788345
Description
Mind Map by jacksearle, updated more than 1 year ago
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Created by jacksearle
about 10 years ago
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Internal threats to the Soviet system: East
Germany, Poland and Hungary
- Intro
- Between 53-56, popular expectations of change in Eastern Bloc
were encouraged developments within USSR, these included:
- K's rise and denunciation of Stalin
- K's acceptance that there were
many roads to socialism
- Better Soviet relations with West
and Yugoslavia
- K's rise and denunciation of Stalin
- Possibility of change limited due to fact
that unity of Eastern bloc was crucial to
USSR position in Cold War
- Any break between countries would undermine
Russia's prestige by implying that the people
were unhappy with communism
- Limits of Soviet new mood of tolerance were tested in
50s, particularly in Poland and Hungary
- Limits of Soviet new mood of tolerance were tested in
50s, particularly in Poland and Hungary
- Any break between countries would undermine
Russia's prestige by implying that the people
were unhappy with communism
- Between 53-56, popular expectations of change in Eastern Bloc
were encouraged developments within USSR, these included:
- Berlin Rising June 1953
- Following Stalin's death - USSR economic
policy focused on consumer goods
- East-Germany, hardline Stalinist leader Ulbricht
continued to develop strict command economy
- June 53, U raised workers quotas without upping
pay - provoked demonstrations
- 400,000 workers took to streets, calling for free
elections, a general strike and lifting of quotas
- Govt responded with force, arresting and executing protest leaders
- Govt responded with force, arresting and executing protest leaders
- 400,000 workers took to streets, calling for free
elections, a general strike and lifting of quotas
- June 53, U raised workers quotas without upping
pay - provoked demonstrations
- East-Germany, hardline Stalinist leader Ulbricht
continued to develop strict command economy
- Significance
- Significant for Cold War relations because it demonstrated
the unpopularity of traditional comm policies
- Also exposed that USSR control over east EU was
based on force not consent
- Also indicated that USSR was unwilling to
allow greater independence in Europe
- Whilst USA made much of the rising in anti-Soviet
propaganda, they didnt intervene - feared they'd provoke a war
- Whilst USA made much of the rising in anti-Soviet
propaganda, they didnt intervene - feared they'd provoke a war
- Also indicated that USSR was unwilling to
allow greater independence in Europe
- Also exposed that USSR control over east EU was
based on force not consent
- Significant for Cold War relations because it demonstrated
the unpopularity of traditional comm policies
- Following Stalin's death - USSR economic
policy focused on consumer goods
- Poland 1956
- Death of Stalinist leader Beriut - Feb 1956 - sparked
increasing calls for liberalisation in Poland
- June - large demos in Poznan turned into anti-govt protests
- Discontent spread - strong calls for Polish nationalist
and moderate communist Gomulka to be given power
- Discontent spread - strong calls for Polish nationalist
and moderate communist Gomulka to be given power
- June - large demos in Poznan turned into anti-govt protests
- Oct - K visited Warsaw to resolve issue
- K tried to force Gomulka to back down - eventually
relented when he realised strength of movement
- To stem unrest - K agreed to Gomulka being leader and
that some economic reforms were allowed as long as
Poland remained in Warsaw Pact
- To stem unrest - K agreed to Gomulka being leader and
that some economic reforms were allowed as long as
Poland remained in Warsaw Pact
- K tried to force Gomulka to back down - eventually
relented when he realised strength of movement
- Reform in Poland was significant- showed
clear divisions in comm world
- until 1953 - Cold war has been struggle between superpowers
- Events in Poland showed that there was an
internal struggle in the communist camp
- K had been forces to compromise with Polish -
moreover Mao publicly supported the Poles
- K's position clearly weaker in 56 than Stalin's had been in 53 so
his position in Cold war was compromised
- K's position clearly weaker in 56 than Stalin's had been in 53 so
his position in Cold war was compromised
- K had been forces to compromise with Polish -
moreover Mao publicly supported the Poles
- Events in Poland showed that there was an
internal struggle in the communist camp
- until 1953 - Cold war has been struggle between superpowers
- Death of Stalinist leader Beriut - Feb 1956 - sparked
increasing calls for liberalisation in Poland
- Hungary 1956
- July 1956 - anti-Stalinist communist, Nagy, became premier of Hungary
- Nagy's moderate policies failed to halt reform
demands, By late Oct people were calling for:
- multi-party democracy
- a free press
- Hungary to withdraw from
Warsaw pact
- multi-party democracy
- Nagy's moderate policies failed to halt reform
demands, By late Oct people were calling for:
- To keep up with popular mood - Nagy agreed to
the demands and declared Hungary neutral
- USSR saw this as act of open revolt
- 4 November - Red army tanks entered Budapest to reassert Soviet control
- By 11 Nov - Soviets had crushed uprising and 'nationalist' Kadar replaced Nagy
- Kadar's new govt reimposed comm control - arresting
35000 and executing 300 leaders of uprising
- Kadar's new govt reimposed comm control - arresting
35000 and executing 300 leaders of uprising
- By 11 Nov - Soviets had crushed uprising and 'nationalist' Kadar replaced Nagy
- 4 November - Red army tanks entered Budapest to reassert Soviet control
- USSR saw this as act of open revolt
- Hungary - like Poland, exposed problems with K's approach to Eastern Bloc
- K encouraged limited reform, but this lead to
demands that threatened to destroy the Eastern Bloc
- This exposed dictatorial nature of USSR control
- Hungary also exposed USA weakness
- Hungarians were encouraged through Radio Free Europe by
messages of support from Eisenhower
- People assumed that US would send assistance
- West refused to stop Red Army's brutal suppression of the rising
- Political and military realities meant that USA could
not intervene to protect Hungary
- Political and military realities meant that USA could
not intervene to protect Hungary
- West refused to stop Red Army's brutal suppression of the rising
- People assumed that US would send assistance
- Hungarians were encouraged through Radio Free Europe by
messages of support from Eisenhower
- Hungary also exposed USA weakness
- This exposed dictatorial nature of USSR control
- K encouraged limited reform, but this lead to
demands that threatened to destroy the Eastern Bloc
- July 1956 - anti-Stalinist communist, Nagy, became premier of Hungary
- Conclusion
- USSR responded differently to the Polish and Hungarian crises
- Poland - comm party stayed in control and
Gomulka gave pledges of loyalty to USSR
- Hungary - Comms lost control and Nagy's
decision to seek neutral status undermined the
USSR's defensive barrier in Eastern Europe
- Soviet military action in Hungary demonstrated USSR's
determination to preserve sphere of influence on its
Western borders
- After Hungary crisis, USSR concluded that USA was
unlikely to intervene in the 'Soviet' part of Europe
- After Hungary crisis, USSR concluded that USA was
unlikely to intervene in the 'Soviet' part of Europe
- Soviet military action in Hungary demonstrated USSR's
determination to preserve sphere of influence on its
Western borders
- Hungary - Comms lost control and Nagy's
decision to seek neutral status undermined the
USSR's defensive barrier in Eastern Europe
- Poland - comm party stayed in control and
Gomulka gave pledges of loyalty to USSR
- USSR responded differently to the Polish and Hungarian crises
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