(G) Theoretical(cool) Virtue Ethics

(G) Theoretical(cool) Virtue Ethics

1. • ARISTOTLE: saw virtue as based in the completion of Natural Law. Virtue ethicists reject the idea of any a priori moral laws and therefore their view of virtue is radically different from that of Aristotle. They reject the priori moral laws because they reject the notion of an ‘is’ becoming an ‘ought’ as in the naturalistic fallacy and because they base their morality on the moral agent.

   • • Therefore, for V. ethicists, what you do morally should be based on the way moral actions affect you. YET, there is a division between different Virtue ethicists.
     • SOME: see moral action as important for the way it makes you virtuous while OTHERS: regard the action as of no specific importance. What counts is the moral agent’s nature.
       • • ROSALIND HURSTHOUSE: a leading exponent of this group .This difference between the two groups can be understood by using this analogy: The first group see the fruit produced by the fig tree as the way you can tell the nature of the tree; the other group look at the tree and say that it’s healthy so it’s bound to produce good fruit. They won’t bother analyzing the fruit; it’s the nature of the tree that counts.
         • • HURSTHOUSE: the chief exponent of the THEORETICAL SCHOOL of V.E. She’s not interested in the practical questions of ethics or rather with them as the basis of morality. They’re the results of a moral state. She turns to the virtue that go with Aristotle’s Golden mean. EXAMPLE: courage as opposed to foolhardiness or cowardice. It’s these moral virtues she’s interested in. If you are virtuous by nature, then whatever you do will be virtuous. As a result, if people should get into a state of virtuous living then what they do will be virtuous.

2. CRITICISMS OF HURSTHOUSE:

3. • How do you judge what to do by a state of virtue? It can be argued that what you do in any situation is difficult to judge on the basis of the state of the moral agent because the intentions of the moral agent might not be wholly virtuous. I may invade Iraq because I’m a virtuous person and wish to get rid of a tyrant but deep down I might be counting the oil revenue.

   • • What happens when my state of virtue conflicts with another person’s? Every moral decision impinges on more than one person and if his moral state is as virtuous as mine, how can the action be both virtuous for them as for me? I may liberate Iraq wholly virtuously but I might kill a virtuous Iraqi in so doing.
     • • How can a Virtuous state be judged objectively? I might appear virtuous; I might convince myself of my virtuosity but how can my virtue be truly determined? If I’m a Kantian deontologist my actions will determine whether I am moral through my acceptance of the Categorical Imperative. If I’m a utilitarian my actions can be judged on the basis of the ‘greatest good of the greatest number’. There are no such guidelines for the Virtue ethicist.