Compatibilism

Compatibilism

1. John Locke

   • Defines the will as the power to order the consideration or non-consideration of ideas, like to move certain parts of the body.
   • Volition is the exercise of the will. A voluntary action is an action that results from volition
   • '[Liberty is] the power to think or not to think, to move or not to move, according to the pereference or direction of his own mind'
     • So an action is free if it is (1) voluntary and (2) free from physical constraint
   • Lack of liberty can result from (1) lack of volition or (2) physical inability. So a rock is not free because it has no volition
   • Rejects talk of free will
     • Rejects talk of free will because, as freedom and the will are both powers, and powers cannot have powers, the will cannot be free.
     • Points out that a belief in libertarianism results in an infinite regression
     • Will is determined by uneasiness (i.e., desire) , though we can suspend desire and deliberate
       • Is the mind still not determined by the strongest desire?
   • Examples
     • A man is carried whilst fast asleep into a room and awakes to find himself in desirable company. He prefers to stay, but in reality the door is locked so he can't leave. So liberty cannot be the same as voluntariness, but physical ability
     • A tennis-ball is not taken by anyone to be a free agent because it does not have any volition
     • A man striking his friend randomly is not free because he did not will it

2. David Hume

   • Peter Milican: view of moral responsibility depends in part on your view of the Good. To ask 'is this action morally good' to Hume would mean 'do I approve of this action', and so an action may be morally good irrespective of determinism
   • 'By liberty we mean a power of acting or not acting according to the determinations of the will'
     • Actions caused by addiction, brainwashing and hypnosis all seem unfree, but each satisfies Hume's definition of freedom
       • Could modify so that an action done for a 'good reason'.
   • Argues that every act has to be caused, otherwise it is chance, not freedom. Freedom becomes indeterminism, the uncaused will, which is equivalent to randomness and chance
   • Argues that the opposite of freedom isn't determinism but constraint. 'Liberty, when opposed with necessity, not to constraint, is the same thing as chance'. That human behaviour is predictable is evidence of determinism
     • Criticised by Alisdair MacIntyre: since I cannot know what I will do in the future, nobody can predict behaviour
     • Might be the case that some, but not all behaviour is caused, but why make this assumption? Causes may be hidden
   • All actions are accompanied by motives (desires) and this are instances of necessity. The internal cause of free will is sufficient for freedom
   • Character is something enduring that can be held responsible for decisions

3. Hobbes

   • Develops the Contrastive Argument, asking what is the contrast is between things that are free and unfree, concluding that 'liberty is the absence of external impediments
   • Notes that determinism is true. All events are the result of a 'concourse of causes', which themselves are the effects of past causes. This chain of causation is also the will of God
   • Says it is nonsense that, even if all things are equal (like motives, laws of nature, physical capability), an agent could do otherwise

4. Kant

   • Interpretation 1: Kant's emphasis on reason transcending desires marks him out as a libertarian
   • Interpretation 2: Kant holds that our noumenal self is outside of time and so can act freely, whereas our phenomenal selves are determined by the laws of nature. Our actions are in our control in the present
   • Freedom is also a 'postulate of practical reason' ; we have to assume it to make sense of the world and to obey what our conscience demands of us
   • Kant argued that Hume's compatibilism was a 'wretched subterfuge'. Hume considers himself to have solved a difficult problem with 'petty word-jugglery'

5. A. J. Ayer

   • Argued that if he suffered from a compulsion neurosis so that when he got up and walked across the room (or if he was compelled), he would not be acting freely
   • If he does it acting freely, without those restrictions, then he is free. It is only when actions have a 'special sort of cause' that it is reckoned not to be free