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Assess the view that Khrushchev gambled

with world peace during the 'Year of Crisis'.

1956 has been considered as a year of

crisis, as there were several incidents that occurred that some would argue

threatened world peace. These events,

such as the uprising in Hungary, the Suez crisis and the Poznan riots were all

potential triggers for confrontation or retaliation between the two

superpowers. Khrushchev’s response to

each of these events, it is argued did not threaten world peace overall,

however, it must be suggested that had the USA not reacted in its own way, this

may have not been so successful in preventing conflict.

Khrushchev did not gamble with world

peace in the Year of Crisis because of previous events that had occurred in

East Germany. In 1953, the East German workforce staged an uprising

against higher production targets with no compensation. This caused a

large-scale uprising that was crushed by the use of Soviet force. Due to

the recent events such as the Berlin Blockade and the creation of West and East

Germany, there was existing hostility between the Superpowers over the

territory of Germany. Furthermore, with

the USA following a clear policy of containment within the Truman doctrine, would

have been understandable if they had supported the East German workers.

However, apart from condemnation over the use of force, there was no

interference. This shows tacit

acceptance of the Soviet Sphere of Influence in Eastern Germany. Germany

was considerably more important than Poland, Hungary or the Suez in Egypt to

the USA. This illustrates that by not intervening with Germany they would

not interfere in any of the uprisings. This would, therefore, show that

Khrushchev was not gambling but taking a calculated risk so that the idea of

peaceful coexistence would exist whilst still remaining in control of the

satellite states.

One of the most important events that

happened in the year of crisis was the Hungarian uprising, that followed on

from the announcement of destalinisation in Khrushchev’s secret speech in

February 1956. After several months of

increasing political turmoil resulting in several changes in government,

Hungary experienced more freedom. However,

when Hungary decided it wanted to exit the Warsaw Pact, this was a freedom too

far for the Soviet Union. Khrushchev,

when he decided to sent the tanks into Hungary, did not gamble with world

peace. This is because just three months before the uprising in Hungary,

the British and the French had invaded the Suez Canal in the interest of their

economies. This meant that this invasion of another sovereign state and

use of force could be seen by the USSR as a sign that this sort of behaviour

was acceptable. Of course, the USA was outraged by Britain and France’s

decision to invade, as they were uninformed. This meant that the USA now

lost all moral high ground on the issues over the use of force because Britain

its ally had used force to protect its own interest. As one historian

says, the Suez crisis could for the USSR ‘deflect world attention from their

own brutality in crushing the simultaneous Hungarian uprising’1. This was a very bad thing for

America because it was now associated with this aggressive action in Egypt and

therefore to take any kind of military action to defend democracy in Hungary

would be indefensible. It was therefore,

left with the only avenue of expressing its outrage in words not actions.

Therefore, it is argued that Khrushchev was not gambling with world

peace. Rather he was taking a calculated risk that he could be confident

that the USA would not interfere and cause a threat to World Peace.

On the other hand, however, Khrushchev

did take risks with world peace. The secret speech that he made in

February 1956 was, by the view of one historian, ‘an extraordinarily dangerous

and daring thing for Khrushchev to do‘2. Khrushchev distanced himself

from many of the actions that Stalin had taken, especially the purges and show

trials of the 1930s. He spoke about the

fact that many people had been imprisoned wrongly and that the Soviet Union was

there to work on everyone’s behalf. This

was a revelation to those listening as it appeared to be a signal of a break

with the past and a thawing of the oppressive nature of Stalinism. It was unclear what this ‘destalisnation’

meant in reality, and this was one of the gambles that it could be argued, Khrushchev

took, as his speech was open to interpretation. This was because they

couldn’t predict what would happen. Many loyal Stalinists were strongly

opposed to the idea. Therefore, many of the Communists left the meeting

in disgust of what Khrushchev had done. It alienated a great many people

and was a gamble with not only stability in the USSR but the whole Eastern Bloc

if they decided to interpret the speech as an indication of gaining some form

of independence. However although a risk it was unlikely the USA would do

anything at all regarding this speech, as it was clearly directed at the

members of the congress and was considered an internal Soviet matter. The USA, cautiously welcomed the apparent

thaw, in the speech in terms of moving away from Stalinism, but like everyone

else that heard the speech, it was unclear what this would actually mean in

practice. Therefore, it is suggested that

although it was a risk it was relatively low in the scheme of world peace

although civil unrest within the USSR and the eastern bloc was entirely

possible.

Overall, it is argued that that

Khrushchev did not gamble with world peace but took calculated risks ensuring

his control of the Eastern Bloc whilst also gaining new allies in the Middle

East. However, he did take risks with his secret speech because it was so

vague as to be widely interpreted. These risks, though substantial, were

unlikely to threaten world peace as the USA saw the speech as an internal

affair. However, in Hungary, where there appeared to be the

greatest chance of conflict between the Superpowers, it did not happen because

the USA, did not involve themselves as a result of the threats to their

economic interests in the Middle East as result of the Suez crisis.