Mixed Strategy questions
Slides in this set (3)
-
-
- If B chooses 1, A's expected pay-off is : 3(p)-1(1-p) = 4p-1
- If B chooses 2, A's expected pay off is: 0(p)+2(1-p) = 2-2p
- Graph:
- Intersection: 4p-1 = 2-2p , 6p=3 , p=1/2 , other value 1- 1/2 = 1/2
- If A chooses 1, then B's expected loss is 3(q)+0(1-q) = 3q
- If A chooses 2, then B's expected loss is -1(q)+2(1-q) = -3q+2
- Graph:
- Intersection: 3q = -3q+2 , 6q=2 , q=1/3 , other value 1 - 1/3 = 2/3
- Value of game: A; sub in 1/2 - 4(1/2) -1 = 1 (can do the same for B if wanted to check its the same)
- Summary: A should choose options 1 and 2 with probabilities 1/2 and 1/2 respectively, and B should choose options 1 and 2 with probabilities 1/3 and 2/3 respectably. A can expect to gain 1 and B can expect to lose 1. The value of the game is 1.
-
- Use domination to simplify table:
- A's pay-offs: B chooses 1 ; 1(p)+7(1-p) = 7-6p
- B chooses 2 ; 2.5(p)-0.5(1-p) = 3p-0.5
- B chooses 4 ; 5(p)-3(1-p) = 8p-3
- Graph:
- Intersection: 3p-0.5 = 7-6p , 9p=7.5 , p=5/6 , other value = 1-5/6 = 1/6
- Value of game: option 1 - 7-6(5/6) = 2, so value of the game = 2
- B's probabilities: If A chooses 1, B's loss is; 1(q)+2.5(1-q)+5(0) as 1=q , 2=1-q and 3 = 0 as dominated. Therefore B's loss = 2.5-1.5q
- Now we can say B's loss = the value of the game, so 2.5-1.5q=2, so q=1/3 (or 1-1/3 so 2/3)