Flashcards
METAPHYSICS DEFINITIONS
Cards in this deck (52)
- 1Persistence questionWhat kind of changes can and can't you survive?
- 2Necessary conditionWhat must x be like in order to be y.
- 3Sufficient conditionWhat is enough for x to be y.
- 4Psychological continuity(umbrella term) x is the same person as y if and only if x is psychologically continuous with y.
- 5Memory criterionx remembers being y. Direct requires x to remember being y, y to remember being z, and in turn x to remember being z. Indirect requires x to remember being y or remember being something that remembers being y (and so on...).
- 6Psychological connectednessA being x is psychologically connected with an earlier being y if and only if y's psychological states can largely explain x's psychological states.
- 7FissionDivision. Suppose sharing at least half a brain suffices for psych connectedness, could be the same as lefty and righty?
- 8Multiple occupancySomething being two distinct entities eg A being lefty and righty, that can go on to be separated. No competition since not distinct?
- 9Physical (bodily) continuityx is the same thing as y if and only if x and y have the same body.
- 10Animalismx is the same thing as y if and only if x and y are part of the same continuing animal life.
- 11Second-personally descriptionMentalistic view.
- 12Third-personally descriptionBodily continuity view.
- 13Sortal propertyThe kind of thing something is.
- 14Substance sortalA sortal upon which a thing's persistence depends.
- 15Phase sortalA sortal that things can acquire or lose without consequences for their existence.
- 16ConstitutionThe idea that one can be constituted by something, but not identical to it.
- 17Physical properties objectionWe have certain physical properties that brains/minds/Lockean persons do not possess (so arguably we are not thinking parts, but could be embodied thinking parts?)
- 18Leibniz's LawIf A is identical with B, then A and B share all the same properties.
- 19Identity of IndiscerniblesIf A and B have all the same properties, then A = B.
- 20Numerical identityOne and the same thing eg actor and their role.
- 21Qualitative identityHave all and only the same properties but are not one eg twins.
- 22TransitiveIf A = B, and B = C, then A = C.
- 23Four-dimensional objectsExtended in time and have temporal parts.
- 24Temporal partsThe parts of an object that exist in time eg me in 1999, me in 2012.
- 25PerdurantismObjects persist through time by having temporal parts.
- 26EndurantismObjects persist through time by being wholly present at different times.
- 27Special Composition Question(Van Inwagen) when do some objects combine to form composite objects?
- 28Mereological universalismFor any things, there is an object composed of those things ie composition.
- 29Mereological nihilismThere are no composite material objects, only particles arranged a certain way ie no composition.
- 30ChangeHas different properties at different times.
- 31TimeMeasured by attending to changes.
- 32VerificationismA statement is only meaningful if it is verifiable ie something we could check is true or false.
- 33TensedA-series. Something happening now, happened in the past, will happen in the future.
- 34TenselessB-series. Something happens simultaneously with, happens earlier, happens later.
- 35PresentismOnly the present moment exists.
- 36Growing blockThe past and present exist. As time passes, there is more past, so more exists.
- 37EternalismThe past, present and future all exist.
- 38Moving spotlightThe past, present and future all exist, but the spotlight moves according to relevance.
- 39RealityFixed and unchanging entity.
- 40Frame of referenceView on the matter eg I am stationary, the fields are moving. Or the fields are stationary, I am moving.
- 41Van Inwagen's incompatibilismDeterminism is incompatible with the thesis that we are able to act otherwise than we do ie incompatible with free will.
- 42Van Inwagen's responsibilityTo be held responsible for an act one must have been able to refrain from doing that act.
- 43CompatibilismIt can be true both that agents have free will and that the world is deterministic.
- 44LibertarianismIncompatibilism is true in that it can suggest that agents have free will, so determinism is false.
- 45Hard determinismDeterminism is true. Incompatibilism is true. So agents do not have free will.
- 46Soft determinismDeterminism is true. Compatibilism is true. So agents do have free will.
- 47Principle of Alternative PossibilitiesA person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise.
- 48Frankfurt's viewA person is morally responsible for what he has done even though he could not have done otherwise.
- 49DispositionalismAims to show that agents in Frankfurt-type examples do have relevant alternative possibilities after all, so retain the freedom to do otherwise (Levy & McKenna).
- 50Revised version of PAPA person is not morally responsible for what they have done if it was causally determined that they did it.
- 51Criteria argument (objection to VI's incompatibilism)There are criteria for determining if an agent could have acted otherwise. Ie it is always possible that an agent could have done otherwise, so to suggest that if determinism is true, no agent can do otherwise than they do, is incorrect.
- 52PredestinarianismAll acts are foreseen by God, if an act is foreseen it is not free, so no acts are free.
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- METAPHYSICS Flashcards on METAPHYSICS DEFINITIONS, created by Lizzie Sykes on 12/05/2017.
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