Flashcards
theory of mind
Cards in this deck (40)
- 1definitionThe ability to impute mental states to one’s self and to others’ - Premack and Woodruff (1978)
- 2The belief-desire reasoning framework (Wellman,1990)Beliefs
Desires
Actions
To explain any of these we need to refer to the other two things - 3belief-desire framework assumes that people engage in actions becausethey believe that it will satisfy their desires
This conception of what constitutes a causal-explanatory framework capable of explaining and predicting the actions of other’s is generally accepted (but not by everyone – simulation account, Harris,1991) - 4problems with belief desire frameworkPreferences (which underlie desires)
Perceptual experiences (that underlie our beliefs)
Emotional reactions (result from actions, beliefs and perceptions etc)
So;
Psychological reasoning involves a coherent system of mental-state constructs in which all of the aforementioned concepts are causally intertwined - 5Standard ToM testsDeceptive box task -Perner et al (1987)
‘Unexpected transfer test’ - Wimmer and Perner (1983)
The A/R task - Flavell et al (1983)
Performance on the aforementioned tasks is correlated - Astington and Gopnik (1988)(Same underlying mechanism? )
All of the standard ‘theory of mind’ tasks require the ability to hold 2 simultaneous representations of the same thing;
Reality
An alternative representation of reality
This is known as the capacity for dual representation - 6Individual differencesOverlooked in ToM task studies
Cross-culturally passed between 3 and 6
Suggests some innate constraints on development
Some social factors affect development;
Interaction with adults (Lewis et al, 1996)
Sibling relationships (Ruffman et al, 1998) - 7why would language and TOM be related?Wolfe et al (2002) –Deaf children exposed to sign language from birth developed ToM earlier than those who weren’t
Charman et al (2002) – Girls pass ToM tasks earlier and are more advanced linguistically
Dunn et al (1991) –Correlation between mothers talk about feelings at 33mo’s and the age Tom Tasks are passed - 8Why are beliefs so difficult to understand?Children think that information in the mind is a direct copy of reality (Wimmer et al, 1988)
-3 year olds don’t understand the relationship between seeing and knowing (Box study)
-Once this is understood children over apply the rule (deny knowledge can be obtained in any way other than seeing)
-Can make transferative inferences but don’t acknowledge that others can (Sodian and Wimmer, 1987) - 9‘Theory theory’ accounts (e.g. Perner and Davies, 1991)-Children acquire a new concept at around 4 years of age: a ‘theory of mind’
-This allows them to understand the mind as a representational entity
-Children come to understand that the mind PROCESSES information rather than just COPYING it
-The understanding that the mind processes information leads to the understanding that beliefs can differ from reality (beliefs can be counterfactual)
-Prior to the age of about 4 years, children are labelled realists by ‘theory’ theorists as a result of their tendency to report reality by default when questioned about counterfactual representations
-A conception of mind such is said to be constructed during early childhood, following the integration of new concepts into existing conceptual frameworks - 10The realism account (Mitchell - 1984)-Children have an understanding of the interpretative nature of minds before the age of 4
- No CONCEPTUAL SHIFT in children’s understanding of minds occurs; at 4 or at any age- children’s understanding of mind develops gradually
-Young children’s early abilities in this area are masked by a REALIST TENDENCY
-With development this bias towards reality decreases gradually, resulting in the ability to attend to an alternative representation of reality rather than reality itself when appropriate
-Children under the age of 4 years can acknowledge false beliefs when the contexts in which they are required to do so are more favourable than are those provided by the standard false belief task because they do not lack a concept of beliefs
-Childhood realism is an excessive reality orientation rather than a problem with the concept of beliefs as is proposed by the ‘theory’ theory
-Realism is a phenomenon in it’s own right, rather than a default response given when appropriate conceptual frameworks are not available - 11Research evidence: Facilitation studiesMitchell and Lacohee (1991): Posting procedure
They enhanced the salience of the child’s initial false belief in the deceptive box task by asking the child to select and post a picture of the expected content of the Smarties tube before the unexpected content of pencils was revealed
This improved performance - 12Research evidence: Facilitation studiesRobinson and Mitchell (1995) : Twins version of unexpected transfer
Explaining behaviour based upon false beliefs was found to be easier than predicting it
Argued that the behaviour demonstrated by the protagonist acted as a physical counterpart to their false belief, in the same way as the picture in Mitchell and Lacohee’s posting procedure - 13Research evidence: Facilitation studiesSteverson (1996)
Found that while children of below the age of 4 can be induced to acknowledge false belief if assisted, children of 5 and 6 can fail to acknowledge false beliefs if hindered. - 14Situation SpecificityTask demands affect ToM performance
The more perceptual support for a representation that contradicts reality, the more likely a child is to refer to it when answering test questions
Evidence?
This supports the realist account - 15Factors that affect ToM task performance-Passing ToM tasks requires more than a ToM (Bloom and German, 2000)
-WM/ Info. Processing abilities
-Perceptual support for representations reduces demands on WM
-WM limitations rather than a realist bias could mask early ToM competencies
-Executive function is likely to play a large part - 16Reasoning and ToMTom tasks involve reasoning
We have already seen (refer to P-S lectures) that reasoning with counterfactual representations is especially difficult for young children
As WM/ executive function abilities increase children resist making realist errors
What determines executive function development? - 17conclusions so farChildren’s understanding of Mind develops rapidly during early childhood
Performance on tasks that require the ability to hold 2 simultaneous/conflicting representations is effected by the nature of the task
This suggests a gradual development rather than a conceptual shift
It also suggests that other developments affect development
However, this still leaves the question of when a child’s understanding of mind is sufficient for it to be considered ‘theoretical’ (a theory is used to explain and predict the actions of others) - 18The development of an Understanding of Mind 9 monthsAt 9 months children use pointing to direct people’s attention (Bruner, 1993)
- 19The development of an Understanding of Mind 18 monthsinfants demonstrate sensitivity to other peoples’ line of sight as Baldwin (1993)
At around the same age children engage in pretend play (Leslie, 1987) - 20The development of an Understanding of Mind 3 yrsare capable of deception (Lewis et al, 1989)
- 21An understanding of the mental-physical distinctionVery young children do not understand this distinction and thus conceive of minds in the same way as they conceive of physical entities – until about 3
Evidence;
They realise that someone who has a dog can play with the dog whereas someone who is thinking about one cannot (Harris et al, 1991)
When asked to consider a thought about a raisin ‘in the head’ versus a swallowed raisin in the stomach they realise that only the latter is physically IN the person (Watson et al, 1988)
Children also appear to understand the subjectivity of thoughts at around this age (Wellman et al, 1996) - 22But do these abilities constitute a ToM ?no
Mental states provide the causes and explanations for a person’s actions and experiences
This causal-explanatory framework has been characterised as a belief-desire reasoning framework (e.g. Fodor, 1987 and Wellman, 1990) - 232 year oldsThey seem to have a basic understanding of some of these concepts
-Understand that people may have different emotions (eg. Denham, 1986)
-Understand that people may have different desires for the same object (e.g. Wellman and Wolley, 1990)
-Spontaneously use different words to refer to peoples internal states and their external behaviours , physical features and facial expressions (e.g. Bartsch and Wellman, 1995) - 24Repacholi and Gopnik (1997)18 month olds
Goldfish cracker and broccoli study This demonstrates an understanding of desires as subjective - 25Meltzoff (1995)18 month olds demonstrated an understanding of intentions when they imitated a models intended actions rather than the action the model had actually performed
- 26Harris and Kavanaugh, 1993By 2 ½ years children use the term ‘pretend’ in their spontaneous utterances and show that they understand that others’ pretend actions are not real
- 27Limitations to 2 year olds ToM abilitiesThey only understand pretence as distinguishable overt actions at this age (he’s pretending he’s a frog because he’s jumping like one)
·Understanding is not mentalistic (he’s THINKING he’s a frog and so is jumping like one)
Infants show a very basic understanding of some of the concepts involved in understanding other minds
However,
There is no evidence to suggest that that the concepts are inter-linked
This would be characteristic of theoretical understanding - 283 yr oldsThey can use information about what a person perceives to predict what / knows/believes (e.g. Pillow, 1989, Pratt and Bryant)
They can predict emotional reactions on basis of desires (e.g. Stein and Levine, 1989) or beliefs (e.g. Hadwin and Perner, 1991)
They understand that while physical forces are necessary to manipulate physical objects, thoughts are sufficient to manipulate mental objects (they can distinguish between the 2) (Wellman and Estes, 1989)
They are also capable of referring to the false beliefs of both themselves and others in some circumstances which suggests an understanding of the relationship between perception and beliefs - 294 yrscan complete all ToM tasks
-the child understands that a persons beliefs are different from reality
-That the child can use this understanding to generate casual explanations of a peoples mental states
-Just because children give mentalistic explanations in such tasks (which direct their attention to mentalistic concepts) it doesn’t mean that they will spontaneously use mentalistic concepts to explain and predict the actions of others - 30what suggests that children HAVE developed a causal-explanatory framework that allows them to explain and predict the actions of othersNaturalistic, language research has revealed that pre-schoolers offer spontaneous;
Belief-desire explanations when asked to explain peoples actions (e.g. Bartsch and Wellman, 1989)
Psychological explanations for emotional reactions Wellman and Banerjee, 1989) - 31Domain-specific knowledge?-If the development of children’s mind reading abilities IS domain-specific we would expect to find innate predispositions to ToM development
- 32dsk neonatesHave been found to prefer;
The facial configuration of their conspecifics (Johnson & Morton, 1988 & 1990)
Human voices over other sounds Klin (1988 & 1991)
So from birth humans are predisposed to preferentially attend to people
Autistic children do not show these attentional biases (preferences)
They do not distinguish between social and physical objects - 33infantsConsiderable ‘understanding of other’s minds’ e.g. Joint attention & pointing behaviour
Bruner (1975) -2 types of pointing;
Proto-imperative (request)
Proto-declarative (comment)
Do children have to understand mental states to use these devices? & if so what level of understanding do they require?
Autistic children don’t display Proto-declarative pointing (Baron-Cohen,1989,)
This suggests that;
ToM development gradually becomes more specialised
The Autistic child’s impairment is specific to the understanding of mental states - 34Propositional attitudes Propositional contents-Propositional contents describe things (rightly or wrongly) e.g. I can hear voices
-Propositional attitudes express a mental state relationship with the prepositional content e.g. I think I can hear voices - 35metarepresentations‘The representation of mental representations as mental representations ‘(Perner, 1988)
- 36Leslie’s theory (1987)Claims that pretend play involves
The ability to distinguish PA’s from PC’s & therefore Metarepresentation
His argument
2 mental representations are required for pretend play
These must be distinguished from one another & the relationship between the 2 understood
A secondary representation (SR) represents an attitude towards a primary representation (PR)
The SR is decoupled from the PR
This decoupling allows the child to treat the 2 representations differently
Neonates have an innately specified ToM module
This becomes operational at about 18 months as a result of maturational changes to the brain
No epigenetic change involved - 37Perner’s theory (1988, 1991)Sees the development of a Tom as part of more general changes in children’s capacities for metarepresentation
Stage 1
Neonate is equipped with an innate sensitivity to behavioural expressions of mental states
They don’t represent internal (mental) states (& therefore can’t relate these to behavioural expressions)
Stage 2
Children progress from a behavioural theory of emotional states to a mentalistic one
They can hold 2 simultaneous representations of the same thing, however these are held separately in the form of 2 propositional contents (at the same level)
So metarepresentation is not involved
According to Perner pretence involves this level of understanding & therefore does not imply a ToM
Stage 3
Children are capable of metarepresentation
This ability credits the child with a representational ToM
Children understand that people act on the basis of their mental states - 38Perner and LesliePerner draws a distinction between a 3 year olds mentalist theory of behaviour and a 4 year olds representational ToM
Leslie’s doesn’t
Leslie argues that metarepresentation is specific to ToM (domain specific)
Perner doesn’t (domain general)
Leslie proposes an innate module
Perner acknowledges innate tendencies but also domain general changes allow for the development of a ToM
These depend upon some environmental input - 39Leslie argues that Language is not essential for ToM computationsHowever, many theorists disagree with purely nativist approaches and suggest that social factors play a role in ToM development
E.g.?
Kazak et al (1991) - Autistic children’s ToM abilities are related to their language abilities
Zaitchik (1991) - Children can pass unexpected transfer tasks earlier (3) if they are shown the location of the hidden object rather than being told where it was hidden
Norris & Millan (1991) Children that pass standard Tom tasks (visual & verbal) have problems with non-verbal versions
So, Language must contribute to the development of a ToM - 40concToM Development is gradual
Both D-G and D-S abilities affect it’s development
This suggests that ToM development is not modular
Distinguishing between competing theories is difficult as they have different emphases and disagree as to what constitutes a THEORY of mind
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- Guff Developmental Flashcards on theory of mind, created by James Rowland on 02/04/2016.
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