a place from outsiders, => locals formed an alliance/new social network to resist – maybe this will transcend to global network of resistance | GARAVAN, M. 2007. |
| • A policy incorporating citizen preference will be implemented smoother = less cost, and diffuse opposition • Gain legitimacy and empower, social capital by being involved | IRVIN R.A. and STANSBURY, J. 2004. |
| • Collaborative decision works best when the group is small and homogeneous, but this doesn’t = representation – might be selfish | IRVIN R.A. and STANSBURY, J. 2004. |
| • Lack of representation and authority are key to why it may backfire and left dissatisfied | IRVIN R.A. and STANSBURY, J. 2004. |
| • Papillion Creek, USA, unsuccessful, one representative out of 15 showed up to the meetings. Project failed to define the problem, thus lack of public interest, meaning complacency occurred – the environment was not an issue people felt strongly about | IRVIN R.A. and STANSBURY, J. 2004. |
| • Azerbaijan: juggling resource wealth (huge revenues) with instability, used EITI to promote distrubtion of revenues within the country – to guarantee benefits for the community | WILSON, E. ET AL. 2009. |
| c• Citizens scrutinize contracts between gov and industry to maximise contribution to sustainable development | WILSON, E. ET AL. 2009. |
| • Lack of long term participation has meant reliance on charitable support | WILSON, E. ET AL. 2009. |
| • Land used as leverage in negotiations – IIED’s tools to help local groups that are facing threat to their land access, Mali used to empower communities | WILSON, E. ET AL. 2009. |
| • New communication technologies combined with traditional media – empower citizen journalism o Green-hotlines in Nigeria text message about ecological and human rights abuses o GPS assist indigenous groups to map out tribal land rights | WILSON, E. ET AL. 2009. |
| • Participation in science is seen as resistance against percieved scientization of politics, to produce own knowledge – new relationship between science and citizens | BACKSTRAND, K. 2003. |
| • Triangular science-politics interface: experts, policy-makers and citizens – all 3 are actors | BACKSTRAND, K. 2003. |
| • Exploitation of scientific uncertainty inhibits sustainable managements and science loses its credibility | BACKSTRAND, K. 2003. |
| • Civic science participation, representation and democratization o It emerges from big planetary science and the legitimacy crisis for modern science o Restores public trust and response to the complexity of global environmental problems | BACKSTRAND, K. 2003. |
| • Find balance between tradition and participation, and between technical and deliberative approaches | BACKSTRAND, K. 2003. |
| • Risk underlines modern environmental regulation • Risk is deeply woven in cultural values and beliefs concerning agency, causation and uncertainty, it is only accessible to experts and constructed out of history and experience | JASONOFF, S. 1999. |
| • Controversies about risk resulted from how knowledge constructs the complexities of the environment • Risks interprets the relationship between others and the planet, not a description of nature • To often it is assumed that environmental risks will resonate in the same way with everyone | JASONOFF, S. 1999. |
| • At the earliest stages need to intertwine science with politics in the decision-making process • In light of experience, need the ability to go back to initial problem frames – require flexibility | JASONOFF, S. 1999. |
| • Risk shouldn’t be the basis of central authority with claims from superior expertise – regulation needs to be more open-ended to dissect multiple perspectives • Understanding risk need to acknowledge to own provisional status | JASONOFF, S. 1999. |
| • Political reluctance to go above and beyond • Environment, society and economics is a nested model | GRIGGS, D. et al. 2013. |
| • Sustainable Development | meet the needs of the present and future, through safeguarding the Earth’s systems |
| • Credible studies behind not crossing these boundaries: climate change, ocean acidification, change in land use | GRIGGS, D. et al. 2013. |
| • Many knowledge gaps in regards to risk, enable societies to become resource efficient, sustainable and wealthy | GRIGGS, D. et al. 2013. |
| • Scientific basis of the risk that humans can do to destabilize the planetary boundaries • Human activity is affecting Earth systems – zone of uncertainty highlights increasing risk • Explore cross-scalar interactions and regional heterogeneity of boundary processes | STEFFEN, W. et al. 2015. |
| • Develop science to understand these thresholds – need time for society to respond • If earth’s resilience is not maintained could result in a loss of genetic diversity – need to prepare • Increase frequency of heat waves and heavy rainfall | STEFFEN, W. et al. 2015. |
| • Doesn’t identify social implications, changes in economy, or methods to prevent exceeding the planetary boundaries | STEFFEN, W. et al. 2015. |
| • Problem wealthy countries are exploiting natural resources, not considering their limits • Policy has too much emphasis on GDP, economics shouldn’t have a monetary value, instead it should determine the nation’s distribution of benefits/wealth and consider the negative externalities | RAWORTH, K. 2017. |
| • Variety of regional and local thresholds of diversity and land/water use | RAWORTH, K. 2017. |
| • Economics might change who we become – can be a good and bad thing • Studying economics changes behaviour: helpfulness, honesty, and loyalty become less important traits o Assume everyone is selfish • This is not the case as humans are capable of cooperating – other things are able to motivate humans, not just money | RAWORTH, K. 2017. |
| • There is a lot of uncertainty in the real world do to human action • We are part of nature’s cycle not a separate entity | RAWORTH, K. 2017. |
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