Fichas
Nazi foreign policy
Fichas del conjunto (27)
- 1Framework of foreign policyHitler wanted to pursue ambitious foreign policy aims despite ToVs
Continental balance of power- political idea- best way of ensuring international power is to have power evenly distributed amongst continents- no single continent has dominant position- worked in Germany's favour - 2International contextWW1 and peace settlements caused great empires of Russia, Austria-Hungary and Turkey had collapsed- power vacuum in central Europe
USSR relatively weak- initially majorly concerned with own modern industrialisation- isolated from Western world but had signed Rapallo treaty (1922) w/ Germany- treaty of friendship yet relations deteriorated after dictatorship established - 3International context p2Successor states of Austria-Hungary empire= unstable/ relatively minor powers- Austria, Czechoslovakia and Hungary
Turkish republic- inward looking
Britain/ France weakened- Britain had to handle war costs/ difficult to maintain empire
France- wanted to maintain continental status/ uphold ToVs but faced political/ economic issues - 4International situation USSA showed retreat to isolationism- didn't join league of nations- March 1920 In November 1919 and in March 1920, the US Senate voted on the Treaty of Versailles, concerning America's entry into the League of Nations. Treaty and Covenant were defeated by a 49-35 Senate vote
- 5Nazi aimsMost Historians argue that Mein Kampf set the blueprint for Hitler’s foreign policy aims - published 18 July 1925. His 1936 Memorandum on the Four Year Plan and his speech to his generals at the ‘Hossbach’ Conference in 1937 also shed considerable light on his foreign
policy aims. Aims were-
Destruction of the ToVs , Establishment of Lebensraum in East, Unite all German nationals under Greater Germany
While aims known- since start of political career precise timeline not defined- - 6Why not be clear on aimsIf don't complete by certain time- look weak
Don't give details to enemies on when to go to war
Hindenburg wouldn't of let Hitler be chancellor if he was open about going to war
Couldn't predict everything when Mein Kampf written- can't plan for the state of country he'd be in power over - 7International attitudesBritain – Strong determination to avoid another war; pragmatic policy
towards Germany; public and politicians divided over Versailles; hostility
towards Stalin led to ‘sympathy’ for Hitler; belief that east was German
sphere and would detract attention from themselves.
France – Very concerned over possible German threat, built Maginot
Line; after 1919 had treated Germany badly, increasing their own insecurity;
concerned to develop links with countries on Germany’s eastern borders;
politically divided, due series of weak governments; wary of Russia; major
economic problems.
USSR – Communist Russia aroused great suspicion in Western
Europe, its main concern remained economic development; Stalin’s rule
was a concern - 8International attitudes p2Austria – A German state, but was not part of a united Germany; no
longer a great power after 1919; Anschluss forbidden by Versailles, but
many Austrians favoured it.
Italy – Fascist government, though initially Mussolini didn’t have good
relations with Hitler; looking to expand in Mediterranean; 1935 invaded
Abyssinia, led to a quarrel with Britain and France and revealed the
weakness of the League of Nations.
Czechoslovakia – New Slav state; formally ruled by Germans;
contained minorities, including 300,000 Sudeten Germans; successful
democratic government. - 9Versailes - limitationsarmy limited to 100,000-
contributed to unemployment- weakeness of gov- unemployment at 6mil
og priority= establish dictatorship at home not abroad - 10Bigginings of foreign policy- LONIn early years foreign policy focussed on cultivating friendship w/ Britain and Italy and weakening French power- international situation helped with this
Manchuria invasion by Japan 1931- LON gave warning but no action- showed weakness to Hitler- also showed Britain weakness- need to be 'world politician' for league but maintain political stability in Europe- also weakness of France/ US- busy focussing on own domestic issues - 11General situationWorld trade slump dissolved international
solidarity and fostered attitude of national
insularity
Memories of horrors of First World War so
strong that many people and statesmen
determined to avoid another war. - 12German withdrawal from LONFirst phase- early caution (trying to forge friendships)- made regime appear reasonable - lulled many in Europe into false sense of security- helped b y Germany's withdrawal from Disarmament conference in October 1933 when France refused to accept proposal for equal numbers/ military parity of land forces for 2 countries- made France look unreasonable - got sympathy from Britain and Italy
- 13Polish- German non aggression pactUnexpected signing of 10 year non aggression pact w/ Poland in January 1934- not only did it create a favourable - created impression of reasonableness to Poland and to international circles - looked to Poland like Germany willing to come to understanding- but pact more than propaganda- also breached French system of alliances in Eastern Europe- France had signed a series of alliances in 1920's with Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia
Also secured Germany's eastern flank (army position) while diplomatic problems were being dealt with in the south/ west eg Rhineland and Austria - 14Why Poland/ relations impactIn long term Hitler didn't see any place for independent Poland just wanted gateway to creation of Lebensraum in east
Although Britain showed sympathy- not same as military or strategic understanding so- several high level diplomatic Anglo-German missions failed to get breakthrough- alliance w/Italy also seemed long way off- In July 1934 attempted coup by Austrian Nazis only really got support from Berlin- but frightened Mussolini to moving 40,000 troops to Austro Italian frontier- saw Austria as buffer between Germany and Italy-showed limits of Nazi power - 15By end of 1935/ 1935Hitler had secured domestic position and economy was recovering rapidly - prestige enhanced in Jan 1935 when Saarland- under control of LON for past 15 years- voted in a free and fair plebiscite to return to German - showed propaganda success
But if Hitler was to loosen constraints of Versailes need greater military power than was permitted by treaty - 16Breaking free from Versailes- overview1933-35 cautious approach by Hitler, as Germany was in a weak position compared to its potential opponents
1935 Hitler felt secure enough to announce in public German rearmament
Felt a reluctant mood in parts of Europe to risk another war in defence of a possibly unjust and outdated settlement.
1936 tested theory and entered the Rhineland - 17Breaking free for Versailles- detailGermany declared in March 1935 existence of Luftwaffe - followed shortly afterwards by introduction of conscription and peacetime army of 550,000 - went directly against treaty of V- led to combined verbal condemnation by Britain, France and Italy in Stresa Declaration-shows weakness - Yet in uncertain international atmosphere in June 1935 Britain and Germany signed naval agreement - against treaty of V- allowed Germany to have navy 35% of strength of British fleet
So Hitler successfully: detached Britain from other 2 friends of Stresa Front, managed to increase German naval military power, laid basis for improved Anglo-German understanding - 18Remilitarisation of Rhineland- March 1936March 1936- ordered troops to occupy demilitarised Rhineland - seized opportunity due to international atmosphere:
Mussolini ordered in October 1935 invasion of Abyssinia - one of two remaining independent African states- - destroyed its unity with Britain and France - showed LON inability to control international situations
Crisis focused Anglo-French diplomacy on Italy- not Germany - 19Why didn't west intervene w/ RhinelandBritish public opinion was hostile to military action. Jan 1935 British government decided that the Rhineland was not vital, favouring negotiations, as Hitler offered a buttress against Bolshevism.
France was militarily too weak for offensive action, having cut military expenditure and focussing its efforts on the Maginot line rather than military modernisation.
Britain and France were also quarrelling over their response to Mussolini’s invasion of Abyssinia.
On 3rd March the French Government asked Britain for reassurance over support for the Rhineland, Britain refused to give any. - 20Hitler's gamble Rhinelandwas a bold gamble- initially not supported by army generals
- went against treaty of V and Locarno 1925- main points included recognise permanent demilitarisation of Rhineland
fact- Treaty of V 1919 stated Rhineland was to be demilitarised from the French frontier to line of 32 miles east of Rhine but legally still part of Germany- March 1936- re-occupied by German troops - 21Rhineland effectsHitler’s popularity soared. Hitler dissolved the Reichstag and held a plebiscite asking the German people to approve remilitarisation of the Rhineland; 99%of electorate voted; 98.8% voted in favour of Hitler’s plans.
Abroad, other threatened regimes now distrusted Britain and especially French resolve- no demilitarised buffer between Germany and France anymore. Some now felt they would have to be conciliatory toward Germany.
Germany, now secure on its western border, felt it could now expand in the east.
Argued that resistance here would have persuaded Hitler to withdraw or led to a minor war which Germany would have lost, but would not have probably caused a major war. - 22Rome- Berlin axis- lead upDiplomatic international situation still in Germany's favour in 1936
Civil war broke out in Spain- caused further political uncertainty - worsened by military involvement of Italy, Germany and USSR. feared by Britain and France war could cause major international conflict- struggled to maintain non-intervention
Suited Hitler- attention away from central Europe/ gave common Italian and German interests- caused Rome-Berlin Axis- - 23Rome-Berlin axis- what was itunderstanding signed in November 1936 based on political, economic and ideological co-operation - didn't involve military commitments- by end of 1936 - France dominant position withered-international status of Germany transformed- no longer isolated- Mussolini detached from Brit/ France- moving toward Hitler
- 24Hossbach conferenceAutumn 1936- showed weakness of Germany's economic expansion- Hitler was not in position to risk war- so four year plan to get war economy
Certain elements in conservative forces of army/ foreign ministry advised a more cautious policy- if Hitler wanted to push forth w/ foreign policy- needed their support
-Problem remained- Germany not achieved alliance with Britain and some forces in party still advocating other alliances - 25Hossbach conference- Ribbentropribbentrop was keen to develop tripartite understanding between Germany, Japan and Italy- Hitler wasn't convinced and remained committed to gaining Britain as alliance to crush USSR- sent Ribbentrop to London as Germany's new ambassador in 1936 Autumn- job of securing agreement with Britain
Can explain inactivity of 1937 between diplomatic coups of 1935-6 and pre war crisis between 1938-9- but in November 1937 in Hossbach conference Hitler addressed Foreign Minister Neurath , War Minister Blomberg and 3 commanders- in chief- of armed forces and outlined 3 scenarios - 263 scenarios- To take action after period 1943-45 when military preparations would nearly be complete
-To exploit French internal problems and to take action against Czechoslovakia
-To take action if France became involved in war with another country which would prevent her defending herself against Germany - 27Hossbach conference significancehas been focus of controversy- used by Prosecution at Nuremberg trials and by some post war historians - Shirer that from this point Hitler had communicated irrevocable decision to go to war- at other extreme meeting= dismissed as simply manouvre in domestic affairs to overcome conservative doubts about pace of rearmament