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ToM essay
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- 1Premack and Woodruff (1978)The ability to impute mental states to one’s self and to others
- 2Wellman 1990belief desire reasoning framework
belief +desire =action
(also preference underlies desire emotions link all 3 etc) - 3Standard ToM tests = .... tasksFalse belief tasks > recognise others can have false beliefs
Test capacity for dual representation > 2 simultaneous representations of same thing - 4Standard ToM tests examplesUnexpected transfer (Sally-Anne test)
Deceptive box (smarties test) - 5LanguageWolfe et al 2002
Charman et al 2002
Kazak et al 1991 - 6Wolfe et al 2002Deaf children taught sign language develop ToM quicker than those without
- 7Charman et al 2002Girls develop ToM earlier
- 8Kazak et al 1991Autistic children's ToM abilities related to language abilities
- 9Theory theory accountse.g. Perner and Davies (1991)
ToM = new concept acquired around 4 years. Allows us to understand mind as a representational entity. Mind processes rather than copies > beliefs differ from reality. - 10The realism accountMitchell 1984
Gradual development, no conceptual shift. Realist tendency masks early abilities. - 11Evidence for realism accountFacilitation studies e.g.
Mitchell and Lacohee (1991): Posting procedure increase performance.
Deceptive box - post picture of expected contents before reveal of unexpected.
Less demand on WM - 12Evidence to counter facilitation studies and realism accountWellman et al (2001) meta analysis = improvement modest and not more extreme in younger kids.
- 13Development of understanding of mind 9 monthsBruner 1993 - pointing to direct attention
- 14Development of understanding of mind 18 monthspretend play
Leslie 1987 - 15Dev of An understanding of the mental-physical distinctionWatson et al, 1988
3yrs
When asked to consider a thought about a raisin ‘in the head’ versus a swallowed raisin in the stomach they realise that only the latter is physically IN the person - 16Belief-desire reasoning framework 18 month oldsRepacholi and Gopnik (1997)
18 month olds
Goldfish cracker and broccoli study This demonstrates an understanding of desires as subjective - 17Limitations to 2 year olds ToM abilitiesThey only understand pretence as distinguishable overt actions at this age (he’s pretending he’s a frog because he’s jumping like one)
·Understanding is not mentalistic (he’s THINKING he’s a frog and so is jumping like one) - 183 year oldsThey seem to understand the relationships between some of the concepts that underpin a belief-desire reasoning framework
- 193 yrs evidenceThey can predict emotional reactions on basis of desires (e.g. Stein and Levine, 1989) or beliefs (e.g. Hadwin and Perner, 1991)
- 20Naturalistic language researchhas revealed that pre-schoolers offer spontaneous;
Belief-desire explanations when asked to explain peoples actions (e.g. Bartsch and Wellman, 1989)
This suggests that children HAVE developed a causal-explanatory framework that allows them to explain and predict the actions of others - 21Domain-specific knowledge?If the development of children’s mind reading abilities IS domain-specific we would expect to find innate predispositions to ToM development
- 22DSK innate? NeonatesHave been found to prefer;
The facial configuration of their conspecifics (Johnson & Morton, 1988 & 1990) - 23DSK innate infants?Bruner (1975) -2 types of pointing;
Proto-imperative (request)
Proto-declarative (comment
Autistic children don’t display Proto-declarative pointing (Baron-Cohen,1989,) - 24Domain general PiagetPiaget claimed that reasoning about mental states was no different from reasoning about other things (D.G. view)
More recent researchers disagree; they suggest that ToM computations involve distinguishing between;
Propositional attitudes
Propositional contents - 25PA/PCPropositional contents describe things (rightly or wrongly) e.g. I can hear voices
Propositional attitudes express a mental state relationship with the prepositional content e.g. I think I can hear voices - 26Representing how PA’s relate to PC’s involvesMetarepresentation:
‘The representation of mental representations as mental representations ‘(Perner, 1988 - 27Leslie’s theory (1987)Metarepresentation specific to ToM. Innate ToM module. Pretend play involves 2 mental representations.
A secondary representation (SR) represents an attitude towards a primary representation (PR)
The SR is decoupled from the PR
This decoupling allows the child to treat the 2 representations differently
Neonates have an innately specified ToM module
This becomes operational at about 18 months as a result of maturational changes to the brain - 28Perner’s theory (1988, 1991) generallySees the development of a Tom as part of more general changes in children’s capacities for metarepresentation
domain general
some innate tendencies that depend upon environmental input.
Genie feral child
Morality - continuum
development into aulthood - 29Perner stage 1Neonate is equipped with an innate sensitivity to behavioural expressions of mental states
They don’t represent internal (mental) states (& therefore can’t relate these to behavioural expressions) - 30Stage 2Children progress from a behavioural theory of emotional states to a mentalistic one
They can hold 2 simultaneous representations of the same thing, however these are held separately in the form of 2 propositional contents (at the same level)
So metarepresentation is not involved
According to Perner pretence involves this level of understanding & therefore does not imply a ToM - 31Stage 3Children are capable of metarepresentation
This ability credits the child with a representational ToM
Children understand that people act on the basis of their mental states - 32Language development and LeslieLeslie argues that Language is not essential for ToM computations
Many researchers looking at the ToM abilities of primates agree (e.g. Premack, 1988)
However, many theorists disagree with purely nativist approaches and suggest that social factors play a role in ToM development - 33Autism extrasBaron-Cohen 1985 Sally-Anne
85 % typical correct
80% autistic fail
Peterson et al 2013 - candy motivation
74% autism passed
Chevallier et al 2014 - pc/researcher - 34Saxe 2003PET scans duirng false belief tasks - medial prefrontal cortex.
Right Temporal parietal Junction - transcranial magnetic stimulation 2006 - 35depression/schizophreniaLee et al 2005 - ToM decoding e.g. facial expressions, tone of voice. fucked by major depressive episode
Spring et al (2007)- meta analysis schizophrenia failure at false belief tasks - 36ChimpanzeesWrangham, Harvard
Ugandan chimps play with dolls
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- Guff Developmental Karteikarten am ToM essay, erstellt von James Rowland am 29/04/2016.
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