184.108.40.206.1 Indirect realism claims that we perceive physical objects
which are mind-independent, but we do so via, or in virtue
of, perceiving mind-dependent sense-data that are caused
by and represent physical objects.
220.127.116.11.1.1 We perceive sense-data immediately, and physical objects
18.104.22.168.1.1.1 John Locke - primary (PQ) and
secondary qualities (SQ)
22.214.171.124.126.96.36.199 (SQ) Secondary
qualities exist due
to sense-data being
sensations in us by
188.8.131.52.184.108.40.206.1 Clolour, temperature,
220.127.116.11.18.104.22.168 (PQ) Primary qualities are
the properties an object
holds mind -independently
of perception, qualities
that exist despite our
presence. A primary
quality exists irrespective
of any changes made - the
primary qualities hold
these properties ‘in and of
22.214.171.124.126.96.36.199.1 extension, motion -
including rest, solidity etc.
188.8.131.52.184.108.40.206 ‘The tepid bowl’ - water has
one temp (M-I,PQ) but heats
(SQ) the perception of heat is
M-D. Our senses perceive SQ,
they’re M-D. PQ (eg extension)
exists in an of itself, it’s M-I.
220.127.116.11.18.104.22.168.1 Russell - IR sense-data and
22.214.171.124.126.96.36.199.1.1 Russell argues from an epistemological stance of indirect
realism; perception is achieved indirectly through
mind-dependent sense data. (This stands in opposition to the
view of direct realism: we perceive objects directly).
188.8.131.52.184.108.40.206.1.1.1 1. We have variations in our perception.
220.127.116.11.18.104.22.168.22.214.171.124 2. Our perception varies without corresponding
changes in the physical object we perceive. (eg the
desk remains rectangular, even if the way it
appears to me changes as I look at it from different
126.96.36.199.188.8.131.52.184.108.40.206.1 3. Therefore, the properties physical objects have,
and the properties they appear to have, are not
220.127.116.11.18.104.22.168.22.214.171.124.1.1 4. Therefore, what we are immediately aware of
in perception is not exactly the same as what
exists independently of our minds.
126.96.36.199.188.8.131.52.184.108.40.206.1.1.1 5. Therefore, we don’t perceive objects directly.
220.127.116.11.18.104.22.168.22.214.171.124.126.96.36.199.1 1) leads to
nature of the
188.8.131.52.184.108.40.206.220.127.116.11.18.104.22.168.1.1 IR argues that a mind
independent world causes
mind dependent sense data
(e.g. PQ/SQ). But sense data
differs from perceiver to
perceiver. So, who's right about
the nature of the MI world?
Well, the skeptic argues no one
is right: we cannot know what
the world is like, I can only
know my sense data.
22.214.171.124.126.96.36.199.188.8.131.52.184.108.40.206.2 2) leads to scepticism about the
existence of the external world
220.127.116.11.18.104.22.168.22.214.171.124.126.96.36.199.2.1 can we ever know the source
of sense data? How can I
prove an object and it's
properties really caused my
perception? Every attempt
will just be more sense data,
never it's supposed source.
188.8.131.52.2 Berkeley - idealism
184.108.40.206.2.1 If one were to apply Locke’s arguments against the
mind independence of the SQ to PQ, one would be a
220.127.116.11.2.1.1 1. ‘The Master Argument’: Nothing can exist unperceived, esse is
percipi. (A tree for example, one cannot imagine a tree without it
being perceived - because wherever we imagine a tree we
imagine it from the point of view from some perceived. It is
impossible to imagine a tree from no perceiver's point of view.)
18.104.22.168.22.214.171.124 2. God perceives all.
126.96.36.199.188.8.131.52.1 Rejecting Idealism:
184.108.40.206.220.127.116.11.1.1 God's role in perception is questionable.
18.104.22.168.22.214.171.124.1.1.1 The claim that everything I perceive is
mind dependent leads to the conclusion
that all that exists is my own experience.
It gives me no reason to believe that
anything other than my own mind exists,
as all I perceive are Ideas.
126.96.36.199 All objects of perception are M-I and
are perceived directly; it obeys
188.8.131.52.1 (eg the reason I see the sky
to be blue is because the sky
possesses the property ‘blue’
which causes my perception to
have the same property.)
184.108.40.206.1.1 Arguments against DR:
220.127.116.11.1.1.1 1) Russell's perceptual variation
18.104.22.168.22.214.171.124 2) Argument from illusion
126.96.36.199.188.8.131.52.1 (The crooked oar.) Rather than directly
perceiving the stick, which would entail our
seeing it as it truly is, we must instead perceive it
indirectly, by way of an image or "sense-datum".
184.108.40.206.220.127.116.11.1.1 This mental representation does not tell us anything
about the stick's true properties, which remain
inaccessible to us. With this being the case,
however, how can we be said to be certain of the
stick's initial straightness?
18.104.22.168.22.214.171.124.1.1.1 If all we perceive is sense-data then the stick's
apparent initial straightness is just as likely to be
false as its half-submerged bent appearance.
Therefore, the argument runs, we can never gain
any knowledge about the stick, as we only ever
perceive a sense-datum, and not the stick itself.
126.96.36.199.188.8.131.52.184.108.40.206 3) Argument from Hallucination
220.127.116.11.18.104.22.168.22.214.171.124.1 1. We perceive something as having a property.; we
perceive this property so there must be a physical
object that has this property.
126.96.36.199.188.8.131.52.184.108.40.206.1.1 2. In a hallucination, we do not perceive a physical
object at all.
220.127.116.11.18.104.22.168.22.214.171.124.1.1.1 3. Therefore, what we perceive exists only in
the mind- sense data.
126.96.36.199.188.8.131.52.184.108.40.206.220.127.116.11 4. So, we perceive sense data in both
hallucinations and veridical perception.
18.104.22.168.22.214.171.124.126.96.36.199.188.8.131.52.1 5. Therefore, we only ever perceive sense
data immediately- not the physical objects.
184.108.40.206.220.127.116.11.18.104.22.168.22.214.171.124.1.1 6. Therefore, direct realism is false. We cannot
distinguish between empirical reality and
126.96.36.199.188.8.131.52.184.108.40.206.220.127.116.11.1.1.1 3) Time-lag
18.104.22.168.22.214.171.124.126.96.36.199.188.8.131.52.184.108.40.206 1. Visible light from our sun bounces off objects of perception and
strikes our retina, this is human perception as DR understand it.
220.127.116.11.18.104.22.168.22.214.171.124.126.96.36.199.188.8.131.52.1 2. Light from the sun is delayed by aprox 8 minutes.
184.108.40.206.220.127.116.11.18.104.22.168.22.214.171.124.126.96.36.199.1.1 3. Therefore we do not percieve the light immediatly.
188.8.131.52.184.108.40.206.220.127.116.11.18.104.22.168.22.214.171.124.1.1.1 4. Therefore, we do not percieve objects directly.
1.1.2 I. Perception
126.96.36.199 II. Knowledge
188.8.131.52.1 Justified True Belief
184.108.40.206.1.1 There are three components to the
traditional (“tripartite”) analysis of
knowledge. According to this analysis,
justified, true belief is necessary and
sufficient for knowledge.
220.127.116.11.1.1.1 The Tripartite Analysis of
18.104.22.168.22.214.171.124 S knows that p iff
126.96.36.199.188.8.131.52.1 i. p is
184.108.40.206.220.127.116.11.1.1 ii. S believes that
18.104.22.168.22.214.171.124.1.1.1 iii. S is justified in
believing that p.
126.96.36.199.1.1.2 But is it always sufficiant for
188.8.131.52.184.108.40.206 Edmund Gettier - 'a Gettier case'
220.127.116.11.18.104.22.168.1 Where one has JTB but fails to have knowledge
22.214.171.124.126.96.36.199.1.1 Case study one:
188.8.131.52.184.108.40.206.1.1.1 The case’s protagonist is Smith. He and Jones have applied for a
particular job. But Smith has been told by the company president that
Jones will win the job.
220.127.116.11.18.104.22.168.22.214.171.124 Smith combines that testimony with his observational evidence of there
being ten coins in Jones’s pocket. (He had counted them himself — an odd
but imaginable circumstance.) And he proceeds to infer that whoever will
get the job has ten coins in their pocket.
126.96.36.199.188.8.131.52.184.108.40.206.1 Notice that Smith is not thereby guessing. On the contrary; his belief b
enjoys a reasonable amount of justificatory support. There is the company
president’s testimony; there is Smith’s observation of the coins in Jones’s
pocket; and there is Smith’s proceeding to infer belief b carefully and
sensibly from that other evidence. Belief b is thereby at least fairly well
justified — supported by evidence which is good in a reasonably normal way.
As it happens, too, belief b is true — although not in the way in which Smith
was expecting it to be true. For it is Smith who will get the job, and Smith
himself has ten coins in his pocket.
220.127.116.11.18.104.22.168.22.214.171.124.1.1 These two facts combine to make his belief b true. Nevertheless, neither of
those facts is something that, on its own, was known by Smith. Is his belief b
therefore not knowledge? In other words, does Smith fail to know that the
person who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket? Surely so (thought
126.96.36.199.188.8.131.52.184.108.40.206.1.1.1 It contains a belief which is true and justified — but which is not knowledge. And if
that is an accurate reading of the case, then JTB is false. Case I would show that it is
possible for a belief to be true and justified without being knowledge. Case I would
have established that the combination of truth, belief, and justification does not
entail the presence of knowledge. In that sense, a belief’s being true and justified
would not be sufficient for its being knowledge.
220.127.116.11.18.104.22.168.22.214.171.124.126.96.36.199.188.8.131.52.184.108.40.206.1.1 A synthetic proposition is
one that is not analytic,
i.e. it is true not in virtue
of the meanings of the
words, but in virtue of the
way the world is
220.127.116.11.18.104.22.168.22.214.171.124.126.96.36.199.188.8.131.52.184.108.40.206.220.127.116.11 if a proposition is not
made true through logic
or meaning; it can only
be established by sense
18.104.22.168.22.214.171.124.126.96.36.199.188.8.131.52.184.108.40.206.220.127.116.11.6 Contingent and Necessary
18.104.22.168.22.214.171.124.126.96.36.199.188.8.131.52.184.108.40.206.220.127.116.11.6.1 A truth represents a true statement
whose negation must imply a
contradiction in reality, such that the
negation would be impossible
18.104.22.168.22.214.171.124.126.96.36.199.188.8.131.52.184.108.40.206.220.127.116.11.6.2 A contingent truth, or falsehood, concerns
something that could have been otherwise. A
proposition that expresses a contingent truth
can be rationally denied without resulting in
18.104.22.168.22.214.171.124.126.96.36.199.188.8.131.52.184.108.40.206.220.127.116.11.7 See Diagram
18.104.22.168.22.214.171.124.126.96.36.199.188.8.131.52.2.1 Instead of destroying JTB, it
attempts to preserve it by
improving the J.
184.108.40.206.220.127.116.11.18.104.22.168.22.214.171.124.2.1.1 It does this by:
126.96.36.199.188.8.131.52.184.108.40.206.220.127.116.11.18.104.22.168 s believes p;
22.214.171.124.126.96.36.199.188.8.131.52.184.108.40.206.220.127.116.11.1 p is true;
18.104.22.168.22.214.171.124.126.96.36.199.188.8.131.52.184.108.40.206.1.1 s is justified in believing p IFF s can't
be mistaken, thus your J results in
220.127.116.11.18.104.22.168.22.214.171.124.126.96.36.199.188.8.131.52.1.1.1 Flaws in infallibilism:
184.108.40.206.220.127.116.11.18.104.22.168.22.214.171.124.126.96.36.199.188.8.131.52 1. It ends in very little knowledge
184.108.40.206.220.127.116.11.18.104.22.168.22.214.171.124.126.96.36.199.188.8.131.52.1 To say you know something you
have to be ultimately certain,
which results in little 'knowledge'
184.108.40.206.220.127.116.11.18.104.22.168.22.214.171.124.126.96.36.199.188.8.131.52 2. If you think you know
something you also
believe you are certian
184.108.40.206.220.127.116.11.18.104.22.168.22.214.171.124.126.96.36.199.188.8.131.52 3. People want to
say 'I know' but can't
with this theory.
184.108.40.206.220.127.116.11.18.104.22.168.22.214.171.124.126.96.36.199.188.8.131.52.1 So, humans want to be able to
say they know something but
this theory leave very little to
184.108.40.206.220.127.116.11.18.104.22.168.22.214.171.124.126.96.36.199.188.8.131.52 4. Only super human epistemology
works, as only superhuman
knowledge (beings) can be certain.
184.108.40.206.220.127.116.11.18.104.22.168.22.214.171.124.3.1 Reliabilism claims that you know that p if
126.96.36.199.188.8.131.52.184.108.40.206.220.127.116.11.3.1.1 p is true;
18.104.22.168.22.214.171.124.126.96.36.199.188.8.131.52.184.108.40.206 you believe that p;
220.127.116.11.18.104.22.168.22.214.171.124.126.96.36.199.188.8.131.52.1 your belief is caused by a
reliable cognitive process.
184.108.40.206.220.127.116.11.18.104.22.168.22.214.171.124.3.1.2 Disadvantages: 1. Reliable
methods can easily lead to
falsehoods. (ie: 'I saw a dragon,
therefore it's real')
126.96.36.199.188.8.131.52.184.108.40.206.220.127.116.11.18.104.22.168 Advantage: of reliabilism is that
it 1. allows young children and
animals to have knowledge.
22.214.171.124.126.96.36.199.188.8.131.52.184.108.40.206.220.127.116.11.1 2. It allows for knowledge to
become broad in terms of how
much we can be certain of
18.104.22.168.22.214.171.124.126.96.36.199.188.8.131.52.184.108.40.206 2. Justification can often be
explanatory, it destroys JTB by
taking out the justification, but
reliable methods don't always
tell you why, how or when
220.127.116.11.18.104.22.168.22.214.171.124.126.96.36.199.188.8.131.52.1 3. You can just as easily
believe a false proposition as
a true one, due to the lack of