The Right to Life

The Right to Life

1. Utilitarianism

   • Utilitarianism is teleological - it looks at the 'end' or 'purpose' of our actions, not the act itself.
     • There is no sanctity of life principle here.
     • The end justifies the means, so if we want to decide whether in this specific case it is wrong to kill, we would need to look at the consequences of the killing.
       • If the outcomes are good, the action is a good one.
         • One of the problems with this approach is the need to ascribe a value to a human life based on the amount of pleasure/pain (or interest/preferences etc.) that the person is likely to experience.
           • Firstly, it seems wrong to value one person more than another simply because they are capable of having more preferences, experiencing a greater amount of pleasure etc.
             • Secondly, it isn't at all clear how you could say how much pleasure or pain was lost if, for example, an embryo was not implanted.
             • Even if we assumed an average amount of pleasure, how much pleasure are we talking about for a whole lifetime?

2. Kantian Ethics

   • Kant knows that we cannot prove moral principles based on experience.
     • Morality is synthetic a-priori - statements about the world that cannot be confirmed by looking at the world.
     • Kant asks "If there were such a thing as morality, what would it be like?"
       • We should all treat people as we would like to be treated.
         • This leads to an obvious sanctity of life position, as rational people don't usually want to be killed.
     • However, it is easy to imagine a universal rule that allows you to kill terminally ill people with no hope of recovery who want to die.
       • We could make a law of nature that said as soon as a terminally ill person loses the will to live, they will die.
         • Kant is likely to come back here with his third statement of the categorical imperative - never treat anyone merely as a means to an end.
           • Killing someone to end their pain would be to use them.
       • A large part of Kantian Ethics is a strong sense of moral duty.
         • We should ignore our emotions, disregard the outcomes of our actions and do the right thing.
           • You also get a thorough use of reason.
             • Rationality is what separates us from other animals.
               • As such, a foetus, or even a baby, does not rate above an animal.
                 • They are not part of the 'kingdom of ends'.
                   • However, they will develop reason, and once they have that faculty they will be able to act according to universalisable maxims.
                     • In other words, they will be able to ask "Would I want to have been destroyed as a foetus?"
                       • This means, using Kant's theory, that as soon as human life is genetically distinct, and would, if allowed to, grow into a rational being, it is wrong to kill them.

3. Natural Law

   • Natural Law, like Kant's theory, is deontological.
     • It deals with absolute moral principles that look at whether an action is right or wrong.
     • Killing, whether abortion or euthanasia, is seen as equivalent to murder.
       • This explains why the Catholic Church is opposed to abortion, euthanasia, Embryo Research etc.
         • Life and Death issues are much more black and white with Natural Law.

4. Situation Ethics

   • Situation Ethics is Pragmatic, and would look at what is in people's best interests.
     • In the case of Baby Theresa, using her organs to help other babies was the practical, useful thing to do.
       • Baby Theresa was born with Anencephaly, and her organs were given following her death in 1992.
       • Situation Ethicists would probably have advocated ignoring rules about sanctity of life in order to do the pragmatic thing.
         • That doesn't mean that you should discard the rule about not killing one person to save others.
           • It's a good rule, but in some situations (each situation is different) love will motivate you to break the rules.